ERNST TROELTSCH'S FINAL PHASE OF THOUGHT:

HISTORICAL MONADOLOGY

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for Mom and Dad
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>General Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>Historical Background</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>Factors Contributing to the Position</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV</td>
<td>Troeltsch's Position of Historical Monadology</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V</td>
<td>Summary of Monadological Features</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI</td>
<td>Critique</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Footnotes</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I General Introduction

This work deals with Ernst Troeltsch's struggle at the end of his life with the implications of Historicism. Our theme will be Troeltsch's reliance on Leibniz' theory of monads to vouchsafe metaphysical coherence among the individual people forming history.

Our purpose in this essay is twofold. The first purpose is to show the nature of Troeltsch's view of history, found in Der Historismus und seine Überwindung (1924), and to indicate how that position relies on Leibniz' Monadology.

The second purpose is to critique this view.

The first goal will be met by briefly showing Troeltsch's preparation for this position and by explicating the position itself and its similarities with Leibniz'.

We will meet the second goal by first attempting to judge his view according to its internal effectiveness, and then by looking at what, in our opinion, are some of its strengths and weaknesses.

But before proceeding with our theme, we must first give some background to aid in understanding what is involved.

Historicism can be loosely defined as the worldview which sees everything in reality as being at base an historical object. All things come into being, change through time and pass out of existence. They have no fixed nature. They each have their own individual development, their own history. This in itself does not make for Historicism. What is Historicistic about it?
is that this individual change or development is believed to be the most basic aspect of reality, the meaning of life. This means that there is nothing fixed and sure in reality, which can be used as an abiding standard to judge all of the other things that are changing and developing. As Professor Smit writes quoting Troeltsch:

...one may use the word in a strictly factual meaning: the categories of historical becoming and having-become are applied with extreme consistency both to that which is historical as such and to the non-historical. Troeltsch expressed this in his well-known formulation: historicism is "the fundamental historicizing of our knowing and thinking." "We see everything in the flux of becoming, in the endless and always new individualisation, in being determined through the past and in the direction toward an unknown future. State, Law, Morality, Religion, Art are all dissolved into the flux of historical becoming and we ourselves are only understandable as a constituent of historical development."¹

When it first became an explicit school of thought in Germany in the nineteenth century, what later became known as Historismus was in part a reaction to the Rationalism of Western Europe. It was a disclaimer to the notion that there are absolute standards according to which people and events must develop and by which these are judged. Abstract concepts are static and unchanging, and represent only what is common among the things that are subsumed under them. They miss completely the differences among things. Historically speaking, it is just those differences which make things unique and interesting, which give them an identity or nature all their own. It is just this life-blood of individuality which was squeezed
out of existence by Rationalistic science, but which was the proper object of history. Historicism's incipient purpose was to preserve the unique and individual in man and nature from just being an instance of general laws governing all of reality.

There are a multitude of various thoughts and circumstances that could be called influential in the rise of Historicism. Some of these influences can be attributed to the deterioration of Medieval culture, Europe's realization that other cultures exist or even that cosmologies were changing. It was a gradual development that took many years to become what Friedrich Meinecke called "the greatest spiritual revolution of the Western world."²

In terms of its intellectual development, Historicism took most of its impetus from the Renaissance and Romanticism. One idea which was influential for the formation of Historicism was the Renaissance belief that man was a law unto himself and meaning-giver of his own life. Specifically this meant that man was being reborn to a life-for-himself, out from under the thumb of Church authority. Man was to be his own authority, his own law.

In respect to history, this view can be seen in the formulation of Giambattista Vico.³ Vico was reacting to the ideas of Rene Descartes who believed that man's proper function was the knowledge of clear and distinct ideas. Vico, on the other hand, said that man's only sure knowledge was that of history.
Only God can truly know the world because He made it. Likewise, man can know history because he makes it. Man shapes history in his own self-layed image.

In addition to this, there was the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For the Enlightenment, reason was the key to understanding who man was. The past was only an irrational preparatory stage for the fulness of reason. It had no real value in itself except as a stepping stone to Enlightenment. With Rousseau, on the other hand, man's will was glorified instead of reason. Since men of the past had a will like that of contemporary man, they were not so very different after all and could provide fruitful sources for understanding ourselves and the present.

A further impetus to the rising star of Historicism was the publishing in 1859 of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Until then it was generally accepted that, despite any other change and development taking place in the world of man and culture, nature remained static in form or mechanical in movement. But now it became obvious that nature too, although over longer periods of time, changes. It too has a history. This realization tended to give even more weight to the belief that history held the key to discovering the meaning of reality as a whole.

Besides these very general examples, among many, of ideas that were influential in the increased importance for history as the key to understanding life, there is one viewpoint that
is central to the development of Historicism and to the topic of this essay.

Descartes, starting from his adage, *cogito ergo sum*, conceived of reality as being comprised of individual egos which were the prime substance in a world which was mechanical in essence. Freedom was inherent to the individual ego, while the mechanical world was deterministic. Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), in a monumental effort to combine these two ideas of substantial freedom and mechanistic determinism, arrived at his doctrine of monads. Monads were weightless, dimensionless building blocks of the visible world. They operated as building blocks according to their own internal law of development (they were free) without any heteronomous influence from other monads. At the same time, this all took place without any conflict between the freely developing monads. There was a pre-established harmony between all of these monads, which kept one monad's self-lawed development from interfering with that of another monad.

Leibniz' doctrine had far-reaching effects when variations of his ideas made themselves felt in the field of history. Because the doctrine preserved individual self-lawed development without giving up coherence, it was well suited for history's emphasis on the individual and unique. Nations, States or Cultures were believed to develop, as mentioned above, according to their own internal laws or norms without any influence or judgemental attitude from other nations or cultures. Yet some-
how it was believed that this self-lawed, self-interested development was unharmedful to or at least lacking in conflict with other nations or cultures.

It was this belief in simultaneous freedom of development and orderly coherence which marked early Historicism thinking and preserved it from total chaos and Relativism as a result of this self-lawed Individualism.

But this faith later broke down when the rational or religious grounds for the coherence became suspect. Georg G. Iggers, in his work discussing the close link between Historicism and German political thinking, puts it this way:

Classical historicism at no time asserted that the universe was devoid of rational or ethical purpose, but expressed its faith that the apparent expressions of irrationality, individual spontaneity, and will were manifestations of an underlying ethical order. This faith assumed the existence of a God who at each moment in history, actively created the mysterious balance which linked each sovereign monad to the total whole. The rise of a naturalistic worldview in the nineteenth century, which accompanied the mechanization of life, made this faith steadily less convincing.

Ernst Troeltsch's own intellectual development came at the end of this gradual breakdown when people either glorified the non-coherent individualism or grappled with re-instituting some idea of coherence. Because Troeltsch was a very honest thinker who was unafraid of confronting his own position with all possible objections to his views, he was throughout his lifetime continually re-evaluating his viewpoint in light of new con-
siderations and developments, and unabashedly following the implications that these had for all the other areas of his thinking. Because of his thoroughness of self-examination, Troeltsch's own intellectual development paralleled that of Historicism in general. His life work accepted the same basic assumptions and dealt with the same problems as did the development within Historicism itself.

Because of this, Troeltsch faced the same problem at the end of his life, of reconstructing some sort of coherence among self-lawed individuals, once the old faith in harmony was gone. For that very reason, the last phase of Troeltsch's life offers an especially instructive view of a Christian going right to the limits of Relativism. It is at that point that Troeltsch relied on Leibniz' theory of monads to reconstruct some idea of coherence among, for Troeltsch, the even more radically so individuals of history.

But before we get to the heart of this investigation, we must first take a brief look at Troeltsch's life in preparation for the question at hand.
II Historical Background

Ernst Troeltsch was born in 1865 to Lutheran parents. His father was a medical doctor; early in his life Troeltsch was familiarized with viewing the world in light of the natural sciences. But he was also concerned with cultural questions, with the nature and origin of the values of his time. Because of this, he began studying theology. For only in theology could he deal with his questions concerning history, metaphysics, and their relation to nature. He later was influenced by historical criticism and came under the spell of Historicism.

Between 1883 and 1888 he studied Protestant theology, first at Erlangen, then at Göttingen and Berlin. During this time he was influenced by Albrecht Ritschl, Rudolph Hermann Lotze and especially Paul de Lagarde.

First at Bonn, and then Heidelberg, Troeltsch taught systematic theology and later spread himself into the areas of philosophy, history of religion, philosophy of religion, cultural history, philosophy of culture, history of modern philosophy, sociology of religion, ethics, and the philosophy of history.

During this time he was somewhat active in politics. He served as an Elected Member of the Baden Upper House. He was Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Public Works. And he was also named as a possible candidate for President.

He was married in 1901 and received only one child twelve years later. He died suddenly in 1923 at the age of fifty-seven.
Among his many works, probably the best known are *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches and Sects* (1912), *Historicism and Its Problems* (*Der Historismus und seine Probleme*) (1922), *The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions* (1902), and *Psychology and Epistemology in the Study of Religions* (*Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft*) (1905).

To this brief account of Troeltsch's life and works, we shall now add another brief survey of his theoretical development. In a certain respect, Troeltsch worked from the very beginning of his career with a problematic inherited from Schleiermacher. He conceived religion as a heart-felt feeling whose root is the divine, no longer in tandem with natural reason. Since faith was a psychological feeling and not rational truth itself, it was no longer exempt from rational analysis, but had to go under the microscope like any other area liable to scientific scrutiny. 12 It was open to scientific verification. This produced a situation which can be characterized by Leibniz' – then Kant's – distinction between *noumena* and *phenomena*. As Antoni puts it, "Thus, historical fact on the one hand and subjective experience on the other produced the concept of double truth: that which was inner certainty, a subjective experience, when seen from the outside, proves to be purely human phenomenon, partaking in all of the vicissitudes and developments of history." 13 Although Christianity made
claims to absolute truth, it nevertheless had to take its place beside other historical religions and be considered on an equal footing with them, i.e., as a purely relative phenomenon.

But prior to this relativizing, Christianity had been considered part and parcel of Western culture. Consequently the problem, for Troeltsch, from the outset became how to maintain the validity of any values whatsoever. Christian values were so intricately involved with other values that if its truth-claims were in doubt, so were those of Western culture in general. How is it possible to believe that any ideals today should command our respect and allegiance when we know that tomorrow they will be out of vogue and ridiculous? One need only ask a parent raising a child about the swiftness of changing standards. It is an agonizing ordeal to find the values you grew up with and believed in lose their acceptance. Troeltsch too confronted the experience of watching the whole vision of his culture deteriorate, and strove to find an answer to avoid an anarchy of values. Troeltsch was a man who wanted to somehow find a new vision or value system "to dam the flow" of constant individualization. When Friedrich Meinecke, Troeltsch's friend and colleague, said to him, "...one could sum it up in six Greek words, those of Heraclitus and Archimedes: πάντα ἰσορροπημένα, δόξα μοι ποῦ στῶ (all is flux, give me a place to stand), he quickly nodded and said, 'precisely, that's it'."14

Even though it was partly because of historical study
that historicists came to reduce absolute truth and universal validity to the status of being only relatively true and locally valid that was the cause of the worries about an endless stream of change, Troeltsch nevertheless sought to reconcile Christianity with historical "science" by finding validity for faith from the study of history. Out of historical investigation itself he wanted to find proof for Christianity's being justified in its claims. But it was also in like manner that he wished to arrive at a way of "damming the stream of change," to prevent Relativism.

Once Troeltsch accepted this method of defining his faith, he slowly but surely lost all of his rational proofs for his beliefs. This process of Troeltsch's intellectual development, as Klapwijk suggests, can be divided into six phases. In his initial phase beginning in 1883, Troeltsch is being influenced by Historicism, in that he begins asking himself the questions concerning the absoluteness and relativity of values, which were generally asked at that time. But he still holds to the absoluteness of Christianity. For Troeltsch, religions have always had an ideal development. And Christianity is the ideal goal of that development for all time. Christianity is pure religion and the absolute truth. And since cultural values are so entwined with Christian values, culture too is safe from Relativism.

In the second phase of Troeltsch's thinking, dating from about 1895, he gives more and more credence to Historicism
tenets. Christianity no longer is the truth, but contains the truth. It is no longer the fulfillment of an ideal, but one expression of an ideal that was able to be found in varying degrees in all other religions. Since these ideals are now more basic than the particular Christian expression of them, the way is left open for possible subsequent concretizations of these ideals. But, despite this possibility, Troeltsch still believes that Christianity is to date the high point of development, and probably the end point.

Phase three began in 1902 with the publication of The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religion. But Christianity, for Troeltsch at this point, is anything but absolute. Troeltsch has now given up the belief in Christianity as the high point of development and probable end point. It is only the best man has had. Other developments of the ideal will follow.

In phase four, beginning around 1907, under the strong influence of Max Weber, Troeltsch becomes more firmly convinced of the relativity of Christianity and therefore of values in general. This is due to insight into the conditioning of beliefs and values by the natural, sociological location which produced it. It was during this time that Troeltsch wrote his Social Teachings of the Christian Churches and Sects.

Phase five, commencing around the start of World War I, reveals Troeltsch giving up the thought of ideal development. Troeltsch's major work at this time, Der Historismus und seine
Probleme, was a collection of articles that he wrote over a considerable period of time. In that book, he struggled mightily to deal with the implications of his theoretical direction and of the demise of his homeland after the war. He is now leaning toward the viewpoint that every religion and every culture and time is an individual truth in itself. As will be shown later, Troeltsch indicates the answer to the problem of coherence among these individual truths can be found in Leibniz' theory of monads.

And in the final phase (1921), Troeltsch no longer believes in cultural coherence. There are individual people. The individual person is a truth in himself. Troeltsch here relies even more on Leibniz' monad theory. Without cultural coherence people have only one basis of order among the culture forming individuals, i.e., the divine ground.

This last phase of Troeltsch's thinking is one that is not widely recognized at the present time. There are, we think, two major reasons for this. Because Der Historismus und seine Probleme covers such a long period of time, the views presented there are sometimes confusing and, in our opinion, conflicting. They leave no clear indication of which direction Troeltsch is heading.

Secondly, Troeltsch died suddenly before presenting a series of lectures in England, later collected into a book called, Der Historismus und seine Überwindung. The lectures contained in this book do show the extent of Troeltsch's Leibnizian bent; but the work received little recognition.
Presently there are, to our knowledge, only a few secondary sources handling this particular turn in Troeltsch's thinking; and even they deal with it only in a cursory manner. Jacob Klapwijk, in his work *Tussen Historisme en Relativisme*, does devote considerable energy to the explication of this last effort of Troeltsch. Klapwijk's book therefore has served as the major point of departure for this essay.
III Factors Contributing to the Position

We will begin by making a short sketch of some of Troeltsch's conceptual shifts leading up to the time of the Überwindung lectures.

Like most of the other thinkers in his circles, Troeltsch believed, despite his emphasis on ideal development, that the significant feature of history was that it dealt with the unique and non-repeatable. Throughout the nineteenth century the battle raged among historians and natural scientists over the independence of historical or cultural sciences as opposed to the so-called natural sciences. The latter, following the model of physics which took its lead from mechanics, sought to view reality as being made up of isolated facts governed by universal laws. What was important was what everything had in common with everything else; they were mechanically lawful.

For the historian, this was unbearable when positivistically applied to human reality. It wiped out or glossed over exactly what the historian wanted to do justice to, to the unique and individual in history, that which makes it unlike other events and therefore significant and valid in itself and worthy of recording.

Because this idea of individuality was so essential to historical understanding, it was almost inevitable that anyone with Troeltsch's penchant for viewing the world historically would sooner or later lose all remnants of an idealistic, universal worldview.

As we noticed in the section on Troeltsch's theoretical 15.
development, this is indeed what happened. We saw that steadily Troeltsch relinquished any claim to a universal ideal development. No longer could it be maintained convincingly that there existed an evolution of lower more particularized nature religions into the morally autonomous realm of freedom with claims of universal truth, neither for religions or for values in general. Troeltsch's naturalistic sociological phase à la Weber helped to deal a death blow to any Kantian belief in a lasting, teleological development from lower, more natural processes to higher, more morally free ones. Henceforth, for Troeltsch, all ideal development would be more strongly influenced by and more closely bound to its natural sociological base.

In addition to this, Troeltsch's position slowly loses all remnants of ideal universality. The breakdown of German idealism destroyed its conceptual supports, and W.W.I. squelched any remaining belief in world progress toward an absolute ideal goal.

This two-pronged attack had two effects. Formerly, cultures, religions, or nations were considered to be the historical individualities. They were the structures or constellations which were the particular conveyors or embodiments of the historical "idea" in development. Each was a progressive expression of ideal culture, ideal religion or ideal nation. With universal coherence in development gone, all that is left is individualities. They can no longer find their meaning by being part of an ideal evolution. They are cast adrift on the sea of historical change.
But the second effect is that even this idea of cultures being individuality structures, i.e. as cohesive organic wholes, is lost. These individualities had been considered organically. They were collective organisms in which individual people were constituent parts. People were particular embodiments of the spirit of the whole in the same way the culture was an offshoot of the universal ideal development. The individual person was reduced to the collective. Troeltsch called these individualities 'bearers of progress,' 'the essential object of history' and 'possessor of historical movement.' But in the midst of post-war antagonisms and struggles it became impossible for Troeltsch to maintain any belief in cultural organic coherence. Individuals were now cast adrift as the bearers of historical meaning and movement. Cultures were no longer free to the extent they fit into the ideal evolution and individuals no longer received their freedom from fitting into the cultural whole. The question became where would freedom, meaning and coherence originate for the new historical individuality, the individual person.

In Troeltsch's work on historical science, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, these turns in his thought can be seen, though not always with ease. The category of individuality and its concepts of originality (Ursprünglichkeit) and uniqueness (Einmaligkeit) became as important as that of universal development. Troeltsch also was faced with the problem of hermeneutics.
When a universal ideal evolution was presupposed, we did not need to ask how can we know the past, for the spirit worked in us to give us our ideals and values and norms for future action. But that has fallen away and the past no longer determines our present knowledge, but our knowledge of the past is rooted in the present situation. The fixing and analysis of historical objects is the abstraction of what in reality is an unbroken stream. It is a matter of the choice of the historian.

But that raises the problem of a standard (Maszstab) for analyzing the past. Troeltsch's answer is that it depends on the viewer of the past (Betrachter), whether that is an historian or an ordinary person striving to live morally.

All formation of a standard with respect to historical things springs from one's own circumstance of life, is simultaneously its critique and its continued formation. As every computation of motion in the natural sciences is dependent on the standpoint of the computer, so also in history every standard is ineradicably determined by the standpoint from which it springs.

And if there is no longer any binding, logically necessary development of the ideal out of the past, then freedom and creativity no longer originate there but from the present. There is now "spontaneous creation."

It is an a priori, i.e., spontaneous creation in that something new really breaks forth out of the inner depths and validates itself only through its inner self-certainty and its will-determining power.

As Klapwijk notes, this creation out of the present is, for Troeltsch, the inner power of individual people.
The metaphysical basis of every view of history and of every formation of ideals is for him no longer the human, metaphysical total spirit and its universal course through history, but the individual religious metaphysical root position of the individual human person. New life must blossom out of the creative power of individual existence.25

Troeltsch is grasping for a metaphysical ground to safeguard coherence among these creative individuals. He has already asserted that a metaphysical relation must exist between subject and object.26 As Klapwijk puts it:

He does hold fast to the possibility of a metaphysic of history, but he begins to concentrate it in the depth of individual personal existence and in so doing arrives at the individualistic and pluralistic metaphysics of Leibniz.... It is a metaphysic which does leave room for the recognition of continuity in history, but which on the other hand, also knows how to place and interpret its undeniable discontinuities.27

Troeltsch says himself that he considers Leibniz' theory of monads the direction to go for a solution to his problem: "It will be a new Leibnizianism, a new Universal-Mathematicism and a new Monadology."28

It is here that Troeltsch puts to use the view of a religious a priori. He departs from Kant's view that the religious was predicated upon moral reason and moves close to Schleiermacher's view that religious faith was a spark or offshoot of the divine.

Troeltsch assigned to religion that central function which Schleiermacher had assigned to feeling: it was conceived as a dark unity of consciousness from which emerged other distinct forms and in which consciousness, by compre-
hending itself as it were, might become aware of contact with a reality which transcended it.29

In putting individual religious persons in contact with a divine ground, Troeltsch places his particular stamp on his acceptance of Leibniz' monadology. Individual people are the conveyors of divine meaning and the building blocks of cultural synthesis. We will see this in an analysis of the Überwindung volume.
IV Troeltsch's Position of Historical Monadology

We have seen some of Troeltsch's key positions and we have also seen how his work in the logic of history has pushed him more and more to a position of individualism and, at the same time, made him more dependent on metaphysical grounds to support that position.

Troeltsch's book, Der Historismus und seine Überwindung was not the proposed second volume to, and therefore the conclusion of, Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Nevertheless, it does indicate Troeltsch's course of thought just prior to his death and is in a way a consistent application of ideas to be found in Probleme. Baron Friedrich von Hügel, a close friend of Troeltsch and the man who had Troeltsch's England lectures collected into the Überwindung volume and translated into English (Christian Thought: Its History and Application), maintained that the three lectures intended for delivery at the University of London were "anticipations of what was to have been the central theme of the second volume of this work" (Probleme) and therefore a "sketch" of it. Troeltsch himself stated in the introduction to the first of these lectures that he was occupied with "a theme which is the very centre of all my thought at the present time." Troeltsch himself stated in the introduction to the first of these lectures that he was occupied with "a theme which is the very centre of all my thought at the present time." Troeltsch himself stated in the introduction to the first of these lectures that he was occupied with "a theme which is the very centre of all my thought at the present time."

We will therefore concentrate on those three lectures as representative of Troeltsch's final phase of thinking and as exhibiting his position of radical individualism or what I call his historical monadology.

21.
We have already noticed that, as in Historicism in general, so too in Troeltsch, the question is where to stand when all things are flowing, where to find fixity and certainty in the midst of change. In the first of these lectures Troeltsch reiterates this concern by means of his image of damming a stream; but now the emphasis shifts from finding a place to stand to making a place to stand by damming or limiting change.

At times he uses terms that emphasize the necessity to "bound" (begrenzen) and "shape" (gestalten) what he calls "the immense stream of historical life which grows continually more rapid and more extended" (der ungeheure, immer reiszende und breiter werdende historische Lebenstrom). At other times he speaks of the "domination" (Bewältigung) and "limitation" (Begrenzung) of the stream of historical life and of the ability to "dam" (einzudämmen) and "canalize" (zu kanalizieren). And he also asks about the ability of Ethics to "master" (bändigen) historical Relativism. So this imagery of "damming a stream" is Troeltsch's tool for describing the task of Ethics to create standards of abiding value in the face of the constant change of standards and values.

What is the role and significance of the system of Ethics for the great task of controlling and damming the historical movement, which, in itself, is simply boundless? As we will see later, Troeltsch means by "boundless" that the historical stream will not, in the end, really be controllable and limitable. Yet the task remains.
This is Troeltsch's introduction to the problem. And he discusses it in light of the overemphases that have been given throughout history to the different aspects of Moral Consciousness (sittliches Bewusstsein).

Just as in the case of his use of the image of "damming a stream" so here too Troeltsch, in referring to Ethics, uses another image, i.e., the fabric (Gewebe) of Moral Consciousness. This fabric is comprised in its entirety of the two threads (Fäden) of the Morality of Personality and Conscience (Personlichkeits- und Gewissensmoral) on the one hand and the Ethics of Cultural Values (Ethik der Kulturwerte) on the other.

But even though there are only two threads to this fabric of Moral Consciousness, nevertheless Troeltsch refers to it as "this complex fabric" (dieses komplexe Gewebe). He does so to emphasize the tensions within Moral Consciousness between the two threads. And this complexity is "mirrored, too, in the oppositions and contradictions between the ethical systems themselves." And it is Troeltsch's purpose to investigate the complex relationship between these two "factors" (Momente).

The first factor of Moral Consciousness with which Troeltsch deals is the Morality of Personality and Conscience. Troeltsch's description is that it consists

in the general moral demands of the traditional doctrine of the virtues and the duties; in the demands of personal moral dignity, of strength of character and self-conquest on the one hand, and of justice, benevolence, and public spirit on the other.
These are the formal demands of Moral Consciousness. But, for Troeltsch, these are not deductions of Moral Consciousness made a priori from a formal command as with Kant. Rather, they become evident once one realizes that the moral act is the realization of an end and that that end is the creation of a free personality, no longer trapped in material drives (sinnliche Begehren), but acting autonomously.

We shall have to consider that Ethics is an action; that all action is a realisation of ends; and therefore, that the unity of Ethics too can only be deduced from the end, as indeed even Kant finally realized in some of his incidental and auxiliary thinking. Now, the end of moral action which first appears in an obvious manner is the attainment and the defence of a free personality, which has its foundations in itself and possesses a certain unity of its own. The idea of personality is the decisive idea. Out of the flux and confusion of the life of the instincts, the unity and compactness of personality has first to be created and acquired.  

It is significant that at this point Troeltsch mentions Kant. For we must remember that the notion of history as being the stage on which the drama of moral freedom rising out of nature is played out, is one that Troeltsch inherited from Kant. For Troeltsch, this rising of freedom means a leaving of the "flux" (Flusz) and "confusion" (Wirrsal) of the "life of instincts" (Triebleben). Life on that level is a matter of thinking and acting on the basis of "needs" (Bedürfnisse) in the "struggle for existence" (Kampf ums Dasein), "for room, for food, for life, for more life" (um Raum, Nahrung, Leben und Mehr-Leben). The act of separation from nature itself is thinking and acting
on the basis of rational moral autonomy. It is no longer a matter of "instinct of nature" (Naturtrieb) or of "habit" (Gewöhnung), but of "duty" (Pflicht). Persons are transformed into free moral personalities whose essence is "freedom" (Freiheit) and "creation" (Schöpfung).

But Troeltsch does not follow Kant in deriving the demands of Moral Consciousness from the categorical imperative. Rather, he says that one arrives at specific commands by saying that the idea of personality has a double direction of application. Concerning this aim of free personality, he says:

> From this end or aim which ought to exist the particular demands of Ethics can be derived without difficulty as soon as we consider that, in the first place, this personality has to develop itself in a double direction, in a particular demeanour towards itself, and in a particular demeanour towards its neighbours; and that, in the second place, the characteristic of personality applies as a demand made not only of single men but also of communities, so that not only individual but also corporate personalitites are required.39

This self-creation of free personality is something that in itself is never finished. It is always a finite creation which is never totally free from nature but is nevertheless obedient to the drive for separation.

Freedom and creation constitute the secret of personality, but this self-creation of personality is, of course, no absolute creation in us finite creatures who emerge from the stream of life and of consciousness. It is a creation which takes place in obedience and in devotion to an attraction towards emancipation from merely natural and accidental determination--an attraction to the imperative
"ought" which is analogous to the attraction towards logical truth and correctness, and arises, like the latter, from the deeper spiritual levels of our being.\textsuperscript{40}

It is a finite effort at separation from nature. The important thing to remember is that that takes place in surrender to a drive for separation. We shall see shortly what Troeltsch means by this driving force.

But this intended move for separation is never successful. It is never a strong enough drive to be totally separated. Nature as it were swallows up or devours every attempt. It is like a stretched spring that recoils.

Now this morality is always, to begin with, a controlling and conquering of mere nature, from which it springs, but with which it struggles. In its essence it is a perpetual struggle and a perpetual creation. The very conception of this morality means that it can never be simply victorious. Victory would be the end of struggle and freedom: it would be the absolute and effortless necessity of the good and of reason; and that is something which we cannot picture to ourselves.\textsuperscript{41}

Here we see Troeltsch's antipathy toward any absolute standard or accomplishment. If absolute personality were ever achieved, then all of the other individual attempts or struggles for it would lose their significance, for the truth would have been found. That would be the ruin of meaning for individuality. They would no longer be valuable in and of themselves. They would only have limited value as preludes or stepping-stones to the truth.

And finally it should be pointed out that this creation of
personality is in essence an act of an individual personal conscience. Even though this attempt to limit or dam the stream of history by creating personality is formal or general in intent, it is nevertheless the act of an individual person.

It is a relative act, which only realises absolute standards as far as possible, and bears in its bosom its own absolute quality only in the form of decision by the personal conscience and resolution. As we shall see later, this emphasis on the individual conscience makes one realize that Troeltsch's earlier talk about corporate personality and morality, is, for him, a secondary matter both in importance and in time.

Troeltsch's second London lecture dealt with the second thread of the complex woven fabric of Moral Consciousness, the Ethics of Cultural Values. They are the concrete ends which pave the way for or enhance the general goal of personality. Troeltsch alludes to this purpose in his first lecture:

It is a distinct and independent question what are to be the concrete single ends by which certain qualities are to be acquired that will bring out the general independence.

These are the concrete structures (Gebilde) or creations which are necessary for the actualization of the formal desire to create free personality.

But the ethical consciousness also presents to us at the same time an entirely different series of factors, which in traditional ethics are known as Goals or Ends, and are today preferably designated as Values, or, more precisely, as Cultural Values. The essence of these values is
that they are obligatory values or objective ends—that is to say, actual values of a universal, more than accidental and more than individual validity, for the attainment of which we make it a duty of ourselves and others to strive.\textsuperscript{44}

They are entirely historical creations; they divide themselves into the various great cultural realms of the Family, the State, Law, the economic control of Nature, Science, Art, and Religion.\textsuperscript{45}

These cultural realms of Family, the State, etc., are the ends or cultural values the striving for which is demanded of all. They are the aforementioned concrete ends necessary for the establishment of the general goal of personality, in much the same way that Kant's constitutional state was a necessary preparation for genuine moral improvement of man.

These are totally historical creations which vary according to time and location. The family in sixth century China was different from what it was in nineteenth century Europe. And Baal worship was different from modern Christianity. Yet the creation of these structures is a necessary part of Moral Consciousness.

Just as in the case of Morality of Conscience, so too the Cultural Values arise in a process of being distinguished from nature.

Here again there is thus an advance beyond the accidental turmoil of psychologically explicable needs and instincts, and above the compulsory ties and the utilities of sociological unions.\textsuperscript{46}

This means that here too there is a transformation of what at
first are structures based on natural desire or compulsion, into something that is characterized by moral autonomy. For example, what we call the family is at first a relationship of sexual need and later becomes one of moral responsibility.

But for Troeltsch, this process of creating concrete structures for the enhancement of personality takes place, under ordinary circumstances, in the sphere of the unconscious.

At first it cannot be attained at all through conscious work and theoretical construction. It takes place within the sphere of the unconscious. The evolution of the individual constituent parts themselves, as well as that of their mutual relations, develops under the pressure of factors quite unnoticed by those who suffer it—the pressure of geographical and climactic influences, of the scope available for migration and nutrition, of the number of births and the biological constitution generally; and finally there is the influence of individual mental peculiarities, which are usually labelled as fundamental racial or national characteristics, because one has no further or other explanation for them. To this must be added the influence of special historical events, of the social structure usually connected with them, and of the leading personalities, who are incalculable gifts of Fate, and whose influence transforms itself into a tradition by which multitudes are swayed.47

It appears as though the damming of the flow of history is not really fully in the hands of men. It is partly under the influence of a vast array of non-human circumstances of existence.

But Troeltsch still talks in terms of human freedom. For although this seems to be an unconscious process, it still must, in order to effectively "dam the stream," become a powerful system. This it does only by being organized around the guiding
influence of a central value.

Under all these conditions, and under the stimulus of reason, as it raises itself above Nature and proceeds to organise Nature, there is evolved, without our being aware or taking note of it, a system of values as a pure fact, neither produced by thought nor directed by volition. It becomes a system from time to time partly through the power (for whatever reason it may be triumphant) of a single central value, which unites with itself in a more or less clear and energetic manner all the other values, and partly in virtue of the logic and the development of the consequences immanent in such tendencies.48

But it can become conscious thus allowing for creative freedom.

For although this system depends on the situation and historical destiny,49 there still must be room for a conscious synthesis:

These syntheses, produced unconsciously, but fundamental and fateful in their nature, are primarily decisive. But in all moments of crisis, and in periods of greater maturity, a conscious and constructive synthesis also becomes necessary.50

It is at this point that the impact of Troeltsch's preceding work again becomes felt for Cultural Values. For even though at times man becomes the conscious director of his own Cultural Value formation, nevertheless this shows itself as a purely individual, personal act.

The value of what we thus choose as the central value and thus make the pivot of organization can only be based on a personal impression of the claims of reality and of our own conscience. The manner and method in which the other values are connected with the central value thus attained is similarly, in the last resort, an act in a personal life, which can only afterwards be expressed as a system and justify itself by its results.51
Troeltsch had rejected any possibility of a priori plans for cultural renewal and therefore had to judge any attempts a posteriori according to their fruitfulness, according to how adequately the personal impression of which values should be central meets the needs and demands of reality. If it works, it was right and destined.

But it must be remembered again that Troeltsch no longer can trust in the idea of universal necessary development or even the organological view of culture to vouchsafe moral order. Decisions spring from individual people without any guarantee that it is correct and binding. Troeltsch does still speak of this system as being "grounded on the understanding of the development leading to us" and of synthesis demanding "the insertion into the course of development." But this is really only paying lip service to a concept stripped of any power. For at the same time he has to admit that this is based on a courageous action which is both personal and individual.

Now that we have seen the nature of the respective threads of Moral Consciousness we must also inquire as to what, for Troeltsch, constitutes the relationship between the two. The answer is that neither of these "threads" can do without the other. They both develop out of a common root (Wurzel) and toward a common, though for Troeltsch unknown, final objective (Endziel).

Morality is an indispensable premise for the realisation of substantial spiritual values,
but it is not in itself an ultimate value, which bases itself solely upon its own worth. It can only work upon a substance which is not itself of a natural order, but is an over-powering both of the merely natural and actual life of instinct and of the struggle for existence. Thus the morality of personality, in consequence of its formality, demands an ideal concrete substance, in the realisation of which alone it is capable of attaining action and effect. On the other hand, the essential conception of ethical goods or cultural values requires an intention and power of action which is directed towards uniting the whole personality into something that exalts it above the ordinary life of instinct. The former cannot come into action without the latter; the latter can never become a reality without the former. 55

Both Morality of Conscience and Cultural Ethics are necessary as motivating action and concrete means for the attainment of personality.

But even though both threads of Moral Consciousness need each other, they do differ both in their relation to history and in relation to nature. The Morality of Conscience, by virtue of its being formal, transcends the vicissitudes of history; and Cultural Ethics, because of its thoroughly varying nature, is part of the flow of history.

And here the main distinction between the morality of conscience and the ethic of cultural values becomes perfectly clear. As the former by virtue of its formality leads us out of History into the sphere of the timelessly valid, so conversely the latter conducts us back into History and Development, and more particularly into the realm of the Individual. 56

But in addition to this differing of the two "threads" of
Moral Consciousness with respect to history, they also differ, as mentioned, in their relation to nature. They do this in so far as the one is more formal and the other more material.

The relation of the moral superstructure to the natural basis is different in the two cases. In the first case the relation of moral determination to the natural life of instinct is that of complete and total antithesis. In antithesis to that which is accidental and mutable stand Necessity and Uniformity; in antithesis to the eudaemonistic feeling of pleasure stands the feeling of obligation; in antithesis to the subjective impression stands an objective and universal actuality.57

It is otherwise, however, with the antithesis between cultural values and the natural substratum of the instincts and their sociological implications from which those values emerge. Here a gradual detachment takes place in a sequence which moves step by step and never absolutely destroys the original relation.58

But despite the differences that exist between the two "threads" of Moral Consciousness, with respect to history and nature, Troeltsch nevertheless maintains that they are not in the long run disparate. They both work together because they have a common source, i.e., the deciding individual.

It is, too, the personal and individual conscience which connects the system of cultural values with that of the morality of conscience -- explaining and strengthening, and at the same time conditioning and limiting, the one by the other. For the establishment of this connection there is no a priori system available; the only means is the tact and energy of the acting and shaping mind, which only at a later date precipitates the unity of its life in the unity of thought presented in such a system of the two Ethics.59

Not only are the Morality of Conscience and the Cultural Values
a matter of individual decision, so also is the particular way in which the two are linked. This is an important point. Troeltsch has made a switch here. He has abandoned his belief that the "person" is constituted historically. Formerly, he viewed a person's freedom and creativity as being rooted in and subject to the historical movement. Now the Morality of Conscience and Ethic of Culture are still historical configurations and vary according to time and place. But they do not constitute the free, creative human individual. He lurks behind these historical variations. This switch points up the importance of Troeltsch's religious a priori, the significance of which we will see presently.

There are yet two points to be made concerning the individual deciding connection of the two threads. The first is that this individual connection is fundamentally a matter of faith.

Here, too, it is faith that ultimately decides; and here, too, it is likewise faith that justifies.60

Here Troeltsch's reliance on the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith is obvious. Faith is reckoned as righteousness. The individual connection or decision is a matter of casting one's life into living out one's convictions and trusting that that faith will be justified or validated.

The second point is that this decision of faith is proved, justified or validated by how effective it is in "damming the stream." If a person properly responds to the motivation to shape culture, that person's response is more successful than
that of someone who responds improperly or shabbily. In Troeltsch's words, "...this Faith proves itself by its fruits." 61

The third of Troeltsch's London lectures is by far the most important. For in it Troeltsch confronts the big problem. If all ethical acting, in whatever form, is fundamentally an individual deed, how will it be possible to dam the stream of history when there is no necessary universality of opinion as to correct ethical acting? As Troeltsch puts it:

\[
\text{The real solution demands mass-convictions, common-spirit, broad driving-power, public opinion. And so there arises finally the question of the relation of our solution to this need of a broad common spirit moulding the masses and the successive generations. How can such a personal and individual solution develop into a common spirit, which, after all, presupposes something super-individual and universal? The very curse and torment of the modern world seems to be that it only knows the directive forces of the mind as particular realities at play by the side of one another.}^{62}
\]

The English translation at this point leaves out a number of key phrases that help elucidate what Troeltsch means by common spirit. When he says that the curse of the modern world is that it only knows particulars at play side by side, he opposes this modern world view to its non-recognition of Common Spirit (Gemeingeist), Authority, Tradition and Supra-personal reality of spiritual powers of direction ("überpersönliche Realität der geistigen Richtkräfte"). In other words, Troeltsch is stating the lack in the modern world of the very necessary continuity that he lost in favor of personal individualism. There is no authority out-
side the individual. Nor is there any universal necessary development in which the individual finds meaning and direction. Likewise, he no longer has an organological view of culture in which the individual is an offshoot of the whole, or an individual expression of the common spirit. There is no more unanimity. There is only individual decision and action.

But, for there to be a serious attempt at a system of ethics to counteract Relativism, Troeltsch must rebuild, so to speak, the universal. As Klapwijk notes, "Just as the earlier view of society encompassed that of the solitary person, so conversely the new idea of individuality is not thinkable and manageable without the 'supraindividualism' of the concept of society." And Troeltsch puts it as follows:

Common spirit remains common spirit. And without this 'supraindividualism,' no strong and sound ethical shaping of the stream of life is at all possible.

But because Troeltsch emphasizes the individual and considers monisms anathema, he denies the possibility of a totally encompassing Common Spirit or, for that matter, one sphere of society holding sway over all the rest. So he postulates a multiplicity of Common Spirits.

The truth is that there has never been any Common Spirit but that of a group, a family, race, class, profession, school, or sect, and even the Church's attempt to comprehend all these, as it were, under a single dome remained, in the time of its real and complete domination, a work of force and diplomacy, a faith and a dream, contradicted in the actual life of the times by the eternal strife of ideas and interests.
But it is rather the case that our lives are passed from the first not in a monistic, homogeneous circle, but in a number of circles, each of which has its own ethical Common Spirit. The facts of life show, within the atmosphere which surrounds us and is therefore incomprehensible to us, a multiplicity of Common Spirits or Social Complexes, which have each their own intellectual foundation. Enumerating roughly and proceeding from the general to the particular, we may tabulate them as follows:

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<td>The free professional associations;</td>
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<td>The narrower circles based on sympathy or friendship;</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>The communities of creed, church, and denomination;</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The free intellectual communities or schools of thought.</td>
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What must be noted here is that the individual person is the common denominator. He lives in a plurality of different circles existing side by side. Each has its own Common Spirit. But that spirit is, even in this plurality of circles, no longer determinative of the spirit of the individual person but the result of it. Even though Troeltsch talked about corporate individuals and corporate morality, they are only the construct of individual people and their morality is merely the reflection of the morality of the people forming it.

Troeltsch's answer to this radical plurality of spirits is that somehow these circles of cultural existence will have to be arranged concentrically. This concentric arrangement means finding a central element around which the circles are organized.
and by which they are directed. For Troeltsch, this means that we are immediately directed to the metaphysical and religious element of existence. For this is the only way to unite the various circles of culture in accord with a single leading force.

In all these complexes we live simultaneously, without difficulty and without confusion. If we seek to give them an association and a connection, to conceive of them not as coordinated but as concentric circles, we find ourselves at once confronted with the metaphysical and religious element, which alone can unite them under one common dome.67

But even though there is this pointing to the metaphysical or religious root of this arrangement into a system, nevertheless it still is driven home by Troeltsch that this is an individual personal arrangement.

For this most fundamental question of Ethics all that is left today is the individual and personal combination of the Morality of the Conscience, of the Cultural Values, and of the given situation, of which we have spoken above. With us, accordingly, any Public Spirit of a metaphysical-religious nature can only arise and operate alongside and outside the churches—and often enough, we must admit, also within them—in a way that is in keeping with such a basis.68

In other words all Common Spirit regarding the re-organizing of cultural circles concentrically, will have to be grounded in a metaphysical, religiously motivated, individual, personal decision of how it should be done.

Here we see Troeltsch trying to reconstruct some type of
uniform cultural system out of the individualistic building blocks or germ cells (Keimzellen) as Troeltsch calls them: the individual metaphysical decision.

It is germ-cells of a new spiritual freshness, power, concentration, and discipline, which have everywhere to be formed against the crudity, shallowness, and vulgarity of a trivialised or caricatured, increasingly disintegrated and desolate civilization. In the nature of things this must begin in a small way and assume an individual form in accordance with individual impulse. And this is actually the case at the present time. Wherever we look today, such germ-cells are forming; everywhere they are striving to spread abroad, especially in the form of personal communion and love, the universal and inevitable elements comprised in their particular synthesis. The nature of the further development along these lines is a question in itself which cannot yet be answered today. From these germ-cells there must proceed great fighting forces of public life. Since in the personal and particular they seek to find the Universal and Love, they will meet, embrace, and amalgamate.69

Individual persons formulate their plans as to how culture should be constructed; they meet and amalgamate with other persons having their own plans. Common Spirit will grow from the seed of individual decision.

But, while this fusing is possible, Troeltsch also must provide a reason why these germ-cells fuse or amalgamate into a larger Common Spirit. They do not just bump into each other like atoms fusing together to form a molecule.

...this synthesis is demanded, not as an interesting or tolerable play of personal mood and opinion, but as the outcome of a feeling of responsibility and the communicative impulse
of an overflowing love. The spiritual forces must be created and moulded, not in self-centered solitude, or intellectually and in literature, but with an active and basic purpose of direction towards intimate community, leadership, and self-communication. A new salvation, to be found in fresh and original concentration on a metaphysical foundation; a new love, resting on the feeling of all spiritual values as fundamentally common values—this is the form in which the universal validity of these syntheses can emerge into a Common Spirit.70

So here we see that what causes the coherence among a multitude of individual persons is communicating love. This love is what takes the place of the necessarily developing universal spirit. Love is the spark of social fusion. This love is the acceptance or amalgamation of apparently differing value systems due to the realization that they are fundamentally common values. Other value systems are just different expressions of the same things we hold to. All religions are variations of the same truth.

But, while individually loving persons communicate themselves into community, there can still arise conflicts. For different individuals have different views of what is the correct way in which the social circles become concentrically organized.

The solution thus gained, which we have to regard as a central solution achieved in a metaphysical religious nucleus, can only be spread from individual centres, and made into a spirit of self-communication and love, which will as far as possible spread itself over the widest circles, but will always be at war with other forms of belief.71
This metaphysical religious kernel of individual decision is rather ambiguous with Troeltsch. At times he speaks of it as if it were merely an abstract formal drive to achieve an absolute solution to the problem of damming the stream of history, no matter what the content of that solution might be.

On the other hand, there is in particular syntheses, when they are made with a wide vision and deep thought, something objective and of a universal validity, which is ever pressing forward, and, in its special individual application to place and condition, can rather be felt than intellectually constructed. And this feeling, joined to broad and objective considerations, establishes sufficient security against all scepticism and all fundamental relativism.72

It is the formal dutiful feeling of the necessity to dam the stream of history.

And at other times he speaks about it as being a communicating, overpowering love. But even that is quite an empty concept. Whose definition of love do we use?

In any case, it is here that the importance of Troeltsch's religious a priori must be stressed. As we saw, the person was something behind the Morality of Conscience and Ethic of Culture synthesizing the two in an individual act in a given situation. Troeltsch views this person as having his motivation for individual decision "arise out of the deeper or more spiritual levels of our essence."73 It is the very ground of our existence.

Strong emphasis must therefore be laid on the fact that this central synthesis concerns those very religious and metaphysical foundations from which the real fusing warmth and glow of life proceeds.74
So we see that what Troeltsch is doing is replacing the universal spiritual development with that of the metaphysical ground of life (die religiöse und metaphysische Grundlage) in order to preserve necessary coherence. And he is, after the breakdown of the organological view of culture, rebuilding cultural perspective out of the metaphysical ground via the individual decisive action. These individuals move out beyond themselves in love and touch and unite with other individuals to organize the various circles of society concentrically into a coherent ethical system that becomes an enduring structure that thereby temporarily stems the flow of Relativism and Scepticism.

Yet these systems of ethics are only relative solutions. Before, necessity was the universal ideal spirit. Now necessity is no longer found in objective reality. It is located in the individual decisions. Necessary coherence flows from the individual person, building up order in the world. That leaves objective reality as non-necessary and non-rational. Fate (Schicksal) reigns supreme. The damming of the stream of history is only partial and temporary.

The task of damming and controlling is therefore essentially incapable of completion and essentially unending; and yet it is always soluble and practicable in each new case. A radical and absolute solution does not exist; there are only working, partial, synthetically uniting solutions. Yet the stream of life is always surging upward and onward. History within itself cannot be transcended, and knows of no salvation except in the form of devout anticipations of the Hereafter, or glorified transfigurations of partial salvations. The Kingdom of God and Nirvana lie outside history.
In history itself there are only relative victories; and these relative victories themselves vary greatly in power and depth, according to time and circumstance.75

In other words Troeltsch is re-affirming as a conclusion what he held at the beginning of these lectures. The historical movement is in itself boundless.76 Objective reality is fate full. There is no meaningful development. And the metaphysically grounded individual programs for renewal give only limited and temporary order.

The fact that these relative victories or dammings of the historical stream vary according to time and circumstances points to another aspect of Troeltsch's position. Each attempt at damming the stream is a matter of individual germ-cells (Keimzellen). And because their motivation springs from a common root or metaphysical ground, they are mirrors of the whole of all attempts to limit history and individual offspring of the divine life. A passage already quoted serves equally on this point:

The spiritual forces must be created and moulded, not in self-centred solitude, or intellectually and in literature, but with an active and basic purpose of direction towards intimate community, leadership, and self-communication. A new salvation, to be found in fresh and original concentration on a metaphysical foundation; a new love, resting on the feeling of all spiritual values as fundamentally common values--this is the form in which the universal validity of these syntheses can emerge into a Common Spirit.77

And in one of the other lectures found in Überwindung he says:

A truth which, in the first instance, is a truth for us, does not cease because of this,
to be very Truth and Life. What we learn
daily through our love for our fellow-men,
viz. that they are independent beings with
standards of their own, we ought also to be
able to learn through our love for mankind
as a whole—that here too there exist au­
omous civilisations with standards of their
own. This does not exclude rivalry, but it
must be a rivalry for the attainment of in­
terior purity and clearness of vision. If
each racial group strives to develop its
own highest potentialities, we may hope to
come nearer to one another. This applies to
the great world-religions, but it also applies
to the various religious denominations, and to
individuals in their intercourse with one an­
other. In our earthly experience the Divine
Life is not One, but Many. But to apprehend
the One in the Many constitutes the special
character of Love.78

For Troeltsch, each individual person strives for a cultural
ethical synthesis on the basis of his own choice of how that
synthesis should be. This individual synthesis is propagated
by communicating love. Each strives for his own inner purity
and clarity in fulfilling to the best degree possible the di­
vinely grounded urge to create cultural order. Each thereby
gives the best synthesis he can and thereby from his own stand­
point mirrors the same striving of others and thus meets him­
self in them.

This second passage, as Klapwijk says,79 is not yet Troelt­
sch's position of radical individualism, but it does point up
the belief of Troeltsch that the historical individualities are
each offshoots of the divine. Each is its own individual ex­
pression of the divine drive to lovingly renew culture. Each
is "immediate to God" in a Rankean sense. In Troeltsch's radi­
cal individualism phase, the historical individual is no longer culture but individual persons. Individual people are now the "divine ideas." Each individual act of damming the historical stream is part of the divine movement toward that goal.

But, although each individual responsible act is a divinely inspired move toward this goal of damming the stream, there is no absolute achievement in it. So teleologically speaking the goal of history is now the inspiration of individuals to strive toward a goal that will never totally happen. The individual person, not cultural formation, is the bearer of and at the same time the goal for history. In preparing for this position, Troeltsch says:

The material philosophy of history is naturally teleological. How should that be otherwise? But it is not the teleology of the objectively constructable world progress seen from the final eternal purpose, but the teleology of the will forming and shaping out of its past and out of the moment into the future.80

This is necessarily an individual forming and the forming of individuals.

...the purpose and the meaning of history lies not in the long and wide cultural formation interwoven with all sorts of terror and outrage, but in the fulfillment of the individuals.81
Summary of Monadological Features

One purpose of this essay is to show that Troeltsch, just prior to his death, conceived of individual people as being historical monads in the formation of culture. From the explanation of Troeltsch's position, it can be seen that people do function, for him, in much the same way as Leibniz' monads.

Individual people, for Troeltsch, unite to form a common Spirit in the organization and orderly formation of culture, in order to give structure and stem the constantly changing flow of history. These people are the building blocks of historical culture for Troeltsch just as the monads, for Leibniz, were the simple substances that made up the composite structures of visible reality.

This "building block" similarity between, what I call, Troeltsch's historical monads and the ontological monads of Leibniz is also accompanied by another. Just as Leibniz held that each monad was only a temporary constituent of a temporary composite in the eternally changing visible reality, so too Troeltsch thought that individual people (historical monads), through planning and working to shape culture, formed the cultural institutions and structures of short duration. A systematic damming of the stream of history is temporarily effective, but then breaks down and is followed by other attempts. Although monads, for Leibniz, are eternal substances and Troeltsch's monads are not, nevertheless, for both of them, there is an ongoing process of individual formation of structures and break-
Troeltsch's reliance on Leibniz can also be seen in the idea of self-lawed development. Each simple substance or monad, for Leibniz, exists and changes according to its own internal law or principle of development without any influence or output from outside, from other monads. Leibniz' term for this is "windowless." Likewise for Troeltsch, each individual person comes up with his own particular program of cultural formation. It is a decision of the individual conscience, arising from the depths of individual being without influence from others.

Both Troeltsch and Leibniz see their respective monads as being in varying degrees offshoots of the divine. Leibniz' monads help form higher (close to God), more rational objects in the hierarchy of visible reality the more their principle of development reflects the divine. Likewise, Troeltsch's historical monads are more effective in forming cultural structures to dam the stream of history the more faithfully they respond to the divine impulse to do so. The one is an ontological reflection and the other is an ethical-cultural reflection. But both are more adequate to or successful in their task the more they are reflections of the divine.

A corollary to this idea of reflecting the divine is that of mirroring the universe. Each Leibnizian monad was a mirror of the whole universe and therefore of all other monads. Troeltsch's monadlike individuals mirror in their own particular attempts to dam the flow of history, the universal drive to do
so, and thus all other individual attempts also. Each person meets himself in the culture formative actions of others by recognizing the values of others as fundamentally the same as their own.

In addition to these other parallels between Leibniz' theory of monads and Troeltsch's cultural individuals, there is one, for Troeltsch, most important similarity. There was, for Leibniz, a preestablished harmony among the individual monads. Because of the self-developing nature of monads, God established from the beginning harmony so that the states and changes of one windowless monad was adapted to and not interfering with the states and changes of all the other monads. Troeltsch's version of this idea is communicating love. Here too with Troeltsch it is a matter of coherence and harmony among self-developing individuals. Each person has his own "windowless" plan of how to shape culture, yet there is a drive to lovingly communicate with other individuals and merge efforts in cooperation for the forming of culture. Troeltsch speaks of it as a metaphysical drive based on the feeling that other people's values are fundamentally common with our own.

There is one possible similarity that can be drawn, in our opinion, from Troeltsch's reliance on Leibniz. Despite Leibniz' emphasis on mathematical continuity, evidenced in the calculus, it is our opinion that it is just as important, for Leibniz, to safeguard the infinite possibility of development for each monad. The correlate, for Troeltsch, is his emphasis
on individual teleology. Despite Troeltsch's belief in universal movement for cultural formation, there is also, for him, just as much importance, if not more, placed on the fulfillment of the individual person regardless of how successful the cultural formation is.

So, at the end of his life, Troeltsch fell back on a Leibnizian monadology in order both to safeguard freedom of development for the individuals of history and to give divine grounds for the harmony between those individuals and for their community, i.e., to replace the coherence lost by the breakdown of the notion of ideal development.
VI Critique

In our opinion, the position which Troeltsch reached at the end of his life is somewhat of a contradiction of his original suppositions. If you remember, he previously viewed the individual person as fitting into a cultural organ which in turn was the prime historical object and the bearer of the movement of the universal ideal spirit. The cultural spirit took its direction for the formation of cultural norms from out of that total spiritual movement. Likewise, individuals were to be free by meaningfully fitting into the cultural organ. The developing spirit of the cultural whole was to dictate the direction for the individual norm formation.

But now the total spiritual development is gone and so is any homogeneity within culture. The individual person takes his direction for cultural renewal from his rootedness in the metaphysical-religious ground of life. The individual decision as to how culture should be formed is the formal urge to absolutely form culture. The particular shape that it takes in Western Europe is the Morality of Conscience and Cultural Ethics, both of which are relative and temporary because of Schicksal.

Because there is no necessarily cohering development of the cultural realm, all that is left, in the West, is the historical perfection of the individual person. In Der Historismus und seine Probleme, Troeltsch repeatedly states that any directedness that does not come out of the flow of history is not truly Historismus but a denial thereof. In specific reference to the Greeks he says:

50.
This essence did not grow out of history, but conversely, the understanding of history grew out of this essence, such that human acting and creating seemed to be a sometimes gloomy and unsteady, sometimes increasing, progressing approach to these ideals, fixable through pure logic.88

As we have seen, this is exactly what Troeltsch does. He started by extracting understanding of the past and values for present norm formation out of the actual historical process. But now in the position of Troeltsch just discussed, it is clear that he has departed from that viewpoint. He does talk about fitting into the course of development, but it is weakly done. The particular context for norm formation springs forth from the metaphysical-religious individual root, not from history.

Troeltsch even talks about Überwindungen of the historical stream. They are only temporary Überwindungen and relative to place, thus pointing up the fact that the historical stream is the final victor. But as far as man is concerned, he is the momentary victor of history by his rootedness in the divine ground of life. He is not the victor by his rootedness in history.

Because of the way he conceived of ethics, Troeltsch had, in our opinion, many of the same problems Kant did, in his distinction between regulative Personal Morality and constitutive Cultural Ethics. Whereas Kant finally rebuilt his metaphysics in history by means of the ideas of God and teleology in nature as guarantee of constitutive results, Troeltsch was left with
only individual enhancement vouchsafed. Because of his idea of the religious a priori he found only coherence and not constitutive results for individual historical enhancement in the divine and to a certain extent rejected the very Historicism that he wished to preserve.

Aside from this problem with Troeltsch's religious a priori as the basis of his historical monadology, there are also sore spots with the particular way he works it out. The first has to do with his notion of Schicksal. Schicksal functioned for Troeltsch as a limiting concept for how effective any individuals were able to be in their faithful response to the impulse to dam the stream. One person's attempt might be such a weak response that circumstances made it ineffectual.

In a Neo-platonic framework, the concept of matter had, as one of its functions, the task of explaining why some objects were more of an embodiment of divine reason principles than others were. The more effective matter was, the less effective was divine reason and therefore the object was less rational and lower in the hierarchy of reality. Matter was enemy to reason. Leibniz, in his adaptation of this view, avoided the problem of an unaccountable negation by making the limitation of rational reflection a quality inherent to monads. It was part and parcel of the self-lawed development of each monad to be more or less rational as time went on.

Troeltsch runs into difficulties with the concept of
Schicksal as limit of effectiveness. Schicksal is, for him, located outside of and working against the historical monad. Individual people, out of their metaphysically, religiously rooted decision, seek to bring universal and absolute structure to the flux of reality but are opposed by Schicksal which keeps this from happening at all or at the very least makes it a short-lived phenomenon. "Decision-versus-fate" is posited by Troeltsch as an endless process.

This means either that there is an outside force working against the metaphysical ground of life thwarting its attempts at bringing absoluteness into the world, or that it is essential to the metaphysical ground both to move individuals to decide and work for absoluteness and to thwart those attempts.

This problem leads Troeltsch to a second one closely related to this. Because he returns to a Leibnizian monadology, Troeltsch becomes heir to a problem that Leibniz received from the Neoplatonism which influenced him: there is sufficient intelligible grounds for every particular object in reality. But now it has become: there are intelligible grounds for everything that happens. It is the value of individuality characteristic of Historicism. If there are rational grounds for every particular thing that is or happens, then each is meant to be that way and there is a higher order harmony between the apparently conflicting individuals in the visible world.

For Troeltsch, this means that the incalculable number of individual decisive viewpoints should, somehow, be rationalized
in the unitary divine ground. Diversity would have to be re-conciled in the unsearchable divine.

But as we noticed, Troeltsch drives himself to admit individuality even in the divine. The divine truth is not one, but many. The divine is even diversified. The much sought-after unity and coherence for historical reality is not even in the last possible place. It is not even in the divine ground of life. There is just endless conflict among individuals. Because there is no unity in the divine as ground harmony of the sensible world, then even the divine is essentially in endless conflict.

This means that Troeltsch's belief that individuals could and would unite in loving communication into a Common Spirit to stem the flux of life, is a pipe-dream. He really has no grounds for believing in the possibility of cultural unity (even short-lived unity). How can unity and harmony arise from disunity and disharmony?

On the basis of my own suppositions, there are two reactions to Troeltsch's monadological history. The first is one of disagreement. Despite the fact that Troeltsch uses the idea of the divine ground to vouchsafe harmony and coherence among individuals, nevertheless his source for meaningful directedness is none other than the individual person.

Before the individual was reduced to the universal. Now the universal is reduced to the individual. Both viewpoints stem from the mistake of seeing the law or governing principle
for creation located within creation.

In this case, the immanentization of the law for creation means that the individual is the all important object of history and the bearer of movement in history. This effectively eliminates any meaningful movement in what was formerly the structures or objects of history, i.e., states, nations, church, etc. That is why Troeltsch sees religious renewal as being a mystical venture, no longer part of the institutional church. That is also why he places such emphasis on the various youth movements that spring up in Germany after W.W.I. It was from out of these youth groups that a rebirth of the German Volksgeist would occur.

If the individual decision is meaningful and cultural structures meaningless, then that individual stands alone against Fate (Schicksal). He is little more than a puny "Demiurge" trying to impose shape on the totally hostile matter of culture. Looked at from the point of view of the individual, two choices exist. He can withdraw from cultural formations or plunge whole-heartedly into it. If he withdraws, he can either give up on life out of despair for being culturally insignificant; or he can cultivate himself, bring himself to his own highest potential and forget everyone else.

If he plunges ahead, then his input is limited to influence from individual to individual. He can try to build up a "common spirit," but fate works against it. In essence this
is a variation of positions that make a split between private morality and the public sector. Decisions and viewpoints of personal conviction have no place in the common structures of culture. There is only room for influence among individuals. Structural input for structural change is ruled out of order. The result is that any chance of altering the situation is, in effect, eliminated, and the status quo is preserved.

My other reaction is one of limited acceptance. I think Troeltsch's historical monadology is touching on a number of valid points concerning reality, as I see it.

Although conceived in a slightly different manner, Troeltsch's religious a priori gets at what I consider to be the basic nature of reality. All of life is religious. Every aspect of reality is colored by the fact that every human being lives his life in total unconditional surrender or commitment to something. And that commitment is what shapes and colors a priori all of the rest of his thinking and acting and feeling and willing.

Troeltsch, I think, is also right when he maintains that this a priori is something that cannot be proved. Everyone believes unconditionally and holds what they believe to be beyond question. It cannot be proved because the standard of proof is wrapped up in what one is committed to as the truth. A person can trust in a rational argument or proof only because he is unconditionally trusting in Reason as the truth for life. If he is right in trusting in Reason, Reason will justify his commitment, prove him right.
Aside from putting his finger on something valid in his idea of proof, Troeltsch also sees clearly that results are not within human power. Although Schicksal is somewhat of an alien force for Troeltsch, he is right in saying that the effects of divinely grounded action are not within human grasp. Troeltsch holds that individual action is effective to the degree that it is an adequate response to the divine. Although I agree that the vindication of right action lies with the divine, the justification may not be a matter of being effective because of being right. Action and faithfulness may only be vindicated at the end of time, not in immediate fruits.

I said "limited acceptance" because of the following. Although I basically agree with Troeltsch in his assessment of a priori motivation and proof, I disagree that all individual commitments are a priori motivated by or offshoots of the divine. Because of Troeltsch's adaptation of the idea that there are sufficient intelligible grounds for everything that exists, he thought that every religion, every individual commitment was an offshoot of the divine. In my opinion, if only Troeltsch would have reinstated the belief in the absoluteness of Christianity on the basis of proof as vindication from the divine, he would have been rescued from the dissolution of unity in the divine, his last ground of defense.

In other words, all faiths are not the truth. Christianity believes it is absolutely true at the expense of all others. And other faiths believe likewise. Even Bahai which believes
all faiths are variations of the same truth would exclude your faith if you absolutely maintain that you're right and they are wrong. It cannot be proved by the person involved. He can only trust that his faith will be vindicated by his god, if it is the true one.
VII Conclusion

We have viewed a little of Troeltsch's life and intellectual development and seen how at the end of his life he struggled with the problem of finding coherence among the self-lawed individuals of history once the grounds of classical, idealistic Historicism were gone and an organic view of culture had vanished. He found coherence, via Leibniz, for the "monads" of history, in the divine ground. The problem, for Troeltsch's solution, was not that he took refuge in God as guarantor of existence, order and meaning. God, in our opinion, is the only meaning for an in itself meaningless flux of history. Troeltsch's last-ditch effort to curb Relativism failed because he tried to use God as the rational ground for every particular religiously directed life of cultural formation. The attempt failed because it made God subject to the same individualism as is in the world. God becomes individualized into meaningless Relativism.


4 Ibid., pp. 86-87.


Ibid., p. 43.


I take as my sources for this periodization Jacob Klapwijk's two works, Tussen Historisme en Relativisme and "De Absolutheid van het Christendom en zijn historische en soziologische Gebondenheid (Ernst Troeltsch)."

It appears that Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen's "Ein Versuch der Überwindung des Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch" recognizes this individualism of Troeltsch. Meinecke and Tillich do point to Troeltsch's turn to Leibniz but I do not think they realize the full weight of that move. Antoni and Mandelbaum both later admit Troeltsch's use of Leibniz but also miss, as far as I can see, the radicalness of his individualism.

Jacob Klapwijk, Tussen Historisme en Relativisme, p. 370/. We will see in our analysis of the Überwindung lectures how drastic this individualism is.

Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, p. 17. .... erscheint als Träger des Fortschritts und damit als der eigentliche Gegenstand der Geschichte nicht mehr die Kirche, sondern die staatlich-kulturell aufgefaszte Volkseinheit, deren Selbstanschauung sie sich als neuen aufstrebenden Inhaber der
geschichtlichen Bewegung empfinden lässt und aus deren Bedürfnissen sie den Sinn der Geschichte als Fortschritt zu bürgerlicher Freiheit deutet.


22 Ibid., p. 39.


24 Ibid., p. 167. Es ist ein apriorisches, das heiszt spontanes Schaffen, insofern das Neue wirklich aus inneren Tiefen hervorbricht und nur durch seine innere Selbstgewiszheit und seine den Willen bestimmende Macht sich beglaubigt.

25 Jacob Klapwijk, "De absoluutheid van het Christendom en zijn historische en soziologische Gebondenheid (Ernst Troeltsch)," p. 30. De metafysische basis van alle geschiedbeschouwing en ideaalvorming is hem niet langer de menselijke metafysische totaalgeest en diens universele gang door de geschiedenis, doch de individuele religieus-metafysische wortelpositie van de enkele menselijke persoon. Vanuit de scheppende kracht van de individuele existentie moet nieuw leven opbloeien.

Unterscheidung in den Gegenstand selbst in letzter Linie auf metaphysische Annahmen hinaus, auf grundsätzliche Geschiedenheiten in der Erlebniswirklichkeit selbst, die mit den Verschiedenheiten, der sie auffassenden Subjektivität eng und innerlich zusammenhängen, wie denn zwischen Subjektivität und Gegenstand überhaupt im letzten Kern ein metaphysisches Verhältnis bestehen muss.

27 Jacob Klapwijk, Tussen Historisme en Relativisme, p. 402. Wel houdt hij vast aan de mogelijkheid van een geschiedenis- metafysika, doch gaat hij haar concentreren in de diepte van de individuele persoonlijke existentie en komt zodoende uit bij de individualistische en pluralistische metafysika van Leibniz. ... Het is een metafysika die wel ruimte laat voor de erkenning van samenhang in de geschiedenis, doch die anderzijds ook haar onloochenbare diskontinuïteiten weet te plaatsen en te duiden.


"Ibid., p. 39. Überwindung, p. 1. ... ein Thema..., das den Kern meiner ganzen gegenwärtigen Gedankenarbeit darstellt....

"Ibid., p. 42. Überwindung, p. 3.

"Ibid., p. 43. Überwindung, p. 3. Welches ist Rolle und Bedeutung des Systems der Ethik für die grosse Aufgabe einer Bewältigung und Begrenzung der an sich grenzenlosen historischen Bewegung? -- das ist die grosse Frage.

"Ibid., p. 76. Überwindung, p. 25. Erst beide zusammen machen das Ganze des ethischen Bereiches aus,....


"Ibid., p. 63. Überwindung, p. 17.

"Ibid., p. 52. Überwindung, p. 10. Aus diesem gesollten Zweck lassen sich die sittlichen Einzelforderungen mühelos ableiten, sowie man bedenkt, dass erstlich diese Persönlichkeit sich in einer Doppelrichtung, in einem Verhalten zu sich selbst
und einem Verhalten zum Mitmenschen, sich entfalten muss und
dasz zweitens der Persönlichkeitscharakter nicht bloß vom
Einzelmenschen, sondern auch von Gemeinschaften als Forderung
gilt, dasz nicht nur Einzelpersönlichkeiten, sondern auch Kol-
lektivpersönlichkeiten gefordert sind.

der Persönlichkeit ist aber bei uns endlichen, aus dem Lebens-
und Bewusstseinstrome auftauchenden geschöpfen selbstverständ-
lich keine absolute. Sie findet statt im Gehorsam und in der
Hingebung an einen Zug zur Loslösung von der bloß natürlichen
und zufälligen Motivation, an einen Zug zum Sollen, der dem Zug
ter der logischen Wahrheit und Richtigkeit analog ist und wie
dieser aus tieferen, geistigeren Schichten unseres Wesens auf-
steigt.

41 Ibid., p. 62. "Überwindung, p. 17. Diese Moralität ist
doch eben immer erst Bändigung und Überwindung der bloßen Natur,
entspringt aus ihr heraus und kämpft mit ihr. Ihr Wesen ist
immer neuer Kampf, immer neue Schöpfung. Sie kann ihren Begriff
nach niemals schlechthin siegreich sein. Die Vollendung wäre
das Aufhören des Kampfes und der Freiheit, wäre die kampflose
Notwendigkeit des Guten und der Vernunft, die wir uns gar nicht
vorstellen können.

42 Ibid., p. 66. "Überwindung, p. 20. Er ist ein relativer
Akt, der absolute Normen nur nach Möglichkeit verwirklicht und
seine eigene Absolutheit nur als Entscheidung des persönlichen
Gewissens und Entschlusses in sich trägt.

43 Ibid., p. 52. "Überwindung, p. 10. An welchen konkreten
Lebenstoffen und konkreten Einzelzwecken die hierdurch erworbenen
Eigenschaften bewährt und betätigt werden sollen, das ist dann
eine Frage für sich.

44 Ibid., p. 71. "Überwindung, p. 22. Aber nun bietet
daneben das sittliche Bewusstsein noch eine ganz andere Reihe
von Bestimmungen dar, die in der traditionellen Ethik den Namen
der Güter oder Zwecke führen und heute gerne als Werte oder
genauer Kulturwerte bezeichnet werden. Das Wesentliche dieser
Werte ist, dass sie gesollte Werte oder objektive Zwecke sind,
d.h. sachliche Werte von allgemeiner, überzufälliger und über-
individueller Geltung, deren Anstrengung wir uns und anderen als
Pflicht zumuten.

45 Ibid., p. 80. "Überwindung, p. 27. Sie sind durch und
durch historische Gebilde, zerteilen sich in die verschiedenen
großen Kulturgebiete der Familie, des Staates und Rechtes, der
wirtschaftlichen Naturbeherrschung, der Wissenschaft, der Kunst
und der Religion.

eine Erhebung über das zufällige Geschiebe psychologisch erk-
lärbare Bedürfnisse und Triebe und über die Zwangsbindingen
und Nützlichkeiten der soziologischen Zusammenhänge.

überhaupt nicht durch bewusste Arbeit und theoretische Konstruk-
tion. Es vollzieht sich vielmehr in der Sphäre des Unbewussten.
Sowohl die Herausbildung der einzelnen Glieder als ihres gegen-
seitigen Zusammenhanges erfolgt unter dem gar nicht beachteten
Druck geographischer und klimatischer Lage, des Wanderungs-
und Nahrungsspielraums, der Geburtenfruktbarkeit und der bio-
logischen Konstitution, schließlich unter dem Einfluss der
individuellen geistigen Besonderheiten, die man als Vorausset-
zungen der Rassen und Nationen zu bezeichnen pflegt, weil man sie nicht
weiter erklären kann. Dazu kommt die Wirkung besonderer his-
torischen Schicksale, der mit diesen meist verbundenen
sozialen Gliederung und der führenden Persönlichkeiten, die
unererfahrene Geschenke des Schicksals sind und sich in
tausendfach verbreiterte Tradition verwandeln.

nissen bildet sich zunächst unbewusst und unbemerkt aus dem
Triebe der sich über die Natur erhebenden und sie organisierenden
Vernunft das System der Werte als reine Tatsache, nicht vom
Denken erzeugt und nicht vom Willen geleitet. Zum System wird
es jedesmal durch die aus irgendeinem Grunde vorherrschende Macht
eines einzelnen zentralen Wertes, der sich die übrigen mehr oder
minder klar und energisch angliedert, sowie durch die Folgerich-
tigkeit und Entwicklung der in solchen Ansätzen liegenden logis-
chen Konsequenzen.

sich überhaupt ausbildet, hängt an der Grösse und Tiefe der
ursprünglichen Anlage und der Gunst des historischen Schicksals.

geschaffenen, grundlegenden und schicksalsartigen Synthesen
sind zunächst entscheidend. Aber in allen kritischen Momenten
und in den reifereii Perioiden wird dann auch eine bewusste kons-
struktive Synthese nötig.

zentralen Wert ergreift und zum Organisationspunkt macht, das
ist dann nur durch den persönlichen Eindruck der Forderungen
der Wirklichkeit und des eigenen Gewissens zu begründen. Die Art, wie mit dem so begründeten Zentralwert die übrigen Werte verbunden werden, ist wiederum in letzter Linie eine persönliche Lebenstat, die erst hinterher konstruktiv ausgedrückt werden und sich durch ihre Fruchtbarkeit bewahren kann.

52 Ibid., p. 97. Überwindung, p. 40. Im Grunde kann ein solches System sich nur als lebendige Tat und geschichtliche Leistung darstellen, begründet auf das Verständnis der auf uns zuführenden Entwicklung und auf den Mut zu deren Um- und Weiterbildung.

53 Ibid., p. 111. Überwindung, p. 47. Er (i.e. der ethisch-metaphysischen Individualitätsgedanken) fordert die Einstellung in den Zug der Entwicklung, wie ihn ein intuitives und konstruktives Denken vom eigenen Standort aus sehen zu müssen gewiss ist, und den Einsatz der vollen Tapferkeit für das, was einem persönlich und auf individuelle Weise Gewißheit ist.

54 The two adjectives "personal" and "individual" are used to link the idea of historical individualities to that of people. For now, people are the historical individualities.

55 Ibid., p. 79. Überwindung, p. 27. Die Moralität ist eine unentbehrliche Voraussetzung für die Verwirklichung geistiger, inhaltlicher Werte, aber sie ist nicht selbst ein endgültiger und sich lediglich auf sich selbst begründender Wert. Sie kann nur arbeiten an einem Stoffe, der selbst nicht naturhafter Art, sondern selbst eine Überwindung des bloß naturhaften und tatsächlichen Trieblebens und Kampfes ums Dasein ist. So fordert also die Persönlichkeitsmoral infolge ihrer Formalität einen idealen inhaltlichen Stoff, an dessen Verwirklichung sie selber erst zur Auswirkung und Aktion kommen kann. Andererseits fordert der Inbegriff der ethischen Güter oder Kulturwerte eine Gesinnung und Kraft des Handelns, die auf Zusammenschluss der Persönlichkeit in etwas gerichtet ist, das sie über das gemeine Triebleben erhebt. Das erste kann nicht in Aktion treten ohne das zweite, das zweite kann nicht verwirklicht werden ohne das erste.

56 Ibid., p. 82. Überwindung, p. 29. Damit wird der Hauptunterschied zwischen der Gewissensmoral und der Kulturethik ganz deutlich. Führt die erstere vermöge ihrer Formalität aus der Historie hinaus in das zeitlose Gültige, so führt die zweite uns umgekehrt in die Historie und Entwicklung hinein, vor allem in das Reich des Individuellen.

57 Ibid., p. 83. Überwindung, p. 30. In beiden Fällen näm-


Ibid., p. 123. Überwindung, p. 56. In all diesen Kreisen leben wir gleichzeitig ohne Schwierigkeiten und ohne Vermischung. Sucht man ihnen eine Verbindung und einen Zusammenhang zu geben, sie nicht nur als koordinierte, sondern als konzentrische Kreise zu begreifen, so werden wir nun freilich auf das metaphysische und religiöse Element gewiesen, von dem aus alleine eine Verbindung und Zusammenwölbung erfolgen kann.


Ibid., p. 125. Überwindung, p. 58. Es sind Keimzellen einer neuen geistigen Frische, Kraft, Zusammenfassung und Disziplinierung, die überall gegen die Roheit, Flachheit und Gemeinheit einer trivialisierten oder karikierten, immer, zersetzten...


73. *Ibid.,* p. 51. Überwindung, p. 10. ...dieser aus tieferen, geistigeren Schichten unseres Wesens aufsteigt.
Überwindung, p. 59. Dabei ist stark zu betonen, dass diese zentrale Synthese gerade die religiösen und metaphysischen Grundlagen betrifft, von denen die eigentliche zusammenschmelzende Wärme und Glut des Lebens ausgeht.


Ibid., p. 43.


Jacob Klapwijk, Tussen Historisme en Relativisme, p. 347, footnote #3.


Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology, in Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics/ Correspondence with Arnauld/ Monadology. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1973), propositions # 1, 2, 3.

Ibid., propositions # 65-77.

Ibid., propositions # 7, 11, 15, 18.

Ibid., propositions # 42, 47, 48, 49, 60.

Ibid., propositions # 56, 57.

Ibid., proposition # 51.


There are solid connections between Neo-platonic themes and those active in Historicism. For a discussion of the Neo-platonic influence on early German thinking, especially Leibniz, see Heinz Heimoeth's Die sechs groszen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik und der Ausgang des Mittelalters (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958).
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