

MAN, FAITH, AND RELIGION

in

BAVINCK, KUYPER, AND DOOYEWEERD

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN CANDIDACY

for

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LIST OF KEY TERMS

Note: Wherever possible the quotations in this paper are from available English translations of the Dutch texts. But since most of the works cited are not available in English, the writer has supplied his own translation where necessary. In such cases the original Dutch quotes have been included in the footnotes. However, certain key Dutch terms are retained throughout to avoid the loss of particular nuances intended by the authors, and to give an overview of the terminological similarities and differences between them. In addition, Greek and Latin words used by the authors are retained in the text.

CHAPTER I: HERMAN BAVINCK

Dutch: geest - spirit
geestelijk - spiritual
geloof - faith, belief
lichaam - body
stoffelijk - material
vermogen - ability, capacity, aptitude,
 faculty, disposition
ziel - soul

Greek: nous - mind (intellect)

CHAPTER 2: ABRAHAM KUYPER

Dutch: ik - ego, 'I', the self
lichaam - body
vermogen - capacity, faculty
(zelf) bewustzijn - (self) consciousness
(in the sense of self-
knowledge)
ziel - soul (understood as the whole of
psychē, man's spiritual substance)

Greek: pneuma - spirit
 ps̄ychē - soul, man's spiritual substance
 sarx - flesh (the material, physical)
 sōma - body

CHAPTER 3: HERMAN DOOYEWEERD

Dutch: ik (ziel) - the self, ego, heart
 lichamelijkheid - bodiliness (not 'the
 body', but the whole of
 man's temporal life
 expression)

INTRODUCTION

Within world-wide Christianity there reigns a bewildering confusion of tongues concerning the nature of faith, religion, and theology. It is generally customary in Christian circles to regard religion as (merely) one among many kinds of human interests and activities, and to limit its integration with these activities to a moral one. Furthermore, it is customary to use 'theology' as an umbrella term designating not only the 'I believe' which comes as an immediate response to being convicted of the truth of revelation, but also the worked-out, analytically rooted activity engaged in by theologians. Even if taken in its more limited or scientific sense, there is still a haze obscuring the nature of theology. Often a christian approach to any field of study is called the "theology of" that field. And even within the science of theology proper there is great confusion as to the nature of the field of investigation. Theology can be thought of as the 'study of God', or the study of theories of Christian doctrine, or of 'religious language', or of the whole range of what are considered to be 'religious' phenomena. Herman Dooyeweerd has pointed out that the many misconceptions concerning the nature of theology are directly related to misconceptions of the field or aspect of reality which theology deals with. And, in turn, the many misconceptions of this dimension of reality are related to the confusion concerning the nature of faith and religion. All of this highlights the fact that if our academic community is to make a meaningful contribution to unravelling some of this confusion, it is of paramount importance that we come to a deepened understanding concerning the existence, place, and role of what Dooyeweerd has called man's faith or pistical function. Dooyeweerd's key contribution in this area has been his stress on the faith or pistical function as one limited (but leading) aspect of all of reality, man included. Dooyeweerd has further emphasized that all man's functioning is religious in character, since it is all driven by his religiously-directive heart. Dooyeweerd's analysis provides the possibility of distinguishing theology, the scientific discipline analyzing the pistical dimension of reality, from faith

confession as a non-scientific activity. These groundbreaking contributions of Dooyeweerd ought not to be overlooked. However, any attempt to reap further benefits from these insights must be prepared to subject this approach to a thorough-going critique, in order to point out problem areas and suggest avenues for further development. This thesis is intended as a contribution to such an effort.

The work embodied in this paper had its beginning two years ago as an effort to deal with what the writer conceived to be certain problem areas within Dooyeweerd's understanding of man's religious heart and his faith function. In order to get a better grasp on the roots and context of these formulations, the focus of study was expanded to include an examination of the views of Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper, two christian thinkers who contributed most significantly to Dooyeweerd's understanding of pistis and religion. However, although this comparative study was interesting in itself, it lacked a framework within which the problems sensed by the writer in Dooyeweerd's formulations could be properly highlighted and related to the views of his predecessors. This framework came to the fore when the views concerning faith and religion of each of these three men were seen in the context of their respective views of man. A definite common pattern emerged in the anthropological frameworks of these men, and thus it became possible to see a common pattern (and common problem) in their respective understanding of the place of faith and religion in man. Consequently this study reached its present form. A separate chapter is given to the respective positions of Bavinck, Kuyper, and Dooyeweerd. Each chapter falls into two basic sections. First, an attempt is made to demonstrate that the view of man presented by each of these scholars follows a common pattern that can be called dichotomistic monarchian. The term 'monarchian' is here understood in the way in which D.H. Vollenhove developed its meaning in his investigation of recurring conceptual patterns in the history of philosophy.¹ As the name itself implies, this particular pattern involves the monarchial dominance by one 'element' in reality over the rest of reality. The further characteristics of this pattern will become clear as the study progresses. The second part of each chapter attempts to show how the respective formulations concerning faith and religion

relate to this anthropological pattern, and how this entails certain problems. The chapter on Dooyeweerd is concluded with an attempt to indicate avenues which could lead to further fruitful development of our understanding of these vital matters.

¹ D.H. Th. Vollenhoven, Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte (Amsterdam: THEJA, 1956), p. 18.

I

HERMAN BAVINCK (1854-1921)

I BAVINCK'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

(a) Two Substances in Man

Bavinck articulates his view of man in conscious opposition to what he calls the trichotomist position; in his opinion this conception was rooted in an unbiblical Platonic dualism and was therefore regularly and rightly rejected by the christian church. In similar fashion Bavinck rejects what he calls "materialism" and "spiritualism" as conceptions which make the error of recognizing only one substance in man. By contrast, Bavinck's view of man roots itself in the conviction that man "is fashioned not out of a single (substance), but out of two distinct substances,"¹ Although these substances can and should be "essentially (i.e., according to essence) distinguished"², and although he can say that he considers the Scriptural view of man to be (in a certain sense) definitely dualistic³, Bavinck is convinced that he has not lapsed into dualism, since in his opinion the two substances in man don't dualistically stand beside each other but are intimately "united."⁴ Indeed, as we shall see Bavinck expends a great deal of effort in trying to delineate this unity. However, we must keep in mind that no matter how great this stress on 'unification' might be, Bavinck can never get rid of his original duality. Thus he has from the beginning ruled out the possibility of truly grasping the unity of man. Indeed, his stress on 'unification' is typical of a dualist's attempt to introduce unity in a divided framework,

The two substances which Bavinck recognizes in man are the geestelijke (spiritual) and the stoffelijke (material). Man does not exhaust these two substance; rather, there is a "spiritual world" which stands beside a "material world."⁵ But in man "spiritual and material worlds are joined (locked) together."⁶ In man the stoffelijke component is called lichaam (body) while the geestelijke is called geest (spirit) or ziel (soul). Because these components are unified in man, he becomes the unifying factor (image of God) of created reality. "The whole world, . . . receives its unity, its goal, its crown in man."⁷ Man is the "oneness of the material and the spiritual world, the mirror of the universe, . . . mikrokosmos, and for that very reason (man is) also image and likeness of God."⁸

(b) Geest and Ziel

Since for Bavinck the fundamental concern is to achieve a unity in man between two distinct substances, he struggles to find some integrating factor that will allow him to give a more concrete account of this unity. To find this integrating factor, Bavinck introduces a further distinction in the geestelijke part of man so that he ends up with a "third" in man, which, although it remains geestelijke in substance, is yet distinguishable from man's geest (spirit) and is peculiarly adapted for bringing man's geest and lichaam (body) together. Thus, within man's geestelijke substance, Bavinck distinguishes between geest (spirit) and ziel (soul). He is quick to assert that there is no "wezenlijk" (i.e. essential, substantial) difference between these two. Rather, "spirit and soul refer to the same inner man, (but) looked at from different sides."⁹ "As spirit, man is related to the invisible (world), as soul (he is related) to the sensory world."¹⁰ Man is ziel because "his spiritual component, in distinction from that of the angels, is from the very first moment oriented to (i.e. designed for) a body; (it is) organized for a body."¹¹ Thus the ziel becomes that 'side' of man's geestelijke substance which indicates the intimate unity of man's geest and lichaam.¹²

In distinguishing ziel from geest Bavinck is attempting to give a quasi-structural account of the factor which unifies geest and lichaam by introducing a 'third' element in man while yet 'avoiding' the pit of trichotomy. Ziel becomes the ontologically distinguishable (though not distinct) part of man which serves as the buffer and link between geest and lichaam. As Bavinck strives to distinguish ziel and geest, something happens which we shall observe time and again within his conceptual pattern. The more Bavinck defines ziel as a structural component of man's being (i.e. ziel as the geestelijke substance adapted to the lichaam), the more nebulous and less substantial becomes his understanding of geest. Although the latter is something that man has as part of his being, it is not defined as a structural, substantial dimension, but gets the character of a (ruling, monarchical) directional principle. The geest is called "... the principle and the power, ... of life,"¹³ which is breathed from above.¹⁴ This tendency leads Bavinck to assert that man has a geest but is a ziel.¹⁵ In sections (d) and (e) below, we will observe further implications of this tendency.

(c) Hierarchy in Creation

It is especially in his account of the relationship of man's geest, ziel, and lichaam that Bavinck's monarchian framework comes to the fore. But since this inter-relationship in man is a reflection of inter-relationships in the created world as a whole, we would do well to observe the wider picture first. Although Bavinck sees the cosmos as an organism, he is convinced that there is a definite hierarchy among the creatures so that some stand in closer connection to God, the highest good, than others.¹⁶ Some creatures display God's qualities more than others. Similarly, some dimensions of man bear God's image more clearly than others.^{17a} Within the whole creation, at every point that which is 'higher' (i.e. standing closer to God, manifesting his qualities more clearly) becomes the unifying, organizing, ruling principle of that which is 'lower'. Thus the pattern emerges which has led Vollenhoven to characterize this conception as monarchian. According to Bavinck, the 'higher' rules over the 'lower' and has the latter as its field of expression. The relationship of God (the ultimate Monarch) to His creation is the archetype of all this. The whole diverse creation finds its ultimate unifying, ruling principle in God, the highest good. All of creation is the field of expression of the mind of God. "All creatures are embodiment of His Divine thoughts, and all (creatures) display vestigia Dei."^{17b} The embodiment of God's powerful thoughts comes to peak expression in man, who is the "object of God's most glorious deeds."¹⁸ Man is the most diverse creature of all, and just because

"man is organized in such a wondrously rich manner, he can, in the richest possible way, as it were from all sides, become conformed to and enjoy God, the highest good, in all his virtues and perfections."¹⁹

Thus, because man's concrete being displays the greatest degree of organization, his being reflects God, who has the entire creation as field for the organized expression of His thoughts. Therefore man, of all the creatures, shows himself to be most nearly "related to"²⁰ God, and therefore man becomes the unifying organizer (ruler) of the rest of creation.

(d) Hierarchy in Man

The relation of God to the creation (through man) becomes the archetype of the relation of the geestelijke and stoffelijke substances in man.

"Just as God, although he is pneuma (spirit), is yet the Creator of a material world which may be called his revelation and appearance, . . . so also the human spirit (Dutch: geest) is, as soul (Dutch: ziel), oriented to (i.e. designed for) the body (Dutch: lichaam) as its appearance (i.e. field of expression)."²¹

Man's stoffelijke component (lichaam) thus becomes the field of expression of the geestelijke component. The latter organizes and directs (rules over) the former. The geestelijke substance becomes the unifying power at work in the diversity of the lichaam. In all this the geest functions as the breathed-from-above "principle and power of life."²² The ziel (i.e. the geest 'organized' for union with the lichaam) functions as the "centrum" (centre) of man, the core of his "wezen" (being), the "seat and subject of life."²³ In the unification of ziel and lichaam the lichaam becomes the organ of the ziel.²⁴

"It is always the same soul (Dutch: ziel) which sees through the eye, thinks with the brain, grasps with the hand, and walks by means of the foot."²⁵

"The soul (Dutch: ziel) is the form, the motivating power, the principle of the body, and the body is the matter, the material, the possibility of the soul."²⁶

It is through the powerful dominance of the ziel, driven by the "breath of life from above"²⁷ that man's stoffelijke substance truly becomes human lichaam. Thus Bavinck vigorously grasps for integral unity in man by placing the two substances in a relation of monarchical dominance; the ziel dominates, rules over²⁸

and organizes the multiplicity of the lichaam. The lichaam becomes the (structural) object of the directive activity or power of the ziel. And, just as the geest, the higher part of man's geestelijke substance, seemed to lose its structural character when seen in relation to ziel, so the ziel, when seen as the higher structural principle in man in relation to the body, seems to give up its substantial, structural character as it becomes the directive principle in relation to the lichaam.

(e) The "Vermogens" and
"Organen" of the "Ziel"

In elaborating the means by which this hierarchical relationship is concretized, Bavinck deals with what he calls "the capacities (Dutch: vermogens) of man,"²⁹ These vermogens (powers, abilities) are rooted in the ziel. A vermogen is a "facultas, potentia"; it is nothing other than "a capacity, belonging to the soul (Dutch: ziel) by nature, for a soul (Dutch: psychische) activity."³⁰ The vermogens are thus 'faculties' or 'capabilities' which become the means of expression or embodiment (belichaming) of the power of the ziel. Since the ziel expresses itself in a multitude of vermogens or activities (werkzaamheden), the need arises for organization and unification. This need is met by the three organs of the ziel, which serve as channels through which the vermogens of the ziel are actualized.

The most fundamental of these organs is the heart.

"While the spirit (Dutch: geest) is the principle and the soul (Dutch: ziel) is the subject of life in man, the heart is, according to the Holy Scriptures, the organ for his life. It is in the first place the centre of his bodily life, but further, in a metaphorical sense it is the basis and source of all soul (Dutch: psychische) life, of emotions and passions, of desire and will, even of thinking and knowing."³¹

The heart is thus the central organ, through which all the vermogens are channeled. Out of the heart are all the issues of life.

"This life, which has its origin in the heart, then splits itself up into two streams. On the one hand, it is possible to distinguish that life which encompasses all impressions, senses, perceptions, observations, deliberations, thoughts, knowledge and wisdom. Particularly in its higher form, this life has the nous as organ and embodies itself in words or language. On the other hand, all emotions, passions, inclinations, affections, desires, and volitions have their origin in the heart. All of these must be led by the nous, and they are embodied in deeds."32

The organ for this second stream of life expressions is the will. There are thus three organs: the heart, the nous (mind) and the will.

These organs, which constitute an attempt to overcome the vagueness with respect to the nature and concrete operation of the ziel, are once again put in hierarchical relation to each other.³³ The heart is the highest of the three, giving shape to the other two. As might be expected, what the heart actually stands for (beyond being the 'central organ for life') is rather vague; here again the contentful contours of the ruling factor fade away and it comes to resemble a directive power. The other two organs are much more concrete. They stand in hierarchical relation, the nous controlling the will, and together they translate the power of the ziel into concrete activities within the area of man's bodiliness (Dutch: lichamlijkheid).

II BAVINCK'S VIEW OF FAITH AND RELIGION

(a) Religion and Its Principia

Keeping in mind the broader context of Bavinck's view of man, we turn now to a more specific examination of his formulations concerning faith and religion. Fundamental to Bavinck's understanding of man's faith is his conception of religion. The basic characteristic of religion is man's "sense of the existence of God and of his obligation to worship (God),"³⁴ In relation to man's creational make-up, religion is "natural, universal, and necessary."³⁵ Religion is

"an essential characteristic of human nature, so . . . inseparably tied in with it that although it (i.e. this essential characteristic) was devastated by sin, it could not be destroyed. Therefore religion is universal and has great power in life and history. Whether one wants to or not, one always comes up against a certain religious aptitude in man. One can give it various names: semen religionis, sensus divinitatis (Calvin), religious feeling (Schleiermacher, Opzoomer), faith (Hartmann), feeling for infinity (Tiele), etc., but it always comes down to a certain aptitude of human nature for awareness of the divine. . . ." ³⁶

Religion has the character of relating man, in an attitude of complete dependence, to what lies beyond his creaturely horizons. Even fallen man

"remains tied to the heavens. In the depth of his soul he lies firmly anchored to an invisible, supernatural world. In his heart he is a supernatural being; his reason and conscience, his thinking and willing, his wants and inclinations, are grounded in the eternal. And religion is the irrefutable evidence of this." ³⁷

In his analysis, Bavinck identifies three principia which are fundamental to an understanding of

religion. In the first place, God is "the principium essendi of all religion. Religion is only because God is and wants to be served by His creatures,"³⁸ God makes possible the two principia of religion proper, namely, the principium cognoscendi externum and the principium cognoscendi internum. Although both these principia are fundamental, the former, which for Bavinck is revelation, is especially correlated to the very nature of religion.

"(Religion) not only assumes that God exists, but also that in one way or another He reveals Himself and makes Himself known. All religions have this understanding of revelation . . . There is no religion without revelation; revelation is the necessary correlate of religion. . . Religion is by nature and origin a product of revelation."³⁹

This correlation of religion and revelation does not complete the picture, however. To prevent the impression that religion is completely oriented to the non-creaturely, without intimate connection with human nature, Bavinck draws attention to the principium internum of religion. As Bavinck puts it:

"Religion is not something that was added later through a separate creation or by means of the long road of evolution, but is immediately bound up in man's being created in the image of God. . . There is thus in man a certain faculty or aptitude for becoming aware of the divine which corresponds to God's objective revelation. God does not leave His work half undone. He does not only create the light, but also the eye to behold the light. The internal responds to the external."⁴⁰

Thus, corresponding to the religio objectiva (revelation), is a religio subjectiva, which is a ". . . habitus, a certain aptitude in man, which through the influence of religio objectiva proceeds to actus (cultus in- and externus). All men have such a habitus,"⁴¹ Religio subjectiva is thus a built-in dimension of

human 'nature', and as such it becomes the key element in our investigation of Bavinck's understanding of the place of faith within his view of man.

(b) Religio Subjectiva

Its Geloof Character

As already indicated, Bavinck uses the notion of religio subjectiva to underscore the fact that man has the

"capacity, aptitude, power, ability and the inclination, tendency and disposition to obtain some definite, certain, and indubitable knowledge of God; a knowledge gained in the normal course of development. . . , and arrived at in a natural way; i.e., without scholarly argumentation and reasoning."⁴²

Religio subjectiva is thus one of the faculties or vermogens of man's ziel.⁴³ Bavinck does not object to using the term innate for this ability, as long as this is not understood as having reference to innate ideas in man's mind which themselves become the source of his knowledge. The source (religio objectiva or revelation) always lies outside man. Religio subjectiva simply has reference to the vermogen in man which can answer to revelation; as such it is comparable to other human vermogens or functions, such as "intellect and reason, heart or conscience."⁴⁴ Religio subjectiva is not the

"source, out of which knowledge flows to him, (i.e., man) but the organ of the soul whereby he acknowledges the objective, self-sufficient truth; (it is) the pail with which he draws the living water from the fountain of God's Word."⁴⁵

Bavinck, however, does not consider it a sufficient characterization of religio subjectiva to simply draw attention to this "religious aptitude" of man. He gives two reasons. In the first place, this aptitude "never and nowhere occurs in a perfectly pure state or

without content";⁴⁶ secondly, because of sin this capacity is corrupted and in need of re-creation. As a result it becomes necessary to distinguish between christian and non-christian religion. With respect to non-christian religion it is important to note that sin and unbelief do not eliminate man's subjective religious faculty. Although this part of man's nature is "devastated" by sin, it is not "eradicated."⁴⁷ Under the influence of "impure religio objectiva" this faculty now brings forth idolatry.⁴⁸ This stress on the universality of religion and its roots in the structural make-up of man is certainly an important, groundbreaking insight. However, the full impact of this breakthrough is muffled by Bavinck's understanding of what it means that this 'aptitude' is "devastated" by sin. As we shall see, Bavinck argues in the direction that true religio subjectiva is found only in christian believers. This carries the implication that non-christian religio subjectiva, rather than being seen as the full human religious 'faculty' totally misdirected toward a false god, now becomes something less than religio subjectiva proper.

Bavinck's further delineation of the nature of (christian) religio subjectiva takes place within the context of an elaboration of the process of man's salvation in Jesus Christ. He begins by stressing the two-sided regeneration that is necessary in man's renewal. On the one hand, man's religious aptitude (vermogen) must be "re-born and re-newed."⁴⁹ But before this is possible, there must be renewal on the side of religio objectiva; it is a must that the latter "once again teach us to know God as He truly is."⁵⁰ When this true revelation comes to man, it does not ask for his psychic or analytic judgment; its authority calls for his subjection, no questions asked.⁵¹ On the religio subjectiva side the Holy Spirit grants man a renewed adequate religious aptitude so that he can once again appropriate true revelation.⁵² In the face of those who might accuse him of subjectivistically giving man too significant a role in salvation, Bavinck insists that only in and through this renewed religious 'faculty', which in his opinion the Scriptures call "geloof", can man come to know the truth of God's revelation. The knowledge obtained from revelation does not come into man's possession by some mysterious, unnatural means, but comes, like all knowledge, "... through (man's) consciousness in a way that is entirely natural, normal, human" because it comes through this

totally human Spirit-re-created aptitude.⁵³ But as if himself afraid of placing man too much in the forefront, Bavinck asserts that in regeneration the Holy Spirit becomes the principium internum of religion; i.e., the Holy Spirit takes the place of man's religious faculty or aptitude. Thus he ends up with God in man believing in God. And although 'after' the 'moment' of regeneration there again seems to be a truly human place for the religious aptitude, Bavinck more and more defines its structural character in terms of the content of the scriptural revelation to which it is oriented. Thus Bavinck asserts that "the central idea" of religio subjectiva is that of faith or geloof. Indeed, "the Scriptures stamp, . . . the religious disposition of the christian in relation to God and his revelation with the name 'faith'",⁵⁴ Geloof has two basic elements:

"in the first place that in relation to God and his revelation man is wholly receptive and totally dependent on God; and, secondly, that exactly through his acceptance of this dependence man comes to share in forgiveness, adoption as God's child, and salvation."⁵⁵

Geloof is described as not only "a sure and certain knowledge, (but also) a whole-hearted trust and total surrender to God, . . . and a personal appropriation of the promises, . . ."⁵⁶ Since geloof rests in the testimony of the Holy Scriptures, it can even be said of this aptitude, "that it does not arise spontaneously out of human nature."⁵⁷ Geloof has "a certainty of its own", much deeper and more firmly rooted than any other kind of certainty that man knows.⁵⁸

At this point the question ought to be raised whether the carefully delineated characteristics Bavinck attributes to geloof undermine his idea of regarding geloof as the principium cognoscendi internum of religion. It seems that the more Bavinck delineates man's religious aptitude in terms of christian belief, the more he threatens his insight that this aptitude is universal in character. He more and more defines this principium internum in terms of its content or 'activity' rather than in terms of the character of the aptitude itself. As already noted, Bavinck, although realizing the possibility of this aptitude-content distinction,

pleads for the fact that in actuality the geloof-aptitude never occurs without content.⁵⁹ True as this may be, the fact remains that in his approach this distinction is not only possible but, by definition, necessary. Bavinck's principia interna are by definition aptitudes or capacities for obtaining some content; they are thus by definition contentless. Content does not enter into consideration until the aptitude is activated. To characterize the aptitude in terms of its content is to violate its definition. For instance man's logos is the principium internum which, by appropriating the logos embodied in creatures (principium externum) gives rise to scientific knowledge.⁶⁰ The character of man's logos is not determined by looking at the characteristics of the scientific process. Similarly, the character of man's religious faculty (aptitude) or pail (as Bavinck called it)⁶¹ ought not to be determined by looking at the (Spirit-renewed) water in the pail, even if this water (i.e., faith knowledge or certainty) is, in Bavinck's words, innate or immediately given.⁶² In Bavinck's discussion we learn very little about the religious faculty as principium internum; it is only when Bavinck commences his discussion of the activity-side of this faculty, seen in terms of the New Testament idea of pistis, that we learn more. Herein we see that within his structuralist framework Bavinck can not properly account for the religious dynamic manifested in man's life. He seeks to overcome this shortcoming by structuralizing this religious direction; i.e., transforming one of man's components into a ruling, directive principle and defining the latter in terms of its content. In this way, Bavinck seeks to safeguard the universality of religio subjectiva and the uniqueness of (christian) geloof at the same time.

Any thorough evaluation of Bavinck's approach must critically question whether his 'aptitudes' or 'faculties' really capture the created character of man. These faculties seem by nature to be some kind of increased neutral platforms, common to christians and non-christians. In this conception, the whole question of normativity does not (should not) enter in until in their activities these faculties give rise to a certain content. The Cosmologic Philosophy has gone a step beyond these problematics by asserting that man has various functions (modes of expression) which are both in their 'make-up' and 'activity', i.e., structurally and directionally, normed or determined by God's Law, and are thus totally involved in obedience or disobedience to the Creator.

Its Place in Man

It is fundamentally important for our purposes to come to clarity concerning the place of religio subjectiva or geloof within Bavinck's view of man. We have seen that Bavinck described religio subjectiva as a 'facultas' or 'vermogen'. Earlier it was noted that each of man's many vermogens comes to expression through one of the three organs of the soul. And although, as we shall see, religio subjectiva tends to explode its characterization as a vermogen, it too stands connected to one of the organs, namely, the nous. Just as the nous has for example, the potential (vermogen) for observation, reflection, thought, knowledge, and wisdom, so it also has the capacity for religion, i.e., the appropriation of revelation leading to saving knowledge of God.⁶³

It is important to note that at this point Bavinck is taking a fundamental step toward recognizing that religion is rooted in man's very nature. He correctly sees that built-in to man's nature is the capacity that in concrete life calls him to come explicitly face to face with His Maker. However, within Bavinck's framework this religious disposition of man seems to be only a part of his nature. Bavinck fails to see that it is the very essence of man's whole nature to stand in a relationship of full-life religious service to God. As a result, Bavinck makes the mistake of limiting religion in toto to one human capacity, coming to expression through one (structurally conceived) limited organ of the soul (i.e., the nous).

But in simply critiquing the too-limited place thus given to man's religious nature we have not yet done full justice to Bavinck's position. For although he sees geloof as only one of several vermogens, and although geloof stands connected with (only) one of the organs (the nous), Bavinck's monarchian framework still allows him to give a 'central' (dominant) place to geloof. We must keep in mind that man's nous, the organ through which the higher vermogens of the ziel are channelled, stands hierarchically dominant with respect to man's concrete life expression. It therefore plays a controlling, directive role in the shaping of this (embodied) life expression. Among the vermogens coming to expression through the nous, geloof appears to be ranked as the highest (and therefore directionally dominant). Thus, within the context of Bavinck's monarchian

framework, the way is opened up for an ingeniously two-sided understanding of faith. On the one hand, geloof (and, with it, religion) is limited to one part (i.e., vermogen and organ) of man. In this sense, man's religious or faith vermogen stands on equal footing with all his other vermogens. On the other hand, however, the monarchian pattern allows Bavinck to give expression to the genuinely reformed emphasis on the all-encompassing, full-life scope of faith (and religion). Because of its place as the highest of man's vermogens, coming to expression through the dominating nous, religious faith becomes the hierarchical integrating and directive principle, the manifestation of the life-directing rule or power of man's geest. Thus Bavinck can assert: "In belief the whole man is involved, with his intellect, with his will, with his heart; (indeed), man in the kernel of his being."⁶⁴ When Bavinck focuses on geloof from this point of view, its scope seems to lie far beyond the other vermogens; although terms characteristic of the vermogens (such as 'knowing' or 'trusting') can be used to try to describe geloof, its essence defies delineation. Indeed, when it really comes down to it, geloof seems to be much more than a simple vermogen. This is evidenced by the fact that Bavinck at times drops the designation 'vermogen' and calls religio subjectiva an organ, seemingly parallel to intellect and heart.⁶⁵ But, more importantly, geloof is also characterized as the key directive principle in man. It is called a "wonderful and mysterious power" which roots much deeper in human nature than any other power.⁶⁶ The character of geloof begins to approach that of geest, the central, dominating power that expresses itself first through the heart.⁶⁷ Thus man's religio subjectiva or geloof is seen as a structural part of his make-up, but is at the same time described as a structure-dominating power, giving expression to what lies at the core of man.

In all Bavinck's deliberations concerning geloof (and, as we shall see, religion) this ambiguity concerning its character is evident. On the one hand geloof as the 'central' highest power in man has implications for all his other vermogens; on the other hand it stands beside the others on an equal structural basis. This is shown clearly, for instance, in Bavinck's discussion of geloof and certainty. Geloof gives rise to certainty; but there also seem to be other, apparently independent kinds of certainty. Bavinck speaks, for instance,

of "scientific" certainty (which is founded on a rational basis),⁶⁸ This certainty is then discussed on a plane with geloof certainty, as if the former were not ultimately grounded in the latter. But on the other hand, there is a sense in which geloof (and the certainty it brings) has an all-encompassing role. In all man's activities, Bavinck maintains, there is sense of

"believing in general, (which is) a very ordinary way of attaining knowledge and certainty. . . . Belief is the foundation of society, and the foundation of science. All certainty is finally founded in faith."⁶⁹

Under this sense of geloof Bavinck understands

"the immediate knowledge of principia; . . . the trust we have in ourselves, in our perception and our thinking, the acknowledgement of the objective existence of the external world; . . . the mutual trust on which the whole of human society is built; . . . all that which is done and known through intuition."⁷⁰

All of these examples Bavinck calls "analogies of religious belief";

"They have this in common with religious belief, (namely) that the knowledge (associated with them) is obtained immediately, (and) not through reflection, and that the certainty is not secondary to that which rests in consciousness."⁷¹

However, Bavinck quickly moves away from the universal implications of geloof to stress its very particular character. And, as already noted, he does so by defining its structure in terms of the content of God's revelation in Scripture.

The 'Dual' Sense of Religion

In order to round out our examination of Bavinck's position, we should take a closer look at what he says about the concrete workings of man's religio subjectiva. To do this, we must consider his understanding of religion. The latter has two sides. In the first place, the term 'religion' is used in a broad sense that encompasses all three principia of man's religious life, as we saw in II, (a) above. But, in the second place, religion refers more specifically to the full human side of religion, i.e., man's religio subjectiva and the activity that results when this aptitude or faculty is acted on by revelation. This diversity of usage is complicated by the fact that the ambiguity we noted with respect to the nature of religio subjectiva or geloof is also apparent with respect to religion. Although this ambiguity is again related to Bavinck's monarchian framework, we ought to realize that in formulating this position Bavinck truly tried to wrestle with and overcome what were to him the key problems of his age. One of Bavinck's strongest desires was to reverse the tendency of his age to turn theological study into comparative religion and philosophy of religion. Bavinck reacted strongly against any attempt to explain religion in purely historical or psychic terms.⁷² On the other hand, he rejected the idea that activities such as science and art can at bottom be derived (evolutionistically) from (all-encompassing primitive) religion. Over against these streams Bavinck stresses the (original) uniqueness of religion; indeed, he strongly resists any attempt to dissolve away the variety of human activity, insisting that this variety has its roots in needs and tendencies which are part of man's created nature.⁷³ But however important this insight into the colorful variety of human experience may be, in Bavinck's position it contributes to a tendency to tie religion to one part of man. This limitation is connected with Bavinck's failure to distinguish 'religion' in the limited sense of one of the colors of the spectrum of human functioning from the central religious heart of man which lies at the root of all the colors.

Bavinck's limiting of religion is most clearly evidenced in his discussion of it as something that, although different, stands beside or parallel to activities such as "sense perception", "science" and "art".⁷⁴ Strikingly strong is his parallel description

of science and religion, especially with respect to the matter of principia. "Just like science, religion has its own principia,"⁷⁵ This paralleling is apparently possible because both science and religion have to do with the attainment of knowledge. In science, man employs his logos (principium internum) to gain knowledge of intelligible things (principium externum). In religion, man's religious aptitude is applied toward the goal of knowledge of God and assurance of salvation. But Bavinck is also quick to stress the dissimilarities between religion and science. Since religion has to do not simply with the multiplication of knowledge but rather with eternal salvation and communion with God, he insists that

"In religion man is concerned with something totally different than in science or art. . . . (Religion) demands . . . a different source than science or art; it assumes a revelation,"⁷⁶

Thus religion and science are treated as parallel, almost independent phenomena which, because of their different sources (principia), aim for totally different goals. In relation to religion, science is one of the "other powers of culture",⁷⁷ powers which seem to have status and validity quite apart from religion. Bavinck carries this line of thinking further when he asserts that "man (is) not only a religious (being), but also a moral being,"⁷⁸ Within the contours of Bavinck's divided anthropology, religion is given a limited place.

This tendency to see religion as one 'power' among many does not, however, exhaust Bavinck's conception; there is another stream in his writings which stresses the centrality of religion. Oddly enough, this other mainline of his thinking comes to the fore in the context of his discussion of religion's contact with the 'other powers of culture'. In this context he understands religion as the central motivating force from which all life's 'powers' or activities have their being. The 'other powers' may be said to come into contact with religion because religion is the "inspiring (animating) element in all cultures. . . ." ⁷⁹

"Religion is more deeply rooted in human nature than any other power (capacity),"⁸⁰

"Religion is not confined to one of man's capacities, . . . , but (encompasses) the whole man, . . . The relation to God is one that is total and central."81

Religion makes use of all the soul's organs; the nous with its capacity for (rational) knowledge, 'normally' involved in science, but now directed at knowledge of God, the heart (now directed in fear and hope, sadness and joy, a sense of guilt and forgiveness before God), and the will (showing itself in acts of love and good works).⁸² Precisely because religion involves all these organs it comes into contact with the 'other powers of culture'.


"It (religion) encompasses the entire man, in his thinking, feeling and acting, in his whole life, everywhere and at all times. Nothing falls outside of religion. It extends its power over all of man and humanity, over family and society and state. It is the foundation of the true, the good, and the beautiful. It brings unity, coherence and life into the world and history. Religion is the source for science, morality, and art; and these return to religion to find rest, . . . What God is for the world, religion is for man."83

But the power of this conviction is short-circuited by Bavinck's anthropological framework. Indeed, in the very next paragraph Bavinck backs down from this strong sense of the centrality of religion. He now states that although "religion encompasses the entire man, . . . , science, morality and art are rooted in the various capacities of reason, will, and heart."⁸⁴ This implies a certain independence for these vermogens, 'before' they are taken up for the purpose of religion. And Bavinck explicitly states that although religion is "central", it has an "independence" with respect to all the other named capacities. Thus he comes to a unique and two-sided formulation: "Religion assumes (takes) . . . a separate and independent, a unique and all-governing place (for itself)."⁸⁵ Thus religion becomes

something which, while it is central and all-ruling with respect to man's life, is at the same time very particular and independent, explicitly related to one particular human vermogen from which man's other vermogens are (up to a point) quite separate.⁸⁶

This confusion as to the nature and role of religion can be broken by making a proper distinction, first fully introduced years later by Dooyeweerd, between these two motives in Bavinck. Dooyeweerd distinguished the heart of man, i.e., the root of his humanity, from his concretely expressed functional diversity. Properly understood, religion has to do with this central heart of man; man is at heart a religious creature. Man's religious heart comes to expression in all his functional activity. Also in the concrete diversity of his life man remains a whole; he is always involved as man, in his religious wholeness, and thus cannot be divided into 'layers' with several separate faculties. Thus religion is truly "all-governing" in the sense that it encompasses the whole of man's life; science and the "other powers" are thus integrally religious in character. One of man's concrete religious functions can be designated as the 'pistical' or 'faith' function. This dimension of life calls man to make explicit the central religious orientation guiding his life. It is this side of human functioning that Bavinck tried to take account of with his limited (i.e., distinguishable from other faculties) notion of religion. But since Bavinck was as yet unable to make the heart-function (central-particular) distinction, he failed to see that his connecting of religion to one 'faculty' undermined the biblical confession of the totally religious character of man.

Schematic Diagram of Bavinck's
Anthropological Framework



FOOTNOTES

¹H. Bavinck, Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie, (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1920), p. 19. (Parenthesis mine). Dutch: "niet uit ééne enkele, maar uit twee onderscheidene substantiën gevormd is."

²Ibid., p. 21. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "wezenlijk onderscheiden,"

³Ibid., p. 19.

⁴Ibid., pp. 21 & 57. Dutch: "vereenigd".

⁵H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol. II, p. 500. Dutch: "geestelijke wereld" and "stoffelijke wereld,"

⁶Ibid., p. 543. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "sluiten de geestelijke en stoffelijke wereld zich saam,"

⁷Ibid., p. 604. Dutch: "De gansche wereld, . . . ontvangt haar eenheid, haar doel, haar kroon in den mensch."

⁸Ibid., (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "eenheid van de stoffelijke en de geestelijke wereld, de spiegel van het universum, . . . mikrokosmos, en juist daardoor ook beeld en gelijkenis Gods. . ."

⁹H. Bavinck, Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie, (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1920), p. 59. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "Geest en ziel duiden denzelfden innerlijken mensch aan, maar van een verschillende zijde bezien,"

¹⁰Ibid. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "Als geest is de mensch aan de onzienlijke, als ziel aan de zinlijke wereld verwant,"

¹¹H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol. II, p. 597). (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "Het geestelijke bestanddeel bij hem van het eerste ogenblik af, in onderscheiding van de engelen, op een lichaam is aangelegd, voor een lichaam is georganiseerd."

¹²Bavinck's dualistic framework causes a breakdown in this drive to see the ziel as the unifying factor in man when he asserts a certain independence of the ziel from the body (i.e., a sense in which the ziel is not the adaptation of geest to lichaam. Cf. H. Bavinck, Beginnelsen der Psychologie (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1923), p. 40.)

¹³H. Bavinck, Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1920), p. 58. Dutch: 'het beginsel en de kracht. . . des levens.'

¹⁴H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol. II, p. 597.

¹⁵H. Bavinck, Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie, (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1920), p. 58.

¹⁶H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol. II, p. 598.

^{17a}Ibid.

^{17b}Ibid., p. 604. Dutch: 'Alle schepselen zijn belichaming zijner Goddelijke gedachten en alle vertoonen zij verstigia Dei.'

¹⁸Ibid., p. 487. Dutch: 'voorwerp van God's heerlijkste daden.'

¹⁹Ibid., p. 598. Dutch: 'de mensch zoo wonderbaar rijk is georganiseerd, kan hij God als het hoogste goed, op de rijkste wijze, als het ware van alle zijden in al zijn deugden en volmaaktheden, gelijkvormig worden en genieten.'

²⁰Ibid., Dutch: 'verwant aan.'

²¹Ibid., p. 602. (parentheses mine). Dutch: 'Gelijk God, ofschoon pneuma zijnde, toch Schepper is van eene stoffelijke wereld, die zijne openbaring en verschijning heeten mag, . . . zoo is ook de geest des menschen als ziel op het lichaam als zijne verschijning aangelegd.'

²²Ibid., p. 597. Dutch: 'beginsel en kracht des levens.' Cf. also Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1920), p. 58, and Beginnelsen der Psychologie, p. 41.

- ²³Ibid., p. 598. Dutch: "zetel en subject des levens."
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 602.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 601. Dutch: "Het is altijd dezelfde ziel, die ziet door het oog, denkt door de hersenen, grijpt met de hand, wandelt met den voet."
- ²⁶H. Bavinck, Beginnelsen der Psychologie (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1923), p. 42. Dutch: "De ziel is de vorm, de bewegende kracht, het beginsel van het lichaam, en het lichaam is the stof, de materie, de mogelijkheid der ziel."
- ²⁷H. Bavinck, Bijbelsche en Religieuze Psychologie (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1920) p. 25. Dutch: "adem des levens van boven."
- ²⁸Cf. Ibid., p. 28. "de ziel beheerscht (het) lichaam." (parenthesis mine).
- ²⁹H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908) Vol. II, p. 598. (parenthesis mine) Dutch: "de vermogens van den mensch."
- ³⁰H. Bavinck, Beginnelsen der Psychologie (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1923) p. 53. (parenthesis mine) Dutch: "facultas, potentia", ". . . eene der ziel van nature eigene".
- ³¹H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908) Vol. II, p. 598. (parentheses mine). Dutch: "Terwijl de geest het beginsel en de ziel het subject des levens in den mensch is, is naar de H. Schrift het hart het orgaan voor zijn leven. Het is eerst centrum van het lichamelijk leven, maar dan voorts in overdrachtelijken zin grondslag en bron van alle psychische leven, van aandoeningen en hartstochten, van begeerte en wil, zelfs van denken en kennen."
- ³²Ibid. Dutch: "Dit leven, dat in het hart zijn oorsprong heeft, splitst zich dan in twee stroomen, Eenerzijds is dat leven te onderscheiden, hetwelk alle indrukken, beseffen, gewaarwordingen, waarnemingen, overleggingen, gedachten, kennis, wijsheid omvat, bepaaldelijk in zijn hoogereren vorm den nous tot orgaan heeft en in het woord, de taal zich belichaamt. En anderzijds nemen uit het hart al de aandoeningen, tochten,

driften, neigingen, genegenheden, begeerten en wilsbesselingen hun oorsprong, die door den nous moeten geleid worden en zich uiten in de daad."

³³Bavinck parallels the relation of the organs to the relation of the three Persons of the Trinity, "Gelijk de Vader aan de Zoon en de Geest het leven geeft en de Geest van de Vader uitgaat door den Zoon . . ." (H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Vol. II, p. 599; (emphasis mine)). If Bavinck were to consistently develop such a view of the Trinity, cast as it is within a monarchian framework of hierarchy, he would end up not far from one of the (monarchian) conceptions of the Trinity which the church struggled with and rejected in the third and fourth centuries. Cf. my "Three in One; One in Three", ICS, 1975.

³⁴H. Bavinck, Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1908), p. 120. Dutch: "Besef van het bestaan God's en van zijn plicht tot vereering."

³⁵H. Bavinck, The Doctrine of God. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), p. 44.

³⁶H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol I, pp. 288-9. Dutch: "eene wezenlijke eigenschap van de menselijke natuur, zoo. . . onafscheidelijk aan haar verbonden dat zij door de zonde wel is verwoest, maar niet uitgeroeid is kunnen worden. Daarom is de religie ook algemeen en heeft zij ook groote macht in het leven en de gescheidenis. Of men wil of niet, altijd stuit men tenslotte in den mensch op een zekere godsdienstigen aanleg. Men kan die verschillend noemen, semen religionis, sensus divinitatis (Calvijn), godsdienstige gevoel (Schleiermacher, Opzoomer), geloof (Hartmann), gevoel voor oneindigheid (Tiele) enz., maar altijd is het toch een zekere vatbaarheid van de menschelijke natuur, om het godelijke gewaar te worden. . . ."

³⁷H. Bavinck, Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1908) p. 120. Dutch: "Blijft aan den hemel gebonden; in het diepst van zijne ziel ligt hij aan eene wereld van onzienlijke, bovennatuurlijke dingen vast; in zijn hart is hij een supranatureel wezen; zijn rede en geweten, zijn denken en willen, zijne behoeften en genegenheden zijn in het eeuwige gegrond. En de godsdienst is daarvan het onweerlegbaar bewijs."

Cf. also pp. 135-6. Bavinck's words have a ring that recurs in Dooyeweerd's assertion that all man's functions are rooted in his supra-temporal heart, through which they have reference to the Origin.

³⁸H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol. I, p. 287. Dutch: "het principium essendi van alle religie. Er is godsdienst, alleen omdat God is en van schepselen gedient wil worden."

³⁹Ibid., p. 287-8 (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "(De religie) onderstelt niet alleen, dat God bestaat, maar ook dat Hij zich op de eene of andere wijze openbaart en kennen doet. Alle godsdiensten hebben dit begrip van openbaring. . . Er is geen religie zonder openbaring; openbaring is het noodwendig correlaat der religie. . . De religie is in haar wezen en oorsprong een product van openbaring." Cf. also Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), pp. 135-6, and The Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), p. 41.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 289-90. "De religie is er niet later bij gekomen door afzonderlijke schepping of in de langen weg der evolutie, maar ligt in het naar God's beeld geschapen zijn van de mensch vanzelf opgesloten . . . Aan de objectieve openbaring God's correspondeert dus in den mensch een zekere facultas, aptitudo zijner natuur, om het goddelijke op te merken. God doet geen half werk. Hij schept het licht niet alleen, maar ook het oog, om dat licht te aanschouwen. Aan het uitwendige beantwoordt het inwendige."

⁴¹Ibid., p. 244. This objective-subjective correlation reminds us strongly of the law-side subject-side correlation in Dooyeweerd. It is also noteworthy that for Dooyeweerd too the law-side of human pistical functioning is Word-revelation. Dutch: "habitus, een zekere aanleg in den mensch, welke door inwerking van de religio objectiva in actus (cultus in- en externus) overgaat. Zulk een habitus is er in iederen mensch."

⁴²H. Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), p. 58.

⁴³Cf. H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1908) Vol. II, p. 47 and I, p. 528.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 533 and 532. Dutch: "verstand of rede, hart, of geweten."

⁴⁵H. Bavinck, De Zekerheid des Geloofs (Kampen, 1932), p. 89. Dutch: "bron, waaruit de kennis hem toevloeit, maar het orgaan der ziel, waardoor hij de objectieve, in zichzelf rustende waarheid erkent, de emmer, waarmee hij uit de fontein van God's Woord het water des levens schept."

⁴⁶H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1908, Vol. I, p. 533. Dutch: "komt . . . nooit en nergens in volkomen zuiveren toestand en zonder inhoud voor;"

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 288. verwoest-devastated; uitgeroeid-eradicated.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 244. Dutch: "onzuivere religio-objectiva".

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 245. Dutch: "herboren en vernieuwd".

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 244. Dutch: "ons God weer kennen doe gelijk Hij werkelijk is."

⁵¹Ibid., p. 533. Dooyeweerd later emphasizes this same matter when he discusses the immediate relation of faith to revelation. Cf. A New Critique, II, pp. 303-4.

⁵²Ibid., p. 534.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 606. Dutch: "volkomen natuurlijk, normaal, menselijk."

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 246. Dutch: "het centrale begrip". "De Schrift bestempelt, . . . die religieuze gezindheid, welke de Christen tegenover God en zijne openbaring gevoelt, met den naam van geloof."

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 246-7. Dutch: "ten eerste dat de mensch tegenover God en zijne openbaring geheel receptief en volstrekt van God afhankelijk is, en ten andere, dat hij juist door erkenning dezer afhankelijkheid de vergeving, het kindschap, de zaligheid uit genade deelachtig wordt."

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 609. Dutch: "een vast en zeker weten, . . ." "een hartelijk vertrouwen op, een algeheele overgave aan God, . . . en eene persoonlijke toeëigening van de beloften, . . ."

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 611. Dutch: "dat het niet vanzelf opkomt uit de menschelijke natuur."

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 614. Dutch: "een eigen zekerheid"

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 533. This leaves the faculty as such rather nebulous. Cf. Doctrine of God, (Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1955), p. 60.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 290.

⁶¹Ibid., Cf. footnote 45 above.

⁶²Cf. The Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), p. 41ff, for a discussion of innate knowledge as distinct from acquired. Bavinck's whole discussion of belief as recounted above would be in the area of the innate, although he says that innate knowledge is at heart acquired, since it involves revelation. Cf. Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol. II, p. 50.

⁶³H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908) Vol. II, p. 47, Vol. I, p. 528.

⁶⁴H. Bavinck, De Zekerheid des Geloofs (Kampen, 1932), p. 84. Dutch: "bij het geloof is . . . de gansche mensch betrokken, met zijn verstand, met zijn wil, met zijn hart, de mensch in de kern van zijn wezen."

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 89, also Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1908) Vol. I, pp. 528 and 532.

⁶⁶H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1908) Vol. I, p. 531. Dutch: "wondere en geheimzinnige kracht."

⁶⁷Cf. H. Bavinck, Verzamelde Opstellen, (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1921, p. 14.

⁶⁸H. Bavinck, De Zekerheid des Geloofs (Kampen: 1932), p. 29. Dutch: "wetenschappelijke zekerheid . . ." "redelijke".

⁶⁹H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Box, 1908), Vol. I, p. 606. Dutch: "geloven in het algemeen. . ." is "een zeer gewoone weg, om tot kennis en zekerheid te komen. . . Geloof is de grondslag der maatschappij en het fundament der wetenschap. Alle zekerheid rust tenslotte in geloof."

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 607. Cf. De Zekerheid des Geloofs (Kampen: 1932), p. 26. Dutch: ". . . de onmiddellijke kennis der principia; . . . het vertrouwen op onzelf, op onze waarneming en ons denken, . . . de erkenning van het objectief bestaan der buitenwereld; . . . het onderling vertrouwen waarop heel de menselijke samenleving is gebouwd; . . . al datgene wat door intuïte geweten en gedaan wordt."

⁷¹Ibid., p. 608. This distinction of belief-proper and belief-in-general, along with the stress that both are integral to 'natural' human living, represents a fundamental, very important insight, which Dooyeweerd was able to refine. Belief-proper for him became the pistical mode of human experience (subject-side). His idea of analogical moments (anticipatory and retroci-patory), coupled with the idea of faith as the leading aspect, captures what Bavinck refers to as belief-in-general. Dutch: "zij hebben met het godsdienstig geloof dit gemeen, dat de kennis onmiddellijk, niet door nadenken wordt verkregen, en dat ze in zekerheid niets onderdoet. voor die, welke op bewustzijn rust."

⁷²Ibid., pp. 280 and 532.

⁷³Cf. Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1908), p. 122. Bavinck at this point foreshadows what became known in the Cosmonomic Philosophy as modal irreducability.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 176. Dutch: "zinnelijke waarneming", "wetenschap", "kunst".

⁷⁵H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Bos, 1908), Vol. I, P. 238. Dutch: "Evenals de wetenschap heeft ook de religie hare principia."

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 287-8. Dutch: "het is de mensch in de religie om iets gans anders te doen dan in wetenschap en kunst. . . . (De religie) eischt. . . een andere bron dan wetenschap en kunst; zij onderstelt eene open-baring. . ."

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 277. Dutch: "andere machten der cultuur".

⁷⁸H. Bavinck, Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1908, p. 122, (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "de mensch (is) niet alleen godsdienstig, maar ook een zedelijk wezen."

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 122. Dutch: "bezielende element van alle cultuur, . . ."

⁸⁰H. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J. H. Box, 1908), Vol. I, p. 531. (emphasis mine) Dutch: "de religie wortelt dieper in de menschelijke natuur dan eenige andere kracht."

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 276-7. Dutch: "De religie (is) niet tot één van's menschen vermogens beperkt. . . , maar (omvat) de ganschen mensch. . . De verhouding tot God is een totale en centrale."

⁸²Cf. Ibid., pp. 277-8. (emphasis mine). In his stress on the fact that all man's faculties are involved in religion, Bavinck is issuing a polemic against any attempt to explain religion in terms of one of its sides.

⁸³Ibid., (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "Ze (religie) omvat de ganschen mensch, in zijn denken, gevoelen en handelen, in zijn gansche leven, overal en ten alle tijde. Er valt niets buiten de religie. Zij breidt haar macht uit over heel de mensch en de menschheid, over gezin en maatschappij en staat. Zij is grondslag van het ware, het goede, en het schoone. Zij brengt eenheid, samenhang, leven in wereld en geschiedenis. Uit haar namenwetenschap, zede, en kunst haar oorsprong; tot haar keeren ze weer en vinden rust. . . Wat God voor de wereld is. dat is de religie voor den mensch."

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 278. In Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, p. 122, where Bavinck also asserts the central, "bezielend" character of religion, it becomes clear that he somewhat fears to emphasize this too much lest he fall into one of the traps of his age, namely, the idea that science, art, etc., evolved from a kind of cultically centered primitivie religion. Dutch: "religie omvat de gansche mensch. . . wetenschap, zede, kunst wortelen in de verschillende vermogens van verstand, wil, en gemoed."

⁸⁵Ibid., Dutch: (Religie) neemt, . . . eene eigene en zelfstandige, eene eenige en allesbeheerschende plaats in."

⁸⁶This last point is evidenced by the fact that the nature of science, etc. and their related human faculties are already determined before religion is even discussed. Cf. also the discussion of faith-certainty and other kinds of certainty, above.

II

ABRAHAM KUYPER (1837-1920)

I KUYPER'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

(a) Man's Place in the Hierarchy of Creation

Abraham Kuyper's understanding of the nature and structure of man is spelled out most clearly in the "Locus de Homine" of his Dictaten Dogmatiek. It is his avowed conviction that in his treatment of man he is not attempting to give an anthropology, since the focus of dogmatics implies certain limitations. As Kuyper puts it:

"to Dogmatics belongs only that which God has communicated concerning man. All that which results from experience, perception, or observation belongs to Anthropology; all that which results from the intimate communication of God concerning man constitutes the locus de Homine."¹

Kuyper is quick to add that this does not mean that Dogmatics focusses only on the relationship between God and man; the scope of what is revealed about man is much broader than that. It appears that in making the latter statement, Kuyper is opening the back door so that Dogmatics can indeed present an all-encompassing view of man. In Kuyper's subsequent presentation it at times becomes difficult to see the connection of his views with what 'God has communicated.'² The picture of man presented by Dogmatics becomes so complete that the task of Anthropology would seem to involve simply a (scientific) filling in of detail.

Kuyper commences his analysis with an account of how man fits into the whole scheme of created reality. The fundamental character of all that God created is that it is "not-God." This created reality

"is not all of one kind, but is either closer to God or further removed from Him. A piece of cold, hard granite is the furthest removed from God. One could almost say that it is without God; it consists of nothing but matter and in this matter all animation and movement is absent. God is the

centre, and if one conceives of the world as a periphery around Him, then the granite stone lies on the outermost circumference. Moving toward the centre, one would find the plant and animal realms consecutively closer to God. But after the creation all of this stood over against God, because it was not-God."³

Creation is thus the realm of diversity or multiplicity, conceived in terms of a hierarchy of being arranged concentrically around one God. But as yet this scheme lacks a link between God and "not-God"; this contact is established through God's image-bearer, man.

"Where God brings his image into the world there comes an end to absolute separation; where God, through his image, enters the world, the latter once again comes under God's dominion. Man thus functions as God's vice-regent, the link bringing the world into contact with God. . . ."4

It seems that apart from man, the world, even though it is a creation, has a certain independence and lack of connection with respect to God. Through man the divine Monarch is able to rule in such a way that He becomes the all in all. We must be careful to note that in making man the link between God and "not-God", Kuyper is not erasing the line between God as Creator and man as creature;⁵ man does not mystically participate in God's Being. Rather, man is simply that creature who by nature is susceptible to standing in a (faith) relationship with God. As God's servant, man is a reflector (shadow-image) in creation of God's dominance over creation.⁶ Man is "as it were the handle by which God grasps the world."⁷

The contours of this whole conception are, of course, strikingly parallel to those of Bavinck's view of reality as outlined in Chapter 1, I (c), above. In both cases the various 'realms' of creation are hierarchically related, and although all creation is the field of expression of God (who holds dominion over all), in both cases it is through man, the highest of His creatures, that God relates to and rules over (organizes) his creation.

(b) Two Substances in Man

For reasons very similar to those of Bavinck, Kuyper rejects out of hand any notion of trichotomy with respect to man. Scripture teaches

"dichotomy and rules out trichotomy. Trichotomy is of Platonic origin. It was taken out of pagan philosophy and carried into the Christian Church. Its advocates were mostly those who were later unmasked as heretics."⁸

As might be expected, Kuyper also takes distance from the Monists, among whom he distinguishes Materialists and Idealists.⁹ It is noteworthy that Kuyper's argument versus the trichotomists is much more vehement than that against the monists. Indeed, his rejection of trichotomy leads him straight to the portals of dualism. Kuyper writes:

"Every antithesis has two poles: good stands over against evil; beautiful stands over against ugly. It is not logically possible to conceive of a third pure, absolute element between these poles; it would have to be a mixture of the two. Standing over against one another in the same way are Creator and creature, spirit and matter, since God stands in absolute antithesis to all that which is not-God."¹⁰

This polarity reappears within man: "the antithesis should be between body and soul, and within that soul the distinction between the psychical and the pneumatical should be sought."¹¹ The interesting fact here is that although Kuyper vehemently rejects trichotomy, it is part of the very character of his position always to be introducing a (non-substantial) 'third', (as evidenced in the last quote) which serves as the factor for bringing the two 'poles' together in harmony. Kuyper's vigorous attack on trichotomy probably indicates that the trichotomist position is so close to his own that he perceives it as a particular threat.

Following the lead of Scripture, says Kuyper, dichotomy "cuts man into two halves: sōma and psychē,"¹² These two, also called lichaam (body) and ziel (soul), are "two distinct substances..., which do not give rise to one another, but which were separately created."¹³ Being composed of these two substances, man is by nature "designed to exist in the visible and the invisible world at the same time,"¹⁴ Giving a hint of what is to come, Kuyper asserts that "although both substances belong to man's being, still man's 'centre of gravity' lies in the psychē, and not in the sōma."¹⁵

Although Kuyper seems less apprehensive than Bavinck about being considered a dualist, he is careful to take distance from those dualists who allow the two substances to stand parallel to one another without real inter-relation. Rather, Kuyper wishes to stress 'union' of the two through inter-active influence.¹⁶ Thus, just like Bavinck, Kuyper expends a great deal of energy in expounding the nature of this 'union'. We will examine this matter more closely in sections (c) and (d).

(c) Ziel (psyche) and Ik (pneuma)

As already noted, Kuyper, having identified two constitutive substances in man, is faced with the problem of introducing unity. Like Bavinck, he attempts to accomplish this by making a further (non-substantial) qualitative distinction in the ziel.

"if sōma and psychē are taken to be the two substances in man, then I may wish to focus on sōma in its unique quality and psychē in its unique quality. 'Unique quality' must be understood as follows: because they are united in man, soul (ziel) and body have a point of contact. If I go away from this point or boundary (in either direction) then I get soul and body in their (unique) quality, i.e. in their own peculiar nature. Then I call sōma (apart from the influence of the psychē) sarx or basar (Heb.), and (I call) the psychē (apart from the influence of the sōma) pneuma. Thus the sarcotic (sic) (i.e. purely material) and the pneumatical are the two poles of psychē and sōma."¹⁷

Pneuma, the highest expression of man's psychē, now becomes that all-important 'third' which unifies the substances through its integrating rule. In delineating the characteristics of this 'third' Kuyper states:

"that 'third' is not a substance of a different nature, nor added to man as a third element; rather it is simply the consciousness of these two (substances)."¹⁸

Thus pneuma and "self-conscious" are put in intimate correclation:

"The union of these two substances (i.e. psychē and sōma) receives a unique stamp or character in every individual. This unique element is our ego (Dutch: ik) or our person. Where this ego, this self-consciousness of man comes to expression, there the pneuma comes into its own (literally: into being)."¹⁹

As Kuyper spells out his position further it becomes clear that the ik (ego) functions as the dominating organizational principle which welds man's two substances together.²⁰ In this welding process the ik functions as the outward manifestation of pneuma. Ik and pneuma are one, but can be distinguished as 'outer' and 'inner'. The pneuma is the "driving power"²¹ which comes to expression in the "zelfbewust-zijn" (self-consciousness) of the ik: it is the steam motivating the ik.²² Thus, as with Bavinck, the all-important 'third' in man takes on the character of the directive principle setting in motion the hierarchal relation of soul and body. This notion leaves Kuyper (and Bavinck) with a conception that is neither truly trichotomist nor starkly dichotomist. It is not trichotomist since it does not find in man three (structurally-conceived) substances; yet it is not starkly dichotomist since it introduces a third 'dimension' which certainly acts as if it is substantially different, capable of uniting the other two. As a result, this level becomes cloaked in vagueness, a characteristic which makes it all the more suitable for its key role as dominating, integrating factor.

In Kuyper's terms, the ik-pneuma is thus the highest dimension of man's soul. At the same time, according to Kuyper's own diagram, (which, we note, is interestingly parallel to his description of the relationship of creation to God), the ik-pneuma is the centre or core of man's being and works its effects outward.²³ In thinking of a diagrammatic model of Kuyper's anthropological framework, it might be helpful to use the three-dimensional figure of a cone. Then the ik-pneuma is at once the dominating pinnacle as well as the central axis or core around which (or, from which) everything revolves. The other dimensions of man would, according to this model, be at once lower and (concentrically) more peripheral.

(d) Hierarchy in Man

According to Kuyper, man's lower substance is once again organized and governed by the higher. Such an arrangement is necessary for the harmonious functioning of man; if it breaks down, disharmony and sin result.

"When referring to the dominance or disharmonious functioning of the sōma, one speaks of sarx, i.e. the sinful. But what is sinful with respect to the sōma is holy in relation to the psychē, and where the psychē has dominion one speaks of the pneuma."²⁴

Of course, Kuyper would not deny that the sōma also has positive and negative effects on the psychē. For instance, an injury to the body causes the soul to feel pain.²⁵ But this does not take away from the fact that the basic character of the relationship is one of domination of the body by the soul. In Kuyper's opinion "the operation of the body is passive while that of the soul is active."²⁶ The ziel brings the lichaam into action, and the means by which it does so are the nerves,

"which are, as it were, the hands whereby the soul lays hold of the body in order to bring it into action. . . . The nerves form the conducting wire through which the soul effects its operation on the body."²⁷

Here Kuyper comes in imminent danger of identifying the seat of the soul with the brain as the concentration point of the nerves. Sensing this danger, he denies such a relationship between soul and brain, although his simple denial does not eliminate the fact that such a relationship is directly implied by his categories. Indeed, Kuyper edges even closer to this conclusion when he allows that the brain is the seat of man's bewustzijn which he associates intimately with the ik, the finest dimension of the soul.²⁸ Since the brain also bears an intimate connection to man's rationality, we get a glimpse here of how Kuyper conceives of the workings of the soul.

Thus far, Kuyper has only dwelt on the domination of the lichaam by the ziel. He has yet to take account of the harmonious unity between the two achieved through the dominance of the ik-pneuma, the 'third' in man which represents the highest expression of ziel. The ik-pneuma, as we shall see in the next section, exerts its hierarchical rule through the vermogens. Worthy of note at this point is that this ruling dimension of man is once again dependent on a higher domination:

"Just as the soul penetrates and pushes into the body, so God's Spirit penetrates and pushes into our pneumatical consciousness. (There is an) indwelling of God in man, just as the soul dwells in the body."²⁹

Kuyper here gives us a preview of the context of his discussion of the place of faith.

(e) Vermogens of the Ik

In our treatment of Bavinck, we saw that the element in man which served to bring his two substances into 'unity' was the lower dimension of his geestelijke substance, i.e. ziel in distinction from geest. Thus man's vermogens, as the means by which the ziel effected its dominating 'unification', were called the vermogens of the ziel. In Kuyper, however, the geestelijke substance as a whole is called ziel, and it can be distinguished as psyché (lower) and ik or pneuma (higher). Kuyper believes that the element which welds man's two substances together is the higher

dimension of the ziel, i.e. the ik-pneuma. Thus, although the vermogens are once again the means by which the unifying dominance is effected, the vermogens are in Kuyper's case considered to be related to the higher level, the ik-pneuma.

"Man has three increated capacities: the perception capacity, the knowledge capacity and the will capacity, i.e. the facultas percipiendi, intelligendi, and volendi. All three are capacities (vermogens) of our ego (ik), . . .

The facultas percipiendi is the capacity of our ego to receive in our consciousness (bewustzijn) the impressions which correspond to the reality of that which exists and occurs in us and outside us.

The facultas intelligendi is the capacity to investigate as to basis, being and operation, all that which enters via the facultas percipiendi, and to form a judgment concerning that which is thus known or investigated. This judgment is either a judicium abstractum, . . . or a judicium practicum, . . . To this faculty belongs the conscience.

Finally, the facultas volendi is the capacity to posit, in so far as it depends on us, a conclusion of the facultas intelligendi as secunda causa,"³⁰

We note that Kuyper seems to give more of an 'ontological' status to these vermogens or faculties than Bavinck did. Indeed, his treatment of the vermogens is roughly equivalent to what Bavinck called the organs of the ziel. For Kuyper a faculty is not simply a 'habitus', capacity, or inclination of the ik. In fact, the faculties themselves can have such potentials or inclinations; for instance, conscience is an inclination or habitus of the facultas intelligendi. Thus Kuyper's understanding of the faculties seems to go beyond the bounds of the simple definition of vermogens.

Kuyper must now deal with the matter of the relation of these three 'vermogens' or faculties. He is hesitant to relate them in the pattern of a simple hierarchy; he rejects as deterministic the empiricistic view of Prof. Scholten, who asserts that the facultas percipiendi controls the facultas intelligendi, which in turn guides the facultas volendi.³¹ Kuyper insists on the mutual interdependence of the faculties, although he does give some priority to the facultas intelligendi in its relation to the facultas volendi.³² Yet he does not wish to see this as a deterministic relationship; the will remains formally free, but is materially bound to the facultas intelligendi.³³ However, the key to the whole interrelation of the faculties is the fact that the ik is the controlling, organizing principle. The ik is the central 'gear' which guides the 'rotation' of the three faculty 'gears',

"these gears are not free; not even the consciousness is free. But the ego (ik) is free. The freedom of the ego consists herein: it is free to perceive or not, it can judge one way or the other; it can will or not."³⁴

", . . . When the ego has once made a decision (choice) with respect to its relation with the perception 'gear', then the facultas intelligendi is also bound. . . . to work according to that judgment, and similarly the facultas volendi."³⁵

It is important to note that especially in the last quote the nature of the activity of the ik in guiding the faculties is described as a choosing, a making of a judgment. These terms are exactly characteristic of the activity of the facultas intelligendi.³⁶ This seems to indicate that the ik has the characteristics of intellect; we are reminded of the close association of the ik and bewustzijn with the brain. Thus it would seem that the ik becomes the mask through which the facultas intelligendi becomes the powerful integrating factor. Indeed, Kuyper comes close to admitting this when he states:

"First a judgment by the facultas intelligendi takes place, then the ego comes to know about this, and only when supplied with this knowledge does the ego give an order to the facultas volendi."37

Before moving on to Kuyper's discussion of faith, we should note that, as was the case with Bavinck, the vermogens are the means by which the power or drive (judgments) of the ik-pneuma are brought to concrete embodiment (somatiseering). One example of this is language,³⁸ It is in such 'embodiment', i.e. the ziel in its 'belichaming' (becoming 'fleshly'), in Kuyper's opinion, that the unifying of man's two substances ultimately comes to concrete expression.

II KUYPER'S VIEW OF FAITH

(a) The 'Formal' Function of Faith

Like Bavinck, Abraham Kuyper is concerned to give an account of what he calls 'faith' which shows the latter to be very much a part of man's created nature. However, the context in which Kuyper gives his account of faith, as well as the account itself, differs somewhat from Bavinck's. Kuyper sets forth his position most clearly in his Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, his three volume work concerning the place and task of theology within the whole encyclopedia of the sciences. Kuyper first approaches the subject of faith when discussing the nature of the sciences in general, especially as they have been affected by sin. The leading question in the sciences in Kuyper's era was that of certainty; a historical relativism (or, as Kuyper calls it, Scepticism) was the dominant force to be reckoned with. Kuyper wishes to take up this challenge. Scepticism, Kuyper insists

"originates from the impression (Dutch: waan) that our certainty depends on the results of our scientific research." (But since) "this result constantly appears to be governed by subjectivistic influences, and is affected by the conflict between truth and falsehood (Dutch: Waarheid en Leugen) which is the result of sin,"³⁸

many are giving themselves to a complete relativism. Kuyper is convinced that this scepticism can be defeated by showing that there is 'something' in all human objects, some "general and communal sense"⁴⁰ which lies at the very basis of all scientific (and other) endeavor. In "faith" Kuyper finds what he is looking for.

"Faith in this connection is taken formally, and hence considered quite apart from all content. By 'faith' here, then, we do not mean the 'faith in Jesus Christ' in its saving efficacy for the sinner, nor yet the 'faith in God' which is fundamental to all religion, but the formal function of the life of our soul which is fundamental to every act of our human consciousness (Dutch: bewustzijn),"⁴¹

Faith refers to "that function of the soul (psychē) by which it obtains certainty directly and immediately, without the aid of discursive demonstration,"⁴² Taken in this sense, faith is similar to what Bavinck called a vermogen; it is simply "the means or instrument by which to possess certainty,"⁴³

It already begins to become evident that man's faith function is intimately connected to the highest dimension of the soul. As we saw in the previous section, man's ik is correlated to the pneuma, and it is in the ik that man's zelfbewustzijn (self-consciousness) becomes a reality. Now Kuyper asserts that the formal function of faith is fundamental to this human self-consciousness (Cf. note 41). Indeed, faith becomes the means by which "a certain power, . . . is exercised upon our consciousness." Faith refers to "an action by which our consciousness is forced to surrender itself and to hold something for true, to confide in something and to obey something."⁴⁴ We recall that in another context the pneuma was described as a driving power (drijvende macht) which comes to expression in the zelfbewustzijn of the ik.⁴⁵ It would thus seem that the faith function forms the instrumental link in the correlation of ik and pneuma.

The assertion that faith is fundamental to human consciousness leads Kuyper to the claim that faith is foundational to all man's activity, including science. The starting point of all knowledge, says Kuyper, is self-consciousness. You engage in science, and without some undoubted awareness of who you are, scientific activity is impossible. But one's self-awareness never has the force of demonstration; "nothing but faith can ever give you certainty in your consciousness of the existence of your ego."⁴⁶ Therefore, without "faith (in yourself) you miss the starting point of all knowledge . . . (It) is actually the case that he who does not begin by believing in himself cannot progress a single step."⁴⁷ Going on from this basis, Kuyper is convinced that he can show step by step that faith is foundational to scientific activity. In the first place, faith makes you

"sure of all those things of which you have a firm conviction, but which conviction is not the outcome of observation or demonstration."⁴⁸

But faith does not stand isolated from demonstration; it plays a role in the appropriation of all knowledge, also that which is attained by observation and demonstration. For instance, faith forms the link between the ik and the workings of the facultas percipiendi: "... our ego believes in our senses," and does not doubt what is perceived.⁴⁹ Only on this basis does what is observed become a worthwhile basis for science. Thus faith has a role in convincing us of the reality of the perceived world around us. Further, faith has an important relation to our reasoning understanding: there are axioms, "first principles introductory to demonstration," which are simply given in our self-consciousness. These axioms of themselves "bring their certainty with them;" they are the "starting-point of all demonstration" and are not "fixed by demonstration but only and alone by faith."⁵⁰ Beyond this, faith plays a very important role in helping us accept as valid our formulations of general laws. Since it is impossible for us to personally examine all cases in all times and places subject to such a law, we must accept the formulation of it in the belief that it applies to all men.⁵¹ In these several ways faith in the formal sense functions in all the sciences.⁵² Through these examples Kuyper is convinced that he has demonstrated the

"utter untenability of the current representation that science establishes truth which is equally binding upon all, exclusively on the ground of observation and demonstration, while faith is in order only in the realm of suppositions and uncertainties. In every expression of his personality, as well as in the acquisition of scientific conviction, every man starts out from faith. In every realm, faith is, and always will be, the last link by which the object of our knowledge is put in connection with our knowing ego."⁵³

At this stage we already become aware of certain similarities and differences between the views of Ravinck and Kuyper. What the latter is thus far talking about is the same reality as what Ravinck called belief-in-general, a sense of belief which is fundamental to all man's activities and thus lies at the very basis of

society. But Bavinck differs from Kuyper in that he does not relate this sense of belief directly to any 'formal function' or 'faculty' of man. Although Bavinck calls the various manifestations of belief-in-general 'analogies' of religious belief-proper, he sees only the latter as a direct outworking of man's religious aptitude. Furthermore, Bavinck finds it impossible to separate (as opposed to distinguish) 'form' and 'content' in this aptitude; indeed, the 'form' becomes more and more defined in terms of a specific, soteriological New Testament 'content'. Kuyper's somewhat different approach allows him to go a step further in defining man's faith function and its integration into all man's activities. He believes it is possible to talk about faith in a purely formal sense, as a universal function of the human ego. Thus the faith function not only has the task of bringing man face to face with his Creator, but is also operative in a very basic way in providing man with the certainty he needs in his many kinds of activities. In his view of the role of the formal function of faith Kuyper comes close to articulating what Dooyeweerd later called "the anticipations of faith in the other functions of human consciousness,"⁵⁴ as well as the leading character of man's faith function in the whole of his life.

(b) The Primordial Sense of Faith

Religion, Revelation and Faith

Kuyper's understanding of the primordial sense of faith begins to come out in his comments concerning the relation of science and religion. In Kuyper's understanding, "all religion assumes communion with something that transcends the cosmos."⁵⁵ It is in this religious communion that the formal function of faith "obtains its absolute significance."⁵⁶

Like Bavinck, Kuyper asserts an intimate correlation between religion and revelation. Since religion involves communion with a power that transcends the cosmos man cannot construe his religion from within himself or from within the cosmos: religious communion depends on communication from the 'central power'. Therefore Kuyper concludes that

"No sense, no perception, and no knowledge is here possible for us until this central power (i.e. the

'something' communed with) reveals itself to us, affects us, and touches us inwardly in the centrum of our psyche. Except, . . . this central power, . . . with entire independence reveals itself to us in a way which bends to the form of our sense and of our consciousness, it has no existence for us, and religion is inconceivable."⁵⁷

"The entire gold-mine of religion lies in the self-revelation of this central power to the subject, and the subject has no other means than faith by which to appropriate to itself the gold from this mine."⁵⁸

Focussing more specifically on christian religion and revelation, Kuyper insists that revelation is not something that happens for man's sake, but that it is rather, ultimately designed to give glory to God. Therefore, since the purpose of the whole creation is to display the power and majesty of God, all creation is itself revelation. And in this revelatory (structural) context, God from the beginning gave His powerful, directive Word-revelation to man. Revelation thus did not rise as a consequence of sin; like faith, revelation may never be reduced to its "soteriological element", since the latter is

"ever accidental, bears an intervenient character and remains dependent on the fundamental conception of revelation which is given in creation itself."⁵⁹

Soteriological revelation does not have a purpose that is entirely unrelated to original revelation; rather, it must be seen in organic relation to revelation given in creation. Soteriological revelation is simply a readjustment of original revelation to overcome the obstruction of sin.⁶⁰

As already indicated, Kuyper joins Bavinck in insisting that the chain of revelation is not complete if no attention is paid to the fact that man is according to his nature equipped to receive what is revealed. Thus since "without faith there is no appropriation of revelation,"⁶¹ Kuyper is moved to present an account of

the nature and workings of the 'primordial' sense of man's faith function. In the sciences, the formal function of faith formed the link between the ego and created reality; in religion this function forms (on the human side) the link with the "central power" with which man's ego is to commune. In this relationship of communion with God the primordial sense of faith is expressed. Here faith is laid bare in its essence; here faith is strictly on its own, unsupported by observation, demonstration, and self-consciousness.⁶² Here we see the genuine, characteristic functioning of faith; all its other (previously discussed) expressions are derived from this fundamental sense. Faith is now not just the instrument or capacity for attaining certainty, but the instrument, or capacity for coming face to face with God through the appropriation of revelation. When this function is activated, man grasps the reality of God's presence with certainty. The functioning of faith in its primordial sense is thus utterly correlated with revelation. Thus Dooyeweerd, in his discussion of Kuyper's position, can assert that at this point the formal function of faith is totally governed by the material (i.e. content-full) sense of faith in which (christian) geloof and (the content of) revelation are correlates.⁶³

Faith and Zelfbewustzijn

Earlier we noted that Kuyper called the formal sense of faith a function or capacity of the soul intimately linked to the ik or ego. We must now examine what the implications of this are for Kuyper's understanding of the primordial sense of faith. Kuyper elaborates his views on this matter by placing faith in connection with man's logos, and the logos in connection with the pneuma. Man's logos, says Kuyper, plays a dual role in revelation; it is not only the means by which man appropriates revelation, but is also itself revelatory. Man's logos,

"reflectively (abbildlich) reveals something of the eternal logos, . . . And if, without lapsing into trichotomy, we may call this finest element in our human being the pneumatical, we define it as being both the choicest jewel in the diadem of revelation and the instrument by which man transmutes all revelation into knowledge of God. Both are expressed in the creation of man after the image of God."⁶⁴

Thus Kuyper once again identifies man's faith function, now in its primordial sense, as the highest element in man, intimately related to the pneuma in its correlation with the ik.

This connection of faith to the ik-pneuma leads Kuyper into a real confusion as to the nature of faith. So far, we have heard primordial faith described as man's capacity for coming face to face with God, in correlation with revelation but unsupported by observation, demonstration, or self-consciousness. However, in another context Kuyper gives an account of man's capacity to come face to face with God in which this capacity is not called faith, but is treated simply as something which arises out of an extension of the self-consciousness of the ik. In other words he now seems to be saying that while the formal function of faith has a role in the establishment of man's self-consciousness, the primordial sense of faith is simply this self-consciousness taken a step further. Kuyper presents this view in his Dictaten Dogmatiek, in the context of his treatment of innate knowledge of God. In this account, Kuyper is again looking for that common element in human nature which serves as the point of orientation or connection for religion, i.e. he is trying to focus on what Calvin called the semen religionis.⁶⁵ Kuyper feels the connection is made through an extension of man's self-consciousness. In his ik man has the vermogen for "self-awareness."⁶⁶ The fact that man, of all creatures, has this capacity displays the fact that he bears the image of God. (We recall note 64 -- that primordial faith also displays this fact). And when, through the use of this capacity man comes to real self-consciousness, he will realize "that he does not bear (i.e. sustain) himself, but that he is borne by a power outside himself."⁶⁷ It seems that it only takes a further extension of self-consciousness, for the recognition to emerge that this transcendent, upholding power is really God. Truly self-conscious man,

"resting moment by moment on the omnipresent power of God which is imminent in him, will as soon as the self-consciousness at work in him penetrates to the depth of his being, necessarily come to cognitio Dei insita, (i.e. innate knowledge of God)."⁶⁸

Indeed, through his self-consciousness man realizes that in the unity of his (self-conscious) being he is upheld by a simple (i.e., single),

"conscious being. . . In this way he for the first time learns to place another ego, namely that of God, over against his own ego; in this entirely natural way the cognitio Dei insita first posits itself in man."⁶⁹

All human beings have this cognitio Dei insita, at least in potential, and therefore it is the link to which revelation appeals as it brings man to acquired knowledge of God,

Between these two approaches, we are left confused as to the true character of faith. On the one hand, faith is discussed as a vermogen of the soul (ik) just as self-consciousness is. That is to say, man's capacities for self- and God-knowledge are both seen as vermogens creationally built into man, with the latter capacity, in its dependence on revelation, being the foundation of the other. On the other hand, man's capacity for God-knowledge is seen as an extension of self-knowledge, as if man has the resources within himself to come face to face with God and to gain some immediate, "innate" knowledge of him without revelation. The first approach focusses on the fact that man's faith function is utterly dependent on God's communication, the second approach focusses more inwardly on man, and stresses the fact that his need to know God wells up out of his need to know himself. Kuyper does not always keep these two approaches separate. For instance, in the detailed definition of faith given in his Encyclopaedie, the second approach is quite in evidence, although the idea of faith as a distinct capacity related to revelation is strongly maintained. Kuyper states:

"Faith indeed is in our human consciousness the deepest fundamental law that governs every form of distinction, by which alone all higher "Differentiation" becomes established in our consciousness. It is the daring break of our unity into a duality; placing of another ego over against our own

ego; and the courage to face that distinction only because our own ego finds its point of support and of rest only in that other ego. This general better knowledge of faith renders it possible to speak of faith in every domain; and also shows that faith originates primordially from the fact that our ego places God over against itself as the eternal and infinite Being, and that it dares to do this, because in this only it finds its eternal point of support. Since we did not manufacture this faith ourselves, but God created it in our human nature, this faith is but the opening of our spiritual eye and the consequent perception of another Being, excelling us in everything, that manifests itself in our own being. Thus it does not originate after the Cartesian style from an imprinted idea of God, but from the manifestation of God in our being to that spiritual eye which has been formed in order, as soon as it opens, to perceive Him and in ecstasy of admiration to be bound to Him. By faith we perceive that an eternal Being manifests Himself in us, in order to place Himself over against our ego, in the same way in which we discover the presence of light by our eye; but what this eternal Being is and what it demands of us, is not told us by faith, but by the innate knowledge of God, presently enriched by the acquired."⁷⁰


It is interesting to note that at this point Kuyper finds it necessary to distinguish faith as a habitus or capacity from innate knowledge of God immediately given.⁷¹ In Kuyper's opinion, the designation 'habitus' only applies to the instrument side and not to the instrument's immediate content. This of course, differs from what Kuyper stated in his Dictaten Dogmatiek. What is now seen as universally present in human nature is the instrument or vermogen of faith. With non-Christians there is not absence of

faith, but a positive privation of their faith instrument. As an instrument, the proper, creationally intended working of faith can be paralleled with the proper use of human organs, such as the eyes,

The faith instrument or function is the means by which man appropriates the powerful manifestation of God in his being. And since faith is seated in that part of man (i.e., the pneumatical, the area of the ik and self-consciousness) which acts as the dynamic directive power in the integration and unification of man's being, faith (and religion) takes its proper place in Kuyper's monarchian framework. Faith (and religion) can be treated as a very limited dimension of man, parallel to many others. But since faith is considered to be the pinnacle of pneuma, it is taken up into the dominating, motivating rule of the latter in man's being. Thus faith (and religion) gains important directive implications for all of man's life,


In conclusion we must pay some attention to a very peculiar tone in Kuyper's definition of faith. Kuyper uses terms that seem to properly belong to the realm of analysis: "distinction", "differentiation", "breaking something into duality", etc. Thus, while Kuyper saw the legitimate place of faith in the doing of science,⁷² his own understanding of faith has overtones characteristic of (scientific) analysis. This is not surprising in light of the fact that faith is rooted in man's ik, which is also designated as logos. We have already noted the fact that Kuyper defines the ik in terms that are very characteristic of the facultas ratiocinandi. Thus it is to be expected that Kuyper would be predisposed to a rational-logical understanding of faith. This predisposition is further shown in Kuyper's insistence that faith's innate knowledge (i.e., intellectual, obtained, not logically thought out) must always be complemented by the logical action which can "reduce" or "transmute" it into real knowledge, thus giving rise to innate theology.⁷³ This rational-logical tendency, however, should not cause us to be blind to the acuteness and Biblical soundness of Kuyper's insight that faith has to do with that side of man's creationally nature which calls him to come face to face with his Creator.

Spectrum



? = de levenstrib.
α = hartstochten.

Schematic Diagram of Kuyper's Anthropological Framework



FOOTNOTES

¹A. Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek (Grand Rapids: J.B. Hulst, 1910), Vol. II, Locus de Homine, p. 4. (emphasis mine). Dutch: "tot de Dogmatiek behoort alleen datgene, wat over den mensch door God meegedeeld is. Al wat resultaat is van de ervaring, waarneming of opmerking behoort tot de Anthropologie; alles wat resultaat is van de intieme mededeeling Gods over de mensch vormt de locus de Homine."

²Cf., for eg. paragraph 9 of the Locus de Homine (A. Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek, Grand Rapids: J.B. Hulst, 1910, Vol. II, p. 98).

³Ibid., pp. 5 and 6. Dutch: "is niet één-soortig, maar is of dichterbij God of gaat verder van Hem af. Een stuk koud, hard granietsteen is het verst van God af, men zou haast zeggen zonder God; er is niets dan stof en uit die stof is alle bezieling en beweging weg. God is het middelpunt; denkt men nu de wereld als een peripherie om Hem, dan ligt de steen op den uitersten omtrek, vandaar terug gaande krijgen wij dichterbij God de planten-en dieren-wereld; maar dit alles stond na de schepping tegenover God, want het was niet-God,"

⁴Ibid., p. 6. Dutch: "Waar God zijn beeld in de wereld brengt, houdt de absolute scheiding op; waar God in zijn beeld de wereld ingaat, komt die wereld weer onder God's beheersching. De mensch treedt dus als stedehouder God's op, als tussenschakel, om die wereld met God in contact te brengen. . . "

⁵Cf. A. Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek (Grand Rapids: J.B. Hulst, 1910), Vol. I, Locus de Deo, p. 40.

⁶Cf. A. Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek (Grand Rapids: J.B. Hulst, 1910), Vol. II, Locus de Homine, p. 5.

⁷Ibid., p. 6. Dutch: "als 't ware de knop, waarmee God de wereld aanvat."

⁸Ibid., p. 23. Dutch: "dichotomie en sluit trichotomie uit. De trichotomie is van Platonische herkomst, uit de heidensche wijsbegeerte in de Christel. Ker ingedragen en meest door hen bepleit, die later als ketters openbaar geworden zijn."

⁹Ibid., p. 39. Cf. also A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), p. 214.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 25. Dutch: "Elke antithese heeft twee polen; goed staat tegenover kwaad, schoon tegenover leelijk; een derde zuiver, absoluut bestanddeel daartusschen is logisch niet te denken; het moet een mengsel van beide zijn. Zoo staan ook tegenover elkaar: Schepper en schepsel, geest en stof; omdat God een absoluut tegenstelling vormt met al wat niet-God is."

¹¹A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1963), p. 214.

¹²A. Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek (Grand Rapids: J.B. Hulst, 1910), Vol. II, Locus de Homine, p. 24.
Dutch: "snijdt den mensch in twee helften: sōma en psychē."

¹³Ibid., pp. 23-24. Dutch: "twee onderscheidene substantiën . . . die niet uit elkander voortkomen, maar beide afzonderlijk geschapen zijn. . ."

¹⁴Ibid., p. 23. Dutch: "aangelegd om te gelijk èn in de zichtbare èn in de onzichtbare wereld te bestaan. . ."

¹⁵Ibid., p. 27. Dutch: "hoewel beide substantiën behooren tot 's menschen wezen, toch 't zwaartepunt van den mensch ligt in de psychē, niet in het sōma."

¹⁶Cf., Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 28. (Parentheses mine, except as shown below). Dutch: "Wanneer sōma en psychē als de twee substantien van den mensch genomen worden, dan kan ik dat sōma willen uitdrukken in zijn qualiteit en die psychē in haar qualiteit. Onder 'in zijn qualiteit' moet dit verstaan worden: ziel en lichaam hebben, omdat zij in den mensch vereenigd zijn, een aanrakingspunt; ga ik nu van dat punt af, van die grens weg, dan krijg ik ziel en lichaam in qualiteit d, i, in hun eigen natuur; en dan noem ik sōma (zonder de invloed van de psychē) sarx of basar en de psychē (zonder invloed van het sōma) pneuma. Het sarcotische en pneumatische zijn dus de beide polen van psychē en sōma."

¹⁸Ibid., p. 32. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "dat derde is geen substantia of natuur, of iets wat er als derde bijkomt, maar eenvoudig het bewustzijn van deze twee."

¹⁹Ibid., p. 33. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "De unio van deze beide substantien (i.e. psychē and sōma) ontvangt in elk individu een eigen cachet, een eigen karakter, d. i. ons ik, onze persoon. Waar dat ik, dat zelfbewustzijn van den mensch tot uiting komt, daar ontstaat het pneuma."

²⁰Ibid., p. 23.

²¹Ibid., p. 29. Dutch: "drijvende macht."

²²Ibid., p. 99.

²³Cf. the attached chart, also found by p. 81 of Dictaten Dogmatiek, Vol II, Locus de Homine.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 28-9. Dutch: "Waar nu de heerschappij of de disharmonische werking van het sōma wordt aangeduid, daar is sprake van sarx, d.i. het zondige. Maar wat zondig is bij 't sōma, is bij de psychē het heilige; en waar de psychē heerscht daar is dus sprake van het pneuma."

²⁵Ibid., p. 39.

²⁶Ibid., p. 40. Dutch: "is de werking van het lichaam passief, van de ziel actief."

²⁷Ibid. Dutch: "die als 't ware de handen zijn, waardoor de ziel het lichaam aanvat, om het in actie te brengen, . . . De zenuwen vormen den geleiddraad, waarlangs de ziel haar werking op 't lichaam overbrengt."

²⁸Cf. Ibid., pp 32-3 and p. 40.

²⁹Ibid., p. 42. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "Gelijk de ziel penetreert en inschuift in het lichaam, zoo penetreert en schuift God's Geest in ons pneumatisch bewustzijn." (There is an) "inwonen van God in den mensch, gelijk de ziel woont in het lichaam."

³⁰Ibid., p. 68. "Den mensch is drieërlei vermogen ingeschapen t.w. vermogen der gewaarwording, het vermogen der kennis en het vermogen te willen, de facultas percipiendi, intelligendi et volendi. Alle drie zijn vermogens

van ons ik, . . .

De facultas percipiendi is het vermogen van ons ik om in ons bewustzijn aan de werkelijkheid beantwoordende indrukken te ontvangen van hetgeen in ons en buiten ons bestaat en voorvalt, . . .

De facultas intelligendi is het vermogen om hetgeen aldus in ons vermogen inkomt te onderzoeken naar grond, wezen en werking en over het aldus gekende of onderzochte een oordeel te vellen. Dit oordeel is of een judicium abstractum, . . . of een judicium practicum, . . . Tot deze facultas behoort de conscientie,

De facultas volendi eindelijk is het vermogen om, voorzoo veel aan ons hangt, een conclusie van de facultas intelligendi als secunda causa te poneeren."

³¹Ibid., p. 81.

³²Ibid., p. 76.

³³Ibid., p. 78ff.

³⁴Ibid., p. 83. Dutch: "Deze raderen zijn niet vrij, ook het bewustzijn niet; maar het ik is vrij. Die vrijheid van het ik bestaat daarin, dat het ik kan waarnemen of niet, kan oordeelen zus of zoo, kan willen of niet willen."

³⁵Ibid. (parenthesis mine). Dutch: ". . . Als het ik eenmaal gekozen heeft in de rota percipiendi dan (is) ook de facultas intelligendi gebonden, . . . naar dat judicium te werken, en evenzoo de facultas volendi."

³⁶Cf. Ibid., p. 68 and pp. 73-4. Cf. also pp. 99 and 102ff., where making distinctions is the basic characteristic of the ik.

³⁷Ibid., p. 81. Dutch: "Eerst heeft er plaats een judicium van de facultas intelligendi; dit komt 't ik te weten en eerst met die wetenschap voorzien geeft het ik last aan de facultas volendi."

³⁸Ibid., p. 33.

³⁹A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968) p. 125. (parenthesis mine). (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 72.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 126. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 73.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 126. (parenthesis mine). (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 72.

⁴² Ibid., p. 129. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 75.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 131. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 78.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 127. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 74.

⁴⁵ Cf. notes 21 and 22, above.

⁴⁶ A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), p. 131. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 77.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 130. (parenthesis mine). (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 77.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 131. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), Vol. II, p. 78. At this point observation and demonstration seem to stand beside (over against?) faith as a way to attain certainty, with observation and demonstration showing a greater degree of (provable) reliability. But this impression is not Kuyper's intention: he is simply emphasizing not only that demonstration roots in faith, but also that there is much in science that cannot be demonstrated.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 133. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), p. 80.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 136-7. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), pp. 83-4.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 137-9. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), pp. 84-6.

⁵²In addition, Kuyper sees a more complicated role for faith in what he calls the "spiritual sciences." Part of this complication involves the fact that he feels faith no longer functions simply formally in these sciences, but presents a content (p. 144). In the "spiritual sciences" faith seems to have a role in determining the content-full reality of the object of study (p. 145) while in the positivistic physical sciences the object is clearly there for all to see, faith being only 'formally' necessary to make us believe what we see (p. 145). This distinction is influenced by the dualistic stream in Kuyper's thought, which prevents him from realizing (i) that 'what is seen' is not the same for all men, even in the so-called physical sciences, but is always guided by the eyes of faith; and (ii) the role of faith in guiding what is seen gradually increases as the respective sciences deal with gradually more complex aspects of reality.

⁵³A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), p. 143. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909), p. 90.

⁵⁴H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1969), Vol. II, p. 300.

⁵⁵A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), p. 146. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909), p. 94.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 149. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909), p. 97.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 148. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909), p. 96. (parenthesis mine).

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 149. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909), p. 96.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 258. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1909), p. 209.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 260 and 258. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), p. 211 and 209.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 274. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), p. 226.

⁶²Ibid., p. 149. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), p. 97.

⁶³H. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer," Philosophia Reformata, 4^e Jaargang (1939), p. 229.

⁶⁴A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), p. 264. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), p. 216.

⁶⁵A. Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek (Grand Rapids: J.B. Hulst, 1910), Locus de Deo, p. 50. In Principles of Sacred Theology, Kuyper uses "semen religionis" to refer to the faith function. (p. 265).

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 41. Dutch: "zelfbesef".

⁶⁷Ibid., (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "dat hij niet zichzelf draagt, maar gedragen wordt door een macht buiten hen."

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 42 (parenthesis mine). Dutch: "van oogenblik tot oogenblik rustend op de alontegenwoordige kracht Gods, welke immanent in hem is, zal, zoodra het zelfbesef, dat in hem werkt, zich uitstrekt tot het diepste van zijn wezen, noodzakelijkerwijze komen tot de cognitio Dei insita."

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 43. Dutch: "bewust wezen, . . . Zoo eerst leert hij tegenover zijn eigen ik een ander ik, nl. dat van God, stellen; zoo eerst poneert zich geheel natuurlijk in den mensch de cognitio Dei insita."

⁷⁰A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), pp. 266-7. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), pp. 218-9.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 266. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), p. 218.

⁷²Dooyeweerd points out that Kuyper's view of the formal function of faith in the sciences comes close to being a description of intuition. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. II, p. 299.

⁷³A. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), p. 268. (Dutch: Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909), p. 220.

III

HERMAN DOOYEWEERD (1894-1977)

I DOOYEWEERD'S VIEW OF MAN

In our treatment of Bavinck and Kuyper we saw that their respective views of man not only followed a very similar general pattern, but also involved the use of almost identical categories and divisions. As we now move into Dooyeweerd's analysis, our purpose is to indicate the striking similarity of his position to that of his reformed predecessors. Although Dooyeweerd may employ different terminology and make different distinctions, the framework or pattern within which these function is an adaptation of that of Bavinck and Kuyper. Thus we will try to demonstrate that the way in which Dooyeweerd tries to answer some of the basic questions concerning man follows a pattern very similar to that of Bavinck and Kuyper.

(a) Temporal Lichamelijkheid and Supra-temporal Ik

For reasons which we will examine shortly, Dooyeweerd rejects any account of the nature of man which divides him up into two substances or components. This does not mean, however, that Dooyeweerd does not identify a certain 'twoness' with respect to man. In his opinion, there is a sense in which Scripture teaches a dichotomy of soul (ziel) and body (lichaam).^{1a} Dooyeweerd goes on to maintain that man does function in two 'levels' of creation, and certain dimensions of man's being are associated with each 'level'. These 'levels' of creation are the temporal and supra-temporal. The nature of man's being in these areas is immediately bound up with the question of his unity and the diversity of its expression: man's supra-temporal dimension (ziel) becomes the factor that unifies and organizes his (many) temporal expressions, just as in Bavinck and Kuyper the ziel or ik served as the principle which organized, unified and directed man's multiplicity.

Dooyeweerd argues that it is necessary to recognize a supra-temporal dimension in man since the depth-unity of his humanity can not be grasped from within the boundaries of temporality.

"As long as we, . . . regard man only in terms of his temporal existence in the enkaptic structure-totality of his bodiliness (lichamelijkheid), he remains the most complicated and internally divided being to be found on earth."^{1b}

By lichamelijkheid Dooyeweerd does not mean man's physical body; he distinguishes the physical body (lichaamsvorm) from the "human body."² The latter "is man himself in the structural whole of his temporal appearance,"³ i.e., the whole diversity of his temporal functioning. Any attempt to uncover the depth-unity of man on this level is doomed to failure, says Dooyeweerd. Unity that is found within temporality is of a structural kind. Thus, if the essence of man's unity were of such a nature, it ought to be possible to find a "typical qualifying structure-function in man's bodily existence in one of modal aspects of the temporal horizon of human experience."⁴ Since there is no such temporal qualifying function for man, his being, unlike that of plants and animals, is not exhausted within his temporal lichamelijkheid. But immanence philosophy has generally ignored this reality and has sought to locate man's centre of existence (existentie-centrum) in one of his functions (or groups of functions), thus creating a polarity between the latter and the rest of man's lichamelijkheid. No immanence approach (including that which divides man into substances) can discover the

"true totality and unity of human existence, because the deepest starting point of such a view of man bears a dualistic character, which rules out the concentric insight into the root-unity of human existence."⁵

The development of a christian anthropology must therefore begin with a radical critique of all immanence totality-ideas.

Dooyeweerd's analysis of man thus proceeds in the awareness that although there is a legitimate place for examining the structural diversity of man's temporal expression, man is yet "that creature which is not enclosed (exhausted) within time and cannot be enclosed therein."⁶ Man transcends time in that his ik, i.e., his "centre" or "root-unity", is not to be found in his lichamelijkheid, but is of "supra-modal religious-spiritual nature."⁷ ". . . The self is elevated above the modal diversity of meaning and is thus transcendent with respect to it."⁸ Man's lichamelijkheid, which as such is "enclosed in. . . the temporal-horizon of our experience," find its "supra-bodily concentration point" in the ik (self).⁹

It ought to be questioned whether in this analysis of man's temporal lichamelijkheid and supra-temporal ik Dooyeweerd has truly steered clear of a dichotomistic view of man. Of course, his rejection of all immanentistic attempts to introduce a duality in man's temporality is to be applauded. But in distinguishing man's temporal and supra-temporal dimensions the way he does, Dooyeweerd again goes in the direction of introducing two 'levels' or 'kinds' of reality. He thus becomes vulnerable for what Hendrik Hart calls a threatening dualism.¹⁰

(b) The Character of the "Ik" (Heart or Self)

Dooyeweerd formulates the character of the ik in a way reminiscent of the monarchian formulations of Bavinck and Kuyper. As we saw in our discussion of their views, it is part of the 'genius' of the monarchian position that it allows the highest dimension of man, through its ruling, unifying influence, to be at the same time the most central factor of man's being. In our discussion of Kuyper we concluded that this view could perhaps be grasped best by using the figure of a three-dimensional cone, in which the key dimension of man could be the highest part (the pinnacle) and the center (the axis) of his being at the same time. The same figure applies in the case of Dooyeweerd's view of man, since he applies this dual characteristic to the ik. On the one hand the ik is called the "centre" and "root-unity"¹¹ of man. Man's lichamelijkheid is related in "concentric correlation" to the ik as 'central reference point.'¹² In this sense the ik is the "concentration-point" of man's temporal diversity, and, conversely, the focus out of which this diversity issues. The ik is operative in all man's functions,¹³ from it are "all the issues of temporal life."¹⁴ On the other hand, the ik is at the same time described in a manner that puts it in a realm above temporal lichamelijkheid. In section (a), above, we heard the ik described as being "bovenmodal", "buiten", "boven-lichamelijk", "elevated above the modal diversity." Indeed, the ik is that element in man which "transcends (literally: goes above) all temporal things."¹⁵ Dooyeweerd himself apparently feels no tension between these two senses of ik since he readily combines them in his formulations, describing the ik as "the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity."¹⁶ We must constantly keep this typically monarchian dual sense of ik in mind in our further examination of its character.

Dooyeweerd draws the line between the ik and lichamelijkheid quite clearly when he further delineates the character of the former. In contrast to man's lichamelijkheid, his ik is of a "religious-spiritual nature."¹⁷ This difference of nature implies a separation: in all its relations to man's lichamelijkheid, the ik itself never becomes lichamelijk, and "human bodiliness (lichamelijkheid) as such remains enclosed" in temporality.¹⁸ Thus, since temporality is the area of structural unity, the "inner unity" of the ik is definitely not of a structural character.¹⁹ Rather, it is to be characterized as the central-religious (bezielend) principle, determining the direction of man's whole life.

" . . . The central sphere of human existence is in the full sense of the word a dynamic one. Out of it the dramatic conflict between the civitas Dei (city of God) and the civitas terrena (earthly city) takes its issue in the history of the world. We can even call it the central sphere of occurrence. . . ."20

The ik is the seat of the religious impulse in man.²¹ For it is at this level that man makes a religious choice of position. This choice, "which is an act of the full self which transcends the diversity of modal aspects," is a religious act, just because it contains a choice of position in the concentration-point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning.²² The ik is further charged with the task of making this fundamental religious choice effective in the diversity of man's life. And it can do this because, "as the central seat of the image of God," it has been "endowed with the innate religious impulse to concentrate his whole temporal life and the whole temporal world upon the service of love to God."²³ Because of this built-in impulse the ik "restlessly seeks" until it finds its Origin (God) (or a pseudo-origin) "in order to understand its own meaning, and in its own meaning the meaning of our entire cosmos!"²⁴ As the "religious root" of the "whole temporal cosmos,"²⁵ the ik becomes the means by which God directively (centrally) relates to His entire creation. The ik is thus the creaturely reflection of the Origin; there is an analogous relationship between God and the human ik,²⁶ and because of this the ultimate meaning of reality is to be found through the self-understanding of the ik.

In all this, it becomes increasingly clear that Dooyeweerd is following a pattern very similar to that of Bavinck and Kuyper. The higher (central) principle in man once again becomes the directive force which sets the whole of (structural) creation going. At the same time this higher (central) principle serves to introduce unity in the diversity of reality, and provides the link by which the ultimate Principle (Dooyeweerd's divine Origin) steers his world.

In further elaborating the character of the ik, Dooyeweerd emphasizes that because its internal unity is not of a structural kind, the ik is not susceptible to analysis.²⁷ "As soon as we try to grasp it in a concept or definition, it recedes as a phantom and resolves itself into nothingness."²⁸ Thus Dooyeweerd's ik, that all important directive principle becomes cloaked in vagueness, as was the case with corresponding principles in Bavinck and Kuyper. Dooyeweerd, however, does not let the phantom rest in its vagueness. In his view, there is a certain structuredness in supra-temporal reality also. Man's central ik

"is subjected to a central law.
This law derives its fulness of
meaning from the origin of all
things and limits and determines
the centre and root of our exis-
tence."²⁹

The nature of this law is that it places the ik in three relations, one of which is fundamental to the other two. Thus, while the ik "is nothing in itself" it is possible to analyse the relations "which alone give it meaning,"³⁰ as long as such an analysis is done in the awareness that it can never (fully) lay hold of the ik. In addition, these relations

"into which it (i.e., the ik) was
woven according to the creation
order" must be examined in their
"unbreakable mutual coherence."³¹

Otherwise they can give no meaning or content to the ik.

The first of these relations is that of the ik, "to our whole temporal existence and to our entire experience of the temporal world as the central reference point of the latter."³² However, this relation by itself can give the ik no positive content, since, as we already

saw, the ik by nature transcends temporality.³³ The second relation of the ik is its "essential communal relation to the egos of its fellowmen."³⁴ But also this relation by itself can give the ik no positive content since the ik of our neighbour is a phantom, just like our own.³⁵ The third and fundamental relation is that of the ik to "its divine Origin in Whose image man was created."³⁶ This relation gives content to the other two. In other words, the "mutual coherence" of these relations is not mutual at all; the first two are strictly dependent upon and governed by the (central) third one. For it is this third relation which (by itself) determines the "central law" governing the ik; it calls man to concentrate his whole heart (ik) and all his temporal functions "in the love-service of God and in the central, i.e., religious, love-communion with the neighbor."³⁷ In order that man can respond to this central religious law, his ik is "seized, . . . by the driving-power of God's Word Revelation."³⁹ God's Word revelation is in this sense the dynamic "beweegkracht" which directs man's dynamic center to God-knowledge. And in true God-knowledge man finds true self-knowledge in all three of his relations.⁴⁰ Such God-knowledge, of course, is beyond analysis, so that the meaning and content of the ik also still lies outside the bounds of man's analytic grasp, and thus, from the point of view of science, the ik retains its cloaked character. We would point out that although the dependence of true self-knowledge on knowledge of God, given through His Word and Spirit, is biblically undeniable, the pattern or framework within which Dooyeweerd treats these matters is again typically parallel to the monarchian approach of Bavinck and Kuyper. The search for the meaning of the ik is conducted in a hierarchially-related series of relations in which the transcendent ik finally meets the ultimate higher principle, which seemingly can just as easily be called (monarchian) 'Origin' as 'God'. When the ik is viewed in relation to this higher Origin, Dooyeweerd typically stresses that it is structured to receive directive Word Revelation. But when the ik is viewed in relation to man's lichamelijkheid, it itself becomes the higher directive principle galvanizing man's structural diversity into action.

(c) The Relation of the "Ik" to "Lichaam"

In taking account of the way in which the directive 'dynamis' of the ik comes to expression in the structural diversity of man's lichamelijkheid, Dooyeweerd places a great deal of emphasis on the act-structure of the latter. The act-structure is one of the four "individuality structures" of the human body (lichamelijkheid). These individuality structures are ranked as 'lower' and 'higher'. The lowest individuality structure is physico-chemically qualified; the second is biotically qualified; the third is psychically qualified, and the fourth, the act-structure, has no single modal qualification.⁴¹ The lower individuality structures are successively "morphologically bound by the higher ones."⁴² This "morphological binding" is essentially a dominance; for instance, as the act-structure morphologically binds up the other three there results a "hierarchical subordination of the unconscious substratum of the act-life to the conscious superstratum."⁴³ Man's lichamelijkheid, though it has no modal qualifications, can be said to be qualified by the act-structure.⁴⁴ The act-structure functions in all the modal aspects and, although each particular act is qualified by one particular aspect, there is no typically qualifying function for the act-structure.⁴⁵ This reflects the fact that the human body (lichamelijkheid) has no qualifying function in temporality, but finds its unity in the ik. "The act life of man manifests itself in three fundamental ways (Dutch: grondrichtingen) n.l. knowing, imagining and willing."⁴⁶ Thus prayer, for instance, is a pistically qualified willing-act.⁴⁷

The act-structure is the means by which the ik relates to the lichamelijkheid. "It (i.e., the act-structure) is the immediate temporal expression of the human I-ness, which transcends the cosmic temporal order."⁴⁸

"All human acts have their origin in the soul as the spiritual center of man's existence. With respect to their temporal structure, however, they can only take place in the human body. . . . The whole man as an integral unity of soul and body performs these acts."⁴⁹

The act-structure thus becomes the means by which man, made up as he is of 'body and soul', becomes a unity. The role of the act-structure is therefore directly

parallel to the role of the organs or faculties in Bavinck and Kuyper. It is certainly, no coincidence that the three 'directions' of the act-structure correspond very closely to these organs or faculties. In fact, the correspondence is so close that immediately after stating the three 'directions' of the act-structures, Dooyeweerd feels the need to distinguish them from the traditional faculties.⁵⁰

The monarchian pattern is further manifested when Dooyeweerd spells out the nature of the relationship established between ik and lichamelijkheid through the act-structure. The latter is the means by which the ik brings the "total human body" into "action".⁵¹ The act-structure is thus the means by which 'dynamis' enters man's structural make-up. "Through the activity of man's soul, the human body (which only takes on a typical, human character in the act-structure) receives its spiritual character."⁵² Through the act-structure, the "human body is the free plastic instrument of the I-ness."⁵³ The human body is thus the "field of free expression for the human spirit, i.e., for the religious centre of human existence."⁵⁴ Through the act-structure the ik comes to "express itself bodily."⁵⁵ Man's lichamelijkheid is the stage dominated, shaped and governed by his higher (central) ik; once again Dooyeweerd's pattern is directly parallel to that of Bavinck and Kuyper.

II THE FAITH (PISTICAL) FUNCTION

(a) Introduction

In beginning our examination of Dooyeweerd's analysis of man's faith (or pistical) function, it is important to note that for him this function comes to expression in a context, namely, the faith (or pistical) aspect of reality. Man's faith function does not exhaust this faith aspect. In distinction from his predecessors, Dooyeweerd stresses that all creatures have a faith dimension, although man alone functions as subject in this aspect while all other temporal creatures function in it as objects of man's faith activity. Dooyeweerd therefore finds it important to

distinguish clearly (a) the faith-aspect of reality; (b) the subjective function of believing, which man possesses in this aspect; (c) the objective function that all temporal things have in it; and, (d) the content of our subjective faith. 56

These distinctions will help us keep in mind that our discussion of man's subjective faith function (and its content) has a certain limited character within the faith aspect.

In discussing the nature of the various aspects of reality, Dooyeweerd tries to maintain that these are not to be understood as the ontologically-conceived building blocks of which reality is composed. Rather, these aspects are modes of being, ways in which the religious fullness of meaning (rooted in man's ik or heart) comes to expression. The aspects thus have reference to the modal 'how' of reality, and not the concrete 'what'. 57 However, Dooyeweerd has difficulty in consistently maintaining this view. He tends toward substantiating these modes when he calls them aspects in which concrete phenomena function. These aspects serve as a field of expression, especially for the human ik. As such a field, the aspects seem to be substantized and static, serving as the context within which man, for instance, functions. With respect to these functions, Dooyeweerd again emphasizes that they refer to the various 'hows', the modes in which the religious drive of the ik expresses itself in temporal diversity. The functions have reference to the various 'capacities' or 'potentialities' for the expression of man's being, and as such they

are quite similar to what Bavinck (and Kuyper) designated as vermogens. For Dooyeweerd, however, all the functions are temporal expressions; they are not, as Bavinck and Kuyper's vermogens, capacities structurally located in the soul which come to bodily (temporal) expression in word and deed. There is, however, a similarity in the fact that for Dooyeweerd the functions, in their activity, are always drawn together and channelled through one of the three act structures, just as in Bavinck the vermogens are always channelled through one of the three organs.

In our further discussion, we will focus our attention on one of man's functional capacities, namely, his faith function or, as Dooyeweerd calls it, using a term also employed by Bavinck, his "subjective faith-activity."⁵⁸ We must examine this function to see whether Dooyeweerd's analysis of it is influenced by the framework we have thus far seen in his view of man. We must evaluate whether or not Dooyeweerd's statement that the heart (*ik*) is operating "in all the functions in which it expresses itself" in temporality,⁵⁹ is cast within the monarchian pattern, so that the faith function, as the highest function, becomes that factor in structural temporality which mediates the dynamic directive power of the heart to the other functions, rather than simply being that function which comes as close as functionally possible to (explicitly) expressing the fulness of man's unity, the fulness of the root-meaning of his being, which is also operative in all his other functions.

(b) The Faith Aspect and the Opening-Process

The context for Dooyeweerd's most detailed discussion of man's faith-function is his analysis of the process of the unfolding of meaning in the aspects of reality. An examination of the place that the faith aspect has in this process is very illuminating for our purposes. And since it is the human subject who effects the opening-process, a discussion of the role of the faith aspect here is in effect a discussion of the role of man's faith-function.⁶⁰

Dooyeweerd stresses the need for regarding the various aspects in both the foundational and transcendental directions in order to grasp the fully opened-up meaning of these aspects. The foundational direction refers to the coherence of an aspect with the lower aspects on

which it is founded, as reflected in the retrocipatory moments of that aspect. The opening-process has to do with the transcendental direction; it refers to the opening-up of the anticipatory moments of an aspect, reflecting those aspects which are higher in the cosmic order. When an aspect is fully opened-up in the transcendental direction it grasps (as much as it can) for an expression of the fulness of meaning which transcends (lies above) temporal diversity.⁶¹ Since, in the transcendental direction, faith is the terminal aspect, the transcendental opening-up of all the other aspects comes to rest in faith; these aspects themselves cannot transcend (reach beyond) their temporality. Thus it is the faith function

"which ultimately guides the opening-process without itself being guided by a later temporal meaning-function. . . . In the final analysis the entire opening-process makes an appeal to faith in its modal functional structure."⁶²

The faith aspect thus sets the limits to which the other aspects can be opened-up to the fulness of meaning rooted in the human heart (ik).

Since faith is one of the aspects, it too can be regarded in the foundational and transcendental direction. But with respect to faith, 'transcendental direction' has an entirely different meaning than with respect to the other aspects, since there is now no higher aspect to guide in faith's opening-process. With respect to faith, 'transcendental direction' has reference to the fact that faith is "driven on directly by impulses from the religious root of human existence."⁶³

"Only in the 'heart' does the function of faith find its religious concentration, and from this spiritual root of our existence the direction of our believing is determined."⁶⁴

"In the religious root of our cosmos, . . . irreconcilable war is waged between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena. The temporal function of faith in determining the

direction of the opening-process in the earlier law-spheres is itself immediately directed by religious basic motives in which this radical contest expresses itself,"⁶⁵

It becomes clear that faith has the task of mediating the directive, dynamic, religious drive of the heart⁶⁶ and effectuating it in the (structural) opening process in temporal reality. Man's heart (religious root), in being gripped by the power of revelation, addresses its religious impulses to faith, thus activating this werkzaamheid (function). The other aspects participate in the religious direction through being opened-up by faith; they depend on the directive leading of faith.

There is, of course, a legitimate place for giving an account of how the central religious unity of man comes to expression and integration in his diverse (but equally religious) functions. And in such an account the faith function must take an important place as that function whose very character it is to express, in the fullest way functionally possible, the depth-unity of the meaning of all reality. As such, faith has the task of playing the leading role in the opening-up of the other aspects, so that they may, to their capacity be expressive of the fulness of meaning. But in Dooyeweerd's analysis, his framework causes him to lose sight of the fact that man's heart and functions are one, i.e., that the heart is directly expressed in all the functions, since the heart is the functions in unity and the functions are the heart in diversity. In Dooyeweerd's framework there is a certain separation of the heart from the temporally diverse functions. Thus there is also a separation of the one directive principle from the structural diversity. The faith function is then given the task of becoming the link for relating and integrating these two factors. The other functions participate in an expression of religious fulness of meaning only through faith. Man's heart is seemingly not 'directly' active in them. Faith gets a key place in what is presented as a sequential series: the heart is gripped and directed by Divine Revelation; faith is directed by religious impulses from the heart, and the other functions are directed (in their opening up) by faith. Faith mediates direction into a structural area; it becomes the key, ruling factor in this area. The whole opening-process in temporal reality thus depends on the religious orientation of faith, and the chief problem to be faced is

"how the entire process of disclosure in all the normative aspects of experience may be realized, if the guiding terminal function of temporal human existence is not activated in this process by the Spirit of the Civitas Dei,"⁶⁷

(c) Heart, Faith, and Revelation

In both Bavinck and Kuyper we noted an intimate correlation between man's capacity for faith (religion) and divine revelation. In coming to understand Dooyeweerd's view of faith it is again important to see it in relation to revelation. Further, it is important to compare the correlation of heart and revelation.

Dooyeweerd distinguishes two kinds of revelation. In his opinion,

"Christian theology has always distinguished between the general revelation of God in 'nature' (i.e., in the whole of God's work of creation) and the general and special Word Revelation. . . We must, . . . be attentive to the original relation between God's 'natural revelation' in all the works of his hands, and the general Word-revelation. God, creating the World, has revealed himself in that creation both in its religious root (the heart of man) and in its temporal order and coherence. But from the very beginning this revelation of God in all the works of his hands was borne and explained by the Word-revelation which at first, also after the fall, was not limited to some, but directed to the whole of mankind,"⁶⁸

'Natural revelation' has to do with the law which determines the structural nature of created reality. For instance, 'natural revelation' helps explain the fact that faith structurally remains faith even when man rejects true Word revelation and falls into sin. Word Revelation, on the other hand, is the central directive power which seeks to lay hold of man's religious heart. In section I (b) Word revelation was described as the dynamic motivating power (beweeegkracht) which directs

man's dynamic heart to God-knowledge. Now Dooyeweerd goes further in this direction. Word revelation is a "divine power", either unto life or death;⁶⁹ it is the "central knowledge-principle" which as a "spiritual power" in its central ground motive of creation, fall, and redemption through Jesus Christ in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, is the key to true God and self-knowledge and the key to the (temporal) Scriptures.⁷⁰ Therefore man's knowledge of God's natural revelation is

"exclusively guided by faith in the Word of God. Through this Word alone the eyes of the mind were opened to the universal revelation of God in created nature."⁷¹

Man's heart or ik stands in integral relation to both these types of revelation. In section I (b) we noticed that the ik was subject to a (central) structural law which determined that it stood in three basic relations. But it was only in relation to the Origin that anything meaningful could be said about the heart. And, of course, man could only relate to the Origin if the Origin revealed himself (Word revelation). Thus Dooyeweerd comes to an interesting unification of the two types of revelation with respect to the heart: because it responds to its unique structural law, the heart shows itself to be a work of God's hands and thus participates in "natural revelation." But it is exactly this structural law which determines that the heart is by nature oriented to Word revelation; i.e., the structural law for the heart requires it to listen faithfully (no questions asked) to Word Revelation, so that the latter in effect becomes the law for the heart. In other words, like Bavinck and Kuyper, Dooyeweerd insists that it is the nature of the heart to be 'semen-religionis', to have a 'religious disposition' which makes it immediately susceptible to or correlated with Word Revelation. And since Word Revelation acts as a dynamic, directive power which calls man to submit his heart in total service to God, the heart becomes, as we saw, the dynamic religious-directive principle in man, embodying itself in all his acts.

Man's faith function is related to revelation in a way that is exactly parallel to what we have just observed with respect to the heart. Of all the functions, only faith is related to both kinds of revelation; faith

is thus given the task of mediating Word revelation to the rest of temporality.

With respect to faith, 'natural revelation' again has to do with the structure of this function which reflects the work of God's hands and which (seemingly) remains intact if man turns away from God. The structural law for faith determines that it is the "organ of believing" which lies within "the 'natural' order of creation"; it is the "instrument of God's grace in Jesus Christ." But it is exactly this structural ('natural' revelation) character of faith which

"guarantees that it cannot be conceived apart from the 'heart' as the religious root of human existence and the spiritual dynamis operative in the latter,"⁷²

The structural law for faith thus immediately involves the "subjection of our belief to Divine Revelation as the ultimate guarantee of certainty."⁷³ As in the heart, so also in faith the relation to the self-revealing Origin is directly implied.⁷⁴ Faith is by its very nature linked to the heart and receptive to Word revelation. The implication is that the other functions are not directly linked to the heart and through it to the Origin's self-revelation, but require the modal mediation of faith. Dooyeweerd thus seems to set up a sequential series through which the power of Word-revelation enters temporality. As he puts it, Word-Revelation "occurs primarily in the heart."⁷⁵ "Divine revelation is directed to the heart, . . . and from there to the whole of one's temporal life in the total coherence of its aspects,"⁷⁶ This revelation works the religious ground motive into the heart, and this ground motive "first manifests itself in time in. . . , faith-life. . . ." ⁷⁷ And, as we saw, faith mediates this religious direction to the other functions through its role in the opening-process. Faith, as the only aspect oriented to both kinds of revelation, has a structure which calls it to listen to the dynamic, directive, powerful Word-Revelation. Thus faith becomes the structural link by which directive power is introduced into temporal structural reality which, seen apart from this link, would seem to stand quite separate from the higher (central) directive principle (i.e., the heart). Thus Dooyeweerd again establishes distance between the heart and man's functional diversity.

The heart is not simply the unity dimension of man, but something that also transcends time and that can only be linked to man's diverse functions through faith. It is faith which, because of its structural orientation and because it is the transcendental terminal function, puts not only man's functionality but all of reality in contact with its transcendent religious root and thus in contact with God. Faith forms an all-important link in the sequential order of temporal reality. "Without faith this reality cannot exist."⁷⁸

Dooyeweerd's definition of the modal-meaning nucleus of faith concisely expresses faith's structural orientation to a dynamic, powerful Word-Revelation. Dooyeweerd describes the essence of faith as

"an original transcendental certainty, within the limits of time, related to a revelation of the Archē (Origin) which has captured the heart of human existence."⁷⁹

At one point, Dooyeweerd maintains that this structural, philosophical definition is purposely contentless. He claims he is only concerned to describe the structural theatre within which the directive content of Word-Revelation (which is of theological concern) or a pseudo-revelation can manifest itself.⁸⁰ Thus Dooyeweerd seems to be contending that the structural contours of faith, although directly calling forth orientation to a revelation, stand neutral with respect to the content of that revelation. In other contexts, however, Dooyeweerd contradicts this. He indicates that christian philosophy must recognize that integral to the structural law for faith is the fact that it calls for subjection to true Word-Revelation.⁸¹ Openness to this Divine Word-Revelation thus becomes part of the 'natural' structure of faith.⁸² Thus "Word-revelation in its aspect of faith establishes the norm and contains the principium of Christian belief."⁸³ Word-Revelation overshadows, almost replaces the purely structural law for faith. Dooyeweerd thus joins Bavinck and Kuyper in asserting that from the christian point of view the 'formal' (i.e., purely structural) sense of faith is totally governed by the 'material' sense in which christian belief is normed by the directive content of true Word-Revelation.

(d) Closed, Restrictive and Disclosed Faith

Every aspect of reality has what Dooyeweerd calls a 'restrictive structure'. In all the aspects other than faith, this restrictive structure has to do with a lack of being opened-up in the transcendental direction. That is to say, in its restrictive sense, the aspect is regarded only in terms of its foundational sub-structure, with no disclosure of its anticipatory moments, under the leading of faith. The faith aspect, as we saw, also has a transcendental direction. Here transcendental direction does not refer to a disclosure of anticipatory moments, but to the fact that faith is directly driven by religious impulses from man's religious root. We might expect, then, that comparable to the other aspects, the restrictive structure of faith has to do with a lack of recognition of this transcendental direction. However, Dooyeweerd insists that

"we must bear in mind from the outset that the terms 'restrictive' and 'disclosed function', used with reference to the modus of faith, can only have a special signification. This particular and really exceptional sense is connected with the position occupied by faith as the transcendental terminal function in the entire opening-process of temporal meaning."⁸⁴

An elimination of the transcendental direction of faith would involve an elimination of faith's orientation to the religiously directive heart. But since this orientation is part of the very nuclear structure of faith as Dooyeweerd has defined it, an elimination of the transcendental direction would in effect eliminate the faith aspect itself. It is impossible to regard faith only in terms of its modal sub-structure.

Dooyeweerd has no doubt that the key to the restrictive sense of faith is to be found in natural revelation, since it reveals to us that by its very structure faith is not only oriented to religious direction from the heart, but also, with and through the heart, subjected to Word-Revelation. Since this structure remains intact when man fell into sin, natural revelation became a judgment unto him. Apostacy from God

"started with a refusal to listen any longer to Him, with the repugnance of the heart to what God has said. The function of faith was thus drawn away from the Divine Word.

. . . Where the heart closed itself and turned away from God, the function of pistis (faith) was closed to the light of God's Word. As a result faith began to manifest its transcendental direction in an apostate way, in the search for an absolute firm ground in the creation itself. The inevitable consequence was the idolatrous absolutizing of meaning."⁸⁵

It becomes clear that in the fundamental sense the closed function of faith has to do not (as in the other aspects) with an elimination of structural opening-up in the transcendental direction, but with a religious, directional re-orientation. In Dooyeweerd's words "(faith's) direction became apostate: natural faith turned into un-belief before the Word of God,"⁸⁶

"In (faith's) closed sense the true direction to the absolute Origin has been reversed in the absolutizing of what has been created,"⁸⁷

Dooyeweerd recognizes that within the context of closed faith it is possible to give a structural account of this function as 'restrictive' or 'disclosed', depending on what part(s) of creation is (mis)taken to be the revelational principle. Faith reaches its lowest ebb, its restrictive sense, when it "has no other revelational principle than the transcendental certainty about the deity revealing itself in the closed 'forces of nature'. . . ." ⁸⁸ Man then sees his selfhood or religious heart as completely caught up in these forces,

"The restrictive function of faith is the extreme transcendental limit reached in the apostacy of faith, in which under its guidance the narrative anticipatory spheres of all the earlier aspects remain rigidly closed."⁸⁹

Here we confront the limit to which faith can apostatize without violating its structural law. The restrictive

structural law of faith "must be conceived as a transcendental restrictive structure in apostacy,"⁹⁰ In its restrictive sense, faith keeps its transcendental terminal character in that it remains oriented to (what it takes to be) a revelation; but, because of the norming influence of this revelation, faith forfeits its directive, leading role in the opening process. When, within the context of closed (apostate) faith, 'disclosure' occurs, faith again takes up its role in the opening-process. But it can only do this if man first (in his apostacy) becomes conscious of the fact that his selfhood (heart) transcends temporal diversity. Then faith can anticipate a 'revelation' in the heart from a 'revealing deity' (now sought in an absolutization of one of the normative or higher aspects of reality).⁹¹ The 'revelation' will (in his heart) give man what he considers to be self-knowledge. Thus, normed by this 'revelation' the heart directs its religious impulses to the faith function. Faith, now also normed by this 'revelation', guides the opening-process. But this opening-process is always directed toward the idol; it is a deepening of meaning in the direction of apostacy.⁹²

There can however, be a positive (non-apostate) way in which faith comes more and more into its own in directing the opening-process. The starting point for this process is again to be sought in the 'natural' structure of faith, which is now explained in a way that is clearly dominated by the content of christian Word-revelation. As Dooyeweerd puts it, the starting point for the deepening of meaning of the pistis function is to be sought "in the structure of pistis (faith) as it was implanted in man by God at the creation, i.e., in its primary openness to Divine Word-Revelation.

"After the fall into sin this primary disclosure is only possible by means of the working of God's Spirit in the opening of the heart by grace. The apostate function of faith as such does not offer any starting-point for the development of Christian faith. First the religious root of human experience must be directed to God, if pistis is to be a useful organ for listening to the Word-Revelation.

"In this process no new function of faith is created, but the primary opening of the pistis to the Divine Logos is a radical reversal of the direction of faith, which cannot possibly be brought about by the apostate nature of man,"⁹³

This discussion brings to the fore several characteristics of faith which we already began to be aware of earlier. In the first place, we note that Dooyeweerd is once again ambivalent as to whether or not subjection to true Word-revelation is integral to the structure of faith. In our last quote, both tendencies are evident. On the one hand, he insists that openness to Word-revelation is creationally characteristic of faith. On the other hand, he maintains that although in apostasy faith's structure remains intact, it is rendered useless for listening to true Word-revelation. Thus orientation to this revelation is seemingly not structurally essential to faith. Dooyeweerd's monarchian framework allows him to emphasize these two sides at the same time. When the structural law for faith is dominated or normed by Word-revelation, the latter controls so fully that it in effect becomes part of the intended structure. When this dominance is disrupted, however, the 'lower' principle (i.e., structural law seen apart from true Word-revelation) comes to the fore,

Secondly, we note that faith is again presented as the principle which introduces direction into structural reality, and thus links temporality to the transcendent, religiously-directive heart. This is evidenced, by the fact that the terms 'closed' and 'opened-up' have a fundamentally different meaning with respect to faith than they do with respect to all the other aspects. When applied to faith, these terms have to do with the fundamental religious-directional orientation of this aspect, in relation to religious impulses received from the heart. In this fundamental sense, 'openness' (i.e., true religious direction) was creationally implanted in man's faith function. After the fall, faith became closed and turned in the direction of apostasy. The other aspects are seemingly only involved in sin through the (mis-) guidance of faith in the opening-process. And although within either of the two religious directions it is possible to speak of 'restrictive' and 'disclosed' faith, these terms only have reference to the nature of faith's

orientation to a revelational principle and its consequent role in the opening-process of reality. Thus the meaning 'restrictive' and 'disclosed' have when used with respect to faith also bears no relationship to their meaning when applied to the other aspects. Faith is once again given a characterization that sets it quite apart from all the lower aspects, so that it can play its religious-direction-radiating role within the (hierarchical) order of reality.

CONCLUSION

Bavinck, Kuyper, and Dooyeweerd all struggled to come to clarity concerning the nature of man and the place of faith and religion in human life. In developing the view that faith is not a supernatural additive, but rather part of man's creational make-up, these men have pointed the way for a fruitful re-orientation of christian thinking on these matters. Especially Dooyeweerd has made significant contributions to our understanding of the integral role of faith in leading and integrating the diversity of life, thus creating the possibility of deeper insight into the full-orbed character of christian living. However, despite their best intentions, all three of these thinkers have limited their possibilities for a more thorough-going reformation of christian thinking by utilizing a particular pattern of thought which, although they considered it particularly adaptable for expressing a christian view of reality, does not have its roots in biblically sensitive reflection. On-going christian scholarship must seek to pick up from these men their penetrating, groundbreaking insights while eliminating the monarchian framework and its inherent short-circuits. On the basis of the preceding study it is possible to indicate several crucial problem areas that will require intensive reflection. In the interest of furthering this communal task, we conclude by pointing out three such problem areas and suggesting provisional avenues for further fruitful exploration.

1. The Nature of Revelation

Dooyeweerd's separation of ik (direction) and functions (structure) is concomitant with his distinction of two kinds of revelation. Dooyeweerd's conception involves the need for a kind of pre-redemptive special revelation; i.e., he requires a directive Word to galvanize a static structural (law-ordered) creation into action. Such a need for two separate kinds of revelation would fall away if the monarchian framework were eliminated. Further reforming reflection concerning the nature of revelation must stress the wholeness of the latter. God relates to man, indeed, to the whole creation, through his covenantal Word. This many-sided Word of God called the diverse creation into being by directionally structuring the responsive existence of all God's creatures. But the Word of God is not exhausted in its diversity; it has a depth-unity which sums up the meaning

of the whole. It is this depth-unity of God's covenantal Word which Christ summed up in commanding his followers to love God above all and their fellow man as themselves. We experience this unity in all dimensions of life, but in the deepest possible way in faith.⁹⁴ Through the salvation won by Christ, God has again made it possible for man to live in this covenantal fellowship with Him and to respond in all his life accordingly.

We should maintain, then, that God's revelation is a whole, and that all revelation is Word revelation. God's whole revelation is addressed to the whole of man. The Holy Spirit works the whole burden of the root-meaning of God's covenantal Word in Christ into the hearts of His children, giving them heart-understanding of the whole Word. We cannot fathom this working of the Spirit; we cannot logically grasp the way of the Word in the depth of man. We are called to confess or believe that that Word in its centrality calls man in his heart to ~~surrender~~ his whole person to God so that the new life in Christ may encompass his being. In our scientific analysis, we can try to give a limited, functional account of these matters. Then we see that functionally the Word of God addresses the whole man by appealing to his faith function, since the latter by nature comes functionally closest to expressing the wholeness of man's being. On this functional level, the Word calls for man's surrender, no questions asked, and it immediately calls faith to integrate this surrender into all of functionality. But this is only a limited, one-sided analysis of the whole picture; man in his heart unity is immediately caught up in this process. There is no sequential order as in Dooyeweerd's position, in which (only) the heart and the faith function are oriented to directive Word-Revelation and faith stands closer to the heart than the other functions, as if the heart has a supra-temporal spiritual reality apart from the functions.

2. The Nature of Man

Further reflection concerning the nature of man must abandon all notions of a dichotomy, whether that dichotomy be one that places material over against spiritual or temporal over against supra-temporal. Once a dichotomistic distinction has been made, all attempts to stress the wholeness or oneness of man are doomed to failure. Dooyeweerd's best attempts to stress that the whole man is body and the whole man is soul still get

bogged down in the dichotomy he starts with.⁹⁵ In tune with the Scriptures, a renewed christian view of man must stress his wholeness or oneness. And although it is possible to distinguish (heart) unity and (functional) diversity in that wholeness, these must never be separated. The integrality of man as he lives life must always be kept clearly in mind. Thus, even as these distinctions are made, it must be stressed that man's heart is nothing apart from his functions and his functions are nothing apart from his heart. The heart is the functions in their unity, and the functions are the heart in its diversity. Yet the fullness of man is not exhausted in his functions. His heart, as the depth-unity of his being, is more than the sum of his functions. But this 'more' should not be isolated and ontologically located in a part of man's make-up. Analysis can only deal with man in his functionality, but it deals with the whole man in his functionality. This view implies that man's heart-unity does not recede as a phantom which cannot be integrally known. Rather, it is the characteristic of one of the modes of man's creationally-ordained functioning (i.e., faith) to express (to the greatest degree functionally possible, i.e., the greatest degree possible) the wholeness of man's being. In so doing the faith function points to the reality that functionality is not the whole of man; indeed, faith functionally expresses that man in himself is not whole but was made to live in communion with his God. It can be said that faith is referential; in the faith function there is an openness in man to what is beyond his creatureliness. However, this openness does not, as in Dooyeweerd's view, establish a link with a realm which directionalizes a static, structural reality. Rather, this openness is an ordinary creational dimension of man's directionally-structured being. Every man roots himself somewhere, in something that lies beyond his creatureliness. Man must unconditionally surrender to someone, or be open to someone as the final validation of his life. The fact that some men open themselves up to the true God (i.e., are opened up by God) and some to a false god (i.e., devise a god that suits their ends) does not do away with or mitigate the creationally 'natural' reality of this 'openness' or 'surrender' dimension of man's being.

All men have this creational dimension in the full sense, as Dooyeweerd often affirms. But due to his monarchian approach in which the supra-temporal

bears the weight of directionalizing the temporal (structural), Dooyeweerd, following especially Bavinck, at crucial points is virtually forced to maintain that the creational structure of the faith function implies covenantal fellowship with the true God through orientation to true Word-Revelation. Dooyeweerd is thus in danger of somehow 'christianizing' all men, since he maintains that all men fully possess the faith function. Of course, Dooyeweerd can not allow this possibility. But in his framework, the only other possibility is to compromise the full humanity of unbelievers. And this is in fact what Dooyeweerd does. Outside of Christ, man's (mis-directed) faith function is structurally 'closed' (although the reality of the unbeliever's unfolding of reality ironically forces Dooyeweerd to speak of "opening-up" in the context of "closed" faith). Dooyeweerd allows that sin not only has radically directed man away from God, but also has tampered with the structure of his being. As a result, life outside of Christ can not fully structurally unfold; indeed, the possibility of any real, genuine unfolding or opening-up is made questionable. Dooyeweerd's framework did not allow him to say both that 'openness' belongs to the natural constitution of man and that full and complete openness is only received in Jesus Christ.

We would stress again that all men have a creational dimension calling them to open, covenanting surrender with what they take to be the firm Rock in their lives. In this sense, unbelievers are fully human. Fear of placing too much stock in man and his capacities, ought not to make further christian reflection shy away from this emphasis, as long as such analysis is done in the humbling awareness that in the final analysis those who cut themselves off from God in Christ will turn the wholeness of their being into meaninglessness.


An emphasis on the wholeness or oneness of man must lead continued christian reflection to stress the fact that the whole man is a religiously dynamic (structured) being. It has been common in our academic circles, when distinguishing heart and functions, to regard the heart as the religious root-unity, the directive life-driving force in man. But the heart is not distinct from the functions in that it is religious while they are not (or only secondarily) religious. The heart is not distinct from the functions in that it is

characterized by directionality while the functions are characteristically structural. Man functions as a fully-religious self; his diverse functioning is not somehow one step removed from his religious centre. One might say that the functions give structurally differing configurations to man's direction. But these structural configurations are integrally involved in the whole religious life of man. For instance, the way in which man's functions are creationally structured points him in a certain definite direction. Such directive-structure has direct implications for man's responsive functioning; for example, disobedience will rule out certain blessings implied in God's directive-structure for his functioning.

3. Faith and the Unfolding of Reality

The unfolding of reality is the task of human beings, i.e., whole, religiously functioning persons. It is again possible to try to analyse this activity and give a scientific account of it, but such an account can only grasp this process in its modal diversity. The opening-up process displays that, at all levels, reality anticipates the fullness of meaning. An opened-up function expresses this fullness to the fullest extent that it can do so in its functionally limited way. The faith function is that function which by nature anticipates (to the greatest degree functionally possible) the fullness of meaning of reality. The faith function has no modal anticipations, but is itself the anticipatory mode. Faith is the referential mode making functionally explicit the depth-heart dimension of man's being and its whole dependence on God, through the Word. Thus from the functional viewpoint, faith can serve to integrate and lead the unfolding of the fullness meaning in the other functions. Faith, however, is not that function which religiously directionalizes the other functions. Religious direction is not mediated to the other functions via faith; all the functions are integrally religiously directed. However, within the total context of man's directionally-structured functioning, faith plays a leading and integrating role, since its task as a function is to bring out as explicitly as functionally possible who or what man is at heart living for. Yet it must always be emphasized that all of life issues from (i.e., is the concrete, diverse side of) the heart of man.

Schematic Diagram of Dooyeweerd's Anthropological Framework



FOOTNOTES

^{1a}H. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer," Philosophia Reformata, 4e Jaargang (1939), p. 204.

^{1b}H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 39.
Dutch: "Zoolang wij, . . . de mens alleen maar naar zijn tijdelijk bestaan in het enkaptisch structuurgeheel van zijn lichamelijke beschouwen, blijft hij het meest ingewikkelde en in zichzelf verdeelde wezen, dat op de aardbodem te vinden is."

²H. Dooyeweerd, "De Leer van de Mens in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee," (pamphlet), proposition XII. Cf. also proposition X. Dutch: "het menselijk lichaam," (English translation: "The Theory of Man," pamphlet, Toronto, ICS).

³H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. III, p. 89.

⁴H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 40.
Dutch: "typisch kwalificerende structuurfunctie in 's mensen lichamelijke existentie in een der modale aspecten van de tijdshorizon der menselijke ervaring."

⁵Ibid., p. 41. Dutch: "waarachtige totaliteit en eenheid van het menselijk bestaan, omdat het diepste uitgangspunt dezer mensbeschouwing hier een dualistisch karakter draagt, dat het concentrisch inzicht in the wortheleenheid der menselijke existentie uitsluit."

⁶Ibid., p. 39. Dutch: "het in de tijd niet afgesloten en niet af te sluiten schepsel."

⁷Ibid., p. 40. Dutch: "bovenmodale religieus-geestelijke aard. . ."

⁸H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. I, p. 16.

⁹H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 42.
Dutch: "besloten in, . . . de tijdshorizon onzer ervaring," finds its "bovenlichamelijk concentratiepunt" in the ik.

¹⁰H. Hart, Problems of time: an essay, in The Idea of a Christian Philosophy (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1973), p. 35.

¹¹H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropolgie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 39.
Dutch: "centrum" and "worteleenheid".

¹²Ibid., p. 42. Cf. also p. 41. Dutch: "concentrische betrokkenheid" to the ik as the "centrale betrekkingpunt" of his temporal existence.

¹³Cf. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I., p. 5.

¹⁴H. Dooyeweerd, "De Leer Van de Mens in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" (pamphlet), Proposition V. Dutch: "alle uitgangen van het tijdelijke leven."

¹⁵Ibid., (parenthesis mine). "alle tijdelijke dingen te boven gaat."

¹⁶H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. I, p. 5. (emphasis mine)

¹⁷H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 40.
Dutch: "religieus-geestelijke aard."

¹⁸Ibid., p. 42. (parenthesis mine) Dutch: "de menselijke lichamelijke blijft alsoe zondanig besloten."

¹⁹Ibid., Dutch: "innerlijke eenheid."

²⁰H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. I, p. 32.

²¹Ibid., p. 57.

²²Ibid., p. 20. Sin is therefore the opposite of a religious choosing for God; it is "the apostacy of this centre; of this radix of existence." (A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. I, p. 175).

²³H. Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968), p. 189.

²⁴H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. I, p. 11.

²⁵Ibid., p. 175.

²⁶Cf. J.A.L. Taljaard, Polished Lenses. (unpublished manuscript) Potchefstroom, 1974. Taljaard maintains that Dooyeweerd's view of man combines the doctrine of analogia entis with the monarchianistic system, so that, analogous to God, man is in effect the origin of the temporal world.

²⁷H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 43.

²⁸H. Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968), p. 181.

²⁹H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969) Vol. I, p. 11.

³⁰H. Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968), p. 181.

³¹H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 43. Dutch: "waarin het (ik) naar de scheppingsorde gevoegd is" must be examined in their "onverbrekelijke onderlinge samenhang. . ."

³²H. Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968), p. 181. Cf. also De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie, p. 43.

³³H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 43.

³⁴H. Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968), p. 181.

³⁵Cf. "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," p. 43.

³⁶H. Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought (Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1968), p. 182.

³⁷H. Dooyeweerd, "De Taak Ener Wijsgerige Anthropologie," Philosophia Reformata, 26e Jaargang (1961), p. 44.
Dutch: "in de liefdedienst van God en in de centrale, d.i. religieuze liefdesgemeenschap met de naaste,"

³⁸Ibid., Dutch: "de religieuze aandrift als aanleg."

³⁹Ibid., Dutch: "gegrepen. . . door de drijfkracht van Gods Woord openbaring."

⁴⁰Ibid., Cf. also "De Leer Van de Mens in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" (pamphlet) Proposition VI.

⁴¹H. Dooyeweerd, "De Leer Van De Mens in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee" (pamphlet), Proposition XII.
(English translation: "The Theory of Man", pamphlet).

⁴²"The Theory of Man" (pamphlet) Proposition X.

⁴³Ibid., Proposition XXIV.

⁴⁴H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. III, p. 88.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶"The Theory of Man", Proposition XIV. (parenthesis mine).

⁴⁷Ibid., Proposition XXI.

⁴⁸H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. III, p. 88.

⁴⁹"The Theory of Man", Proposition XX.

⁵⁰Ibid., Proposition XIV.

⁵¹Ibid., Proposition XVIII.

⁵²Ibid., Proposition XXII.

⁵³H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. III, p. 88.

⁵⁴Ibid., Cf. also "The Theory of Man," Proposition XXII.

⁵⁵"The Theory of Man," Proposition XXII.

⁵⁶H. Dooyeweerd, Reconstruction and Reformation, (Toronto: I.C.S.) pp. 4-3. Dutch: Vernieuwing en Beinning (Zutphen: J.B. vanden Brink, 1963), p. 87.

⁵⁷H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. II, p. 68.

⁵⁸H. Dooyeweerd, "De Verhouding Tussen Wijsbegeerte en Theologie en de Strijd der Faculteiten," Philosophia Reformata, 23e Jaargang (1958), p. 49. Cf. Chapter I, above, note 30. Dutch: "subjectieve geloofswerkzaamheid."

⁵⁹H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. I, p. 5.

⁶⁰Cf. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. II, p. 297.

⁶¹Cf. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. II, p. 52.

⁶²Ibid., p. 291.

⁶³Ibid., p. 293.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 299. (emphasis mine).

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 294.

⁶⁶Cf. H. Dooyeweerd, Reconstruction and Reformation p. 4-2, where faith is said to (temporally) reveal the direction of the heart; (Dutch: Vernieuwing en Beinning, p. 86).

⁶⁷H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. II, p. 297.

⁶⁸H. Dooyeweerd, Reconstruction and Reformation, (Toronto: I.C.S.) p. 4-9. (Dutch: Vernieuwing en Beinning, p. 95. Cf. also A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, pp. 306 & 7.

⁶⁹H. Dooyeweerd, "De Verhouding Tussen Wijsbegeerte en Theologie en de Strijd der Faculteiten," Philosophia Reformata, 23e Jaargang (1958), p. 49. Dutch: "goddelijke kracht".

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 3. Dutch: "centraal kennisprincipe" which as a "geestelijke drijfkracht."

⁷¹H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. II, p. 307.

⁷²Ibid., p. 302. (emphasis mine).

⁷³Ibid., p. 305.

⁷⁴H. Dooyeweerd, "De Verhouding Tussen Wijsbegeerte en Theologie en de Strijd der Faculteiten," Philosophia Reformata, 23e Jaargang (1958), p. 50.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 49. Dutch: "geschiedt primair in het hart."

⁷⁶H. Dooyeweerd, Reconstruction and Reformation (Toronto: I.C.S.) p. 4-5. (emphasis mine) (Dutch: Vernieuwing en Bezinning, p. 90).

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 4-2. (Dutch: Ibid., p. 86). (emphasis mine).

⁷⁸H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. II, p. 305.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 304.

⁸⁰Cf. "De Verhouding Tussen Wijsbegeerte en Theologie en de Strijd der Faculteiten," p. 50. also A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. II, p. 298 and Reconstruction and Reformation, p. 4-2. (Dutch: Vernieuwing en Bezinning, p. 86).

⁸¹Cf. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. II, p. 305.

⁸²Ibid., p. 310. Cf. also Reconstruction and Reformation, p. 4-10. (Dutch: Vernieuwing en Bezinning, p. 96).

⁸³Ibid., p. 305.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 306.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 308. (parenthesis and emphasis mine).

⁸⁶H. Dooyeweerd, Reconstruction and Reformation, (Toronto: I.C.S.) p. 4-9. (parenthesis and emphasis mine).
(Dutch: Vernieuwing en Bezinning, p. 96).

⁸⁷H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Pres. and Ref. Publishing Co., 1969), Vol. II, p. 309. (parenthesis and emphasis mine).

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 315.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 309.

⁹¹Cf. Ibid., p. 322.

⁹²Cf. Ibid., p. 310.

⁹³Ibid., pp. 310-311 (parenthesis mine; emphasis mine, with the exception of 'new').

⁹⁴To avoid confusion, I have retained Dooyeweerd's use of 'faith' as referring to man's faith or pistical function. Actually this usage contributes to the problems surrounding the nature and role of this aspect. 'Faith' properly has reference to the depth unity of man or his heart relationship with God. In this sense, all man's functions are dimersions of faith. The aspect as such could perhaps better be designated the certitudinal aspect, i.e., that dimension in life which calls man to surrender his being with unquestioning certainty and which calls him to make explicit the ultimate foundations of his life.

⁹⁵Cf. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. III, p. 89.

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