FAITH IN SEARCH OF A FOCUS

An Internal Critique of the
Faith Development theory
of James Fowler

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most stimulating academic studies engaged in at present in the area of the human sciences is the faith stage theory of James W. Fowler. Fowler, a theologian by training, is in the process of devising an interdisciplinary study of human development, which focuses specifically on the role or place of faith. I use the term interdisciplinary to identify Fowler's utilization of philosophical, theological, psychological, and social research theory in the construction of his own paradigm. The result is a view of human faith experience which understands faith as a universal mode of action, capable of being structurally defined in terms of identifiable stages of development.

Fowler's theory has received positive reviews as exemplified by the response to his major publication, <u>Stages</u> <u>of</u> <u>Faith</u>. The sentiment expressed in the following excerpt is not uncommon in the reviews <u>Stages</u> <u>of</u> <u>Faith</u> has received:

> This theory must be critically reflected upon as a normative statement about the human condition. Every field of ministry is likely to be significantly impacted by the current investigations of Fowler and his associates into the dynamics of faith development.[1]

Yet there is another recurring theme in response to Fowler's work. This theme centers around the lack of clarity involved in Fowler's presentations of his theory. It comes from both psychological and theological communities. For instance, the same author whom I have quoted above also writes;

> ...there is a genuine crisis in Fowler's broad definition of faith; that is, there is both opportunity and danger...The chief danger is the acceptability of his definition of faith as a valid research construct. Just what exactly is it that Fowler is measuring?[2]

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This critic sees, as one of Fowler's problems, the "encroachment" of his faith stage theory upon the general domain of ego development theory. At this point "theoretical clarification" is called for on Fowler's part with respect to the relationship between his faith theory and ego psychology.

Another critic responds by confessing that while he is "more or less convinced that Fowler knows what he is talking about," he also registers the conviction that "there is still something unclear and basically confusing about his formulations...Fowler seems unclear about what he means by faith..."[3]

A third critic, dating back to 1976, wrote in a similar vein;

> It is not clear what is being tested, (focused on), intelligence, verbal faculty, breadth of a person's literary background, amount of reflection of social issues or - as suggested - faith.[4]

It is in this context of discussion that I examine James Fowler's theory of faith development. I intend to outline Fowler's theory and offer a critical analysis and discussion, focusing on what I perceive to be the sources of Fowler's "confusing formulations."

In general, Fowler has attempted to coordinate a broad and diverse amount of information on faith and human development, by making use of a two dimensional approach. This approach identifies faith as a mode of being in relation and as a mode of knowing. I hope to demonstrate that the difficulty in Fowler's paradigm is largely the result of ambiguity in two areas.

First, there is a marked lack of focus in Fowler's presentations which results in an unintegrated model. Although Fowler

holds to a two dimensional approach, he fails to present a clear core focus of faith which can serve as a common denominator, capable of connecting his two dimensions. Secondly, the most promising notion in Fowler's perspective for providing the necessary focus is the notion of ultimacy. But Fowler's understanding and use of ultimacy creates further problems rather than helping him with respect to clarity of focus. I will conclude this thesis with some recommendations designed to take more advantage of the focus that the notion of ultimacy can provide.

In order to accomplish the above, I will proceed as follows. Chapter one will consist of an introduction to a series of concepts Fowler attempts to weave together in his definitions of faith. I will then present the methodological concerns which drive Fowler to organize his material in the manner in which he does. I will conclude chapter one by tracing the origins of the above-mentioned notions by providing a brief biographical sketch of their entrance into Fowler's theory-building development, and explain how Fowler incorporates these concepts into a dimensional model.

Chapters two and three will consist of in-depth presentations of the relational and knowing dimensions of faith respectively. In the fourth chapter, I will analyze and criticize Fowler's project in the above mentioned fashion and suggest a potential way of alleviating the identified points of confusion.

CHAPTER I

FOWLER ON FAITH

In order to introduce some of the various notions Fowler

weaves together in his approach, I have listed below three of

Fowler's most recent definitions of faith.

Faith, Fowler writes, is:

(A) The process of constitutive knowing underlying a
person's composition and maintenance of a comprehensive
frame (or frames) of meaning... Generated from the
person's attachments or commitments to centers of
supraordinate value which have power to unify his or
her experiences of the world ...Thereby endowing the
relationships, contexts and patterns of everyday life,
past and future, with significance.[1]

(B) Faith we may say is, a disposition of the total
self to the ultimate environment... in which trust and
loyalty are invested in a center or centers of value
and power... which give order and coherence to the
forcefield of life, and... which support and sustain
(or qualify and relativize) our mundane and everyday
commitments and trusts...combining to give orientation,
courage, meaning and hope to our lives, and... to unite
us into communities of shared interpretation, loyalty
and trust.[2]

[And finally]

(C) In its most formal and comprehensive terms I can
state it, faith is...Peoples evolved and evolving ways
of experiencing self others and world, (as they con-
struct them), as related to and affected by the
ultimate conditions of existence, (as they construct
them), and of shaping their lives, purposes and meaning
trusts and loyalties, in light of the character of
being, value and power, determining the ultimate
conditions of existence, (as grasped in their operating
images - conscious and unconscious - of them).[3]

Fowler introduced definition (A) in one of his 1980 presen-

tations by referring to it as a composite definition. This

characterization applies in fact to all three definitions. All

three are composed of several identifiable themes.

One major theme is constituted by the terms trust, loyalty, attachment and commitment. All three definitions register a connection between faith and this trust relation theme. Definition (B) actually places investments of trust and loyalty in something transcendent at the core of faith, coloring all that is said about faith by its first two lines. In this definition it is one's investment of loyalty and trust in a center of value and power that orders, coheres, supports, sustains, qualifies, and relativizes one's mundane or everyday commitments and trusts. This kind of trust consequently provides orientation, courage, meaning, and hope in life at large, including uniting persons into communities of shared interpretation. Here, then, Fowler places a primary emphasis on the theme of trust in identifying the nature of faith.

A second major theme consists in such terms as knowing, composing, constructing, construing, interpreting, and imaging. Faith, in this theme, is closely associated with both knowing as a process, and the products of that process. These products as identified include operating images, interpretations, and comprehensive frames of meaning. It is particularly in definition (A) that the association of faith and knowing comes to the fore. In this definition, faith is literally identified as a process of constitutive knowing which underlies one's composition and maintenance of a comprehensive frame of meaning. While generated from one's attachment or commitment to centers of supraordinate value, in definition (A) it is this process of knowing which unifies, contextualizes and patterns life with significance.

Faith is here identified with cognitive processes.

A third identifiable theme, which I prefer to call a sub-theme, is transcendence or ultimacy. I prefer to call this a sub-theme because, rather than depicting a third major concept, transcendence runs like an undercurrent, evenly throughout all three definitions. In each it appears as a qualifying notion, providing context for the major themes. This is most clearly apparent in definition (C) where Fowler conditions his statements concerning the two major concepts already mentioned with the phrase, "the ultimate conditions of existence."

A final recurring theme, again a sub-theme, in these composite definitions, concerns the relationship between faith and mundane or everyday experience. That relation is one of orientation. The gifts of faith, as Fowler lists them, include understanding and energy. Faith provides unity, hope, and courage in the course of one's everyday dealings. Via faith as trusting and committing in, or knowing and composing of one's ultimate environment, mundane life is qualified, relativized, and given order and coherence. Faith funds everyday life with significance. As in the case of transcendence, this theme, rather than coming to ascendancy in any one definition of faith, runs uniformly throughout all three.

In each definition then, all four themes are present. In definitions (A) and (B), one of the two major themes occupies the limelight. These emphases correlate with the context in which each definition is found. In definition (C), the major concepts share equal attention, while the sub-themes appear uniformly throughout.   The thrust of my overview of Fowler's project

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will be to trace out the origins of these various themes and outline Fowler's method for coordinating them into a whole theory of faith. The rest of this chapter will consist in presenting Fowler's methodology, and identifying the sources of these various themes.

Methodology

Fowler acknowledges that his way of approaching faith is controversial. He writes:

> Our use of the term faith does make many people uncomfortable. As Harvey Cox once said to me, 'There is something to offend everyone in this way of talking about faith!' Yet I think we cannot afford to give up faith as our focal concept despite its complexity, its likelihood of being misunderstood, and the difficulty of pinning it down precisely."[4]

Fowler discusses the relationship between faith as a phenomenon and his method in the introduction to the book Stages Of Faith. Here Fowler identifies faith as complex, multidimensional and mysterious. When theorizing about faith, Fowler encourages us to heed the warning of Erik Erikson: "We must take our theories with a serious playfulness and a playful seriousness."[5] This admonition centers on Fowler's concern that while theories can be "exciting and powerful, giving us names for our experiences and ways to understand and express what we have lived...They also can become blinders, limiting our ability to see to only those features of phenomena that we can name and account for."[6]

In response to this state of affairs, Fowler asserts two considerations. First, one must have faith in one's ability to

"measure, grasp, clarify and work effectively" even with the most vital processes in life.[7] Secondly, one must also accept the fact "that the reality of any such complex process[i.e., faith] will not be contained in theoretic frameworks."[8]

> Fowler echoed this same concern in 1980 when he wrote:

> Faith is an extremely complex phenomenon to try to operationalize for investigation. It has more dimensions than any one perspective can contain.[9]

This comment has specific reference to the difficulty the complexity of faith poses to his effort to view it in developmental perspective. Fowler summarizes his methodological approach in the following manner:

> Our effort has been to reflect upon several dimensions of this complex phenomenon we call faith. H. Richard Niebuhr likens faith to a cube. From any one angle of vision he points out, the observer can see and describe at least three sides of the cube. But the cube has back sides, a bottom and insides as well. Several angles of vision must be coordinated simultaneously to do any real justice in a characterization of faith.[10]

Here, after reasserting his concern for faith's multidimensional complexity, and human theoretic limitedness, Fowler argues that in "order to do any real justice in a characterization of faith... Several angles of vision must be coordinated simultaneously."[11] What Fowler refers to as angles of vision are different perspectives. He follows these comments by identifying some of the various perspectives he has coordinated in his own theory of faith.

This same methodological approach is evident in Niebuhr's work as Fowler describes it in the book To See the Kingdom. Here Fowler identifies this methodological principle as "the logic of polarity."[12] Fowler defines Niebuhr's logic of polarity in the

following manner.

> A logic of polarity, we might say, is a mode of thinking and writing that tries to attend to the wholeness, the unity of a complex phenomenon, by juxtaposing the detailed but partial views of it acquired from the several possible points of vantage (each of which may tend to make totalistic claims for its perspective) and by combining those perspectives, making such reconciliations of their contradictions as can legitimately be made, but without any specious removal of the tensions between them.[13]

In essence, Fowler's procedure involves his desire to embrace human limitedness and faith's complex multidimensional character by developing a multiperspectival paradigm. Fowler's view of faith intends to include (coordinate) a number of different perspectives. It is this simultaneous coordination of a number of different perspectives that serves as the ground spring from which Fowler draws his notions of faith. I will now introduce the sources of Fowler's various themes. In doing so, it is helpful to view them in biographic and chronological relief.

Phenomenological and/or Theological Roots

Fowler's initial academic training was in theology. The theological tradition which most influenced his own position on such topics as faith, Fowler identifies as the broadly phenomenological perspectives of Paul Tillich, H. Richard Niebuhr and Wilfred Cantwell Smith.[14] While there are of course other theorists influencing Fowler, these three thinkers are most often referred to by Fowler throughout his work. It is also safe to assume that Fowler came into contact with their perspectives prior to or during his doctoral studies at Harvard.

The particular focus of Fowler's doctoral work was the theological writings of H. Richard Niebuhr. Fowler is in fact indebted to Niebuhr's theological insight more than to either of the other two mentioned above. This is reflected not only in the number of textual references Fowler makes to Niebuhr, but in the breadth of insight and camaradarie of spirit they share as well. For instance, Fowler not only gleans particular ideas from Niebuhr (e.g., faith is relational), but he shares his methodology, as I have already mentioned.

Their camaraderie in spirit is also reflected in their focus of study. Of Niebuhr Fowler writes,

> ...his systematic exposition was addressed more to the description and analysis of...the dynamics of faith in evolution and revolution than to the doctrines expressed in belief. Whether the topic is revelation, responsibility as an ethical norm or faith, Niebuhr characteristically began with description... his descriptions are dynamic... studies of processes, events, encounters, relations, changings and transformations.[15]

These same comments can be made of Fowler's work. His studies are descriptive, identifying faith as a dynamic process, imaginable in evolving, stage-like progressions.

Tillich and Smith can also, I believe, be understood as sharing a similar theoretic interest in faith as a dynamic process. This similarity no doubt undergirds Fowler's conviction that the insights of these three thinkers are theoretically compatible. The following considerations are in fact gleaned from all three thinkers and form the guidelines for Fowler's overall perspective.

The first consideration is Fowler's demand that faith be

conceived of as a verb.[16]   By conceiving of faith as a verb Fowler means to equate faith with activity. Faith is action, a human mode of participation. By defining faith in this manner Fowler distinguishes himself from those perspectives which see faith as something possessed, (i.e., a body of doctrinal propositions).[17] Faith, rather,is an activity or a mode of being in the world.

Fowler's second concern is that faith no longer be considered an optional human activity. Faith is a universal mode of being.[18] Participation in the faith mode of being is constitutive of human experience.[19] Fowler argues his case for the universal character of faith by distinguishing the faith mode from religion and belief.[20] Utilizing the insights of Niebuhr, Tillich, and Smith, Fowler maintains that faith is more general than belief. Faith not only can be but is experienced without religious content.[21]

Finally, as an active posture, disposition or mode of participation in life, one's faith way of being deeply affects one's entire experience. This characteristic of faith was readily evident in the composite definitions reviewed earlier. As evidenced there, faith for Fowler grounds, unifies, orders, and provides character in life. Elsewhere Fowler writes "that faith serves to organize the totality of our lives..."[22] Implicit to this understanding is Fowler's desire to keep faith from being separated from life as a whole. His view of faith development, he maintains, "...stands against the compartmentalizing of a person's or community's life."[23]

These general considerations of Fowler's provide the direc-

tion in which Fowler wants to move in his broadly phenomenological, theological characterization of faith. Faith is to be understood as a universal, dynamic process, distinct from religion or belief. As a dynamic process, faith is integral to life as a whole.

Developmental Roots

Before moving any further in developing Fowler's theological heritage, I want to bring in his developmental roots. Fowler explains autobiographically at one point the general thrust of his faith development program.

> When I became aware of the research and theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, I began to sense that the broadly phenomenological understanding of faith I have learned from Paul Tillich, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith would be susceptible to structural-developmental investigation.[24]

Fowler's overall goal has been to construct a faith stage theory by integrating his phenomenological view of faith with a structuralist perspective on human development.

While true, this autobiographical summary is incomplete. The truth of this summary resides in the fact that Fowler has chosen the structuralist model of human development as his primary model for structuring his own faith development theory. What is also true (which Fowler alludes to the in same text), is that the structuralist model is not the only model Fowler has learned from in his understanding of human development. Fowler has also been deeply influenced by the work of Erik Erikson and others which I shall refer to as the life span approach to human development. With respect to developmental theories, Fowler has

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attempted to construct a paradigm for human development which is foundationally structuralist, yet attempts to incorporate the insights of Erikson, Daniel Levinson and others.[25]

The life span model in fact served as Fowler's first framework for understanding human development. Fowler's initial use of Erikson's theory came during his first year of post graduate work. Assigned associate director of a center for continuing education for clergy and laity, Fowler tells of having "the privilege of listening to well over two hundred life stories... of people's pilgrimages in faith."[26] At that time Fowler used Erikson's framework "as a kind of model by which to sort out and organize" the over two hundred life stories he was hearing.[27] As a result Fowler writes, "...with the help of Erikson's framework, I began to think I could detect certain patterns in people's life stories... I began to discern a typical sequence of transformations, which, despite enormous variety of detail, showed certain formal similarities from person to person."[28] Fowler further explains that this period constituted his beginning work at developing an embryonic theory of religious development.

How is it that Fowler began with Erikson's life span approach to human development and ended up using a structuralist model as his primary framework? After his one-year stint as continuing education director, Fowler returned to Harvard to teach. His intention was to explore this developmental sequence he had discovered more fully.[29] During those first two years back at Harvard, Fowler was asked by some of his students whether he knew the work of Lawrence Kohlberg on moral development and

Kohlberg's critique of Erikson's approach.[30] Fowler responded by studying Kohlberg's writings and meeting him. At that point Fowler began a friendship and collaboration with Kohlberg.

The structuralists, Fowler affirms, have provided "a new perspective on human thought valuing and behavior."[31] One of the strengths of this approach is its systematic rigor.[32] Erikson's model apparently lacks this virtue. Also central to their new perspective is the structuralist challenge " to see that it is not just the contents of our ideas and values that differ; at various stages in our development the fundamental patterns of operation within our minds may be quite different."[33]

Obviously fundamental to this structuralist challenge is the assertion that one can distinguish between the structures or operations of human thought and the contents of that thought. Accepting this fundamental tenet of the structuralist perspective, along with its conception of stages, Fowler has intended to construct a model of faith development which focuses on the structures of human thought and valuing as they pertain to faith. (I will further develop Fowler's notions on these structures in a later section)

Basically we now have the major players on Fowler's paradigm building field. The next step is to unravel the way in which Fowler attempts to coordinate these various bodies of theory. Theoretically Fowler identifies two major dimensions of faith as a mode of being. Through the use of this two dimensional focus, Fowler tries to coordinate the various perspectives mentioned above.

Fowler's two dimensional focus includes viewing faith as a mode of knowing and faith as a mode of being in relation. Generally speaking, Fowler's view of the relational dimension of faith primarily reflects his indebtedness to the phenomenological tradition and life span approaches to human development. On the other hand, while his view of the knowing dimension is also contexted by these phenomenological views, Fowler also attempts here to incorporate the structuralist perspective on human development.

From the very beginning, Fowler has worked with the two dimensional focus. In his early works Fowler's primary concern was to develop and communicate his use of the structuralist perspective on human development. Since Fowler works with this perspective primarily in terms of the knowing dimension of faith, much of his earlier work was spent in elaboration of this dimension. If in fact the importance of these two dimensions to Fowler's overall perspective were to be evaluated on the basis of textual space awarded, the relational dimension would have been considered of secondary concern to Fowler's primary focus on faith as a mode of knowing.

Fowler avoids this evaluation in two ways. First, even at the outset of his presentations, he makes the point that the knowing and relational dimensions together constitute the overall structure of faith.[34] Knowing is identified as the inner structure of faith while relation is understood as the outer, social or interpersonal structure of faith.[35] There is a co-equal

status here.

In turn Fowler makes the point that while his empirical research will primarily focus on the form of the inner structure of faith, the relational dimension is vital as well.[36] This is further evident in Fowler's formulations of faith as knowing. Faith as a mode of knowing examines how persons or communities construe their relatedness to the ultimate conditions of existence.[37]

Secondly, in Fowler's later writings his format for presenting these two dimensions changes. From 1974 to 1976 Fowler devoted the major amount of textual space to the knowing dimension of faith, and he always identified and presented it as a dimension before his discussion of faith as a mode of relation. In 1977, in the book Life Maps, Fowler reversed this order of presentation and emphasized the fundamental value of the relational dimension of faith.

When Fowler reversed his order of presentation, his overall approach became clearer and easier to follow. As a result, I will present the relational dimension first and follow with my discussion of the knowing dimension of faith. For the sake of further clarity, I have chosen to organize Fowler's discussions on the relational dimension in terms of time periods, beginning with 1974 and carrying through to the book Stages of Faith.

CHAPTER II

FAITH AS RELATION

1974-1976

In 1974 Fowler introduced this relational dimension of faith

by stating:

> Faith is always relational. It is one's response to
> one's sense of relatedness to the ultimate conditions
> and depths of experience.[1]

Breaking this statement down, Fowler explained that faith as

relational is always bi-polar. The two poles include the human

self and the transcendent, or "someone or something more than the

mundane."[2] In essence, the relational dimension of faith stands

for "the binding of the self and the transcendent."[3]

Fowler further elaborated by stating that faith is not only

bi-polar, but tri-polar too! For in faith one's "sense of relat-

edness to the ultimate conditions of existence... simultaneously

informs and qualifies... [one's] relations and interactions with

the mundane, the everyday world of other persons and things."[4]

One's ultimate relation then colors or impacts all of one's

relations. Fowler identifies this tripolar character of faith as

relation as the covenantal structure of faith.[5]

Central to this covenantal structure is the presence of

loyalty and trust. This was implicit in Fowler's initial state-

ment about the bi-polar character of faith when he explained it

as "the binding of the self and the transcendent."[6] Fowler

extends this understanding to faith as tripolar as well. In

faith, trust and loyalty must exist both between the self and the

transcendent or ultimate conditions of existence, as diagrammed

below:

$$\text{ultimate conditions}$$
$$\text{(transcendent)}$$
$$\uparrow$$
$$|$$
$$\text{self}$$

and mutually between oneself and others and a shared transcendent (understanding or vision of the ultimate conditions).

$$\text{ultimate conditions}$$
$$\text{(transcendent)}$$

self ⟷ others

In summary, "covenant means a binding of persons in mutual trust and loyalty before and with a transcendent center of value, toward which each also stands in a relation of trust and loyalty."[7]

In this early discussion of the relational dimension of faith, three things stand out. First, faith is identified as an ultimate relationship. Ultimate is a qualifier or mark of distinction when identifying faith.

Secondly, the structure of this relational dimension is tripolar covenant. One's faith relation involves not only the self and the transcendent; it includes other people and things.

Thirdly, the central ingredients of any faith covenant are loyalty and trust. Without mutual loyalty and trust between persons and before a commonly held transcendent, Fowler argues, communal life would be impossible. Epistemological and ethical

solipsism would result. That is, each person would understand

the world and the ultimate conditions of existence "after his/her

own fashion" (epistemological solipsism), and each person would

act "solely out of an ethics of maximizing one's own survival,

security and significance" (ethical solipsism).[8] Trust and loy-

alty are the glue that holds one's faith relation intact.

In these early discussions then, the relational dimension of

faith stood for that angle of vision which focused on the outer,

interpersonal structure of faith as a whole. This dimension's

identifying marks included ultimacy or transcendence, tri-polar

covenant, and the existence of mutual loyalty and trust. In 1977

however, not only did Fowler change his order of presentation

with respect to his two dimensions. He also changed his presen-

tation of faith as relation. I will now trace Fowler's develop-

ment and use of three notions.

1977 Life Maps

In 1977 Fowler opens his discussion by affirming the dis-

tinctions between faith, religion, and belief. Fowler continues

by adding:

> Faith is to be actively disposed to trust in and to be
> related to someone or something. To 'have faith' is to
> be related to someone or something in such a way that
> our heart is invested, our caring is committed, our
> hope is focused in another... Faith is an active mode
> of being in relation... in which we invest commitment,
> belief, love, risk, and hope.[9]

What is missing in these opening comments about faith as

relation is Fowler's previous commitment to immediately qualify

the faith relation mode as relating to a transcendent or the

ultimate conditions of existence. Ultimacy, in fact, up to this presentation, had been Fowler's single qualifying theme. Whether speaking of faith as a mode of knowing, or being in relation, ultimacy served as faith's distinguishing mark. So much was this the case that one of Fowler's earliest attempts at a composite definition of faith reads as follows:

> Faith [is] orientation to the ultimate conditions of existence and ... orientation to the neighbor and everyday life in light of relatedness to the transcendent."[10]

In Life Maps however, Fowler develops his discussion of faith as relation in a different manner. Rather than immediately drawing attention to faith as involving ultimate loyalty and trust, Fowler begins by using the term for other than ultimate relationships. To have faith is to invest trust, commitment, loyalty, and love in another. The "others" Fowler is referring to are human beings.[11] As Fowler is now using the term, faith is equated with that mutual trust and loyalty necessary for the existence of human relationships. In essence, here faith equals interpersonal human loyalty and trust, and no more.

Fowler continues his discussion of faith as interpersonal loyalty and trust by identifying the necessity of its presence for the development and maintenance of human beings as selves.[12] For the consistent care of others provides the feedback necessary for one to form reliable images of self, foundational to identity. "Thou's," Fowler contends, with Martin Buber, are fundamentally necessary for the calling forth and confirming of "I's".[13] Without them selfhood is not possible.

Fowler further remarks, "We could limit our discussion of

faith as a way of being in relation to this level of interpersonal relatedness and have it be a valuable exercise."[14] But it is also the case that without a significant measure of "good faith" between persons - human associations, communities, societies, and the like are not viable."[15] Fowler's next move is to discuss the nature of faith as the "covenantal fiduciary character" necessary for all lasting human communities.[16] Here again, though, there is no reference to ultimacy or transcendence.

"Good faith," meaning loyalty and trust between persons, Fowler explains, does not occur in a vacuum. Faithfulness to other persons and groups "can scarcely be separated from faithfulness to the causes or values to which they are committed."[17] Something as common as the use of language "bespeaks a shared commitment to truth."[18] Mutual faithfulness in marriage includes "a shared commitment not only to the partner but also to an ideal or covenant of marriage."[19] Political communities too demand loyalty not only to one's fellow citizens but to the ideals of the body politic.[20] Human beings bind then, not only "as persons," but as persons by the loyalties we share with others to the causes or centers of values that are in some sense "'beyond'us."[21]

In this instance Fowler is using the term faith as synonymous with the tripolar covenantal character of human communal relations. Faith here literally means relationship covenant.

Finally, Fowler concludes his discussion by adding:

Though we must recognize the relational, interpersonal and triadic character of faith, we have not come to terms with its richness and depth so long as we stay at those levels. Faith as a way of being in relation has

an outer boundary constituted by what we might call our ultimate environment.[22]

In this context Fowler explains that the purpose or function of all triadic covenants is to provide order, coherence and meaning in life. Individuals and communities live "in the midst of powers, forces and valences that break upon us from a variety of levels and directions."[23] All of these triadic patterns constituting the relational dimension of faith, form part of the way we "give order, coherence and meaning to this welter of forces."[24]

By "ultimate environment," Fowler means the most comprehensive faith triad. He adds, "it is our tacit and explicit assumptions about the 'grain' and character of the ultimate environment, taken as a whole, that provide the larger framework of meaning in which we make and sustain our interpersonal, institutional, and vocational covenants.[25] Central to this assertion is the realization that the causes or centers of value already mentioned "are not objects in any ordinary sense... Rather they are concepts or ideals that represent orderings or organizations of our motives and hopes, our images of 'reality' and our intuitions of coherence and purpose."[26]

In turn, one's operational image of life in its most comprehensive sweep (an ultimate environment), includes and gives "direction and reason to [one's] daily commitments."[27] "Faith, Fowler summarizes, "is a community's way-of-being-in-relation to an ultimate environment. As such it includes, permeates, and informs our ways-of-being-in-relation to our neighbors and to the causes and companions of our lives."[28]

I want to pause and compare Fowler's earlier discussions of faith as relation and his Life Maps presentation. In 1974 through 1976, Fowler maintained that faith as relation stood for mutual loyalty and trust between persons, and in a transcendent, which informs and qualifies mundane human experience. Faith as relation is an ultimate relation. While involving both individual and communal loyalty and trust, relation to ultimacy is its necessary focus. Fowler's changed format in 1977 marks a movement away form this original specificity. Here Fowler uses the term faith to identify three distinct phenomena. First, Fowler employs the term to stand for interpersonal human trust. Secondly, Fowler utilizes the term to stand for non-ultimate relational triads. Finally Fowler concludes by maintaining that distinguishable from faith as covenant relation in general, is the outer boundary of all faith relations. This is covenant making with an ultimate environment. As ultimate, it is inclusive of all other covenants and trusts.

In this 1977 presentation, "faith" as a term becomes virtually coterminous with the term "relation" itself. In other words, faith, rather than distinguishing one kind of relation among other kinds, comes to stand for each individual level of relation, and consequently, the term "relation" itself.

On the other hand, it becomes obvious that Fowler's full interest is in developing an understanding of faith as ultimate covenanting. At this point, it also becomes clear that Fowler's understanding of "ultimate" includes the concepts "all-encompassing" or "all-inclusive." For what distinguishes ultimate covenanting from mundane covenanting is its comprehen-

sive or inclusive scope. Faith as ultimate covenanting is that kind of faith relation which provides "the larger framework of meaning..." and "includes, permeates and informs" all other moments of relating.[29]

1980

Fowler's next move is to focus more explicitly on the tripolar covenant stucture as his organizational concept. In 1980, he identifies first the interpersonal trust moment he began with in Life Maps. He does so by linking his notion with Erik Erikson's first stage of trust versus mistrust. Faith, Fowler writes in this context, "implies trust in another, reliance upon another, a counting upon or dependence upon another" which culminates in "attachment," "commitment," and "loyalty."[30]

Fowler's next paragraph evinces his move to focus more specifically on the tri-polar covenant structure of faith. He writes, "But I turn to the philosopher Josiah Royce and to the theologian H. Richard Niebuhr for the most helpful clarifications of the foundational quality of faith as relation in human life."[31] Fowler reaffirms his point "that all viable and lasting human communities have either a tacit or explicit faith structure which is triangular in form."[32] Fowler also explains that "each of us belongs to a number of faith relation triangles."[33] These include, as mentioned above, political, educational, familial, business, and professional communities.

In 1980 as well, Fowler begins to talk of faith as "meaning making." Faith is "a generic human phenomenon...[having] to do

with the making, maintenance and transformation of human meaning."[34] In turn, "in examining this triangular faith structure of relationships, we are in touch with a major source of the forms and colors with which we paint on the canvas of meaning..."[35]

Fowler then concludes his discussion, pointing "to the broadest most inclusive relationship in faith...that includes - when intact - all the others of which we are a part."[36] That faith triangle is of course the one involving one's sense of an ultimate environment. In one's ultimate relation triangle, a person "makes a bid for a relationship to a center of value and power adequate to ground, unify and order their experience."[37]

In this context, then, Fowler identifies the character of an ultimate environment as a central point of reference as well as all inclusive in scope. As a center of reference it integrates the rest of experience. One's ultimate environment, then, not only "gives direction and reason to one's daily commitment..." by serving as the context for them.[38] It serves as a focal point in meaning making as well. Fowler identifies the symbol "kingdom of God," as an example of both Christian and Jewish expressions of ultimate meaning, with the notion "God," serving as the central point of reference in that ultimate context.[39]

Fowler also elaborates further at this point his view of the relaationship between everyday faith triangles and one's ultimate faith relationship. As Fowler puts it, "there is an important double action at work here..."[40] That is, one's everyday covenants influence one's sense of and commitment to an ultimate environment; as well as one's ultimate environment having "important

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implications for the character and quality" of one's every day relations.[41] Ultimate and penultimate relations mutually influence each other. Fowler's further development occurs in the book Stages of Faith.

Stages of Faith

Fowler begins his discussion in Stages of Faith, by identifying one's first experience of faith as beginning at birth. Relationally speaking, Fowler points out, "there is always another in faith... I trust in and am loyal to..."[42] At birth our initial experience of loyalty and dependability is based on "the degree of fidelity" expressed by our primary care takers' "consistency in providing for our needs" and in "making a valued place for us in their lives."[43]

Fowler continues by affirming, though, "that even in this rudimentary form, faith exhibits what we may call a covenantal pattern of relationship."[44] Even on the basic level of parent-infant trust, the infant is developing a "sense" of her or his new environment as either dependable and provident or arbitrary and neglectful."[45] More importantly, the parents bring "their way of seeing and being in the world... their trusts and loyalties... their fidelities -and infidelities - to the causes and institutions and transcending centers of value and power that constitute their lives' meanings."[46] Prior to the infant's ability to distinguish clearly the values and beliefs of her or his parents, Fowler argues, "he or she senses the structure of meaning and begins to form nacent images of the centers of value

and power that animate the parental faith."[47]

In the book <u>Stages</u> <u>of</u> <u>Faith</u>, Fowler also raises his understanding of the interplay between faith and identity:

> When I speak of commitment to centers of value and power I use a highly formal language to speak about intensely personal relationships. We do not commit ourselves - 'rest our hearts upon' - persons, causes, institutions or 'gods' because we 'ought to.' We invest or devote ourselves because the other to which we commit has, for us, an intrinsic excellence or worth and because it promises to confer value on us.[48]

Fowler further explains that those centers that we invest with god value "are those that confer meaning and worth on us and promise to sustain us in a dangerous world of power."[49]

With respect to human identity, one's commitments and trusts shape one's identity. Fowler adds that each person participates in many different faith-relation triads. Consequently each of us invests trust and loyalty, shares common stories, hopes, and meaning in the various centers of value and power, relative to each context. The question Fowler raises in this regard is, "How do our faith and identity integrate the many triads to which we belong?"[50]

> Are we each, in effect, 'many selves', adapting and reshaping our identities as we move from one role, relationship or context to another? Do we have one 'master identity' correlated with one dominant center of value and power and its community which so overshadows our other triadic involvements as to make them unimportant for shaping our identity and faith? Or can we authentically claim faith in an infinite source and center of value and power, in relation to which we are established in identities flexible and integrative enough to unify the selves we are in the various roles and relations we have?[51]

Each of these answers constitutes one of three alternatives in Fowler's faith identity scheme. The first is identified as

polytheistic faith. The second is referred to as henotheistic faith. The third, which constitutes normative faith in Fowler's paradigm, is called radical monotheism. Each of these terms is used in creative adaptation to describe patterns of identity and faith, and not limited specifically to religious forms.[52]

Polytheistic faith, Fowler explains, is exibited by one who "has 'interests' in many minor centers of value and power."[53] Yet simultaneously, a polytheist "lacks any one center of value and power of sufficient transcendence to focus and order one's life."[54] For the polytheist, Fowler argues, "not even the self - one's myth of one's own worth and destiny - can lay a compelling enough claim to unify one's hopes and strivings."[55] A polytheist is an unintegrated self.

A henotheist, on the other hand, does invest faith and identity in a single center of power and value. The problem with henotheistic faith is that the center in which one invests "is inappropriate, false, [or] not something of ultimate concern."[56] A henotheistic center is a penultimate cause inflated by the participant to the position of ultimate concern. In its extreme, henotheism results in fetishism (i.e., careerism, workaholism, sex or money). Such faith, unlike polytheism, produces narrowness of faith and identity.

Fowler's third option, radical monotheism, represents his normative view of faith.

> By it I shall mean a type of faith-identity relation
> in which a person or group focuses its supreme trust
> and loyalty in a transcendent center of value and
> power, that is neither a conscious or unconscious
> extension of personal or group ego, nor a finite
> cause or institution.[57]

This center of power and value is representative of a principle of being. It constitutes "the source and center of all value and power."[58] In turn, rather than negate less transcendent centers of value and power, it relativizes and orders them. By maintaining trust in and loyalty to such an "inclusive" center of value and power, the radical monotheist keeps potentially henotheistic centers of value and power in a position of proper and proportionate love.

"This transcendent center of value and power," Fowler argues, "has been symbolized or conceptualized in both theistic and nontheistic ways..."[59] Sadly, though, Fowler affirms, this kind of faith rarely lasts in either individual persons or communities. For people "too easily lapse into a confusion of our representations of a transcendent center of value and power with that reality itself."[60] "But as a regulative principle" the ideal of radical monotheism is tremendously important in moving towards the formation of a global community.[61] For as a formulation or symbol of faith "it exerts truly transformative power over our more parochial faith orientations."[62]

The notion of radical monotheistic faith, as the norm for Fowler's faith paradigm, corresponds to stage six in his developmental theory. Fowler calls stage six faith universalizing faith. Fowler identifies the virtue of stage six as "...being most truly oneself... [while] participation in the ultimate is direct and immediate."[63] Community is now is universally inclusive, one is in community with being. Fowler explains that the source of this virtue in his stage theory is due to an "epistemological shift..."[64] One no longer experiences the relativity of

human insight as paradoxical.

Radical monotheistic faith "calls people to an identification with a universal community."[65] By relativizing our parochial centers of value and power, universal community is possible. In turn "our tribal gods and finite goods can be seen for what they truly are."[66] As stated above, the regulating power of radical monotheistic faith, exemplified by stage six in Fowler's developmental paradigm, does not negate or deny membership "in more limited groups with their particular 'stories' and centering values."[67] It keeps them from being "revered" as having ultimate value.[68]

Summary on Faith as Relation

What does this development say with regard to faith as a mode of relation? Fowler is concerned to incorporate three fundamental notions. They are trust and loyalty, covenantal structures, and ultimacy. Each of these notions involves a cluster of concepts.

Trust and loyalty include such notions as dependabilty, at-homeness, providence, binding, love, reliance, dependence, attachment, and commitment. These are Fowler's interpersonal terms which imply that faith always involves another.

Secondly, faith relating is not only interpersonal; it involves a third pole made up of the values and causes that focus our energies. Faith is tripolar or covenantal in structure.

Thirdly, faith as ultimate relating involves such notions as inclusiveness and centering. In the midst of all trusting in

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tripolar covenants, Fowler insists that there is an outermost boundary relation which encompasses and includes all others, therefore funding the whole with meaning and reason. Implicit in this overarching relation is a center of value and power which serves to integrate these everyday relations. At its normative best, a person's or community's transcendent covenant serves to relativize all parochial faith triad relations, culminating in an experience of self integration and universal communion.

Each of the phases of Fowler's own development represents his ongoing effort to coordinate these three notions. The direction of this development has been toward the utilization of the tripolar covenantal structure as the organizing principle for these three concerns. Trust and loyalty, and ultimate covenanting become by 1981 distinguishable and descriptively essential moments within Fowler's overarching covenant structural theme.

I am not saying that Fowler deems the notion of tripolar covenant to be more important than trust or ultimacy in his understanding of the relational character of faith. Each concept is vital. The relational dimension would make no sense without all three notions. The covenant or faith relation triad constitutes the general organizing principle or structure within whiich the other two essential pieces fit.

Trust and loyalty are best identified as the core of the faith relation triad. They constitute the heart of faith relating. Faith relating is fundamentally the trusting in and loyalty to another which one experiences in a covenantal bond. Ultimate trusting represents a unique kind of faith relation triad. It serves both as the outermost boundary, and the central

point of reference of all faith relations and the human self.

What is clear is that Fowler ends up with a much broader understanding of the faith relational mode at the end of this development than he had at the beginning. Where at one time Fowler qualified all his discussion of faith with the concept ultimacy, he now opens up to non-ultimate phenomena. Consequently, Fowler's earlier specified focus becomes somewhat blurred.

Before drawing out the implications of this movement, it is necessary to review Fowler's other dimension of faith, i.e., faith as knowing. In doing so, I will again present Fowler's discussions in developmenal sequence. Afterward I will outline and analyze Fowler's understanding of the relationship between these two dimensions.

CHAPTER III

FAITH AS A MODE OF KNOWING

In Fowler's initial writings, he followed his demand to reconceive faith as a verb by describing the kind of activity faith is:

> Here I shall ask you to think of faith as a way of knowing. It may also help to think of faith as a way of interpreting or construing one's experience. At any rate faith as we shall use it is an active constructive interpretive mode of being.[1]

Fowler maintains that he is supported in his assertion that faith is a mode of knowing by his phenomenological roots.[2] Niebuhr for one argued that human initiatives and responses are inaugurated by and arise out of acts of knowing and construing. Niebuhr, and in turn Fowler, maintains this to be true of faith. Faith "as a doing or being includes and flows from faith as a mode of knowing."[3]

When seeking to define the "knowing" itself, Fowler utilizes some of the central notions of the structuralists, Piaget and Kohlberg. In line with the structuralists, Fowler conceives of knowing in terms of reality construction. By "reality construction," Fowler is referring to the active role human beings take in the process of interpreting their world. Knowing within the structuralist school has to do with acting upon or interacting with one's environment.[4]

In the earliest beginnings of this process, infants act upon their environments through the physical manipulation of objects. Based on this interacting, schemas, structures, or operations are internalized as patterns of action. These patterns of action

become generalized and form a repertoire of mental operations which the knower brings to new experiences.[5]

If a novelty is encountered which is unassimilatable in terms of one's existing operations, new manipulations are developed and internalized. The acquisition of new operations, referred to as accommodation, signifies growth in the knowing process. Consequently, development "in the structural developmental approach is understood as the accommodatory construction of new schemes or operations of knowing (which process is largely unconscious, formal or noncontent specific and generalizable)."[6]

This view of knowing is based on the premise that what human beings perceive reality to be, is not simply "a mental copy of something that is out there."[7] Environmental data need organization for understanding. It is the development of structures or operations that makes organization and in turn interpretation and composition of reality possible. With growth, as new structures or operations develop, "the construction of reality changes."[8]

Finally, to speak of knowing in this sense assumes the structuralist assertion that it is possible to distinguish between the structures or operations developed by human beings in the reality construction process and the contents or products of knowing. The structures or operations of faith as a mode of knowing underlie and give form to the contents. The structures in action constitute thought itself.[9] The contents are the conclusions reached, the body of knowledge arrived at, or in

effect, reality constructed.

This distinction is of key importance. For by distinguishing between the structures of knowing and the contents of knowing, structuralists claim to be able to focus their investigation on the structures as opposed to the contents. Consequently Fowler, in light of this borrowed structuralist assertion, claims that his theory seeks to provide the universally generalizable structures of faith knowing which underlie all the various contents of peculiar faith traditions.[10] This is what Fowler means when he maintains that his theory "moves beneath the symbols, rituals and ethical patterns that express" faith.[11] In line with the structuralists, then, Fowler uses the term "knowing" with this structure/content distinction in mind, and develops a view of the structures of faith thought.

Levels of Knowing

Within this general discussion of knowing from a structuralist perspective, Fowler qualifies the kind of knowing that is faith. He does so by distinguishing between three levels or environments in terms of which reality construction takes place. These include the physical, social and ultimate environments.[12]

The work of Jean Piaget is focused on reality construction at a physical environmental level. Physical reality construction involves the cognitive structures or operations developed that range from those first infant hand manipulations of objects to the abstract theories of mathematics and physics. Fowler accepts Piaget's cognitive developmental scale as representing the basic range of these structures.

Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development represents for Fowler reality construction at the social or interpersonal level. Kohlberg, like Piaget, concentrates on the structures but this time with regard to moral reasoning. His developmental theory attempts to describe "the forms or structures of thinking evidenced in the justifications or explanations of moral choices."[13]

Fowler qualifies faith knowing by identifying it as reality construction at an ultimate level. In this connection he writes;

> When we ask 'What kind of knowing is faith?' we focus first on the content ie. on the what it is that faith knows. Faith we have said is a knowing by which we construe our relatedness to the limiting boundaries or depths of experience.[14]

Fowler refers to these depths of experience with the collective terms, "transcendent,"[15] "ultimate environment,"[16] and "ultimate conditions of existence."[17] These limiting boundaries or ultimate conditions include the "power(s) boundaries (such as death and finitude) and source(s) of being and value and meaning which impinge on life in a manner not subject to personal control."[18]

It is helpful to understand the impinging character of these ultimate conditions in light of Fowler's brief anthropological comments. Fowler conceives of human beings as burdened with the freedom to organize and name the phenomenal world. In fact, human beings are unique in this respect. Fowler explains that other animals "are endowed with far more specific instinctive guidance systems."[19] The ways of life for other animals are programmed. Due to the lack of programmed guidance, and the

resulting freedom to respond to life, human beings carry with them "the challenge of composing a meaningful world."[20]

With freedom, death and finitude become questions demanding answers for the sake of a meaningful existence. Other issues like the limits of knowledge, cause and effect in personal and historic life, and the place of evil and suffering become puzzles requiring solutions. Fowler further identifies one's view of ideal manhood or womanhood, one's grounding of ethical and moral imperatives, one's communal identification and belonging, bases of guilt and shame, grounds of terror and dread, beliefs about what is sinful or a violation, beliefs about religion and religious symbols, as well as one's loyalties and commitments and one's locus of transendent beauty, value and power as issues of faith.

By them "we are impinged upon, pulled at and moved from many directions."[21] In the face of them, humankind responds to the challenge of "composing some kind of order, unity and coherence..." an ultimate environment.[22]

The Peculiarities of Faith Knowing

When discussing the actual process or act of composing an ultimate environment, Fowler identifies the peculiarities of faith knowing that lead him to attempt to broaden the structuralist view of knowing. It is here that Fowler makes adjustments he believes will incorporate the insights of other developmental approaches.

The peculiarities of faith knowing result from its ultimate focus. Limiting boundaries and depth experiences are the kinds

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of issues one "rarely" relates to indifferently.[23] They require, Fowler argues, the involvement of the "total self."[24] One is disposed negatively or positively. That is, one may be hostile, distrustful and rebellious, or relate in love, trust and loyal responsibility.[25] Fowler's first concern is that in faith cognition and affection are interwoven.

The problem Fowler has with the structural view of knowing is its strictly cognitive or logical focus.[26] This is true of both Kohlberg and Piaget.[27] According to Fowler, Kohlberg does set a precedent in his model by defining a stage as a structural whole, intertwining cognition and affection.[28] In practice, though, Fowler observes, Kohlberg "tends theoretically to follow Piaget."[29] For even though Kohlberg "makes it clear that in reality the two interpenetrate and are inseparable..." he agrees with Piaget "that cognitive structures tend to dominate the affective dynamics and that only the cognitive structures can serve as a basis for describing the sequence of developmental stages."[30]

Initially Fowler dealt with this limitation in the structural approach by arguing that the positive or negative disposition one takes toward one's construal of the ultimate conditions of existence constitutes a "valuing apprehension" of the known.[31] Faith knowing is simultaneously "orientation and arousal, perspective and motivation, indicative and imperative."[32]

Later on Fowler has attempted to deal with this problem by utilizing Robert Kegan's recent reformulation of the struc-

turalist paradigm in which Kegan has attempted to take account of the dynamics of personality or ego development.[33] Constructive knowing, in its limited Piaget-Kohlbergian sense, "occurs when an active knower interacts with an active world of persons and objects, meeting its unshaped and unorganized stimuli with the ordering, organizing power of the knower's mind."[34] Constructive knowing is "an acting upon or composing of the known."[35]

Kegan's thesis attempts to extend what is understood to be constructed in the act of knowing to the knower himself or herself. Not only does one construct the world, one comes to understand oneself in relation to that world. Kegan refers to this kind of knowing as constitutive knowing. He argues that the ego is to be understood as "the total constitutive activity of knowing (with its evolving characteristic patterns), by which the self constitutes and therefore knows other persons and the self as related to others. Ego, he insists, is the construal of self and others in relationship."[36] Armed with the added appreciation of knowing as constituitive, Fowler reformulates his response to the structuralist bifurcation of cognition and affection.

The problem is not how to theoretically integrate thought and feeling:

> Rather the challenge is to recognize that meaning-making, [a later Fowlerian category which encompasses his earlier notion of reality construction] as a constructive movement, is prior to and generative of both reason and emotion. We must, Kegan asserts, see meaning making as the self's total constitutive knowing activity in which there is no thought without feeling or feeling without thought.[37]

By including self, ego, or personality in the knowing process, Fowler tries to take account of the kind of knowing in

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which the identity or worth of a person is at stake.[38] If iden-
tity and worth are at stake in the knowing process, it is under-
standable why this process undergirds both thought and feeling.
Both cognition and affection are simultaneously employed in the
drive for human meaning, which includes the drive for the
construction of the ego itself. It is both a passionate and
reasonable pursuit.

Fowler makes three other points of distinction. In faith
one is attracted to centers of supra-ordinate power and value.
These centers are related to by means of attachment or convic-
tional investment. They attract on the basis of their "promise to
sustain our lives and to guarantee more being."[39] One con-
structs in one's faith vision, then, a core or unifying point of
reference that gives coherence to a person's or community's
composition of reality.[40]

Furthermore, since an ultimate environment is a comprehen-
sive picture of life, faith knowing reasons in wholes.[41] An
ultimate environment itself is a comprehensive picture of life,
"a felt sense of the world."[42] When constructing an ultimate
environment one composes "a spread of meaning, a canopy of sig-
nificance... to back drop and fund more immediate everyday
action."[43] Fowler also identifies one's ultimate environment as
an "environment of environments."[44] The implication is that one's
vision of an ultimate environment encompasses all other knowing
environments.[45]

A third identifying mark of faith knowing is one's need to
use symbols. An ultimate environment, "as a coherent knowable
reality...is not simply 'there' in the physical sense as is a

person or an object waiting to be related to experientially and known through our perceptive capacities."[46] One is involved in ultimate knowing with realities that can only be represented symbolically. The use of symbols, then, is characteristic of faith knowing.

Fourthly, as in the case of faith as ultimate relating, there is a double action relationship between faith knowing and other levels of knowing. This is most apparent in Fowler's discussion of the relationship between the logic of rational certainty and the logic of conviction.[47]

The logic of rational certainty is the kind of structuring activity Piaget describes in his work.[48] This kind of logic strives for objectivity and rational certainty. The logic of conviction is a constitutive knowing which emphasizes subjectivity, freedom, risk, and passionate choice. This kind of structuring activity is involved in the construction of an ultimate environment.

Fowler points out that one does not choose between these two logics as though choice were possible.[49] Both are fundamentally human. The logic of conviction, being more inclusive, "does contextualize, qualify and anchor" the former.[50] As an anchor, though, the logic of conviction "does not negate the logic of rational certainty."[51] For the logic of rational certainty plays "the crucial role of conceptualizing, questioning, and evaluating" the products of the logic of conviction.[52] Fowler concludes by stating that the logic of rational certainty stands in a dialectic relationship with "the larger more comprehensive

logic of convictional orientaion."[53]

Faith Stages

The final step in presenting Fowler's formulations on faith as knowing is a presentation of his faith stages. As Fowler clearly states, his stage theory is a theory of the stages of faith knowing, rather than faith as a whole.[54] It is a misnomer to refer to Fowler's stage theory as a theory simply of faith. Just as covenant represents the structure of faith as relation, the underlying operations which give birth to the contents of faith knowing constitute its structure and Fowler's stage theory.

Realizing this point is important, I believe, in under-standing Fowler's overall perspective. For those who charge Fowler with reducing faith to cognition need to take cognizance of the fact that Fowler self-consciously limits his stage theory to the knowing dimension. But he does not limit his view of faith to the knowing dimension. To understand that he does so on the basis of a review of his stages is to categorize Fowler's intentions unfairly. That is not to say that I agree or support Fowler in his use of the structuralist school model for outlining faith stages. Rather, at this point I want to affirm that Fowler is not a simple reductionist. (I will have more on my critique of Fowler's stages later.)

Fowler refers to his stages as structural wholes, a term borrowed from Kohlberg to emphasize the inclusion of both cognition and affection.[55] Fowler's stages represent the discernible patterns of thought and emotion necessary for the

construal of an ultimate horizon. These underlying patterns are also referred to as operations, structures, competencies and aspects. A faith stage can be imagined as organismic, or "a flexible organization of interrelated patterns of operation."[56]

Interestingly, Fowler does not insist that his list of operations is an exhaustive one. For "in the construction of a worldview, and in the creation of coherence that reflects a person's most centering loyalties and hopes, this full set of competencies and more are employed."[57] The following are the list of competencies Fowler does include.

Aspect A; Form of logic

This structural competency basically is an incorporation and development of Piaget's cognition stage theory. It focuses on "the patterns of reasoning available to the developing person at each stage."[58] Logical competencies are "necessary although not sufficient" for the development of the rest of the corresponding competencies.[59] In other words, logical development is foundational to the other competencies that make up a faith knowing stage. The inclusion of this competency will prevent faith development from being viewed as illogical or arational. Fowler also adds that he has taken the liberty in his stage theory to add "further adult substages in formal operational thought suggesting ongoing cognitive development."[60]

Aspect B; Role taking

This competency is based on the work of Robert Selman. Its focus is on the ability of a person to take (understand and construct) the perspectives of others. This occurs on both individual and communal group levels and requires the growing

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ability of one to distance oneself from the perspectives of one's own group.[61]   Fowler again has found it necessary to extend Selman's work when dealing with people's abilities to take the perspective of groups, classes and ideological traditions other than their own.

Aspect C; Form of moral judgment

This competency is basically "the inclusion with slight modifications of Kohlberg's stages of moral development."[62]
Aspect D; Bounds of social awareness

This competency is based on a combination of reference group theory and theological and ethical insight.[63]   It "focuses on the extent of inclusiveness and accuracy of construal of the reference groups in relation to which persons ground their identity and define their moral responsibility."[64]   Although, Fowler adds, this competency is similar to role taking, it differs "in that it attempts to account for the typical range of persons and groups 'who count' in one's composition and maintenance of identity and of a meaningful world at each stage."[65] (80a 77)

Aspect E; Locus of authority

This competency is concerned with whomever one invests with meaning sanctioning authority. "To whom or to what does one look for validation or legitimation of her or his own most significant felt meanings? How is that locus constituted?   How is it justified?"[66]

Aspect F; Form of world coherence

This competency "represents a focus on each stage's particular way of composing and holding a comprehensive sense of

meaning."[67] As alluded to earlier, Fowler explains that in faith one reasons in "wholes."[68] In turn, each stage represents a typical genre employed by a person "to conceive or represent patterns of coherence in their ultimate environment."[69]

Aspect G; Symbolic functioning

This competency focuses on the "developmental sequency of levels of symbolic competence."[70] Faith, as the "construal of one's ultimate environment," requires the use of symbols - "whether they are imaginal, linguistic or ritualistic - is therefore of core importance."[71]

Each of Fowler's competencies represents a different focus on the structures underlying ultimate (reality construction) meaning making. In this sense they are all cognitive in focus. It is also true that with particular respect to the competencies, role taking, bounds of social awareness, and locus of authority, we can see that in his own understanding, Fowler is working with more than pure cognition. For each of these competencies touches upon the social context of meaning making.

It is in terms of these competencies as well that we can observe Fowler's perceived connection between the faith knowing competencies and human individuation or self formation. For when Fowler extrapolates on faith (knowing) growth, all three of these competencies witness to the capacity of the knower to move away from other directed and dependent meaning making, toward the projected goal of internally based faith knowing.

In the actual presentation, though, these connections are tacit at best. In presentation, these competencies trace the human power to <u>cognate</u> independently and at greater levels of

sophistication, which preserves their qualification as faith
knowing capacities.

Each of Fowler's stages represents a qualitatively different
level of competency development. With maturity "the structures
underlying faith become progressively more complex, more in-
ternally differentiated, more comprehensive, and more
flexible."[72] In turn, movement from one stage to another
represents for Fowler a "structural transformation" with regard
to these patterns.[73] The stages themselves, or various
identifiable structural whole levels of faith competency, are
located in Appendix A.

<center>Stage Growth</center>

Fowler asserts that stage growth and development occur in
dialectical fashion. Fowler refers to this dialectic as the
simultaneous process of centering and de-centering.[74] The cen-
tering process is the movement in human development toward an
individuated self. Individuation comes gradually as one grows in
the ability to construe and maintain for oneself a vision of
reality (worldview), and accept autonomous moral responsibility
in terms of it. This occurs as one develops higher levels of
competency. The conclusion of the process is a self capable of
establishing boundaries via "self-chosen, self-aware investments
of trust and loyalty."[75]

De-centering stands for one's ability to gradually
participate in broader, more inclusive communities of faith. In
this movement the individuating self, breaking free from an other

determined identity, can choose to identify with and take seriously other persons, groups, experiences and worldviews.[76] Growth is marked by the "effort to find and maintain a mutuality or complementarity with a widened cosmos of being and value."[77] As individuation occurs, so does the breadth of one's involvement.

At stage six this process of centering and de-centering is complete. One's involvement with the transcendent is immediate, relativizing all parochial faith relations. Radical monotheism results.

Fowler adds three more points concerning growth. First, these stages are to be viewed as invariant in sequence. No stage can be skipped. Each must be appropriated and serve as the foundation for the next stage. Each later stage includes, transforms, and integrates the structural competencies of previous stages in terms of its own advanced capacities.[78]

Secondly, faith growth is not automatic. In fact, according to Fowler, very few if any people in American culture reach stage five. The most often reached level is stage three or four. Growth then is not rigidly tied to other growth processes such as biological maturation or chronological age. In this sense and especially with regard to the later stages, four, five and six, it can be said that faith growth is in some respect achieved.[79]

In the third place, faith growth is contingent. That is, one's capacity for faith growth is dependent upon "biological and neurological givens, the contents and 'the modal developmental level' of the cultural milieu and social role opportunities of a given person."[80] One's growth then is dependent

upon one's penultimate experience of life at large. Stage growth is either greatly enhanced or stifled by these contingencies.

Normativity

In conclusion, I want to ask whether or not Fowler views later stages as better or more normative. Fowler struggles with this question throughout his work. Foremost is his concern to assert that his stage theory should not be viewed as an achievement scale, "according to which we can build an accelerator-education program."[81] Each stage, Fowler argues, "describes a pattern of valuing, thinking, feeling, and committing that is potentially worthy, serene and 'grace-ful'."[82]

Even so, Fowler also explains that part of the unique contribution provided by the structuralist school is its conviction that later stages are "more comprehensive and adequate than the lesser developed ones; [moreover] ...the more developed stages make possible a knowing that in some senses is 'more true' than that of less developed stages."[83] And although Fowler believes that to say the same with regard to faith stages requires more caution and qualification than in the case of cognitive and moral development, he "...cannot (and will not) avoid making and trying to corroborate that claim."[84]

The key to understanding how Fowler holds these two concerns together rests in his understanding of appropriateness and timing. With respect to timing, Fowler maintains that "each stage has its proper time of ascendancy."[85] In this regard, if

one is in a given stage at the 'right time' for one's life, "the task is the full realization and integration of the strengths and weaknesses of that stage, rather than rushing on to the next stage."[86]

By "appropriate," Fowler means to take seriously his appreciation of the contingency of faith growth on the givens of one's general life (i.e., biological and neurological givens, the content and the "modal developmental level" of the cultural milieu, the idiosyncratic life experiences, challenges and social role opportunities).[87] In this context, "appropriate" can vary from person to person, community to community, and culture to culture, based on these life givens. It would be as unfair, then, to judge a person from one cultural milieu in the same manner as another from a different richer milieu, as it would be to judge a child by adult standards. Therefore, while later stages do constitute greater sophistication, flexibility, and normativity, all growth is relative to the idiosyncrasies of a person's or culture's experience. And that realization needs to temper any rash objectification of Fowler's theory into a hierarchical scale.

Summary on Faith

This concludes my overview of Fowler's general theory of faith and its development. Fowler maintains, then, a multi-perspectival view of faith. He does so due to its complexity and the limits of human theorizing. He has organized the various perspectives he deems illuminating in terms of a two dimensional focus. Fowler's stage theory represents the structure of one of

those two dimensions.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

It is now time to look at how coherently Fowler's proposals
hang together. I want to work at this question in two distinct
but interrelated areas. The first area concerns Fowler's con-
ceived relationship between his dimensions. The second area
concerns Fowler's developed understanding of the term "ultimate."

Concern One
Fowler's Conceived Relationship Between
His Two Dimensions

How is it that Fowler relates his two dimensions in his over
all theory of faith? Initially he states that faith as knowing
and faith as relation constitute the inner and outer structures
of faith as a whole. The relational dimension is equated with
tripolar covenants of trust. Faith as a mode of knowing is
comprised of all those operations or aspects involved in ultimate
reality construction.

For Fowler, understanding one dimension necessitates
alluding to the other.[1] When one has seen the triadic character
of faith relatedness, one can recognize that this triad includes
causes or centers of value. These causes are, in fact, concepts
or ideals which result from the knowing process of faith.[2] On
the other hand, reality, as a product of knowing, is covenantally
maintained.[3]

This mutual reciprocity of knowing and relation is
understandable in light of the fact that each dimension
constitutes a different angle of approach or perspective on the

same phenomenon. But it is here that I have a problem. My question is, what is in fact the common denominator that these two dimensions share? What is uniquely characteristic of faith?

Up until 1977 Fowler's publications evidenced a movement toward a characteristic focus. That focus had to do with the notion of ultimacy. Prior to 1977, Fowler could affirm that, regardless of the angle of vision from which one approached faith, one was in fact observing human experience on an ultimate level. But in 1977 (as noted earlier), Fowler broadened his presentation of faith's relational dimension to include all human relations, no longer restricting its focus to ultimate relating. Meanwhile, with regard to the knowing dimension, Fowler has been consistent throughout. In all cases Fowler has distinguished between faith knowing and other levels of knowing by qualifying faith knowing with its object, ultimate realty.

Since 1977 then, faith relating, while including ultimate relating, is not qualified by ultimacy as is faith knowing. Consequently, Fowler's broadened presentation of the relational dimension of faith has resulted in ambiguity with respect to a shared point of focus. There is no longer a clear-cut character- istic connection between these two dimensions.

Morover, the term faith serves a categorically different purpose in each of the two dimensions. With respect to the knowing dimension, faith stands for one uniquely identifiable band of knowing within the over all human cognitive repertoire. In this fashion, faith identifies a specific kind within a general classification.

With respect to the relational dimension, the term "faith" stands for the general classification itself. That is, after 1977, the term "faith" has been used by Fowler coterminously with the term "relation." The term "relation," over against "knowing," stands for another dimensional classification. Here faith no longer serves the function of identifying something unique (a kind within a dimensional class uniquely connected to faith in the knowing dimension). It has become the general or classification term with respect to faith as a mode of relation.

The lack of consistent and connected focus can be uncovered in yet another fashion. Fowler maintains that his discussions focus on two major dimensions of faith. Implicit in this assertion is Fowler's openness to there being other dimensions of faith that he has not yet integrated into his own approach. My question is, what qualifying mark or point of distinction is there in Fowler's system that would function as the plumb line to discern what other dimensions of faith there might be? In other words, what point of focus or limiting concept could Fowler provide on the basis of his present formulations, that would help determine what else should be included in a just characterization of faith?

It is important to note at this point that when charged with the failure to produce a focused faith paradigm, Fowler has taken recourse by re-affirming the complexity of faith as a phenomenon. Calling for a focus, though, does not run at cross purposes with Fowler's respect for complexity. Complexity is not an excuse for a lack of focus. No matter how complex or multidimensional a given phenomenon is, one has to give a focused account of that

phenomenon in order for it to be identified at all. And that is what we are asking of Fowler at this point. What is it that you specifically intend to identify with the term "faith"?

To paraphrase Harry Fernhout, given that faith is like a cube with many sides, and incapable of being consumed by a single perspective, one needs to know why one is dealing with a faith cube. In other words, regardless of the complexity, one needs to know why one is in touch with faith.[4]

This lack of specificity and connection between Fowler's two dimensions is further evident in Fowler's stage theory. Fowler's view of a faith stage is restrictive or limiting. This restrictiveness results from the fact that they are "structuralist" stages and therefore are limited in focus to cognitive capacities. In turn, Fowler identifies his stage theory as an "epistemology of faith."[5]

What is obviously and seriously lacking in Fowler's stage competencies is any connection to his formulations of the relational dimension of faith. Where is it that Fowler's stage competencies reflect his discussions of faith as trust, reliance, or commitment? How is it that Fowler can on the one hand say that faith always begins in relationship and on the other hand provide a list of faith competencies in development which fail to register any connection with faith's relational dimension?

It must be remembered that Fowler has made a continuing effort to broaden the structuralist school, so as to make it more amiable to the peculiar dictates of faith. For instance, Fowler asserts that Erikson's work, in particular, provides help in the

area of focusing on the functional aspect of faith.[6] Erikson's theory of developmental eras provides a guide to the expected existential issues with which people in faith must cope. He also argues that even though his view of stages is indebted to the structuralist school, his understanding of faith development is also deeply influenced by Jung's individuation theory and Bellah's understanding of religious evolution.[7]

Theoretically, Fowler tries to include these perspectives in his view of constitutive knowing (meaning self formation as well as object formation). Constitutive knowing, Fowler believes, takes seriously bi-hemispheric, bi-modal forms of thought. Fowler futher asserts:

> To move in this direction requires coming to terms with modes of thought that employ images, symbols and synthetic fusions of sense and feeling. It means taking account of so-called 'regressive' movements in which thepsyche returns to preconceptual prelinguistic modes and memories, and to primitive sources energizing imagery...[8]

The problem is that even though Fowler attempts to broaden the structuralist notion of cognition, Fowler's stage competencies are still limited to the operations of the mind. He identifies what he intends to include as "sub-functions" of knowing.[9] Transformation in consciousness means "the recognition of self-others-world in light of knowing the self as constituted by a center of value powerful enough to require or enable re-centering one's ultimate environment."[10]

Furthermore, the one period in life that allows for the greatest potential to incorporate the notions of ultimate trust and dependence, and which Fowler confesses "avowedly deals with the foundations of faith", he has not until recently even

referred to as a stage.[11] Fowler's term for this foundation of faith has been "prestage."[12] Stage one, he has maintained, cannot begin until a child acquires thought and language. For it is only at the convergence of thought and language that Fowler can apply his cognitive model. As a result, much of what Fowler discusses as essential to faith can only play an implicit role in his stage paradigm.

In fact, the very possibility of Fowler asserting a faith stage theory that reflects only one of two dimensions he deems essential to understanding faith, is a result of the unconnectedness of these two dimensions. If this were not so, Fowler's stage competencies would in some way reflect the relational dimension. As it now stands, Fowler's faith stage competencies are all cognitive. Due to this lack of a shared point of focus, Fowler's dimensions come dangerously close to being self-contained. That is, they tend to represent two unintegrated sets of phenomena rather than each constituting a different angle of approach on the same phenomenon.

Of further import is the relationship between Fowler's dimensions and stage growth. On the one hand, Fowler's formulations on stage growth do correspond to Fowler's relational dimension. Faith as relation, with its focus on covenant bonding, correlates with the centering and de-centering process. For the centering and de-centering process depicts the potential movement of persons toward more internally based and inclusive-in-scope, relational covenants. This process culminates in a covenantal identification with a principle of being.

But, as shown, Fowler's stage competencies are mental operations. Each depicts a different human cognitive capacity. The inference to be drawn from this configuration is that one's maturation level of covenant bonding corresponds to and is immediately equated with one's cognitive growth. Human covenanting capacities, then, are reduced to the development and growth of mental operations.

As I have already stated, it is unfair to criticize Fowler's work by referring to it as a _simple_ reduction of faith to cognition. Fowler obviously does view faith in broader categories than rationality alone. But by virtue of the approach Fowler uses, it follows that his model falls into a rationalistic reductionism. For Fowler has attempted to identify faith bonding growth through the eyes of cognitive development. And again, I believe, this is the result of a lack of focus which is necessary to aid Fowler in the development of a more integrated theory. I maintain then that Fowler's two dimensional focus is lacking a point of focus. As it stands, Fowler's paradigm needs more specific focus to warrant it being called a theory of a single phenomenon, faith.

An immediate remedy to this situation would be to encourage Fowler to return to his pre-1977 focus on ultimacy as his qualifying notion of faith. By doing so, the hope would be to regain focus and bring back symmetry to Fowler's two dimensional focus.

For the notion of ultimacy is the closest thing to a qualifying or limiting concept in Fowler's formulations as they now stand. I personally believe that to move in this direction is

very promising. But to do so, Fowler must address certain problems inherent in his present understanding and use of the term. In turn, I believe that my suggested remedy to this second problem will lead toward a way of theorizing about faith that will both respect its complexity and allow for a more specific focus.

<center>Concern Two
Fowler's Understanding and Use
of the Term Ultimate</center>

Fowler defines "ultimate" with the notions "encompassing" and "inclusive," as well as the notions "centering" and "integrating." Whether it be in terms of relation or knowing, one's struggle with the ultimate permeates all other relations and modes of knowing. My concern revolves around the notions "encompassing" and "inclusive. "

For Fowler, the notions "encompassing" and "inclusive" serve to account for one way ultimate experience relates to penultimate experience. With regard to faith's relational dimention one's ultimate covenant is "the broadest and most inclusive relationship in faith."[13] As the outermost boundary of all relationships, it constitutes "the larger framework of meaning in which [persons] make and sustain [their] interpersonal, institutional and vocational covenants."[14] Consequently, one's ultimate covenant informs and qualifies all other relations.

With respect to faith as knowing, ultimate meaning making requires the involvement of the total self. Faith as ultimate knowing, in fact, is the only level of knowing which Fowler states as requiring this kind of total involvement. Furthermore,

<center>60</center>

one's construction of an ultimate environment, by virtue of its status as an environment of environments, provides "a spread of meaning capable of funding more immediate everyday action."[15]

It is this all-encompassing character of ultimacy, I believe, that leads some critics to consider Fowler's work as ego or personality development, rather than faith development. Due to Fowler's understanding of ultimacy, faith becomes the key or hallmark of humanness. For it represents the human condition in its broadest or most inclusive sense. What Marx did with economic life and Freud with psycho-sexual experience, Fowler now appears to do with faith. That is, he relativizes the legitimacy and value of all other modes of human experience in terms of the one particular mode called faith.

I do not believe that Fowler intends to absolutize faith. When discussing knowing, Fowler refers to faith as an aspect or part of one's total constitutive activity. Moreover, with regard to both dimensions Fowler argues for a dialectic interplay between ultimate and penultimate experience.

I believe that this double action insight of Fowler's is fundamental to the valuable contribution his theory provides. Here faith is human to the point that other modes of experience impact its development and potential for growth. The problem is that when Fowler discusses ultimate as inclusive, faith tends to overwhelm penultimate experience. Faith comes to stand for human life in total, and again Fowler has lost his clarity of focus.

Again to take Fowler's stages as an example, while they are restricted to cognition, it is also striking that they include all the competencies developed by the structrualist school as

well as a few of Fowler's own. This list of competencies,

understood in total as faith competencies, raises this question:

Does Fowler intend to use the term "faith" to indentify the whole

of human knowing? And if so, why doesn't he come out and say

that directly rather than by implication?

Diagrammatically, Fowler's stage theory can be presented as

follows:

FAITH
KNOWING

Form of Logic
Role-taking
Moral Judgment
Bounds of social
Locus of Authority
Form of world ohere
Symbolic Functions

Each circle in his diagram represents a competency. The smaller

interior circles represent those competencies that are necessary

though not suffcent for the functionality and growth of the

outer circles or competencies. It is the inclusion of all the

circles (competencies) or the diagram as a whole that is called

faith.

In a similar manner one can diagram Fowler's relational

dimension;

ULtimate faith
covenant

Family

State
School

Business
Language~use
friendship

In this diagram the smaller interior circles represent the

myriad of penultimate relations which make up mundane or every-
day life. The outer circle, encompassing all other relations, is
one's ultimate faith relation.

In both cases the term faith represents the whole of human
functioning rather than an individual mode of experience, and in
my view overshadows or dominates all others. Faith, when under-
stood as ultimate and therefore inclusive, no longer identifies a
mode of human functioning but rather total human functioning.

Fowler, then, needs to look seriously at his understanding
and use of the term ultimate. His desire is to emphasize the
unique, irreducible role which faith, as a mode of experience,
plays in the overall human challenge to engage life as mean-
ingful. In effect, Fowler needs to find a way to respect faith's
uniqueness without inflating its importance.

In Search of a Point of Focus[16]

As I mentioned earlier, the most promising point of focus in
Fowler's paradigm is the concept of ultimacy. But in order for
this concept to serve as a point of focus, I believe that Fowler
needs to rework his understanding of ultimacy in two ways. First
Fowler needs to work away from the inclusiveness emphasis.
Second, Fowler needs to introduce another concept to unify his
understanding of human experience.

At this point in Fowler's development, he uses the term
faith as ultimate and therefore inclusive experience, to organize
his overall perspective on being human. It serves this purpose
by functioning as a collective term. As I have shown, in

relation to both dimensions, ultimate equals total functionality, or the sum of all human functional parts.

When faith serves this purpose, it can no longer identify a particular kind or mode of experience within the diversity of human functions. But Fowler also wants to utilize the term in this fashion. This is evident in those discussions which place faith as a mode of activity alongside of and on equal footing with other modes or levels of experience (i.e., the logic of rational certainty). As a result, faith fluctuates between the collective use and the more limited modal use. This results in the confusion over whether faith is a mode of exprience or the sum total of all experience.

I want to suggest that an alternative to this approach is to restrict the term faith to represent a mode or aspect of the diversity of human experience. This would allow Fowler to focus his discussions on faith. In turn, I want to suggest another concept to replace "faith" as the unifying concept for human experience. That concept is the concept of the human self.

By the term "self," I mean the "I" or "me," the acting center of unity in human experience. No matter how diversified or multidimensional we experience life to be, we also experience a core-center of continuity and oneness. It is this core-center of unity that Fowler has attempted to account for with his use of the term faith in the inclusive or collective sense. As Fowler puts it,

> There simply is no other concept that holds together those various interrelated dimensions of human knowing, valuing and committing and acting that must be held considered together if we want to understand the making and maintaining of human meaning.[17]

The concept "self" is the other concept that can hold together all the diversity of human experience. In turn, without the need to account for the unity of human experience, the focus of faith as a function can be understood in a more limited, yet uniquely vital way.

It is important to make the point that Fowler needs consciously to make this move. For although Fowler has yet to present an explicit anthropology, I believe that there is evidence to hypothesize that Fowler's dual-focused approach betrays two competing anthropologies.

Throughout, Fowler has acknowledged his indebtedness to H. R. Niebuhr with respect to his formulations on faith as relational. Niebuhr's vision of humanness, Fowler writes, is "one that sees the fact about persons as being our relation in absolute dependence, to a God who is comprehensive of all power, and who is loyal in love to dependent being."[18] This anthropology appears in that stream of thought in Fowler's works that I have identified as revelatory of Fowler's sensitivity to the relational quality of faith.

Within the structuralist school, being human is understood in terms of cognitive processes. This is exemplified by Fowler's utilization of Kegan's view of constitutive knowing. Kegan, Fowler writes, has "rigorously sought to extend Piaget's primary focus on knowing as an active structuring or organizing activity to account for the dynamics of personality development."[19] Kegan concludes that "Ego...is the construal of the self and others in relationship."[20] Kegan's approach, then, "seeks to unify an

understanding of the ego's total constitutive activity (including even the dynamic unconscious of depth psychologies) [in terms of] the ways we construct both the world and ourselves in the knowing that is ego."[21] In this perspective, self is identified with the cognitive processes underlying reality construction, and ultimate knowing equals the total human package.

In both cases, the self is identified with a particular function. In turn, when that function or dimension is the focus of discussion, the other dimensions become of secondary importance. The corrective consists in viewing the self as the unity and agency of action, while the various functions in experience can be understood as the channels or unique avenues through which the self comes to expression.

Once Fowler avoids the temptation to identify the self with any particular mode of functioning, be it cognition, one's ultimate relation, or whatever, he will create room and legitimacy for each of the diversifed modes. Each mode, (i.e., cognition, moral experience, emotional development, and faith understood in a unique but limited way), can be conceived of as a specific kind of action in the overall human drama of the developing self. All modes can be understood as constitutively human, and all developmental theories will identify, not the development of a particular mode, but rather the self in terms of a uniquely identifiable mode.

This kind of anthropology can also accentuate Fowler's ability to focus on each mode. Faith, for instance, free from the responsibility of providing unity within life as a whole, no longer has to be viewed as multidimensional in the Fowlerian

sense. The self is multidimensional, while faith is one dimension of the self. Cognition can also be viewed as a unique human mode having to do with the capacity to conceptualize. Emotional experience can be affirmed as the human capacity for sensation and so on. Each mode can be acknowledged as constituting an irreducible band of experience, no longer needing to be viewed as a subfunction of another mode.

Furthermore, this anthropology makes it easier to conceptualize the relationship between various modes. For if the self is understood as the unity in diversity of human functions, where ever the self is, there is the whole gamut of human functions. This means the act of faith can never be understood as noncognitive or irrational (Fowler's concern), because the self always functions cognitively. Cognition, as well, can never be viewed without the input of faith commitments or feelings, because the self is always feeling and faithing. Wherever the self is, there is the totality of its functions.

What one can identify, though, is that various activities are highlighted by a specific mode. For instance, in church worship or cultic activity, one's faith functioning comes to the fore and qualifies one's activity in that instance. In turn, when one is in the process of scientific analysis, cognitive capacities occupy central ground. But, as mentioned, in neither case are any of the other functions absent. Cognition plays a role in faith activities, while faith plays a role in scientific activities. Each can be understood as playing an implicit or explicit role, depending upon the kind of activity one is engaged

in.

Finally, I believe that this kind of anthropology is genuinely reflective of Fowler's desire to view faith as a normal part of human functioning. So normal, in fact, that it depends on growth in other modal capacities like cognition and affection to undergird its own healthy functioning. For each mode of functioning is not only irreducible but necessary as well, as an essential piece in the puzzle of human experience. All modal growth can be viewed as greatly enhancing each other's growth or serving as detriment to growth.

At this point I want to suggest a specific focus for faith as the ultimate mode of human experience. I am gleaning this focus from Fowler's own work, although it is often unclear due to Fowler's fluctuating uses of "faith." This focus is consistent with Fowler's commitment to work on the human side of the faith experience.[22] The focus is the human experience of ultimate surrender.

Ultimate Surrender

Fowler identifies faith issues as those that deal with the powers and boundaries and sources of meaning not subject to human control. In turn, ultimate centers of value and power promise to sustain one's life and guarantee "more being."[23] What Fowler himself is getting at is the experience of ultimate surrender. The term surrender is helpful because it catches the unique quality of the encounter as experienced by a person in faith. In other relations there is a trusting but not a total dependence. This kind of dependence is only warranted by an ultimate concern.

Sam Keen sums up this point by identifying this kind of surrender as the "gradual or sudden yielding of the illusion of control..."[24] One entrusts one's life and one's being to someone or something ultimately.

This focus on surrender is consistent with Fowler's appreciation of Erikson's contributions to understanding faith. Erikson's initial stage of trust vs. mistrust is a dramatic portrayal of ultimate surrender. At birth and through the first months of life, the infant cries out with the desire to surrender to his or her own need for another to depend on and receive from, the first revelation of the truth about life.

In this light, surrender is consistent with Fowler's appreciation of faith as a mode of action. I am not passive in surrender, but rather in the midst of the struggle to experience life as meaningful, I give myself over in abandonment to an ultimate point of reference. This reference then serves as a platform from which I operate or anchor, through which I and my life are grounded.

Also consistent with Fowler's emphasis on development, surrender is not a once and for all act. Faith growth does not stop with the act of ultimate surrender; it grows and develops. But it is by virtue of real surrender that such growth is possible. For no longer does one rest completely on oneself for further or deeper understanding in life. One's human foibles can be freely accepted once the truth I receive is not ultimately dependent on me. And with freedom to accept my limitedness comes the possibility for real growth.

An emphasis on surrender as the focus of faith also provides the very kind of dynamic quality or passionate involvement that Fowler himself desires.[25] Surrender, as a term, reflects passionate involvement. It highlights the involvement of the total self.

This surrender focus also illuminates the uniqueness of ultimate reality construction. Faith knowing is unique in that it is the kind of knowing which is qualified by receptivity as opposed to other kinds of knowing where the knower is more in command of the object of the study. For in faith, the ultimate impinges on us.

Finally, it is this surrender quality that raises one's ultimate vision to the position of revelation. In penultimate modes of knowing and relations, the causes or centers of power and value are not considered revelational unless in fact one is gripped by a henotheism. Ultimate surrender is to be directed beyond the causes and values of everyday life, which in turn contextualize and integrate everyday concerns.

The beauty of "surrender" rests in its capacity, as a term, to highlight the fundamental human need to secure one's life through an unreserved abandonment to a revelation of truth. This act of abandoned resolve serves as the context of meaning that Fowler's project seeks to identify.

This discussion raises serious questions for Fowler concerning his theory of stages. For if the focus of faith, as I suggest, is better understood in terms of ultimate surrender, how will this effect Fowler's presentation of the stages of faith? In dealing with this I will venture only a few directional

concerns.

In actuality, Fowler's understanding of stage growth is not affected. For growth and development, as Fowler explains them, are general. The process of centering and de-centering can be easily applied to the human self in faith development.

What will change is that since the self takes the place of faith as an integrating concept, the focus of the self in faith growth will be on surrender rather than cognition. This does not mean that cognitive development has nothing to do with faith growth. For the self grows integrally, in all its modal functions. Cognitive growth, as Fowler makes clear with respect to Piaget's stages, undergirds faith development. But as a mode of functioning, cognition deserves an irreducible place of its own in self development. (The same would apply to emotional development, and so on)

It is also important to state that faith development, due to its difference in kind, will not necessarily reflect human cognitive development as devised by Piaget and the structuralists. Cognitive capacities, as they are identified, are unique in form to cognition itself.

What is necessary to avoid is the tendency to force all other modes of human development into the cognitive format. Fowler's tendency to do so is the result of the structuralist critique of other developmental theories. If, though, there are other irreducible modes of human experience, it follows that developmental theories should reflect the core moments of those modes or dimensions.

Fowler need not fear the structuralist critique of other developmental theories. No one modal developmental format should dictate the functioning of other modes of development. The point Fowler needs to secure is that surrender is an irreducible human mode or dimension of experience. Once this is established, Fowler and others need conceptual freedom to develop the kind of conceptual framework which will do justice to the peculiarities of faith.

In faith development the focus of the self will be on one's capacity to surrender oneself freely. Mature growth in surrender is constituted by the capacity to make an unreserved commitment of one's heart with the kind of depth and richness of sophistication Fowler points to in the centering and de-centering process. That is, one's surrender will grow from an outwardly determined, limited communal context, to an inwardly determined, more vulnerable, open stance toward the world at large.

Depth and sophistication also point to growth beyond the level of naivete. Mature vulnerability and openness to others are not the result of ignorance. They are the result of experience that treasures openness to the point of trusting that the risk of the pain of rejection is worth taking, in light of the possible fruit of genuine human fellowship. As Fowler puts it, one achieves a second naivete.

In essence, then, the faith task can be identified as the human need to surrender ultimately to someone or something. Studies of faith development would focus on the human capacity to surrender as this capacity changes through growth and time. The gift of healthful surrender is the necessary ground one requires

to face life with courage, hope and freedom. What one is free from, is debilitating anxiety and hopelessness.

It has not been my intention to work this focus out in a specified developmental fashion. But I do believe that going in the above direction will prove fruitful to this ongoing task. The strength of the above approach is to free up "faith" from serving as the integrating concept in the diversity of human experience, so that it can identify one mode in the diversity. As such, focus is more possible, along with a more nuanced way of concieving of faith in relation to the rest of experience as a whole.

POSTSCRIPT

Faith With One's Feet on the Ground

In concluding this analysis, I want to raise one last concern. Up to this point, I have been necessarily critical of the coherence of Fower's formulations on faith and its development. In closing I want to identify the real sense of comradarie I feel with respect to the spirit of Fower's project.

There is obviously a great deal to Fowler's project that is richly illuminating, not the least of which is his respect for the complexity of the phenomenon in question. I share with Fowler his concern for the complexity of faith and the sensitivity he shows for the limits of human theorizing.

Another strength of Fower's approach is its interdisciplinary flavor. In the process of developing his views, Fower has taken advantage of a variety of academic spheres. In doing so, his program both embodies and encourages cross-disciplinary study.

More importantly, Fowler, a' la W.C. Smith, fruitfully argues for the distinction between faith and religion. This Western association warrants distinction in the service of a more broadly (and I believe justly) applicable view of faith. Due to this distinction, Fower is able to affirm two important insights.

The first insight concerns the universal character of faith as a mode of being. Once faith is distinguished from "religion," with its typically Western deistic overtones, it is more readily possible to appreciate how faith _is_ a universal mode of partic-ipation. Faith for Fowler has to do with investments of com-

mitted trust which serve to organize and integrate life. This kind of model makes much greater sense of the commonality that various communities share, regardless of whether the focus of their investment of trust is deistic or not.

In this light, communities organized around modern social philosophies like capitalism and marxism can be seen as sharing a functional point of contact with classically understood religious communities such as Islam, Shintoism and Christianity. And with Fowler's insight into the necessary symbolic character of all faith "stories," these modern "myths" can be readily understood in terms of the same limitations with regard to ultimate truth claims that the classical faith communities have had to face. That is, all investments of ultimate surrender are investments in relative appreciations of the contours and tones of ultimate reality. This kind of insight provides a needed critical response to the sometimes arrogant selfunderstanding some proponents of modern social faiths hold in relation to the likes of the classic religious faiths.

In turn, with Fowler's emphasis on the structure as well as content of faith, all faith communities have a chance to look at the truth value of their own traditions in a new light. For, as Fowler points out, it is not only <u>what</u> one holds to be ultimately true about life that counts. Just as vital is <u>how</u> one holds what one holds to be true. This added emphasis on the structure as well as the content of faith, allows us to plumb the depths of our own faith with a greater richness of insight.

Secondly, Fowler's distinction between faith and religion

opens the door to his development of a view of faith as action or function. To view faith as function, not necessarily focussed on a deity, enables us to view faith as decompartmentalized, or integral to human experience. The value of this insight again bears its fruit in the understood relationship between "religious" faith communities and non-religious faith communities.

Traditionally understood religious faith communities in the modern West have had to relegate their social impact to the realm of the private sphere of cultural involvement. Public life is to be governed by "non-religious," reasonable insight into the affairs of persons and communities. Fowler's model challenges such a view by reaffirming that all insight is grounded in and colored by an ultimate investment of trust in a symbolically represented vision of reality as a whole. Consequently, all symbolically grounded visions of life share equal footing with regard to "reasonableness" of insight. The implication of this view is that all faith communities should share as well in the development of public policy geared toward the governing of a culture's daily affairs. Regardless, though, of one's political intentions, the point is that faith experience is integral to human experience as a whole.

It is also important to point out that by stating that the implications of Fowler's format include the realization that all faith communities share equal footing in relation to the reasonableness of insight each communtiy can povide, I do not mean to say that Fowler deems all visions of life of equal value. The point is, all contrubutions of insight are guided by and grounded

in an ultimate surrender to a vision of life that is more than reasonable. Fowler, for instance, argues that at least three criteria must be called into service when evaluating the worth of any contribution. They include empirical validation, philosophical soundness, and ethical implications of that contribution.

Fowler further asserts that all insight is relative. But again, relative for Fowler does not mean of equal value. He means in relation to the persons or communities one is exposed to, the givens that constitute the contingent quality of all human experience. And it is here that Fowler struggles with and, I believe, provides the strength of insight that marks the spirit of his approach. That strength is that faith for Fowler is colored by human limitedness and must be accepted in this light.

In this manner I believe that Fowler's perception of faith is one which has its feet on the ground. Faith is an act of people of the earth, looking outward, relative and limited. When taken to heart I believe that this insight can provide a keen sense of the meaning of real faith. That is to view ourselves and our faith as human, and accept ourselves and others in the grace that this realization provides.

APPENDIX

THE STAGES

Each of Fowler's faith stages represents a qualitatively different level of competency development. With maturity "the structures underlying faith become progressively more complex, more internally differentiated, more comprehensive, and more flexible."[1] In turn, a movement from one stage to another represents for Fowler a "structural transformation" with regard to these patterns."[2] The stages themselves or various identifiable structural whole levels of faith competency are as follows.

Stage one; Intuitive Projective Faith (age 3-4)

This is the "imitative, fantasy filled stage in which a child can be powerfully and permanently influenced by the examples, moods, actions and laguage of the visible faith of primary adults."[3] At this stage a child employs pre-operational reasoning while "the capacity for taking the role or perspective of others is severely limited."[4] Nor has a sense of moral obligation developed yet. Bounds of social awareness is limited primarily to family and family surrogate relations as is one's locus of authority.[5] One's form of world coherence is classified as episodic in charater, meaning a child at this stage is able to grasp experience in terms of individual episodes without a narrative story like connection.[6] And finally, with regard to "symbol" Fowler writes, they tend to function as identical with or as part of what they represent. Thus, to draw a picture of a face and then deface it may produce an "uneasy feeling of guilt or fear of retaliation..."[7] As a whole, this stage marks the

beginning of the developmental process.

Stage two; Mythic Literal Faith (6 1/2-8)

This stage marks the begining of a person's ability to take on the faith stories embraced by the person's community. Adaptation takes place through the observation of attitudes and beliefs which are "appropriated with literal meaning."[8] At this point one has aquired concrete operations. Major gains have been made in role-taking as well. One can and will make allowances for the fact that from another person's vantage point, an object he or she is viewing will appear different. Moral judgment, largely due to gains in role-taking ability has added the element of reciprocity and the person's social world has widened as well. Teachers, school authorities, religious leaders and so on are now a conscious element of one's world. In turn, identity now involves one's family's "ethnic or racial heritage, religious affiliation and social class standing..."[9] While one's validation of conclusions in most areas of life is still drawn from one's parents, at this stage sensory experience is in the process of becoming subjected to the canons of one's own judgment. With respect to world coherence, one has achieved "mastery of the narrative mode for giving coherence to experience" Finally, in stage two, symbols are experienced in terms of a literal-correspondence understanding.[10] That is, symbols must refer to something specific and be imagined by analogy with some element of concrete experience.[11]

Stage three; Synthetic Conventional Faith (12-13)

The key to understanding this stage involves the challenge

to incorporate into a coherent meaningful synthesis, a number of spheres of human ivolvement. These include the family, school or work, peers, leisure friendships and possibly a religious sphere.[12] For now not only does one experience a wider social world, one must synchronize the various authoritative voices. Coherence in this stage, Fowler explains, is achieved by rendering authority to appropriate persons in each sphere, or by rendering authority to a conscensus of "those who count."[13] This is done via personal or face-to-face relating. One is attracted to trust evoking personalities who represent ideas or movements. This attraction is based on a conventionally expected style and mannerisms sanctioned by a valued institution or institution-like group. One has acquired early formal operations at this point and role taking has now become "mutual and leads to a third person perspective that is essential to self of mind."[14] Fowler continues, "in keeping with the interpersonal focus of the stage as a whole, [moral judgment] is based on fulfilling the expectations of significant others and maintaining agreement or peace between persons."[15] Identity at this point is based on membership in groups characterized by face-to-face relationships and one's world coherence pattern is synthetic. That is, ideas, beliefs, and values developed through interaction with groups are melded into a tacit (not critically self-aware) system. Meanwhile symbol development, while still precritical or "naive", has reached the stage of understanding metaphor and double intention, which allows one to be affected by them on a number of levels simultaneously. Symbol and symbolized are still bound together in a natural or primal linkage, although in a more complex

fashion than in stage two. Typical images of God are now based on personal qualities like friend, comforter, mind or quide.

Stage four; Individuative Reflective Faith (18-19)

This stage marks a radical change with respect to the three previous stages in that it marks a person's movement to seriously accepting personal responsibility for her or his own "commitments, lifestyle, beliefs and attitudes."[16] In doing so a stage four person must face universal polar tensions which previous stages protected him or her from. These tensions include individuality vs. belonging to a community, subjectivity vs. objectivity, selffulfillment vs. service to others, and the relative vs. the absolute. Stage four people are strongly attracted to charismatic leaders for tutelage in a particular ideology. Fowler contends that stage four people often "find it necessary to collapse these polar tensions in one direction or the other."[17] Full formal operations have been achieved and role-taking has advanced to new levels of complexity. Moral judgment has reached a post-conventional level and "a person's reference group(s), for purposes of identification and inclusiveness in calulating moral responsibility may be quite wide.[18] One's locus of authority is becoming internalized now and world coherence is achieved via the development of an "explicit system."[19] Stage four marks as well the de-mythologization of the symbol. Ideas and propositions are of central concern along with explicit meaning and internal consistency. Here one acts on (interprets) the symbol rather than the symbol acting on her or him.[20] Again, the qualifying mark of stage four is a "new and different kind of

awareness and responsibility for one's choices and rejections."[21]

Stage five; Paradoxical Consolidative Faith (30-32)

While stage four people accept responsibility for faith choices, as mentioned there is a tendency to collapse or over commit to one perspective at the expense of all else. Stage five represents an advance in this regard due to one's capacity at this stage to, first, recognize "the integrity and truth in a position other than its own..."[22] Secondly one affirms and lives out of [one's] own commitments and beliefs in such a way as to honor that which is true in the lives of others without denying one's own insight.[23] Stage five people then are ready for community with those not belonging with in their own "tribal, racial, class and ideological boundaries."[24] Formal operations, in the service of the construction and maintenance of this openness to others takes the form of a dialectical style. Role-taking is now augmented by greater comprehensiveness and accuracy. Moral judgement is now principled and "less distorted by class and group biases" than are those of stage four.[25] One now seeks "identification with and inclusion within groups and classes other than one's own..."[26] Authority, further internalized, must now deal with the awareness of one's own subjectivity due to one's comprehensive role-taking abilities and awareness of a multiplicity of perspectives. And with regard to symbol and myth, stage five represents the development of a second naivete. That is, one "sees through the symbolic medium" both critically and post-critically, recognizing the power of the symbol to provide a new way of envisioning life."[27] Stage five people, Fowler concludes, must exibit genuine integrity with regard to

the relationship between values and beliefs and life actions.[28]

Stage six; Universalizing Faith

Stage five people, Fowler explains, while wanting inclusive community still experience paradox. That is, while affirming others they still feel themselves being denied. This sense of paradox is coupled with still unfettered feelings of defensiveness and egocentricity which makes the affirmation of others difficult and the living beyond one's ties a struggle. Stage six is reached when one's "sense of oneness of all persons is not a glib ideological belief but has become a permeative basis for decision and action. The paradox has gone out of being for others; at stage six one is being most truly oneself. [One's] participation in the ultimate is direct and immediate."[29] Community now is universally inclusive, one is in community with being.

At stage six one experiences an "epistemological shift."[30] Formal operational thought serves the self's grounding of identity with Being. The "union of opposites is no longer experienced as paradoxical."[31] Role-taking now involves taking the perspective of an ideal, inclusive common wealth of being.[32] "Loyalty to Being is the fundamental principle of moral reasoning...The bounds of social awareness become universal, but not merely in an abstract sense. Authority inheres...in a heart and mind purified of egoistic striving and attentive to the requirements of Being. An ultimate coherence informs one's outlook...A complex and plural unity - which centers on a oneness beyond but inclusive of the depth of the actuality they mediate.

Stage six persons are profound shapers and regenerators of symbols due to the immediate quality of their relation to and participation in transcendent actuality."[33] At stage six one can be inclusive from out of the centeredness of one's own being.

Pre-stage; Undifferentiated Faith (birth to 3-4)

Fowler does also speak of a stage 0 or pre-stage of faith. This pre-stage first appears in Fowler's 1974a presentation of his theory and then desappears until 1980. Characteristic of this period is one's pre-conceptual, prelinguistic experience of life, via primal others in which "the seeds of trust, courage, hope, and love are fused in an undiffereniated way and contend with sensed threats of abandonment, inconsistencies and depriva- tions..."[34] Also identified as pre-selfconscious, Fowler contends one's development of trust and so on "includes rudimentary but undifferentiated faith knowing."[35] For one's development of these qualities "underlie" or "undermine" all that comes later in faith development.[36] One's movement out to stage one of faith is constituted by the "convergence of thought and language, opening up the use of symbols in speech and ritual play."[37] Fowler adds that as a pre-stage, undifferentiated faith is largely inacces- sible to his kind of research. (Fowler utilizes the face- to- face, semi-clinical interview format).

NOTES

Introduction

[1] Stephen S. Ivy, Review; Stages of Faith: The Journal of Pastoral Care, (1982), Vol. 36, No. 4, p.274.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Don Browning, Review; Stages of Faith: Anglican Theological Review, (1983), Vol. 65, p.125.

[4] James Fowler, "Stages in Faith: The Structural-Developmental Approach," in Values & Moral Development, ed. T.C. Hennessy S.J., (Paulist Press, 1976), p.217. Hereafter 76b.

[1] James Fowler, "Faith and the Structuring of Meaning," in Toward Moral and Religious Maturity, ed. C. Brusselmans (Silver Burdett Co., 1980), p.64-65. Hereafter 80a.

[2] James Fowler, "Moral Stages and the Development of Faith," in Moral Development, Moral Education and Kohlberg, ed. B. Munsey, (Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1980), p.137. Hereafter 80b.

[3] James Fowler, Stages of Faith, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), p.92-93. Hereafter Stages.

[4] Stages, p.92.

[5] Stages, p.xiii.

[6] Stages, p.xiii.

[7] Stages, p.xiii.

[8] Stages, p.xiii.

[9] 80a, p53.

[10] Stages, p.32.

[11] Stages, p.32.

[12] James Fowler, To See the Kingdom, (New York, Abingdon Press, 19749), p.28-29. Hereafter 74c

[13] 74c, p.29.

[14] James Fowler, "Life/Faith Patterns," in Life Maps, ed. J. Berryman, (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1978), p.35. Hereafter L.M.

[15] 74c, p.7.

[16] James Fowler, "Toward a Developmental Perspective on Faith", in Religious Education (Vol. LXIX, 1974), p.207. Hereafter 74a. Also see L.M., p.18.

[17] L.M., p.18.

[18] L.M., p.18; Stages, p.xiii.

[19] Stages, p.xiii.

[20] Stages, p.9-15.

[21] Stages, p.xii-xiii, 4-5.

[22] 80a, p.83.

[23] 80a, p.83.

[24] L.M., p.35

[25] <u>Stages</u>, 98-114.

[26] L.M., p.16.

[27] L.M., p.16.

[28] L.M., p.16.

[29] L.M., p.16, also see, 76b, p.174.

[30] L.M., p.17.

[31] L.M., p.34.

[32] 76b, p.174.

[33] L.M., p.34.

[34] 74a, p.208.

[35] 74a, p.208.

[36] 74a, p.208.

[37] 74a, p.207

[1] James Fowler, "Faith, Liberation and Human Development," in The Thirkield-Jones Lectures - Gamon Theological Seminary, (Copyright, James Fowler, 1974), p.6. Hereafter 74b. Also see, 74a, p.208.

[2] 74b, p.6.

[3] 74b, p.6.

[4] 74b, p.6

[5] 74b, p.6.

[6] 74b, p.6.

[7] 74a, p.209.

[8] 74a, p.209.

[9] L.M., p.18.

[10] 76b, p.177.

[11] L.M., p.18.

[12] L.M., p.18.

[13] L.M., p.19.

[14] L.M., p.18.

[15] L.M., p.19.

[16] L.M., p.19

[17] L.M., p.19.

[18] L.M., p.19.

[19] L.M., p.20.

[20] L.M., p.20.

[21] L.M., p.20.

[22] L.M., p.21.

[23] L.M., p.21.

[24] L.M., p.21.

[25] L.M., p.21.

[26] L.M., p.21.

[27] L.M., p.21.

[28] L.M., p.21.

[29] L.M., p.21.

[30] 80a, p.54.

[31] 80a, p.54.

[32] 80a, p.54.

[33] 80a, p.55.

[34] 80a, p.53-54.

[35] 80a, p.55-56.

[36] 80a, p.56.

[37] 80a, p.56.

[38] L.M., p.21.

[39] 80a, p.56.

[40] 80a, p.56.

[41] 80a, p.56-57.

[42] Stages, p.16.

[43] Stages, p.16.

[44] Stages, p.16.

[45] Stages, p.16.

[46] Stages, p.16.

[47] Stages, p.16-17.

[48] Stages, p.18.

[49] Stages, p.18.

[50] Stages, p.19.

[51] Stages, p.19.

[52] Stages, p.22.

[53] Stages, p.19.

[54] Stages, p.19.

[55] Stages, p.19.

[56] Stages, p.20.

[57] Stages, p.23.

[58] Stages, p.23.

[59] Stages, p.23.

[60] Stages, p.23.

[61] Stages, p.23.

[62] Stages, p.23.

[63] 76b, p.185.

[64] L.M., p.89.

[65] Stages, p.23.

[66] Stages, p.23.

[67] Stages, p.23.

[68] Stages, p.23.

[1] 74a, p.208.

[2] Stages, p.11, 98.

[3] 74a, p.210.

[4] James Fowler, "Faith Development Theory and the Aims of Religious Socialization," in Emerging Issues in Religious Education, ed. Goria Durka & Joan Marie Smith, (Paulist Press, New York/Ramsey, 1976), p.194. Hereafter 76a.

[5] 76a, p.194.

[6] 76a, p.194.

[7] 76a, p.194.

[8] 76a, p.194.

[9] L.M., p.34.

[10] ie. Marxism, Christianity, and so on. See 76b, p.197.

[11] Stages, p.xiii.

[12] 76a, 194-195.

[13] 74a, p.212.

[14] 76b, p.177-178.

[15] 74a, p.207; 74b, p.3.

[16] L.M.,21; 80a, p.62.

[17] 74a, p.207.

[18] 74a, p.207.

[19] Stages, p.4.

[20] 80a, p.53.

[21] Stages, p.24; 76b, p.181.

[22] Stages, p.24.

[23] 74a, p.211; 74b, p.8.

[24] 74a, p.204.

[25] 74a, p.211.

[26] 74a, p.213.

[27] L.M., p.37.

[28] 74a, p.213

[29] L.M., p.37.

[30] L.M., p.37.

[31] 74a, p.211.

[32] 74a, p.211.

[33] 80a, p.58 and follwing.

[34] 80a, p.57.

[35] 80a, p.57.

[36] 80a, p.58.

[37] 80a, p.60.

[38] 80a, p.62.

[39] 80a, p.53.

[40] The key word here is "center." Fowler's vision of the construction of an ultimate horizon includes both a circumference and a center. To use Fowler's example of the Christian and Jewish formulation of an ultimate horizon, the kingdom of God serves as the circumference concept, while the notion "God" provides the core or centering focus for that world view. See 80a, p. 56.

[41] 80a, p.53, 62, 64; 80b, p.136.

[42] 80a, p.53, 64; 80b, p.136.

[43] 80a, p.62.

[44] 80a, p.59.

[45] Also see 80a, p.56.

[46] L.M., p.24.

[47] 80a, p.61-64.

[48] 80a, p.61.

[49] 80a, p.61.

[50] 80a, p.62.

[51] 80a, p.61-62.

[52] 80a, p.64.

[53] 80a, p.64.

[54] See 74a, p.208, 210, 214;   74b, p.6;   76b, p.175;   L.M., p.24;   Stages p.98 and following.

[55] 76b, p.186.

[56] 76b, p.186.

[57] 76a, p.198.

[58] 76a, p.198.

[59] 76a, p.198.

[60] 80a, p.77.

[61] 76a, p.198;   80a, p.87.

[62] 76a, p.199;   80a, p.87.

[63] 76a, p.199.

[64] 80a, p.77.

[65] 80a, p.77.

[66] 80a, p.77-78.

[67] 80a, p.78.

[68] 80a, p.78.

[69] 76a, p.198.

[70] 76a, p.199.

[71] 76a, p.199.

[72] 76a, p.200.

[73] 76a, p.200.

[74] 76a, p.199-201.

[75] 76a, p.200.

[76] 76a, p.200.

[77] 76a, p.200.

[78] 76b, p.190.

[79] 76b, p.190.

[80] 76b, p.190.

[81] L.M., p.38; Also see 76a, p.201; 76b, p.191; 80a, p.82.

[82] 76b, p.191; Also see Stages, p.274.

[83] Stages, p.101.

[84] Stages, p.103; For further development, see Stages, p.300 and following.

[85] Stages, p.274.

[86] Stages, p.274.

[87] See 76b, p.191.

[1] See L.M.,24; 80a, p.56.

[2] L.M., p.21.

[3] 74a, p.209.

[4] See Harry Fernhout, "Faith: Searching for the Core of the Cube," in Faith Development and Ministry, eds., Dykstra, Parks and Wheeler, (to be published in 1985 by Religious Education Press).

[5] 76b, p.186.

[6] Stages, p.109.

[7] L.M., p.35.

[8] 80a, p.63.

[9] 80a, p.61.

[10] 80a, p.63. Fowler is moving toward a more integrated approach in his most recent publication.

[11] Stages, p.109. Again, Fowler is moving in a direction that attempts to remedy this situation. See latest publication.

[12] Stages, p.121.

[13] 80a, p.56.

[14] L.M., p.21.

[15] 80a, p.62.

[16] I want to note the overriding influence that the formulations on faith of James Olthuis have had on the material in this chapter. Fowler has his Niebuhr and I have my Olthuis.

[17] Stages, p.92.

[18] 74c, p.25.

[19] 80a, p.58.

[20] 80a, p.58.

[21] 80a, p.58-59.

[22] Stages, p.32-33.

[23] 80a, p.53.

[24] L.M., p.105.

[25] 80a, p.57.

Appendix

[1] 76a, p.200.

[2] 76a, p.200.

[3] 76a, p.195.

[4] L.M., p.42-43.

[5] L.M., p.43-44.

[6] L.M., p.42-43.

[7] L.M., p.44.

[8] 76b, p.184.

[9] L.M., p.50-51.

[10] L.M., p.51.

[11] L.M., P.51.

[12] 76b, p.184.

[13] 76b, p.184.

[14] L.M., p.62.

[15] L.M., p.64.

[16] 76b, p.184.

[17] 76b, p.184.

[18] L.M., p.72.

[19] L.M., p.71.

[20] L.M., p.73.

[21] 76b, p.185.

[22] 76b, p.185.

[23] 76b, p.185.

[24] 76b, p.185.

[25] L.M., p.82.

[26] L.M., p.82.

[27] L.M., p.83.

[28] 76b, p.185.

[29] 76b, p,185.

[30] L.M., p.89.

[31] L.M., p.89.

[32] L.M., p.89.

[33] L.M., p.89-90.

[34] Stages, p.121.

[35] 74a, p.214.

[36] 80a, p.68.

[37] 80a, p.68.

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