DOOYeweerd's Theory of Individuality Structure
As an Alternative to a Substance Position, Especially That of Aristotle

A thesis submitted in candidacy for the degree of Master of Philosophy

by

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ERRATA

Page 2, line 24, "infima" should read: infimae
Page 13, line 27, sentence should end: modality" (I:102).^4
Page 19, line 20, "fundamental" should read: fundamental
Page 22, line 23, "want" should read: wont
Page 24, line 26, following "religious" should be: fulness
Page 24, line 26, "(I:8)" should read: (II:8)
Page 32, line 17, "(I:553; see I:41)" should read: (I:553; see I:41)
Page 32, line 21, "apeak" should read: speak
Page 43, line 12, following "outside of that" should be: of
Page 50, line 24, "qualifying" should read: qualifying
Page 57, line 15, "decidely" should read: decidedly
Page 60, line 5, "zaat" should read: gaat
Page 70, line 25, "selve" should read: zelve
Page 70, line 27, "possibilites" should read: possibilities
Page 72, line 25, "functions, for 'het . . .' should be:
functions, "omdat het . . ."
Page 73, line 1, "groepert" should read: groepeert
Page 73, line 3, "bestimmingsfunctie" should read: bestemmingsfunctie
Page 76, line 12, "constant" should read: constante
Page 81, line 18, "bestimmingsfunctie" should read: bestemmingsfunctie
Page 82, line 3, "exist" should read: exists
Page 84, lines 13 and 17, "atriculation" should read: articulation
Page 85, line 14, following block quotation should be: (III:97)
ERRATA (continued)

Page 93, line 24, "So, for example," should read: So, for example:
Page 97, line 13, "to" should read: te
Page 99, line 4, "laws" should read: [laws]
Page 105, line 10, "lay" should read: lie
Page 106, line 4, "grounds" should read: a ground
Page 119, line 5, "creaturliness" should read: creatureliness
Page 123, line 9, "creaturliness" should read: creatureliness
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I. INTRODUCTION

Herman Dooyeweerd, like Aristotle, is concerned with probing how it is that things remain the same while constantly changing. It is in fact with this question of identity amid change that Dooyeweerd opens his discussion of the "structures of individuality of temporal things." Where Aristotle, however, appealed to the continuity of a substance underlying changes of accidents, a continuity derived from and dependent on a union of form and matter, Dooyeweerd steadfastly rejects Aristotle's notion of substance as "metaphysical" and intrinsically unbiblical. In its place he offers the notion of a thing as an "individuality structure," a typical structural whole presenting a unified operational coherence of a functional diversity, to account for continuity of identity.

With the notion of "individuality structure," Dooyeweerd believes himself better able to honor the unity of things, as any such structure embraces the whole gamut of a thing's functioning, integrated in a typical way. In Dooyeweerd's model, there are no partial, antithetical but complementary principles making up things, each making its respective contribution to the whole; things are seen as unities of a diversity of functionality, integrated in a typical manner, which view leaves their wholeness and integrality intact. The individual and typical characters of things are not located in
distinct component principles, but seen as dimensions of an integral whole. Further, that unity and integrality of a thing, though not itself functional in character, is not the unity of a (composite) substance; it is not something in or by itself, apart from its functional diversity. It is a unity in and of a functional diversity, not a deeper "this" underlying a diversity of functional accidents, of which it is essentially independent. Dooyeweerd's treatment of both unity and typicality, then, is bound to the central notion of individuality structure, and as such sharply diverges from Aristotle's discussions of the same matters.

In spite of these differences, however, there are points of contact. Dooyeweerd's "individuality structure" is in many ways reminiscent of Aristotle's "universal." Where form designates a partial structuring principle, a "universal" represents a structure embracing the whole of a thing, but the whole only in its typicality or kind-identity. Dooyeweerd's individuality structure also indicates a structure that is total and typical; like Aristotle's universal, it refers to the structure that is common to all individuals of the same kind, their common kind-identity. In Aristotle's conception, moreover, universals are fitted into an intricate network of genera and species, and have their proper specificity determined relative to a scale ranging from summa genera to infima species. Dooyeweerd's individuality structures, too, are structural types, which find their place within an inner
articulation of radical types into a series of geno-types further divided into sub-types, finally reaching ultimate sub-types, where no further internal differentiation of typicalness is evident.

There are also notable similarities between individuality structure and Aristotle's conception of form. Form is actually the key to the continuing identity of a composite substance, unifying the material elements of a thing into a determinate whole, a definite kind of thing; a thing is what it is owing to the internal ordering of its matter by the form. Form constitutes matter a thing, giving material parts a unitary, structured wholeness; and, as its "contents" are always typical, simultaneously makes the thing the kind of thing it is. In both of these ways, form is the unchanging essence of a thing. In Dooyeweerd's account, individuality structure seems to have both these roles as well. It represents an integration of the functioning of a thing into an operational coherence transcending merely modal considerations, thus accounting for the totality and wholeness which characterize being a thing; and the precise nature of the thing-constituting functional integration (which is always a typical integration) determines what kind of thing we have. Individuality structure, like form, simultaneously makes for a thing, and the kind of thing it is; it is a cohering principle of unity as well as a principle of typicality. In both of these ways, it is the unchanging internal structure, the essential (typical) nature
of a thing.

Form is typical, containing no individuality; when conjoined with matter, it constitutes that matter a thing, but imparts no individual traits to it. Individuality structure is also typical, and does not specify the actual individuality of things. Further, both Aristotle and Dooyeweerd locate individuality in the correlate of respectively form and individuality structure (qua law). For Aristotle, however, the correlate is another component principle of a thing, viz. matter. In the case of individuality structure (qua law), the correlate is an actual whole thing, a subject; individuality belongs to the subjective (in the sense of subject to law). For Dooyeweerd, then, the actual thing is not a compound of law (typicality) and subject (individuality), but it is a subject existing in correlation with law, having both individual and typical dimensions.

These would seem to be the key points of comparison between Aristotle and Dooyeweerd. To substantiate and clarify the similarities and differences identified, however, we shall have to examine in some detail Dooyeweerd's understanding of structures of individuality. In doing so, we shall confine ourselves to that portion of the theory devoted to the structure of a "thing" in the narrow or proper sense, defined by Dooyeweerd as "a structural whole of a relatively permanent character which lacks subject-functions in the logical and post-logical aspects"—as such excluding events,
acts, societal relationships, and also man. This narrowing of our focus will allow us to move to a more intensive comparison with Aristotle on the crucial notion of "substance," as the category of thing so defined is comparable to Aristotle's understanding of "primary substance," with the exception that man is not included.²

Notes


All references will be either to the New Critique or to the third volume of: Herman Dooyeweerd, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1936). This being the case, as a matter of convenience and economy I will indicate the source of a quoted passage in parentheses immediately following the passage, rather than using footnotes for each quotation. This will be done according to the following convention. If the quoted passage is from the New Critique, I will denote the volume number in Roman numerals, followed by the page number in Arabic numerals; if the passage is from the Dutch predecessor, I will indicate this with the letters "WdW", followed by the page number, it being understood that the passage comes from the third volume.

²Man, in Dooyeweerd's view, is unique with respect to all other "things" in that he is not enclosed in a radical type. This relates to the religious center and unity of his existence, which transcends any temporal-modal qualification. Man, alone of all creatures, lacks a typical qualifying function. The reason is that human existence is not restricted to the temporal world, and does not find its ultimate internal destination in the latter. Every radical type, qualified by a typical leading function, implies an inner restriction and limitation of the internal temporal destination of the beings enclosed in it. But man is created after the image of God, as the lord of the 'earthly' temporal world" (III:88). Man alone has a religious concentration point, in which he transcends temporal enclosure.

Since a certain complication presents itself also with regard to things qualified by an object-function (viz. the matter of enkapsis), they also will not fall within our pur-
view; curiously enough, there is some question whether Aris­
totle considered such things (e.g. cultural objects) to
qualify as primary substances (see Metaphysics H, 1043b20-25).
We will, following the introductory section of Dooyeweerd's
discussion (III:1-103), be restricting our focus to macro­
wholes qualified by a subject-function, the so-called "natural
things" of "naive experience," again with the exception of
man.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

To begin to understand Dooyeweerd's theory of individuality structure, we shall have to take a cursory look at the broader philosophic view of reality this limited theory presupposes. Dooyeweerd's theory of things is not isolated from the latter, but indeed has a definite place in the larger scheme of things, being concerned with the "plastic horizon" of the "cosmic temporal order." Our first step, then, must be to indicate in main lines this wider philosophic context, Dooyeweerd's view as to the most general make up and structure of reality, a reality to which things belong.¹

On a most general level, Dooyeweerd distinguishes among all realities between the being of God and the meaning of creation. "Being is only to be ascribed to God, whereas creation has only meaning, the dependent mode of reality or existence" (I:73, fn.1). In this manner he wishes to give philosophical expression to the Christian belief in the creation of all things by the Almighty God, and to the consequent difference between Creator and creature.

... meaning is universally proper to all created things as their restless mode of existence. As meaning, reality points toward its Origin, the Creator, without Whom the creature sinks into nothingness.

... Only God's Being is not meaning, because He alone exists by and through Himself. (I:97; see also I:10-11)

In this way also Dooyeweerd wishes to undercut any possibility of a "being in itself," that is of substance, within the crea-
tion, an idea which Dooyeweerd considers incompatible with the confession of creation and the sovereignty of God (II:31). Only God exists in and through Himself, and so Being can properly only be ascribed to Him. Creatures do not exist in themselves, for as creatures they owe their existence to their Creator; that is, they exist only in the mode of meaning, "the dependent creaturely existence referring beyond and above itself, and in no way self-sufficient" (II:31).

The Being/meaning distinction appears to be a radical one, exhaustive of all reality: "Beyond [the horizon of meaning] there exists nothing except the Divine Being which is the Origin of all meaning" (III:69). All realities can be classed as either meaning, having existence by and through something outside itself, or as the Origin of meaning, existing by and through Himself. Although this distinction, yielding a basic twosome, essentially holds up, we shall see that it is not without ambiguity and further complication; the radical discontinuity it posits is not without a semblance of continuity.

It is with regard to the "horizon of meaning" that complications occur. "Meaning" as such, of course, is something of an abstraction; it designates a certain mode or manner of existence, viz. the dependent mode of existence of creaturely reality: "Meaning is the being of all that has been created" (I:4). And "creaturely reality," in turn, points to an immense diversity, which is not, however, without coherence.
Hence Dooyeweerd speaks of a diversity of meaning and a coherence of meaning, the latter always being a coherence of a diversity. "All diversity of meaning in temporal reality supposes a temporal coherence of meaning . . . " (I:79). Now in Dooyeweerd's view this coherence of the meaning-diversity points beyond itself to a (religious) root unity or central totality or fullness of meaning, a convergence or concentration of that coherent diversity in a radical unity of meaning, which conversely is expressed in that coherent diversity. "The coherence of all the modal aspects of our cosmos . . . points beyond its own limits toward a central totality, which in its turn is expressed in this coherence" (I:3-4); "this coherence is a coherence of meaning that refers to a totality" (I:4). Meaning-diversity supposes coherence, and the latter supposes the "deeper identity in a religious unity of root" (I:79) of that diversity, and must indeed be "the expression of a deeper identity" (I:79). The coherent diversity of meaning, which is (temporal) creaturely reality, then, involves qua meaning not only a Creator of meaning, but also a religious root of meaning; its dependent character includes dependence on a religious root.

Our temporal world, in its temporal diversity and coherence of meaning, is in the order of God's creation bound to the religious root of mankind. Apart from this root it has no meaning and so no reality. (I:100)

This root unity of meaning is distinct from the coherence of meaning; it is outside, "beyond and above" (II:31) that
coherence, pointed to by that coherence. It is "elevated above the modal diversity of meaning and is thus transcendent with respect to it" (I:16), "even in its coherence" (I:16).

"The immanent coherence among all special aspects of meaning of our cosmos lacks in itself the inner concentration point in which these latter meet in a radical unity" (I:15), so that the deeper totality of meaning "necessarily transcends the mutual coherence of all modal aspects of temporal reality" (I:4,fn.1). This discontinuity between the unity and coherence of meaning is accentuated by the coincidence of this distinction with another, viz. that which lies within the boundary of cosmic time, and that which lies outside that boundary, or more simply, the temporal and the supra-temporal.

"Cosmic time," then, is another factor complicating the original simplicity of the Being/meaning distinction. The cosmic order of time forms a boundary for creaturely reality; "as the limit to our 'earthly' temporal cosmos," it "determines the structure of reality in its diversity of meaning" (II:3).

"The entire empirical reality in its overrich diversity of structures is enclosed and determined by universal cosmic time" (I:29). The diversity of structures of reality is bound together by cosmic time into an overarching framework of coherence, in which all specific structures find their place; it is cosmic time which brings together the diversity of structures into a coherence. Cosmic time fits all meaning-diversity in a continuous coherence. "Its cosmic character
discloses itself precisely in the indissoluble inter-modal coherence of meaning into which it fits the modal aspects" (I:29). Modal and typical diversity occur only within the horizon of cosmic time, "the time which is the foundation of all the modal law-spheres, and which maintains them in their continuous meaning-coherence" (II:552). 3

The coherence of meaning-diversity of which we previously spoke, then, is bound to cosmic time; it is a temporal coherence, a coherence guaranteed by cosmic time. Coherent diversity of meaning, in short, coincides with temporal meaning. Such is the nature of creaturely reality within the limit of cosmic time; cosmic reality is a "universal and temporal coherence of meaning" (I:560), an "inter-modal coherence of meaning" (I:24).

The coincidence of meaning-coherence and temporality is crucial for the status of the root unity of meaning, for in transcending the coherence of meaning, the latter transcends cosmic time; the unity or fulness of meaning not only is above and beyond an immanent coherence of meaning, but also the bounds of the temporal. In pointing beyond itself toward a central unity, the coherence of meaning-diversity refers beyond the limit of time.

Not a single temporal structure of meaning exists in itself (an sich). That which makes it into meaning lies beyond the limit of time. Meaning is "ex origine" the convergence of all temporal aspects of existence into one super-temporal focus, and this focus, as we have seen, is the religious root of creation . . . (II:30)
The diversity of meaning found in time has its radical unity only beyond time, for not only does the coherence of all speciality of meaning lack an inner concentration point, but nowhere does "cosmic time in itself offer a concentration-point" (I:31). "This radical unity of the different modalities is impossible in time" (I:106); "the fulness of meaning, as totality and radical unity, is not actually given and cannot be actually given in time" (I:106; see I:552).

Despite this discontinuity between the coherence of meaning, which lies within time, and the unity of meaning, which lies outside time, there is also a sort of continuity between them; the unity of meaning is a concentration of the diversity of meaning, the latter's convergence in a focal identity. And conversely, the coherent diversity of meaning is an expression of the focal unity of meaning. Despite its standing outside of cosmic time, then, the root identity of meaning is seen as the unity of temporal diversity, and temporal diversity is seen as the expression of the deeper, supra-temporal focus. Cosmic time would seemingly disturb this close relationship, forming a breach between unity and diversity, but Dooyeweerd pulls cosmic time into this scheme of continuity, seeing it as the vehicle of expression of unity-totality of meaning into (modal) diversity of meaning.

As time cannot contain the religious fulness of meaning, it splits the latter into the diversity of the modal aspects. (II:4)

The modal diversity of meaning exists only in the coherence
of all modal aspects, but it is the *expression* of a
totality of signification which through the medium of
time is broken up into a modal diversity of aspects. (I:16)

In time, meaning is broken into an *incalculable*
diversity, which can come to a radical unity only in the
religious centre of human existence. (I:31)

Dooyeweerd graphically illustrates this scheme by using the
figure of the refraction of light through a prism into a
diversity of colors.

The unrefracted light is the time-transcending totality
of meaning of our cosmos . . .

The prism that achieves the refraction of colour is
*cosmic time*, through which the religious fulness of mean­
ing is broken up into its temporal modal aspects of mean­
ing. . . .

But under the boundary line of time this fulness of
meaning . . . separates, like the sunlight through the
prism, into a rich variation of modal aspects of meaning. (I:102)

Unity and diversity remain distinct as supra-temporal
and temporal, but they are nonetheless continuous; diversity
of meaning is unity of meaning as it appears under the boun­
dary line of cosmic time, so that each modal aspect "may be
called a functional modality of the religious fulness of
meaning," since it is "indeed nothing but a modal splitting
up of the totality of meaning, in *time*"(II:7) and so "in its
modal structure reflects the fulness of meaning in its own
modality" (I:102). Diversity is unity become split up, re­
fracted; and unity of meaning is diversity of meaning as the
latter appears above the limit of cosmic time, converged into
a single focus. Cosmic time, then, makes for both the dis­
continuity of unity and diversity of meaning, and for their
continuity.
Up until now we have been looking at the root unity of meaning largely from the point of view of the coherent diversity of meaning, of which it is the unity; that coherent diversity refers or points beyond itself to its religious root, where that coherent diversity comes together into a radical concentration of meaning, a "unity above all multiplicity" (I:17). But the notion of expression, and that of the splitting up of the totality of meaning in time, indicate the legitimacy of the converse point of view, starting with the supra-temporal root unity as prior and looking toward the meaning-coherence, which is its temporal expression. Both are equally correct, for each is the converse of the other; the unity of meaning is expressed in a coherence of meaning, the coherence of meaning refers beyond itself toward its convergence in a radical unity. These alternative directions correspond to the "referring" and "expressing" characters Dooyeweerd adduces as "proper to our entire created cosmos" (I:4) and considers as equally central to the latter's meaning-character; it is the "universal character of referring and expressing" which "stamps created reality as meaning, in accordance with its dependent non-self-sufficient nature" (I:4). The coherence of meaning refers to its religious root, which refers to the Origin of meaning; but also, the Origin of meaning has expressed His image in the religious root of existence, which is expressed temporally in a modal coherence of meaning. "Meaning," for Dooyeweerd, involves both.\(^5\)
With this last we are getting a bit ahead of ourselves, however, as we have not yet examined the relationship of the religious root of meaning to the Origin of meaning. From the point of view of referring, the totality or unity of meaning is itself still creaturely meaning; it "cannot exist by itself, but supposes an ἀρχή, an origin which creates meaning" (I:9).

The transcendent totality of meaning of our cosmos exists only in the religious relation of dependence upon the absolute Being of God. . . . it remains in the ex-sistential mode of meaning which points beyond itself and is not sufficient to itself. (I:99-100)

The unrefracted light is the time-transcending totality of meaning of our cosmos . . . . As this light has its origin in the source of light, so the totality of meaning of our cosmos has its origin in its Ἀρχή through whom and to whom it has been created. (I:102; see also I:8-9, II:30)

In this regard the root of meaning is similar to the coherence of meaning; both are creaturely, dependent on an Origin, and hence discontinuous from that Origin. This similarity does not erase their distinctness, however. The totality of meaning remains supra-temporal, and the reference of the coherence of meaning to the Origin is only via reference to a totality of meaning. The coherence of meaning refers immediately toward a central totality, whose own self-insufficiency in turn points beyond itself to the Origin.

The fulness of meaning is in its own mediate way the ground of meaning. "The religious fulness of meaning (in no way self-sufficient, but wholly dependent) is the meaning-ground of all created existence" (II:25); it is "the creaturely Ground of the meaning of all temporal reality" (II:32), apart
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from which the temporal cosmos has no existence (see I:523).

The coherence of meaning comes to a tentative rest in the fulness of meaning, but the latter's own restlessness points toward the Origin, where meaning has its ultimate rest.

This intermediary position of the totality of meaning is evident also when its expressing character is examined. We have already seen that the coherent diversity of meaning is the temporal expression of the supra-temporal totality of meaning. It would also seem, however, though it is not entirely clear, that the religious totality of meaning of the creation is in itself an expression of the image of God, a creaturely image of the Divine fulness of Being.

God revealed Himself at the creation of the cosmos in the religious root and the temporal meaning-coherence of the world. He created man after His own image. He gave expression to His Divine fulness of Being in the whole of His creation, as a totality of meaning. (II:307)

The fulness of meaning is implied in the religious image of God, expressing itself in the root of our cosmos and in the splitting up of that root in time. (II:30)

In the revelation that God created man according to His image, He discloses man to himself, in the religious radical unity of his created existence, and in the religious solidarity of mankind, in which was integrally concentrated the entire meaning of the temporal cosmos.

The integral Origin of all things according to God's plan of creation has its created image in the heart of man participating in the religious community of mankind. The latter is the integral and radical unity of all the temporal functions and structures of reality, which ought to be directed in the human spirit toward the Absolute Origin . . . (I:174)

The radical unity of all the different modalities in which they coalesce . . . is the concentration-point of meaning in the imago Dei, which is nothing in itself, but rather the reflection of the Divine Being in the central
human sphere of creaturely meaning. (III:69; see also I:4, 55; II:335)

These are difficult passages, but they seem to suggest that the religious community of mankind, which is the radical unity of the temporal diversity of meaning, is the created image or reflection of the Origin of meaning, the creaturely expression of the Divine fulness of Being. In this manner "He gave expression to His Divine fulness of Being in the whole of His creation," for that religious image of God expressed in the root of creation further expresses itself temporally in the coherent diversity of meaning. Man, "whose ego expresses itself in the coherence of all its temporal modal functions, was himself created by God as the expression of His image" (I:4), and the ego "is centrally bound with other egos in a religious community" (I:60), in which is "concentrated the total meaning of the temporal cosmos"(I:59)--and whose fulness of meaning, which time can not contain (see II:4), is expressed temporally in a coherent diversity of meaning. In this way it would seem that God and the coherent diversity of meaning are linked, via the fulness of meaning, in a scheme of continuous expression; despite the divide between Being and meaning, they are also continuous.

Just as we found discontinuity and continuity between the fulness of meaning and the coherence of meaning, so now we have found the same between the Origin of meaning and the fulness of meaning (and via the latter, between Origin and coherence). Discontinuity comes to the fore when the refer-
ring character of meaning is the focus, continuity with the expressing character, but in Dooyeweerd's view each implies the other as its converse side; they are always conjoined. Each, in Dooyeweerd's view, points up the dependent, non-self-sufficient character of created reality. At any rate, it should be clear that the Origin of meaning, the fulness of meaning, and the coherence of meaning form three distinct niveaus, each with its own character, but nonetheless woven together with the others. Even though the fulness of meaning is itself also meaning, and in that regard stands together with the coherence of meaning as distinct from the Origin, it has its own intermediate position between the Origin and the coherence of meaning. Hence it can also be said that in one regard the Origin and fulness of meaning stand together as distinct from the coherence of meaning, in that they stand on the same side of the boundary line of cosmic time. At this stage, then, it seems more accurate to speak of a threesome than a twosome in characterizing Dooyeweerd's model of the cosmos. We could perhaps diagram it as follows:
With this we have outlined the main levels in Dooyeweerd's picture of the cosmos. There remains, however, one further complication. Dooyeweerd at times suggests that there is an additional factor to be placed in the picture, one which stands outside of the existing diagram—viz. the Divine Law. This occurs when Dooyeweerd refers to the law as "the universal boundary (which cannot be transgressed) between the Being of God and the meaning of His creation" (I:99), the "absolute boundary between God and His creation" (I:507).

The term "boundary" merely intends to indicate an essential distinction between God and the creature with respect to their relation to the lex. As sovereign Origin, God is not subjected to the law. On the contrary this subjectness is the very characteristic of all that which has been created, the existence of which is limited and determined by the law. . . . But if every creature is under the law, then the limit which the latter sets for the creature's existence can never be transgressed. (I:99, fn.1)

Earlier we noticed the fundamental distinction Dooyeweerd makes between Being and meaning, a distinction motivated by the Christian confession of the creation of the world. Now we see that same distinction amplified somewhat, to give expression to the "Sovereignty of God, the Creator, over everything created" (I:99), from which sovereignty issues the law (I:108). The creation is subject to law, law "which originates in the Creator's holy will" (I:99); God, being the giver of the law, is not subjected to it. The totality of meaning of the creation, too, shares the creaturely state of being subjected to law; it, along with the whole temporal cosmos, lies under the
law. There is now, then, not only Being and meaning, but also law, to which meaning is subject, and over which God is sovereign. It would appear from this that a much deeper going threesome than indicated earlier by us would be God/law/creation or God/law/meaning; both coherence of meaning and totality of meaning line up under meaning, for both share the characteristic of being subjected to law. Further examination will reveal, however, that this new distinction as put will not hold up, that it is overstated.

In our previous discussions we saw that in Dooyeweerd's view meaning is the mode of being of creaturely reality, its manner of existence; and by this was meant, in a general way, the dependent, non-self-sufficient character of such reality, its existence by and through something outside that existence. In the formulation of the preceding paragraph Dooyeweerd has now tied this matter of meaning, dependent mode of existence, to being under the boundary of the law; law is said to be the boundary between Being and meaning, meaning being that which falls under the law. The distinction law properly establishes is between that which is, and that which is not, subject to the law; so now Dooyeweerd says that "this subject edness is the very characteristic of all that which has been created." In short, a shift has occurred in the designation of meaning, from dependent mode of existence to something more specific, viz. subject edness to law, or existence under the law; meaning in this formulation is identified with subject ion to law, the
dependent mode of existence it names taking the more specific form of a subjectedness to law. Hence, "meaning" is nothing but the creaturely mode of being under the law, consisting exclusively in a religious relation of dependence on God" (II:31).

"Being subjected to law" is in Dooyeweerd's view what being a subject is all about; the original meaning of the subject is "being subjected to a law which does not originate from this subject itself" (I:110), a law without whose "determination and limitation, the subject would sink away into chaos" (I:518). Subjectedness, then, being a subject, certainly is a matter of dependence. This is something of a one-sided picture, however, for although it is true that there is no subject without a law to which it is subject, a law which is other than that subject and determines and limits that subject, it is also and equally true that "there is no law without a subject" (I:96) for which it is a law; that is to say, "the cosmic 'nomos' has meaning only in indissoluble correlation with the subject-side of the cosmos" (I:96), for law is "limitation of a subject" (I:95). The full picture is that "law and subject are mutually irreducible," and "only possible in their indissoluble correlation" (II:8); both, further, have their origin in "God's holy sovereign will. Our cosmos is equally the creation of God with respect to its law-and subject-side" (I:507).

The question is, given the above, whether meaning, dependent relation on God, may be limited to, or identified
with, being a subject, as the formulation of law as boundary between meaning and being would have it—and the answer is no. Dooyeweerd readily states that the law, too, "has meaning-character," being "nothing apart from the bond with its Origin" (I:163); moreover, laws hold "only in the cosmic coherence of meaning and in dependence on the religious root-unity of the divine law" (I:160). The law, just as subjectivity, has an "origin, radical religious unity and temporal diversity" (I:522), "a religious fulness and temporal diversity of meaning" (I:518); just as subjective meaning, the divine law for the cosmos can be seen "in its modal diversity, inter-modal coherence and fulness of meaning" (I:160), "in its central religious unity and its temporal diversity" (I:99). "The basic relation among totality, diversity and coherence of meaning" (I:96) holds for both law-side and subject-side of reality. The law, then, fits into the same threefold pattern (Origin/fulness/coherence) that we found applied to meaning, precisely because it too is meaning. Its meaning-character can clearly not be a "subjectedness to law" or a "being under the law," however, for it is law. "Subjectedness to law" is the nature of subjects, but may not be equated with meaning.

Because law and subject exist only in indissoluble correlation, Dooyeweerd is want to speak of "the origin and totality of meaning of this cosmic order and its correlative subject" and the "coherence of the different aspects of meaning in which the divine order and its subject disclose them-
selves" (I:94), or of "the origin of the Law and of individual subjectivity, according to their religious unity and temporal diversity in the coherence of meaning" (I:507), or again, of the "Axxx of the totality and the modal diversity of meaning of our cosmos with respect to the cosmonomic side and its correlate, the subject-side" (I:101). It is law and subject, in correlation, which have an Origin, totality and temporal coherence of meaning; it is they which are, both of them, meaning, and they are so only in correlation. Each, in its meaning-character, implies the other. What we had previously referred to simply as coherent diversity of meaning and fullness of meaning, then, has each of them both a law-side and a subject-side, or, which is to say the same thing, each consists in a correlation of law and subject. The coherence of meaning and fullness of meaning is a coherence and fullness of meaning of law and subject. Law and subject are the correlate givens, and it is to them, and only to them, that the character of meaning applies; it is law and subject which have the manner of existence designated "meaning."

If such is the case, then law cannot properly be said to be the boundary between Being and meaning, for it itself is also meaning; it can not simultaneously fall under the boundary, and be the boundary, which would amount to law being subject to ("under") itself. The law is, however, the boundary between God and subject, which on one occasion is how Dooyeweerd formulates the matter: "the lex is recognized as
originating from God's holy creative sovereignty, and as the absolute boundary between the Being of the \( \text{\text©} \) and the meaning of everything created as 'subject,' subjected to a law" (I:108). Law and subject are both of them meaning, but they remain law and subject.\(^9\)

Law and subject, then, follow the contours of our previous diagram; they are themselves meaning, having a temporal coherence and a religious fulness or unity of meaning, and being dependent on a common Origin. As such, they are not at all foreign to our previously constructed picture of the cosmos, but fit right in. Laws and subjects represent the diversity of meaning, which exists only in a coherence of meaning, having a religious root and Origin; the diversity of meaning is a diversity of laws and subjects, and likewise for the coherence and root of meaning. What we have been calling the "fulness of meaning" and the "coherence of meaning" must simply be understood as having both a law-side and a subject-side, and the scheme of continuity/discontinuity accordingly applying to both. Hence we read: "under the boundary line of time this fulness of meaning with reference to its cosmonomic-side as to its subject-side separates, like the sunlight through the prism, into a rich variation of modal aspects of meaning" (I:102; see also I:60); through the cosmic order of time "as refractinal order the law-side and the subject-side of the law-sphere are integrated into a functional modality of the religious of meaning" (I:8).\(^{10}\)
The triad of Origin/fulness of meaning/coherence of meaning remains, in short, the basic shape of the cosmos, in Dooyeweerd's view exhaustive of all realities, also of law and subject. But since law and subject are mutually irreducible, and cut across and exhaust both the coherence of meaning and the fulness of meaning, it is possible to view the whole schema from this vantage point as well, which yields the threesome of God/law/subject, a triad which is also exhaustive of all realities. Both of these threesomes, moreover, can be construed as variants of the Being/meaning duo; law and subject are meaning, and meaning always comes as coherence and fulness. It may be that when Dooyeweerd is epistemologically busy, the coherence/fulness distinction is predominant, whereas when he is ontologically-cosmologically busy, the law/subject distinction is predominant—but this takes us somewhat far afield, and it would be beyond our scope to pursue it.

This, then, is the cosmic backdrop to Dooyeweerd's theory of things; it is in this universe, whose basic lines we have been busy sketching, that things are found. But where precisely in that universe are "things" (in the strict sense) found? Answering this question will allow us to pull into our more specific focus, to move from this broad picture of the universe in general to things in particular. Provisionally it can be said that "things" are to be found in the temporal coherence of meaning-diversity, on the
subject-side of the latter. Things are creatures, existing in the dependent mode of meaning—bound to a temporal coherence, dependent on a religious root and a Divine Origin.

"All individual things exist only in a structure of meaning" (II:31); they can not be understood "otherwise than in their meaning, that is in their relative mode of reality which points to their temporal coherence, to a totality in the root, and to the Origin of all relative things" (I:97). They are, moreover, subjects; their meaning is subjective meaning.

"All creatures are by nature subject to the law" (I:507); their existence is limited and determined by a law which does not originate from the subject itself. "Creaturely subjective individuality cannot determine and limit itself, but is a priori determined and limited by the Divine order" (II:593).

Although things have a religious root lying beyond the boundary of cosmic time, they do not themselves actually participate in that root; only "man, in his full selfhood, transcends the temporal 'earthly' cosmos in all its aspects, and partakes in the transcendent root of this cosmos" (II:593). This is the case because unlike man, things are "perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood" (III:65) and are "entirely lost in time" (I:32); they have not "a central and radical unity, which as such transcends all temporal aspects" (I:51), a unity, that is, "elevated above the modal diversity of meaning" and not coalescing with the mutual coherence of the latter (I:16), but serving as its "central point of reference"
(I:5)—and which is ipso facto supra-temporal, above and beyond the temporal coherence of meaning. Things, then, have not an "eternal destination" (III:783), but are enclosed within cosmic time; they are thoroughly temporal, bound to and fitted in the coherence of meaning-diversity.

This enclosure of things within the bounds of temporality has certain important implications for our study. Prime among these is that the cluster of problems surrounding the temporal/supra-temporal distinction will not bear directly on things, except insofar as the nature of temporality is in question. Within the bounds of Dooyeweerd's theory, it can be said that a unity such as man has, above and beyond all modal diversity and the coherence of the latter, is excluded for things; unity such as things have will needs be within the coherence of modal diversity which is the realm of temporality, especially so since the plastic horizon of the cosmic temporal order is founded in the modal horizon. Accordingly the law in its central religious sense will not figure for things; it is the law in its temporal diversity, fitted by the temporal order of succession or simultaneity in a coherence (see 10), which determines and limits them in their meaning. The cosmic temporal order and the law coincide for things. We will be, in sum, in all respects within the horizon of cosmic time.

And, as we have indicated, we will be within the "plastic dimension" of the latter. Cosmic time, or the "cosmic temporal horizon," embraces both a modal dimension and the
plastic dimension of the structures of individuality, embraces, that is, both "the modal and typical refraction of meaning" (II:560). Now that we have narrowed our focus to the embracive context of cosmic time, we must move further to just its plastic dimension, and understand the latter's place within cosmic time as plastic dimension—its nature as a dimension of cosmic time, which it shares with the modal dimension, as well as its uniqueness as the plastic dimension. A cursory view must suffice here, however; it can be expected that any latent problems will surface within the limits of the plastic horizon, so their treatment will be put off until we intensively examine the things within that horizon.

The temporal horizon immediately founds the modal horizon, binding the modal aspects of meaning into an order of before and after, into a temporal coherence; these aspects in their functional structure are the determining conditions of all modal individuality of meaning within the law-spheres (see II:553; II:423-424).

The cosmological a priori character of the modal aspects, in contradistinction to all modal individuality of meaning, is manifest in its structural stability in contrast with all that is variable in temporal reality. As these aspects, in their temporal meaning-coherence, constitute the functional structure of our cosmos, they cannot be transitory in time. (II:553-554)

Both the temporal horizon and its modal dimension "form the perspective in which arises the horizon of the structures of individuality" (III:77). As in the modal horizon, we have here the correlation of constant laws and variable factual
individuality, but now of typical laws and the factual individuality of the things determined by these laws (see II:557; I:83).

We are here confronted with structural types of laws, which, just as the structural modi of laws, are founded in the cosmic temporal order. As such they are not changeable in time, since they determine the inner nature of perishable factual things, events and societal relationships functioning within their transcendental cadre. . . .

. . . The modal dimension encompassed by the cosmic temporal horizon is the same for all things. But the plastic horizon of structural individuality is varied according to types which are different for each of the various groups of things, and in which things in turn appear, change their forms, or are changed in form, and vanish. (II:557-558)

The correlation of constant laws and variable subjective individuality, evident in both modal and plastic dimensions, takes shape as follows. The modal and typical structures belonging to the law-side of cosmic time are "principles of temporal potentiality or possibility" (I:105), determining the "margin or latitude of possibilities" (I:105) of the factual subject-side; they form a structural frame within which certain possibilities open up. The factual subject-side retains a certain "free scope" (II:238, 551) or "full latitude" (I:187), and hence "is always connected with individuality" (I:105; see I:83, 152; II:418), but only "subject to the necessary determinations and limitations" imposed by the structural laws (I:187).

Both "the modal structures of the various aspects as well as the typical totality-structures of individuality are grounded in the order of cosmic time" (I:29) and hence can
not be changeable or transitory in time; they belong to the law-side of cosmic time, and as such have themselves no real duration (III:79). "Time-order," however, "is necessarily related to factual time-duration" (I:24), so as specific structures of cosmic time, modal structures and typical structures are "necessarily related to the factual duration of transitory beings, events, processes, acts, social relationships, and so on" (I:29). This relationship to factual duration is a matter of the realization or actualization of the structures of time in factual things, events, social relationships, in that which does have duration and is transitory in time—in, that is, the factual (subjective) structures of the plastic dimension.

... all structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time. As structural laws they are founded in cosmic time-order and are principles of temporal potentiality or possibility. In their realization in individual things or events they have time-duration and actuality as transitory factual structures. (I:105)

Since the modal and typical structures belong to the cosmic temporal order, they are not themselves subject to genesis and change (III:94), but are of a structural a priori determining character. That is, they are "in no way dependent upon the genesis of individuals in which they are realized," but rather "belong to the plastic dimension of the temporal world-order" (III:106). The coming-to-be of individual transitory things, however, is dependent on the modal and typical structures, for it is the latter which individual things but realize. Where the realization of the cosmic
structures is subject to the process of genesis (III:94-95), the structures themselves can not be; they can not be changeable in time, for they determine the inner nature of the perishable things functioning within their transcendental cadre (II:557). The inner nature of things can not be dependent on variable historical conditions, for as soon as a type of thing is realized on the factual subject-side, it is bound to its structural principle (III:170).

This relationship of the cosmic structures to factual duration, which corresponds to the law- and subject-sides of cosmic time, is what Dooyeweerd elsewhere refers to as "the great process of cosmic-temporal becoming" presupposing "the Divine creation of all things after their proper inner nature" (III:95; see II:261-262). The process of becoming is a successive genetic realization of what has been created in principle on the law-side of cosmic time (in its modal and typical structures), so that the inner nature of every thing and function that comes to be is a priori determined by the cosmic temporal order. The latter is the structural frame in which alone the process of becoming is possible (III:106). In this way "the duration remains constantly subjected to the order" of cosmic time (I:28).

All this can be said about the modal and typical dimensions as dimensions of the cosmic temporal order. Certain important relationships they sustain with each other as unique dimensions of cosmic time should also be indicated.
The modal structures, too, then, are realized on the subject-side; further, as we noted, they "are only realized in [factual (realized) plastic structures], which in principle function in all the modal spheres of our temporal horizon" (III:78)—which is simply to say that factual plastic structures actually function in the modal aspects, and only in that actual functioning in the aspects do modal aspects become "real" on the subject-side, show up factually.15

This is the source of the "modal individuality of meaning" mentioned in initially introducing the modal horizon; modal individuality, then, presupposes the factual plastic structures in which modal aspects are alone realized. This means, however, that modal individuality of meaning will always bear a certain typical character, relating to the typical structure of which it is a function, for these structures "express themselves within each of their modal aspects by typicalizing the general modal relations and functions" (I:553; see I:41).

That is to say, within a given modal aspect, one can always perceive typical structural differences "which are only to be understood in terms of the structures of individuality of temporal reality" (I:553). This allows us to speak of modal types of individuality, which, it must be remembered, derive from the factual plastic structures functioning within the modal aspects. Typical structures of individuality express themselves in their functions within modal aspects, showing a certain modal individuality within those aspects.
and thereby giving the modal meaning various types of "content" (III:55). Since these factual structures are themselves realizations of law-side plastic structures, however, so that they simultaneously realize the modal and typical structures (III:78-79), the modal types can be seen as present in principle in the typical (law) structures (see III:77: the structural principle "individualizes" the modal functions).

Dooyeweerd expresses this whole matter also by saying that the modal structures are "individualized by" (II:414), or show an "individualization within" (II:417) typical structures of individuality, or conversely, that a structure of individuality "individualizes the modal functions" (III:76),16 intending to embrace thereby both modal individuality (in the sense of a-typicality) and modal typicality. Especially in the case of the latter, this terminology would seem to be inappropriate—even moreso since Dooyeweerd is very clear that individuality is located on the subject-side (see I:83, 105; II:418), while here we see modal types, determined in principle by plastic law structures, "individualizing" the the modal meaning of an aspect. What seems to be meant in saying that modal types of individuality individualize the general modal meaning of an aspect (II:424), however, is not that they are themselves actually individual in character—so that individuality would have its source on the law-side—but only that those modal types give the general modal meaning a "material diversity of 'content'" (II:423). This individual-
ization, however,

... does not affect the fundamental functional structure of the modal aspect. This structure is determined by the cosmic temporal order, and is the very condition of all modal individualization. . . .

A modal aspect thus individualizes itself only within its structure, which is fitted into the inter-modal meaning-coherence of cosmic time. (II: 423-424)

Modal aspects of meaning, then, are both realized and individualized in the plastic horizon of cosmic time, but the modal horizon is nonetheless foundational to the plastic horizon: "the modal structures lie at the foundation of the structures of individuality" (II: 414). The general temporal order of modal aspects is maintained in every structure of individuality which functions in those aspects. "The latter belongs to a different dimension of our experiential horizon, which is not reducible to that of the modal spheres," but which nonetheless "pre-supposes the general order of modalities" (III: 59).

This is so because structures of individuality "embrace all modal aspects without exception and group them together in different typical ways within individual totalities" (I: 553; see I: 41); they form a "typical unity or order in the diversity of modal aspects of an individual whole" (III: 96), a "typical groupage of irreducible aspects within a structural unity of order" (III: 80). It is precisely in this "internal typical groupage of the modal aspects within structural totalities" that the cosmic temporal order (according to its plastic dimension) expresses itself (III: 78), and hence that the foundation in the modal horizon is revealed. For in this
way it becomes evident that "the internal structure of a thing pre-supposes a functional structure of its modal aspects and an inter-functional coherence of the latter" (III:59), without being reducible to the latter.

Such are the contours of the plastic horizon, its own character within the temporal horizon and its character qua dimension of cosmic time, as well as its relationship with the modal horizon. Clearly this location of things, as belonging to the plastic dimension of cosmic time, also has important implications. That the unity of things can only be a temporal unity within a coherent modal diversity, or a "typical modal groupage," is reinforced (see III:77). We have seen that things are determined by constant typical laws, laws which are not the same for all things, as are modal laws, but which are varied according to types, differing for each of the various groups of things. These typical laws themselves belong to the law-side of cosmic time, and have no real duration, but they are realized in individual things which do have duration; the genesis of individual things presupposes constant typical laws which determine the inner nature of those things, but those laws are not themselves dependent on the genesis of the individuals in which they are realized.

With this we have finished our task of locating things in Dooyeweerd's model of the universe; we have set the context in which things are found, both the broad and more immediate context. Things are to be found only within the
horizon of cosmic time, which horizon is related to a trans­
scendent religious root and a Divine Origin. Within that
horizon, things belong to the plastic dimension, presupposing
the modal dimension. We have seen in a general way what this
location means for things. We are prepared, then, to move on
to a more intensive examination of things.

Notes

1 In the light of John Kraay's thesis concerning succes­sive conceptions in Dooyeweerd's thought, this statement of
intention must be qualified somewhat. We will be limiting
ourselves to Dooyeweerd's thought as present in the New
Critique. Reference will be made to De Wijzegeerte der
Wetsidee only to clarify or amplify the New Critique.

2 "Reality," "existence," or "being" do not in this in­
stance constitute a higher genus of which there are two species,
viz. Divine "reality" and creaturely "reality," "existence" in
the mode of meaning and in the mode of being. "A true con­
cept of being is impossible. The word being has no unity of
meaning. When, in our Introduction, we called meaning the
being of all that has been created, the word 'being' designed
only 'essence,' which does not transcend the boundaries of
meaning" (I:73,fn.1). The Being of God and the meaning of
creation cannot be embraced in a concept (II:58); there is no
"analogy of being," "which pretends to embrace both God and
His creatures" (III:67).

3 The emphasis on modal diversity, and cosmic time fit­
ting modal aspects into an inter-modal coherence of meaning,
relates, as we shall see, to the foundation of the plastic
horizon of structural individuality in the modal horizon;
within the embrace of cosmic time, the modal structures form
the next level of structural a priori (see II:552-553). "The
temporal horizon encompasses and determines also the plastic
horizon of the structures of individuality" (II:560), however.

4 This latter is a reference to the "analogical moments"
within a modal aspect, whereby each aspect internally refers
to all the others (I:3) and expresses the temporal order of
aspects and their inter-modal coherence within its own struc­
ture. In this way it reflects in its own temporal way the
religious fulness of meaning, which can not be contained in
time. "Each of the law-spheres is a temporal, modal refraction of the religious fulness of meaning. And as such every aspect expresses the whole of the temporal coherence of meaning in its own modal structure. If this is so, the temporal order of succession of the law-spheres must be expressed in this structure" (II:74; see I:176,507).

The referring and expressing character mentioned belongs also to the diversity of meaning with respect to the coherence and unity of meaning. Since our intent right now is to sketch Dooyeweerd's general model of the universe, we are dealing primarily with the ontic levels he recognizes, viz. coherence, fulness, and Origin, and their relationships with respect to each other. The referring and expressing character is found also within the level of coherence of meaning, however, in the meaning-diversity which is bound into a coherence; coherence of meaning, after all, is coherence of diversity, it is meaning-diversity which is maintained in a coherence by cosmic time. Hence we see that every modal aspect, in its analogical moments, "refers within and beyond itself to all the others" (I:3) and gives expression to the coherence of all the aspects (I:3). In this way each aspect is a reflection of the fulness of meaning (I:102; see 4).

Meaning is the mode of being of creaturely reality, and "creaturely reality" refers in the first instance to the immense diversity of creatures. Hence the "universal referring and expressing character, which is proper to our entire created cosmos," as that which "stamps created reality as meaning" (I:4), belongs in the first instance to creational diversity. It is this "created reality" which has a root (I:4). This will become significant when we turn our attention to things proper, which are found only within the realm of coherent diversity.

We have focused on the structural intermediacy of the unity-fulness of meaning, its necessary place in the whole scheme as the concentrated unity of meaning-diversity, expressing itself in meaning-diversity. This intermediate position comes through in another way, however, and that is in the religious character of the unity-fulness; it is a religious unity, a religious fulness, a religious root. By this is meant that the temporal diversity of meaning concentrated in that unity, is in that concentric unity focused upon, directed towards the (true or pretended) origin of that temporal diversity; temporal meaning-diversity is, in the human selfhood participating in the religious community of mankind, directed toward service of a true or pretended origin. Hence religion is the "connection between the meaning of creation and the Being of the 'Arawn" (I:104); "the totality or fulness of meaning is the necessary transcendent centre where, in their mutual coherence, all modal aspects converge into
the unity of direction towards the Origin, towards the Ἀρχή of all meaning" (I:16).

It is in the root unity of the temporal cosmos, then, that religious direction enters the picture. The temporal cosmos is a coherent diversity of structures, and in the religious root that coherent diversity is directed toward or away from the Origin of all things. In this connection Dooyeweerd talks about the fall and redemption of man, and in man, of the whole temporal cosmos; of an apostasy in the root, and its temporal refraction, and the renewal of the root (in Christ and His regenerate body).

In a structural sense, this renewed root is the only creaturely ground of the temporal meaning of the creation, that in which meaning has its concentric unity and of which meaning is a temporal expression, itself referring to and expressive of the Being of God; "the framework of the temporal refraction of meaning remains intact" (II:33), in spite of the falling away of man from his true religious root. The apostasy in the root and its temporal refraction remain parasitic upon the creation and its true root; they do not wrest meaning from its dependence on that root, and via that root, on God (the true Origin), so that meaning would become something in itself, but rather they religiously direct that meaning away from God. In the directional sense this means, however, that the whole temporal cosmos in its renewed religious root is only in principle directed again toward God; its re-direction remains an imperative which must be actually worked out in temporal life. The religious community of mankind "is the integral and radical unity of all the temporal functions and structures of reality, which ought to be directed in the human spirit toward the Absolute Origin, in the personal commitment of love and service of God and one's neighbour" (I:174).

Involved here, too, is the distinction between law-side and subject-side, a distinction which will be presently examined; the antithesis in religious root occurs only on its subject-side, and does not extend to the law-side of the religious root or its temporal refraction into a diversity of law-structures.

A problem deserving of separate attention is in how far this threefold setup is determined by the exigencies of theoretical thought— as set forth in Dooyeweerd's "transcendental criticism of theoretical thought"— and especially by Dooyeweerd's conception of what is required to solve the central problem of theoretical (inter-modal) synthesis; in how far, that is, Dooyeweerd's picture of the cosmos is determined by epistemological criteria.

In Dooyeweerd's view theoretical synthesis between the logical and non-logical aspects opposed in the gegenstandsrelation requires a starting-point above and beyond the poles of the relation (I:45; II:473).
If it be objected that meaning is supposed to be the mode of being of creaturely reality, two things may be said in reply. On the one hand, this objection does not limit meaning to creaturely reality; meaning may also be the mode of being of other reality (viz. law) as well as being that of creaturely, i.e. subjective, reality. On the other, since the lex also "originates in the Creator's holy will" (I:99), since the "cosmos is equally the creation of God with respect to its law- and subject-side" (I:507), prima facie the law, too, is creaturely reality, or at least is included in, or is a side of, the creation. If meaning in its fundamental sense is nothing but dependence on an Origin, and it is the mode of existence of created things, then the law, too, is a "created thing."

Whether or not law can be properly understood to be the boundary between God and the creation or the cosmos depends on the extension of the latter. If "cosmos" includes law and subject, as in "our cosmos is equally the creation of God with respect to its law- and subject-side" (I:507), then it is strictly speaking improper to go on to say, as Dooyeweerd does in this passage, that the law is the boundary between God and His creation—it is only the boundary between God and the subject-side of the cosmos, or of the creation. The law-side in this case is "equally the creation of God."

What is a side of the cosmos can not be the boundary between God and the whole of that cosmos, but only its other side. (It is significant to note, however, that the law viewed as included in or a side of "the cosmos" is still a boundary. "Cosmos" is simply defined to include, or better, to consist in, both the boundary and that which lies under it—which is quite meaningful since they exist only in correlation and are equally dependent on God. The boundary and that which lies under it remain, however, irreducible.)

If, however, "cosmos" or "creation" is understood as the totality of subjectivity, so that "subjectedness is the very characteristic of all that which has been created" (I:99), then the law is the boundary between the cosmos and God. Since subjectivity is such only in relationship to law—it is that which is subjected to, determined and limited by, law—so that its very reality can not be understood except with reference to law, it becomes meaningful in this case to speak again of the law as a "side" of that creation's reality.

Law and subject are mutually irreducible, but since they exist only in correlation, and both originate from "God's holy sovereign creative will" (I:507), it seems possible to go either way on the matter—which is what Dooyeweerd does. This is probably the case because "law" and "subject" are correlative philosophical terms with carefully defined meanings, whereas "cosmos," and certainly "creation," are primarily confessional terms, and have no such built-in correlative
In this connection it could be noted that a similar ambiguity exists with regard to (temporal) coherence of meaning and (supra-temporal) fulness of meaning. Often "cosmos" or "creation" refers only to the temporal coherence (e.g. III:632), whose root transcends that "cosmos"; meaning is said to be the mode of being of creaturely reality, which reality has a religious root (I:4)—also suggesting that creaturely reality coincides with the temporal coherence. At other times (e.g. I:507), however, both root and coherence are seen as belonging to "the cosmos," their respective structural horizons both belonging to the "Divine order of the creation" (II:594; see II:552); further, the human ego is said to be "creaturely" (II:552), and the fulness of meaning is more than once said to be "created" (e.g. I:102). Hence we have a situation much the same as with law and subject; coherence and fulness are quite distinct, but are nonetheless complementary and have a common origin. So to what should "cosmos" refer? Again, "coherence of meaning" and "fulness of meaning" are technical philosophical terms, with a well-defined specificity; "cosmos" is not such a term, and has no real specificity.

It should be mentioned that cosmic time, too, has a law- and a subject-side. Its law-side is the temporal order of succession or simultaneity, according to which the diversity of law-structures are fit into a coherence, and in which they are hence grounded; the cosmic time-order is the temporal order in the continuous coherence of the diversity of laws. The subject-side of cosmic time is factual duration, the continuing existence of real subjects in actual subjection to the order of coherence in the diversity of laws, so that the "duration remains constantly subjected to the order" (I:28). "Only this indissoluble correlation of order and duration can be called cosmic time, in distinction from all its special modal aspects" (I:24).

As such, cosmic time embraces the whole diversity of laws and subjects in their enduring correlation, and maintains them in their continuous coherence. It is, so to speak, the "total picture" of the temporal cosmos, and corresponds to "reality as we know it," or in Dooyeweerd's terms, reality as we experience it "naively": actual things in actual coherence with other things, existing integrally in subjection to a coherent diversity of laws, in an ongoing duration. It is that total horizon where lawful structures come together in actual coherence, in the continuing duration of real things. Hence it can be seen not so much as a distinct factor, but rather as the order of coherence in the diversity of laws (as to its law-side) realized in actual duration (as to its subject-side), the coherence of the whole law-order in actual correlation with the whole array of subjectivity. (It remains, of course, theoretically distinguishable.) As such, cosmic time
is, of course, meaning (see I:163).

The boundary cosmic time forms and the boundary of the law coincide in the case of the (temporal) coherent diversity of the law; the law in its central religious unity, which transcends cosmic time, is also boundary, however (between God and subjective fulness or unity of meaning, including the selfhood of man--see II:552).

11On the supra-temporal level of the fulness of meaning, "our selfhood . . . , is under the law, is a subject, limited and determined by the law in its central religious sense" (II:552). The religious community of mankind in Christ remains "in subjection to the central religious meaning of the law: the love of God and one's fellow man with all one's heart" (I:506). This latter is the "totality of meaning of all modal aspects of the cosmic order, their supra-temporal unity beyond all modal diversity of meaning" (I:101), "the radix of all modal aspects which unfold the divine law in temporal reality" (I:60). "In Christ the heart bows under the lex (in its central religious unity and its temporal diversity, which originates in the Creator's holy will) as the universal boundary . . . " (I:99).

"This transcendental meaning of the relation between the divine law and its subject [viz. as boundary] will find expression in every concept of a modal aspect with respect to its special cosmonomic- and its special subject-side" (I:108).

12Doyoweerd certainly wishes to integrate the law/subject duo with that of the coherence of meaning/fulness of meaning, but his success may be questioned, as the very nature of the two sets impedes a ready synthesis. The two schemes do not lend themselves to easy conjunction, for although they are not explicitly contradictory, they certainly do have divergent tendencies, and push in different directions--and it would seem that it is the law/subject distinction, with its conception of law as boundary, that receives short shrift, being bent into the mold of meaning.

The God/law/subject distinction posits an absolute discontinuity between God and subject, as well as between law and subject; law and subject are irreducible, though in strict correlation. The law is the boundary between God and all subjectivity, that which subjects cannot transcend without ceasing to be subjects; to be under the law is the very nature of a subject. The coherence/fulness distinction, however, posits two levels of creaturely reality, two niveaus of subjectivity, one temporal and the other supra-temporal. Hence Doyoweerd introduces the same distinction into the law, so that there is a law correlate with both realities--which means that in reality there is not just one basic set of law/subject correlations, but two such correlations, which are irreducible to one another. The law as constant boundary
between God and creature would seem to be beyond such distinctions, especially when it seems to entail that a certain niveau of subjectivity transcends a certain niveau of law.

Further, we have seen that built in to the coherence/fulness distinction is a scheme of continuity and discontinuity, embracing also God. Pulling law and subject into a scheme of continuous expression reaching all the way from God to the coherent diversity of this world seems incongruous indeed with the nature of that distinction and its relationship to God, and can not but blunt the boundary character of law; rather than law as boundary, now we see both law and subject in their fulness as somehow an expression of the Being of God, which in turn express themselves temporally in a coherent diversity of laws and of subjects. In this scheme subject and God do not stand on opposite sides of the law, but both law and subject are equally continuous with God, equally the expressions of His Being.

The above is usually formulated much more baldly, so that law and subject fade into the background as "sides" of the fulness and coherence, even though fulness and coherence are presumably only of law and subject. "The fulness of meaning," which has both a law-side and a subject-side, is temporally refracted in a "diversity of modal aspects of meaning," each with a law-side and a subject-side. Now we have a single fulness of meaning, and a single coherence of meaning—not unmeaningful, since the coherent diversity of laws exists only in correlation with the coherent diversity of subjects, which total correlation is called "cosmic time," and likewise with regard to the fulness of law and subject—but which in the context of a scheme of continuous expression serves to streamline said scheme, making it neater and simpler, to the detriment of the law/subject distinction.

It should be noted that in the process a subtle inversion has taken place, for law and subject are supposed to be that to which the character of meaning applies, that which exists in a coherence and has a fulness of meaning, but now they are seen as sides of meaning and even refractions of meaning; so far have we come from the law as boundary that the diversity of the law is actually a derivation of the single fulness of meaning, which remains transcendent to that diversity. In this case, too, it would seem unavoidable that in transcending the diversity of meaning, man in his selfhood participating in the fulness of meaning, would also transcend the law in its diversity.

13Some of these could be indicated as follows:
Radical unity of meaning is represented as being both of diversity of meaning and above diversity of meaning, its "Inner concentration-point" (I:15) and "central point of reference" (I:5) as well as lying above all diversity as a fulness broken apart by time into that diversity. The "unity
above" is, of course, the motif of supra-temporality, but it can be asked whether that which is other than and outside of (what Dooyeweerd in this context means by "transcend") temporal diversity of meaning, and is itself not temporal, can yet be the unity and "inner point of concentration" of that diversity. Can a unity which is not merely more than diversity, but actually lies above and beyond it, so much so that it has its own law to which it is subject, yet be the unity of that same diversity? Can a fulness or unity be such outside of that of which it is the fulness or unity? What Dooyeweerd calls an inner concentration point is actually an outer concentration point, for it lies outside of that which it is supposed to be the concentration, and indeed, outside of temporality.

Conversely, can that which is temporal and diverse be an "expression" of that which is and remains supra-temporal and with no diversity in it? Or, can a fulness which is broken up into a diversity yet remain intact as a fulness over and above that into which it has been broken up?

Further than that, it can be asked whether "expression" and "concentration" are indeed merely the converse sides of each other, or indicate differing conceptions of unity—a diversity-in-its-unity versus a deeper, prior "something" behind diversity expressing itself in diversity.

The latter brings up the question as to whether "referring" and "expressing" must necessarily be conjoined. Certainly with regard to God this seems not to be the case; creation and its religious unity may refer beyond themselves to their Origin without actually being expressions of the Being of God. Much depends here though on what precisely is meant by "expression," and at least with regard to God, Dooyeweerd is never too clear on the matter. In the case of the root unity of meaning, however, there can be less question. This root designates a fulness which cannot be contained in time, so is split up in time into a modal diversity, whose coherence is "expressed" in each modal aspect (sphere-universality), so that "each aspect in its modal structure reflects the fulness of meaning in its own modality" (I:102). Must the reference of coherent diversity of meaning beyond itself to its fulness-unity-concentration of meaning, even given the supra-temporality this entails for Dooyeweerd, imply also that that coherent diversity is actually an expression of the fulness? Must diversity of meaning be the expression of something else to retain a dependent, non-self-sufficient character? In that case meaning, which was originally introduced as the mode of existence of creatures, begins to take on a life of its own, existing as a fulness of meaning, which is temporally refracted into modal aspects of meaning—a fulness which is not thereby dispersed but remains a fulness outside of the diversity into which it has been refracted. Diversity in this case is actually derived from a prior fulness, rather than merely having a fulness of meaning.
The fulness of meaning is also a "fulness of individuality" (II:418); temporal individuality, as well as modal diversity, is "rooted in the religious centre of our temporal world: all temporal individuality is an expression of the fulness of individuality inherent in this centre" (II:418). "If the modalities of meaning are temporal refractions of the religious fulness of meaning, then the fulness of individuality must also be refracted prismatically within the modal aspects, and temporal individuality must be diversified in all the meaning-modalities" (II:418).

It is not so that in Dooyeweerd's view it is only the plastic law-structures which are "realized" on the subject-side; the same is true of modal structures (see II:237-238, III:78). Nor is it true that "individualization of modal meaning" is an exclusively law-side phenomenon, something effected by the plastic law-structures. The latter can at best refer to types of modal individuality, which would seem to be set forth in principle by the plastic law-structures--types which serve to flesh out the meaning of an aspect, give it a "material diversity of 'content'" (II:423), but are not themselves actually individual in character (they are types of individuality, not individuality itself). Actual, a-typical modal individuality occurs only on the subject-side, in the functioning of individual things. Such a-typical individuality of modal meaning also expresses, "individualizes" the modal meaning of an aspect; this is the "pole" reached by modal individualization (II:424,416).

Because the individuality structures belonging to the law-side of cosmic time are realized in individual things, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether Dooyeweerd is referring to factual structures or law structures when he uses the words "structure of individuality"--and it oftentimes does not matter.

Generally speaking it can be said that if reference is made to modal functions, then the factual structure is in view; if, on the contrary, reference is made to modal aspects but not to functions, then the law structure is probably in view. Modal aspects are the cosmological a priori conditions, the transcendental cadre or structural frame making modal functioning possible; things function within modal aspects.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF A THING

Because of the presence of a law/subject correlation also in the plastic dimension, we must be careful of our terms of reference. "Structure of a thing" can refer either to the typical structures belonging to the law-side of cosmic time, which have themselves no duration but are of an a priori determining character, or to factual transitory structures, actual things with a certain typical make-up in which the typical structures are historically realized. Law-structures are of course not themselves factual structures. An individuality structure in the sense of a law-structure "bears the character of a type" (III:632; see II: 557-558, III:97); being the structure of individuality it "is not individuality itself" (II:583). Further, belonging to the law-side of cosmic time, such a typical structure has no temporal duration, is not changeable. Factual structures, though of course having a typical character, are also individual and hence are not to be identified with types; moreover, they do endure but for a certain time, they are changing and transient. More fundamentally, typical structures remain laws, and factual structures remain subjects; the structure "of subjectivity cannot be subjectively individual itself" (II:593), but is only realized in that which is subjectively individual.
Dooyeweerd's discussion, in rough lines, is oriented around these correlate structures. He first examines factual historical structures, the make-up of actual things, trying to honor the wholeness and unity they present without resorting to a substance-idea to account for that unity. With this background, he goes on to consider how the immense variety of typical structures or structural types (corresponding to the immense variety of types of factual structures) are ordered, in essence trying to lay the foundation of a typological system (see III:94). Since factual structures exist only in correlation with typical structures, however, dealing with one will needs involve reference to the other.

Our discussion will follow this same twofold pattern.

A. Factual Structures

Dooyeweerd's discussion is immediately complicated, in a way we cannot ignore, by certain epistemological considerations. This is evident already in the way he puts the initial question: "how can we gain theoretical access to the structures in which things present themselves to our naive experience?" (III:53). Dooyeweerd wants to theoretically penetrate "the structure of a thing as given in naive experience" (III:53). Hence we are initially confronted with a distinction between "naive experience" and "theoretical access."

Since such theoretical access "cannot be acquired without theoretical analysis, we must obviously seek a point of con-
tact in the theory of modal spheres" (III:54). This is so because "theoretical thought is bound to the Gegenstand-
relation" (III:77), in which the logical function of thought is intentionally opposed to non-logical aspects of our experience (I:39), the latter being abstracted from their continuous coherence with the other aspects in cosmic time. Such an antithetic and aspectual posture is lacking in "naive experience," in which "we grasp reality in the typical total structures of individual things and concrete events" (I:41) in the full and integral coherence of cosmic time (III:29), where "we have an immediate and integral experience of cosmic time in the uninterrupted coherence of all its modal aspects" (I:33; see I:38).

There is, in short, a pressing epistemological problem involved in trying to theoretically get a hold of the structures of things. It is naive experience in which we relate to things as integral wholes, standing in the full coherence of reality. A theoretical analysis of those structural wholes can not but be functionally oriented, however, and must abstract from the cosmic coherence. "It is in vain to seek for another theoretical access to these structures, because theoretical thought is bound to the Gegenstand-relation" (III:77). This means that theoretical thought must by its very nature fall short of things as integral wholes.

... it should be primarily observed that from the very beginning we have acknowledged the insufficiency of the theory of the modal spheres to account for the internal
structural unity of a thing. We have, however, proceeded from this theory to that of the typical structures of individuality. It is true that for the sake of a theoretical analysis of these plastic structures we were obliged to make use of our previous analysis of the functional structures of the modalities. But we have stressed the fact that the structures of individuality belong to another dimension of our experiential horizon. It was therefore to be expected by anticipation that we should arrive at the critical point where the theory of the modal spheres cannot help us any further. (III:62)

A thing is a lasting integral whole whose functions cohere in a continuous, unbroken way, but theoretical thought must abstract from this continuous coherence to get hold of the thing, and is left with but a diversity of functions (see III:63); the wholeness of a thing disappears under the gaze of theory. Dooyeweerd puts it succinctly: "every attempt at a theoretical analysis of a whole seems to destroy it" (III:61).

Involved here, too, is the distinction between the modal and plastic horizons. Dooyeweerd is after the structures of things, not of functions, and things belong to another dimension of reality, which is not reducible to the modal horizon. Theoretical thought, moreover, can be said to be proportioned to the modal horizon, so there is a problem; modal analysis can not go far enough, but theory is bound to it.

Nonetheless, "there exists an unbreakable coherence between the functional structures of the modal aspects and the internal structures of individuality" (III:62). The fact that the modal horizon is foundational to the plastic horizon, and that both are grounded in the same cosmic temporal order,
gives Dooyeweerd a theoretical avenue into the structures of things, albeit an indirect one. Because of this "intrinsic connection" (III:75) with the plastic horizon, the functional domain of the theory of modalities can "furnish the necessary point of contact, needed to find a theoretical access to a thing's structure of individual totality" (III:58). That access must, by the very nature of theory, be a functional access, but not merely functional—otherwise there would be no access. Put briefly, Dooyeweerd will find the crucial point of contact in certain functional states of affairs which within a thing are no longer merely functional, but point beyond themselves to something more than functional, to the typical unity and wholeness of a thing which is being expressed in functionality. Here we tie in to our previous discussion of the "individualization of modal meaning" (see pp. 32-34). The internal structural functions of a thing "are the expression of its structural unity as an individual whole" (III:77), and it is these "individualized" functions which provide the only theoretical access to that thing's structure.

... we can obtain a theoretical insight into the typical total structures of individuality only by analyzing their internal structural functions in the different modal aspects, as they are typically grouped within an individual whole. (III:77)

In this case we are confronted with a "structural 'Gegenstand,'" which "is no longer merely modal, or functional, but displays typical structural coherences of an inter-modal character" (II:469).
In this manner Dooyeweerd maintains the essentially functional character of theory, while still allowing for an access to things; an access is obtained via a thing's functions, for its typical structural unity as a thing shows up in its functions, so that they have a certain type of individuality. A thing in its integral unity, however, escapes theory. In all this, however, we are getting a bit ahead of ourselves; what we have said here in a general way will become more specific in what follows.

In a functional analysis of a given thing, that thing will not come into view in its actual nature until one particular modal aspect of that thing is considered; it will appear that the thing has a central function in one particular aspect, a function which in its modal type of individuality is "characteristic of the structure of the individual whole" (III:56), which qualifies the thing as a structural whole (III:56), and indicates its intrinsic destination in the temporal world-order (III:60). This function is called the "qualifying function" by Dooyeweerd, as it is the "ultimate functional point of reference" for the thing. This is not to say that the thing is enclosed in this particular aspect, that its reality as a thing is completed therein; any given thing functions in principle in all modal aspects, but only in one aspect do we find a modal function capable of qualifying the thing as a structural whole, serving as the functional point of reference for the whole thing.
The qualifying function is but a functional point of reference, however. The insight into the central place of the qualifying function in the structure of a thing, and a functional analysis as a whole, remain on a functional niveau, and do not yield the structure of a thing as an individual whole. Here again we are confronted with the limitations of a functional analysis.

The qualifying function is, nonetheless, the key to the solution of the problem. When seen in conjunction with the unfolding process in a thing—the above-mentioned necessary point of contact in the functional domain of the theory of modalities—the "internal totality-structure" of a thing comes into view, transcending a merely functional unfolding process.

the qualifying function is also the tree's [the particular example Dooyeweerd is using] characteristic leading or guiding function. It plays the central role in the tree's internal unfolding process. The latter reveals an internal totality-structure and is, therefore, essentially different from the merely functional unfolding process treated in the first part of Volume II. (III:58-59)

The "unfolding process" as to its functional structure involves the opening of an anticipatory moment of the modal structure of an aspect under the "guidance" or "leading" of the anticipated law-sphere; "the modal anticipations will be called guided or directed meaning-functions, and the modal meaning-functions of the anticipated spheres guiding or directing functions" (II:184-185). That is to say, the leading function by being actually operative "points the way" to an earlier aspect towards the opening of its meaning, so that
the latter may approximate within its own limits the modal meaning of the leading function; the opening of any modal anticipation involves the corresponding "guidance" of the anticipated law-sphere (II:184-185).

In the unfolding process within a thing, the qualifying function plays the role of the leading or guiding function. That process in a thing, however, is "essentially different" from the merely functional process outlined above, manifesting an internal typical-structural wholeness which can not be understood from a modal point of view but can only depend on the typical structure of the thing as a whole.

Under the guidance of the qualifying organic vital function the anticipatory spheres in the tree's [again, Dooyeweerd's particular example] earlier modal functions are opened and directed in a typical manner. This is to say that this unfolding-process is no longer understandable from the general modal structure of the pre-biotic functions. The fact that the latter have biotical anticipations in a general modal sense is not sufficient to explain why the opening-process in the pre-biotic aspects of the linden exhibits a typical biotic qualification which is characteristic of this tree, as such. This state of affairs appears to depend upon the structure of individuality of this tree as a whole, in which the biotical function, in a special type of individualization, has the central role of a qualifying function. This is not understandable from the general temporal order of the aspects, which finds expression in their general modal structure. . . . Through the typical structure of our linden, as an individual living whole, the earlier functions acquire an internal inter-modal structural coherence . . . (III:59)

The qualifying function in its type of individuality leads the opening of all earlier functions, so that the opening-process bears a typical character. All the earlier functions are directed toward the typical qualifying function, opened under its guidance; they are, that is, opened and directed in
a typical manner, anticipating within their own limits the qualifying function in its type of individuality.

The qualifying function, it must be remembered, is a typical function, giving a thing a typical qualification (see II:259,fn.1); that is to say, it is a modal function with a certain type of individuality, an "individualized" function (see III:137-138). Hence under its leading, the earlier functions "are opened and directed in a typical manner," and the entire opening process in the earlier aspects exhibits a typical qualification; earlier functions are opened in a typical manner because the function leading their opening, the function they are approximating, is itself a typical function.

This very typical character running throughout the unfolding process in question, however, points to the inadequacy of a merely functional understanding of what is occurring. That the unfolding process bears a certain typical character, that functions are directed according to a certain type, is simply "not understandable from the general temporal order of the aspects" (III:59)—even though that order is maintained and presupposed in such an unfolding. The typical character of the unfolding can not derive from the functions themselves. This rather depends on the typical structure of the thing as a whole; the unfolding is characteristic of a certain type of thing. The qualifying function, too, is an "individualized" function; its type of individuality does not derive from it-
self, but depends on something else. The opening process in question, in short, points to a typical structure expressing itself on each modal level, determining a certain type of modal individuality, a structure which "individualizes the modal functions and groups them together in a typical way within the cadre of an individual whole" (III:76).^4

All a thing's functions

... are related to an individual whole whose typical internal structure lies at the foundation of the typical internal coherence of its modal functions. It is this typical totality-structure which also determines the central role of the biotical function [in the example of the tree] in this temporal coherence of internal functions.^5 (III:60)

In the manner of above, then, Dooyeweerd allows for a theoretical avenue into the structures of things; the typical character of a thing's functioning points beyond the purview of that functioning to a typical totality-structure lying at the foundation of that functioning, on which it depends. It is only through analysis of those functions, however, that one can theoretically get at the totality-structure (see III:77), and that only as a typical character is manifested in those functions. A coherence of functions with a certain typical character, having a qualifying function of a certain modality and type of individuality, will be characteristic of a certain type of thing; a functional coherence bearing a differing typical character, with a qualifying function of a different type of individuality and the same or differing modality, will be characteristic of a different type of thing.
It will appear, however, that the "typical structure" which is here invoked as lying at the foundation of the unfolding process in a thing is actually a law structure, a structural type. That is to say, it is not something internal to the thing itself, but is outside of it, determining it. This state of affairs will be explored in depth a bit later, but at this point it means that in terms of the factual structure of a thing, its actual make-up, all we have so far is a typical unfolding process, a typical structural coherence of functions. Such a typical coherence of functions itself represents a "structure." This is what theory gets a hold of, and imputes to a determining law lying at its foundation; only in this indirect manner, by way of examination of actual (typical) coherences of functions, does theory get at the law determining a typical coherence of functions (see II:559: the structural laws are only revealed to theoretical insight in the structural analysis of the variable reality of actual things).

But in this way only the typical character of a thing in its actual make-up comes into view. What about the individual wholeness of a thing? What can be said about a thing in its integral unity? What is the "more" that a thing is as against its diversity of modal functions, that which is the real key to its identity? This, after all, is the heart of thingness, which must ever escape theory, dissolving under its gaze into a typical coherence of functions, but is yet
incontestably there.

Theoretical thought here reaches its limits and thereby reveals that is is not self-sufficient. To grasp a thing's temporal unity within the functional diversity of our cosmos, it must appeal to the naive experience of time. Theoretical thought can only approach it by means of a transcendental Idea, a limiting concept. By so doing it explicitly accounts for this unity as a transcendental pre-supposition of the philosophical analysis of a thing's structure. (III:66)

This is probably the most crucial, and also the most difficult, aspect of Dooyeweerd's theory. That in Dooyeweerd's view a thing is more than its functional diversity, even its typical functional diversity, is clear enough—"a thing is more than the sum of its individualized modal functions" (III:63)—but getting at that "more" is not so easy, made even more difficult by the continuing epistemological consideration of the intrinsic limitations of theory. It is at this point, of course, that the problem of substance becomes especially pressing; it will be crucial to see how Dooyeweerd proposes to retain a "more" without falling into a "metaphysical" substance solution—something he believes Stoker has been unable to do (see III:62-76). Stoker, too, has seen that a thing is more than its typical unfolding process, that the latter does not explain the unity of a thing, that it can not stand on its own but is dependent on something else. But he goes on to "conceive of the unity of a thing in a new concept of substance" (III:66), which Dooyeweerd does not believe is "new" at all and can not escape the charge of being "metaphysical." We will have occasion to consider what Dooyeweerd
means by this charge, and what precisely he is objecting to, later, but at the present we must consider what Dooyeweerd proposes in the stead of a concept of substance.

Of course, there is "more" to a thing also in the sense that any thing is determined by law; the thing is not the final horizon, it is not explicable in itself but points beyond itself to a law which rules its inner make-up. We have in mind here, however, that very inner factual make-up of a thing, that in which it exceeds functional diversity.

We can begin to get at Dooyeweerd's view by considering that in a functional unfolding process, there is no "causal encroachment" of the leading function on earlier functions; the leading function does not "do" anything to the earlier functions, so that modal boundaries are levelled out.

The general theory of the modal law-spheres decidedly denies such a supposition. It maintains the modal sphere-sovereignty and consequently rejects every idea of a causal relation between the aspects concerned. . . . The biotic anticipations of the energy functions, disclosed in the internal opening-process of the living organism, retain their physical-chemical character. (III:62)

Rather than the boundaries of earlier functions being encroached on by the qualifying function, earlier functions approximate within their own limits the leading function; they retain their own character, but in that character "reach" toward the leading function, so that there is a kind of mesh. Earlier functions are all "geared toward" the qualifying function. Clearly, however, this is not something they can "do" either; earlier functions can themselves "reach" toward the qualifying func-
tion no more than the latter can causally encroach upon the
former. Seemingly we are at an impasse; the unfolding pro-
cess appears immune to description, if indeed it is still
possible to speak of such a state of affairs at all. Modal
sphere-sovereignty seems to preclude an actual unfolding,
and hence to jeopardize the unity of a thing.

The problem becomes less severe, however, when it is
realized that we are dealing abstractly-functionally with
what are in actuality simultaneous aspects of a larger
whole. To get a hold of the unfolding process theoretically,
functions must be abstracted from each other, and more impor-
tantly, from their real, simultaneous temporal occurrence as
functions of whole things; in their abstracted form they be-
gin to loom as separate happenings on different levels
occurring in chronological sequence.

The appearance of an inner contradiction between modal
sphere-sovereignty and the internal unity of a thing is
only due to the Gegenstand-relation. It is due to the
theoretical growth of this cosmic temporal continuity,
which is necessary to grasp the inner structure of a
thing with its typical groupage of modal functions in
our analyzing theoretical view. (II:63)

Recourse must be made at this point to something more
than functional, for functions can not "do" things; they can
not themselves "lead" earlier functions, nor can they "antici-
pate" later functions, as doings of themselves. Functions
remain functions of, theoretically distinguishable aspects
of what is a whole, simultaneous phenomenon; they are them-
selves "doings," as such dependent on that of which they are
functions, and incapable of "doing" things themselves (at least, strictly speaking). Here again we clearly see the "insufficiency of the theory of the modal spheres to account for the internal structural unity of a thing" (III:62). It must be said that "a thing is more than the sum of its individualized functions. It shows the typical structure of an individual whole, in which the continuous unbroken coherence of its structural functions is guaranteed by cosmic time" (III:63). It is the "internal structural unity of this real whole, guaranteed by the inter-modal continuous coherence of its functions in cosmic time" (III:76), which, as belonging to the actual make-up of a thing, "lies at the foundation of" the functional unfolding in a thing.  

The individual unity in the diversity of modal functions is essential to the thing's internal structure, but this unity cannot be of a modal character. We have established that within its modal boundaries the qualifying biotic function cannot exercise any causal influence upon the physical-chemical functions of the living organism. But the real causal processes occurring in the internal structure of this organism proceed after the pattern of an individual whole, which lies at the foundation of all its modal functions and expresses itself in each of them in a specific-modality. The different modalities of the internal causal relations are never real, as such. They are nothing but modal aspects of a real whole which has a continuous duration in cosmic time. Every modal function of this individual whole must have a bottom layer in the continuous inter-modal coherence of cosmic time in which any temporal reality is embedded. (III:63)

We have here not a matter of modal-functional causality, but of "individual thing-causality," which goes outside the boundaries of the law-spheres and can only reveal itself in the continuity of cosmic time.
modaal biologisch worden verklaard . . . Het functioneel, modale causaliteitsbegrip laat hier in den steek. In de inwendige structuur van het ding moet een individuele ding-causaliteit worden vastgesteld, die de modale zin-grenzen der wetskringen te buiten zaat en slechts in de continuïteit van den kosmischen tijd zelvè zich kan open-baren. (WdW:43-44)

The law-side of cosmic time establishes an inter-modal coherence of aspects and thereby makes an individual thing-causality possible. But time as time-order does not itself work causally (WdW:44). Individual thing-causality reveals itself on the subject-side of cosmic time, in the ongoing continuous coherence, in the duration which remains subjected to order (I:28).

The real causal processes in a thing proceed after "the pattern of an individual whole," which is to say that "there exists a typical structural coherence between directing and directed functions in the continuous real bottom-layer of a thing as an individual whole," a state of affairs which "exceeds the boundaries of the modal spheres" (III:66-67). The functions of a thing continue to cohere in the same typical way, displaying the same pattern of directed functions cohering with the directing function (as we shall see, in subjection to law).

This matter of the "inter-modal continuity of cosmic time," then, is the key to the unity of a thing. This guarantees that a thing is "more" than its functional diversity, a "more" which is neither an independent "something" behind the functions, nor an "empty temporal coherence," as Stoker charges. It is rather the integral hanging together of functionality as a whole, the actual ongoing operational coherence...
of the thing itself as a unified whole. The inter-modal 
continuous coherence of a thing's functions means that it is 
an integral whole.

In the plastic horizon of cosmic time, a thing's modal 
functions are neither joined together into a metaphysical 
"substance", nor into a functional identity of modal func­
tions. But they only come together in the continuous 
operational coherence of a structural unity of irreducible 
modal functions, a coherence which as such is necessarily 
inter-modal and temporal in character. (III:77)

And it is only in this cosmic temporal bottom-layer of 
every thing-structure that the individual whole of a thing 
is realized. . . .

This identity is consequently more than functional. 
And this "more" does not mean an empty temporal coherence 
(as Stoker has apparently interpreted my viewpoint), but 
it lies, within time, in the reality of the thing itself, 
as an individual and integral whole. (III:65)

The unity of a thing (plastic horizon) and the sphere-
sovereignty of its modal functions (modal horizon) are alike 
grounded in the cosmic temporal order, and it is only in the 
continuous duration of cosmic time that they come together as 
one simultaneous phenomenon.

Even in the internal structure of a thing the modal sphere-
sovereignty of its different functions is not abolished. 
The reason is that this modal irreducibility appeared to 
be founded in the same temporal order which is also the 
basis of the plastic horizon of human experience. (III:63)

Theory must abstract from this cosmic temporal continuity in 
trying to get a hold of a thing, with the result that the 
appearance of a contradiction between unity and sphere-sover­
eignty arises; either modal sphere-sovereignty seems to preclude 
an integral unfolding process, or the unity of a thing seems to 
level out modal boundaries. But the problem is not that such 
an intrinsic contradiction exists, but rather that theory by
its very nature is unable to penetrate to their deeper coherence, to the inter-modal continuous coherence of directed and directing functions.

This continuous coherence of functions, the ongoing operational coherence of a thing, is also the key to its continuing identity. A thing remains the same thing throughout change not because of an unchanging substance underlying changing accidents of which the substance is essentially independent, but because "the inner operational coherence of this thing continues to reveal itself as an individual totality" (III:98); the "inner operational coherence" of a thing continues to proceed after the same "pattern of an individual whole." A thing remains the same, that is, if its internal structure remains "operational," if the unfolding process peculiar to a thing is an ongoing affair. "... the temporal duration of our linden, as an identical whole, is bound to the maintenance of its realized internal structure, qualified by its typical leading biotic function" (III:65). 9

Since the qualifying functioning of a thing itself undergoes continuous change, but the individual identity of a thing is not thereby violated, we can see again that a thing is more than functional, that functional processes are dependent on the whole and so can not themselves guarantee the unity or identity of a thing. Throughout change the inner operational coherence continues to reveal itself as an individual totality; change occurs only within a pattern of an individual whole
which continues to maintain itself (see III:97-98, WdW:62-64).

The inter-modal continuous coherence of functions is open to analysis of its modal diversity, but it is given as a simultaneous whole. "The idea of the internal structural unity of this real whole, guaranteed by the inter-modal continuous coherence of its functions in cosmic time, precedes every analysis of the modal diversity of these functions" (III:77). What is involved here is an appeal to the integral wholeness of things as found in naive experience, where we relate to things in the full coherence of cosmic time and modal aspects are experienced as "being together in a continuous uninterrupted coherence" (I:38). "To grasp a thing's temporal unity within the functional diversity of our cosmos, theoretical thought must appeal to the naive experience of time" (III:66). Consequently "it is impossible to make the structural continuity of a thing, which guarantees its relative identity, into a Gegenstand of theoretical analysis" (III:65). The inter-modal continuity of the individual whole is impenetrable by theory, for "all theoretical isolation pre-supposes the inter-modal continuity of cosmic time" (III:65); it is precisely the latter which theoretical thought must always abstract from in its isolating activity. The unity and identity of a thing "has its foundation in cosmic time" (III:75), and is no more accessible to theoretical analysis than cosmic time itself. This means, too, that the unfolding process within a thing, and individual thing-causality, are ultimately unexplainable:
"the way in which the internal unfolding-process in a tree, in its inter-modal structure of individuality, is possible, is an unsolvable problem" (III:66).

We, and Dooyeweerd, have said in the same breath that the unity of a thing is guaranteed by the inter-modal continuous coherence of its functions, and also that that same unity lies at the foundation of its functions, expressing itself in each of them; that a thing's functions come together in a continuous operational coherence of a unity of functions, and also that the functions of a thing are its internal structural functions only insofar as they are the expression of its structural unity as a whole (III:77); that the inner operational coherence of a thing reveals itself as a totality, and also that that same totality is the foundation of the internal functions of that thing, expressing itself in each of them (III:98).

The one formulation suggests that the unity of a thing is in a sense derivative, resulting from the inner operational coherence, while the other formulation suggests just the reverse, that the unity is prior, and the functional coherence depends on it (the functional coherence or typical groupage is the expression of the unity of a thing). Clarifying this seeming ambiguity will serve to tighten up our discussion of the unity and diversity of a thing.

It must first of all be established that the functions which are bound together into an operational coherence are the very same functions which are said to be the expression of the unity of a thing, or of which it is said that the unity of a
thing lies at their foundation; or conversely, the functions which are the expression of a thing's unity are the very functions whose inter-modal continuous coherence guarantees the unity of a thing. It is the modal diversity of functions which, in their inter-modal continuous coherence, are given (to naive experience) as a whole; inter-modal coherence embraces modal diversity. We have not a case here of an inner operational coherence of functions lying at the foundation of further (internal-subjective) functions, the latter being the expression of the former. Functions can not provide the foundation of other internal-structural functions, nor can they express themselves in other functions, for the original functions require the same "foundation" that they are supposed to provide the other functions. Functions, in short, do not themselves function, for they are already functions. This makes it somewhat easier to see that the two formulations are getting at the very same state of affairs, but each in a somewhat one-sided manner; they are alternative formulations of the same matter, but each highlights but one side. Here we again run into the limitations of theory, and the difficulty of getting a whole phenomenon into our conceptual grasp all at once; inevitably we must settle for but a side of the phenomenon.

The unity of an operational coherence of functions is a whole, simultaneous, ongoing phenomenon. The continuous coherence of functions guarantees the presence of unity; without such an operational coherence it would be meaningless to
speak of a whole, unified thing. But this gets at a thing from the point of view of its functional diversity. It is equally true to say that a thing is a unity, that this unity comes to expression in its functionality, and is indeed the foundation of that functionality; in this instance we approach a thing from the point of view of its unity. Both ways of approaching a thing are legitimate, for unity and diversity are simultaneous, always together, co-implicative; there is no unity without functional diversity, nor is there functional diversity without unity. Unity-in-a-diversity constitutes the whole that a thing is.

This allows us to forestall another possible misconception, the reverse tack to that which posits a coherence of functions lying at the foundation of further functions. The unity of a thing lying at the foundation of its functions, expressing itself in them, does not signify something somehow behind or apart from its functional (coherent) diversity. What is intended here is that functions of a thing are indeed functions of that thing; they are bound to that whole, being opened so as to subserve it (see III:133), "typically grouped" in a way characteristic of the thing. In this way the wholeness and unity of a thing are manifested or "expressed" on all of the functional levels; indeed, what are referred to as "functional levels" are but aspects of a simultaneous, integral whole. The functions are unified, working as a harmonious whole; the unity of a thing is nowhere but in its functional diversity. The
functions which express the unity of a thing are the same which cohere "in the continuous bottom-layer of a thing" (III:66). Likewise, it is in that continuous coherence that the unity of a thing is found; it does not express itself in that coherence as something lying behind it, apart from it. The unity is the "individual pattern" of the coherence, the bound-together-ness of the functions into a whole. The distinction between a whole and the various aspects of that whole may not be construed in such a way that the whole becomes something apart from its aspects. Likewise unity embraces diversity, and is not something apart from it; inter-modal continuous coherence is a continuous coherence of functions.

The embracive context to this whole discussion is cosmic time. As things lie within cosmic time, the character of the latter shapes the course of the discussion. Dooyeweerd can be seen, in retrospect, to arrive at his idea of the unity and identity of a thing by a kind of cosmic elimination process, using the location of things in the plastic horizon of cosmic time as the context of possibility. A thing's unity can not be the absolute unity of a substance, standing independently behind its modal functions, nor can it be a religious concentration-point such as belongs to man; that is to say, in the first place, a thing's unity is a temporal unity, fully enclosed within cosmic time. That unity must further be a unity in a modal diversity, since the modal horizon is foundational to the plastic horizon.
The identity of a thing, rooted in the continuity of cosmic time, is, however, not the metaphysical identity of a substance, as the absolute point of reference of its different "accidental properties". Nor can it be the radical identity of the different modal functions of the thing concerned. The modal aspects of reality find their deeper identity in the central religious sphere alone. But temporal things are perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal individual whole, i.e. of a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions. (III:65)

The temporal horizon appeared to be the foundation of the modal horizon. And both appeared to form the perspective in which arises the horizon of the structures of individuality. If the internal unity of a thing is grounded in this last dimension, it follows that it can only be a temporal unity in the modal diversity of the functions. As long as we keep this fundamental point in mind we will not fall back into the speculative metaphysical concept of substance. (III:77)

At this point in the Dutch version, Dooyeweerd adds: "Daarom rest op Christelijk standpunt naar mijn meening geen andere mogelijkheid, dan de identiteit van het ding achter zijn modale functies in de kosmische tijds-structuur der ding-werkelijkheid te zoeken" (WdW:51). In a real sense, there is simply nowhere else to look, no other options open; given that things belong to the plastic horizon of cosmic time, their unity can only be of the sort Dooyeweerd describes.

This will become more clear when we remember that temporality and coherent diversity appeared to be coextensive. Since things lie totally within the boundary of cosmic time, they must assume that same shape of temporality; they can not present a different sort of character, involve a further factor alien to a continuous coherence of diversity, if they are to be temporal. Hence the unity of a thing does not constitute
a "supra-modal centre"; we are dealing with an individual whole "which lacks a supra-modal centre" (III:90). Nor, however, can the unity of a thing be of a modal character, lest the plastic horizon reduce to the modal horizon. "The individual unity in the diversity of modal functions is essential to the thing's internal structure, but this unity cannot be of a modal character" (III:63; see III:100). That unity is more than modal, it "exceeds the boundaries of the modal spheres" (III:67), but what categories are left within the realm of temporality? The unity and totality of a thing can only be inter-modal in character; "[This individual totality] is inter-modal in principle and expresses itself in each of its internal modal functions" (III:98; see III:63,77; WdW: 56). The continuous coherence of cosmic time is an inter-modal coherence (III:64), so the unity of a thing, which is rooted in the continuity of cosmic time (III:65,75), can only be an inter-modal unity. Unity exceeds diversity, but against the background of cosmic time, there is room only for a unity in a diversity, a unity which spans and embraces the modal diversity without in any way hanging loose from that diversity, so that it is itself of an inter-modal character. To get at that unity appeal can only be made to the naive experience of things as integral wholes; unity does not present itself as a distinct factor that theory can isolate, or that can be categorized apart from its relationship to modal diversity. We shall see that there is another factor present,
but one no longer internal to the thing.

We have seen that the continuous operational coherence, the hanging together of functionality, occurs according to a pattern of integration; the unfolding process in a thing displays a specific typical character, proceeding according to a type. That is to say, these matters take place under the determination of a law-structure. Our picture of a thing needs to be supplemented by the perspective of a determining law.

The internal structural principle determines the subjective or objective individuality of the whole. It belongs to the law-side of cosmic time; it is a typical law of individuality, which rules the structural coherence of the different functions within the individual totality. As such it is an inter-modal law, a typical unity of order in the modal diversity of its aspects, just as the individual whole, as its factual subjective or subjective-objective correlate, is an individual factual unity in the modal diversity of its functions.16 (III:80)

In a general way we have previously said that the plastic horizon, too, presents a correlation of laws and subjects, now a correlation of "structural principles" and the "things that are determined by these principles" (II:557). We noticed in our discussion of the plastic horizon that these structural principles are typical principles, "varied according to types" (II:558); "De structuur-principes selve zijn structuurtypen" (WdW:56; see III:632). As do other laws, these principles determine the "margin or latitude of possibilities" (I:105) of things, so that a thing retains its "full latitude but nevertheless remains subject to the necessary determinations and limitations imposed" (I:187). These laws, being of a structural a priori determining character, have themselves
no duration, but are realized in things which do endure but for a time.

Now all this can be further specified. As things are inter-modal unities, so the structural types of the plastic horizon are inter-modal laws, typical unities of order in a modal diversity of aspects. These laws set forth a certain typical unity of aspects as a structural possibility; that is to say, they form the structural frame or transcendental cadre within which a certain type of thing is possible. The typical unity of order in a modal diversity of aspects they set forth makes simultaneously for the possibility of a thing—a unity and totality in a functional diversity—and a certain type of thing—a certain typical order in the coherence of functions; it makes for both at the same time. The structural possibility a type indicates has both a unity-totality side (making for things) and a typical side (allowing for a type of thing).

Both these sides, then, are present in the structural principle's "ruling the coherence of functions" of a thing; it determines the typical shape of that coherence, the typical pattern of the inner unfolding, but in so determining, it simultaneously determines that there be an inner structural coherence of functions, that the functionality hang together as a whole (in a certain typical way). There is a unity-totality and a typical side to things, simultaneous and inter-woven—a thing shows a unity and integrality precisely in the typical character running throughout the coherence of functions;
all the functions conform to a typical pattern of integration—and the structural principles, as typical patterns of integration, in their determination encompass both sides. They are "typical laws of individuality" (thingness) in precisely this sense; different laws will determine a coherence of functions with a different typical character, but all these laws will determine an integral-integrated coherence of functions, whatever the type, a coherence of functions which reveals itself as a totality (see III:98).

We will have occasion later on to investigate in some detail what exactly Dooyeweerd has in mind by saying that the laws of the plastic horizon are "varied according to types," but at this stage certain things are clear enough. Different structural types present differing typical unities of order in a modal diversity of aspects, and determine correspondingly different typical groupages or integrations of functions, different types of things. Things of one kind (type) are per se subject to a different law than things of another type, or conversely, a specific law relates only to the things of that kind.

It is on such a structural principle, then, that the unfolding process in a thing depends; the structural principle of a thing also (as well as the unity of a thing) "lies at the foundation of" its functioning, of its typical coherence of functions, for "het de transcendentale "ontsluitingsproces is binnen den tijdelijken werkingssamenhang
van het ding" (WdW:55). It "groepert de functies van het ding zoodanig, dat binnen den tijdelijken werkings-samenhang een harer tot structureele bestemmingsfunctie is gequalificeerd, welke de leiding geeft in het interne ontsluitingsproces der kosmisch vroegere functies" (WdW:55); the principle determines the functions to have a certain type of individuality, groups them in a certain typical way (III:76).

The "typical totality-structure" that Dooyeweerd invokes in the initial stages of his argument (to account for the typical character of the unfolding process in a thing), then, has turned out to be a law-structure, rather than a structure internal to the thing; the typical character of the unfolding points to its determination by law. This means that left to the subject, that which is correlated with the law, is the typical inter-modal (unified) coherence of functions ruled by the law: "just as the individual whole, as [the law's] factual subjective or subjective-objective correlate, is an individual factual unity in the modal diversity of its functions" (III:80). This is the "factual structure."

From the point of view of the things subject to these structural principles, then, certain things of a similar nature can be said, mutatis mutandis. Things are individual inter-modal unities in a modal diversity of functions (rather than aspects); it is with things, on the durational side of cosmic time, that an actual ongoing operational coherence of functions, an actual unfolding process, is found. The functionality of
all things hangs together integrally, it "reveals itself as an individual totality" (III:98), but it coheres in different kinds of things according to different patterns of integration, subjected to different laws (types); an integration of functionality, that is, always displays a certain typical character, with a qualifying function of a certain modality and type of individuality, but it is always an integration. A thing, hence, is always a thing of a kind, and in both these ways it evidences the determination of the law. Things of differing kinds, determined by differing laws, will present integrations of functionality typically different, each characteristic of the respective kind; in both cases there will be integrality, but in each case according to a different pattern, with a different "arrangement" or "grouping" (with a qualifying function of a different type of individuality and the same or differing modality).

When Dooyeweerd says that the "internal structural principle determines the individuality of the whole" (III:80), or the identity of an individual whole (III:65,97), this should be understood in the manner of above. The structural principle determines the thingness of the thing, both in the sense that it is a thing and that it is a certain kind of thing—there is a structural unified coherence of functions, with a certain typical character, a typical groupage of functions.

The typical operational coherence of a thing's functions, then, is determined both qua typical and qua coherence; the
ongoing operational coherence of a thing is a conforming to
law in both these ways, simultaneously. This gets at the no-
tion of "realization," for the latter is essentially synonymous
with a conforming to law, or a being determined by law. A
given structural type is "realized" in a thing in the sense
that the typical coherence of aspects the type indicates shows
up in an actual coherence of functions, the structural possibil-
ity it sets forth becomes an actuality. Things manifest the
specific structural coherence or typical groupage dictated by
the structural principles; they are things of the type in
question, whose inner nature is so determined. Realization
and determination go hand in hand; laws determine the inner
nature of things, things manifesting that inner nature realize
the law. (Determination, though, also entails the "transcen-
dental cadre" status of law, where realization implies the
existence of actual subjects.)

This has certain implications for the continuity of
identity of a thing. We established earlier that a thing
remained the same if its inner operational coherence was a
going concern, was indeed "operational." Now it appears that
what is involved here is a continual realization of a thing's
law-structure (see III:111,fn,1). A thing remains a thing and
the same type of thing, even throughout continuous change,
because it continues to conform to its law-structure, it con-
tinues to be determined as such. Change occurs only within a
structurally determined totality which continues to maintain
Itself as such (see WdW:62-64); continuity of identity is an ongoing subjection to law. 19

A thing, in its determination by the law, remains a thing of a certain kind; "the inner operational coherence continues to reveal itself as an individual totality" (III:98). This latter points up, however, that our analysis remains incomplete. There is clearly more to the identity of a thing than its identity as a thing of a certain kind. "If this identity were to be viewed as that of the internal structural principle only . . . , then the datum in naive experience would not yet be accounted for in a sufficient way" (III:97). "Want dit gegeven is niet de constant identiteit van een elementair stam-type als bv. den 'atroparvus' zonder meer, maar zeer bepaaldelijk van dezen individueelen atroparvus hier voor mij" (WdW:61). The determination of the law is a typical determination; the laws are structural types. But a thing is an individual whole, its identity is also a-typically individual, and it is the individual whole which maintains itself throughout change.

The law-structures have both a unity-totality side and a typical side, and they are determinative of both these sides of the correlative subjects. Dooyeweerd is unequivocal, however, that individuality (in the sense of the unique, a-typical dimension) is a uniqueness of the subject-side. "The factual subject-side is always connected with individuality (actual as well as potential), which can never be reduced to a general rule" (I:105); "the ultimate individual is essential to the
subject-side of our earthly cosmos" (II:418; see I:83,152). Such individuality remains, however, "bound to its structural laws, which determine its margin or latitude of possibilities" (I:105); it "remains controlled and determined" by law (II:424). Individuality does not fall outside the determination of the law, it is not anti-law behaviour, but occurs only within the limits of possibility set by the law. This notwithstanding, individuality as such is not specified by the law, it can not "be reduced to a general rule"; the determination of the law remains typical, and does not approach to the actual individuality of things. Structural types "can never pass over into the a-typical subjective (or objective) individuality of the whole determined by them" (III:97). Individuality pertains to the subject, not to the law.

This becomes somewhat clearer when we remember that it is things that are individual, that individuality is of things. That a thing is a thing of a certain kind relates to its determination by the law, but any actual thing is an individual thing, it is this one here. Laws are fundamentally correlated with things, they determine things (wholes), but things are always individual things. We could perhaps venture to say initially that the individuality of things remains within the typical determination of the law insofar as it is a dimension of the things that are determined; laws determine wholes, and individuality has limits set to it insofar as it is a character of the wholes that are determined.
Laws, it must be remembered, are "principles of possibility" (I:105), they determine the limits of possibility. That is to say, the laws of the plastic horizon make for the possibility of things of certain kinds (types); within their structural frame, things of certain kinds are possible. But the laws do not themselves actualize these possibilities, they do not carry out what they set forth, realize themselves. This is what the subject does, this is its "proper reality and activity" (III:74). The laws typically determine, they set limits of possibility which are of the character of a type, so they can be fairly said to be indifferent to the individuality of things. It is the subject, however, which actually exists within those limits, which is bound to a "margin or latitude of possibilities"; being so bound, the subject gives evidence of those limits and displays a certain typical character—it is a member of a certain kind. But the law does not specify beyond those typical limits, there remains a latitude of possibilities not further spelled out; anything else relates to the subject's own existence within those limits, its own conforming to law. Hence the unfolding process within a thing is lawfully determined, it has a typical shape (with a certain qualifying function) and continues to hold together as a thing, but within those limits it is also uniquely individual.

... the qualifying function (in that individual manner, proper to this linden in my garden) continues to lead and direct its earlier functions ...; and that the inner operational coherence of this thing continues to reveal itself as an individual totality, in which every changed part continues to play its proper role. (III:98)
It is this individual thing which operationally coheres, that maintains itself as a whole, that conforms to law; this is what subjects do, subjects which are always individual. Laws are indifferent to the individuality of things, but actual conforming or subjection to law is done only by individual subjects. Individuality is a matter of being a subject, it is "proper to the subjective as such" (I:152); it pertains to the "full latitude" (I:187) remaining to a subject within the limits of possibility set by the law.

Doooyeweerd summarily formulates all this in terms of a law-side/subject-side correlation.

Our contention is that the identity in question must possess its law- and subject-sides in a mutual, unbreakable correlation; in other words, it must be both a-typically individual, and determined in conformity with its internal structural principle. (III:97)

A thing has both a law-side and an "individual subject-side," "subjective identity," or "individual identity" (III:97,98); it is both a-typically individual, and determined in conformity with its structural principle. This formulation leaves something to be desired in terms of clarity, but it essentially follows the lines we indicated above. The identity of a thing has both typical and individual dimensions, it is simultaneously a kind-member and this kind-member, and these are always together, simultaneous and interwoven in the same thing; a thing is typically determined by the structural type to which it corresponds, and hence bears that specific typical character (displays a certain typical groupage of functions), but it is
also in that determination a-typically individual.

The difficulty in this formulation lies not in Dooyeweerd's distinction of the typical and individual dimensions of a thing, but in the way he uses the terms "law-side" and "subject-side" in connection with that distinction. The passage can easily be taken to suggest that the "subject-side" is not identical with the actual whole thing, but is only its a-typical individuality, which as such is distinct from another internal "side" of the thing relating to its being determined in conformity with its internal structural principle (giving its typical dimension).20 We would have a distinction wholly within a thing, and the "subject-side" in this distinction would not be the side of the thing relating to its being determined by its structural principle. It is precisely the subject-side which is supposed to be so determined, however; the original meaning of the subject is "'sujet,' being subjected to a law which does not originate from the subject itself" (I:109-110), being, that is, determined by law. A distinction within a thing of a subject-side (the a-typical individuality), and another side (the typicality) relating to its being determined by law, then, would be at least terminologically out of kilter, for being determined by law and being a-typically individual are both proper to the subject-side, not just the latter. A thing's a-typicality may be distinguishable from its being determined by law (giving its typicality), but its "subject-side" should not be.
This suggestion, however, is corrected by the subsequent discussion. Therein it appears that the "law-side" of a thing is its determining internal structural principle (in its inner articulation) or structural type, its typical-structural conditions, while the "subject-side" is the actual individual thing itself. Hence it is only when we direct our attention to the "individual subject-side" that we see an actual unfolding process, a real operational coherence continuing to reveal itself as an individual totality. It is precisely this individual totality, moreover, which is said to be structurally determined by law (III:98). The Dutch points version of the passage in question in the same direction.

It is only individual subjects which are determined, which means that they are not only a-typical, but also typical. The typical determination of the law does not approach the actual individuality of subjects, however; it does not specify beyond setting typical limits. Hence conversely, a thing is not only typically determined, and hence bearing of a typical character, but within that determination, it is also a-typically individual.

Typical determination is the prerogative of the law; this is what the law does. It is appropriately called the
"law-side" of a thing, then, for it refers us to the law, within whose limits of possibility a thing alone exists; "law-side" serves to emphasize that a thing exist only in correlation with law. But that actual thing itself, that which the law determines, is a subjective individual—the subject is not the law. That a thing is determined by law tells us that it exists in correlation with law, but it does not inform us of the thing as such, its own peculiarity as a distinct correlate. It is the subject which individually exists within the determination of law; that is its prerogative.

The correlation, then, is not one within a thing between its "subject-side" and another side relating to its being determined by law, or even worse, between its "subject-side" and its determining law as also an internal "side" of the thing, but rather one between subjective individuals and the determination of the law; being determined is not something distinct from being a subject, but the law, which does the determining, is.

B. Structural Types

We have mentioned on more than one occasion that the laws of the plastic horizon are "varied according to types," but we have not yet examined precisely how Dooyeweerd conceives this. A cursory view will suffice for our purposes.

In Dooyeweerd's view, "every structural type exhibits an inner articulation of typicalness, descending from an ultimate irreducible general type to an ultimate species which
embraces no further specific types" (III:80). The problem is to "theoretically approach this articulation in the descending series of divergent structural types" (III:90) in a way which has a "foundation in the structural temporal order of created reality" (III:83), which is not an arbitrary method of logical classification (III:90). The key thing in the first place is to find "a criterion to establish the ultimate irreducible genera, which form the foundation of their further structural articulation" (III:83), a criterion founded in the plastic dimension of the temporal order. Dooyeweerd finds this criterion in "the typical structural groupage of the modal aspects within the structural whole" (III:83). That is to say, the primary distinction among structural types is in the modality of the leading function they prescribe; "this criterion delimits the ultimate genera of the structures of individuality, which, as such, are not enclosed in higher generic types" (III:83).

Dooyeweerd designates these ultimate genera "radical types," which are distinguished by the modality of the leading function they determine, or by the modality of their qualifying aspect (since they themselves represent a typical unity of order in a modal diversity of aspects). The radical type is

\[ ... \text{the elementary and most fundamental structural principle for the typical groupage of the different modal functions within an individual whole which lacks a supra-modal centre. It determines the modality of the leading or guiding function, which qualifies every individual} \]
totality belonging to the same kingdom ["kingdom" is the name Dooyeweerd gives to the things encompassed by a radical type]. (III:90)

As such, the radical types "circumscribe invariable structural orbits of individuality whose further typical articulation is dependent on them" (III:83), but they "do not inform us of the further inner articulation" of a radical type (III:90).

For this latter, Dooyeweerd turns to the actual type of individuality the leading function assumes.21

The radical types remain our starting-point. But now we proceed from the modal determination of the leading function of an individual whole to the types of individuality this function assumes in the inner articulation of a structural principle.22 (III:90)

At this point an immense diversity of mutually irreducible "geno-types" come into view, which further specify the "structural particularities in the descending inner articulation of a radical type" (III:93). Enclosed by their foundational radical type, these geno-types "de structureele eigenaardigheden van geheele groepen van individuen binnen eenzelfde rijk nader bepalen" (WdW:58); they further specify the typical groupage of functions of a thing, determining the type of individuality of the qualifying function (the type of individuality of the qualifying function is, it must be remembered, the functional key to the inner structural coherence of a thing, as the earlier functions anticipate the leading function in its type of individuality).

Further, geno-types themselves "may exhibit an immense internal differentiation of structural, mutually cohering
larger and narrower sub-types, which retain their internal geno-typical character" (III:94); this descending inner articulation will end, however, in ultimate sub-types, "which show no evidence of further internal differentiation" (III:94).

The entire differentiation of types, including the ultimate sub-types, very importantly remain types; the articulation ends in an ultimate sub-type, and does not pass over into individual subjectivity (WdW:59).

We have observed that a type, as a structure of individuality, has the character of a law. Within the ultimate sub-types of geno-types, no further internal differentiation is evident, but these types, too, can never pass over into the a-typical subjective (or objective) individuality of the whole determined by them.

Types are never so narrowed down that they become a-typical, relating to the individuality of a thing (and so only to that single thing); they never lose their typical character.

Types also remain laws, determining individual wholes. That is to say, in Dooyeweerd's words, this whole inner articulation of radical types, geno-types, and sub-types belongs to the law-side of cosmic time. As such, they have no duration, are not subject to genesis or change, are in no way dependent on the genesis of individuals in which they are realized, and indeed are the "structural frame in which alone the process of genesis and decay of individual beings is possible" (III:106).

They are of a structural a priori determining character, belonging to the ontic temporal order (III:106); in terms of Dooyeweerd's creation/becoming distinction, they are given in the creation order from the beginning, and determine the inner
nature of all individual perishable totalities which come to be in time (III:95) and function within their transcendental cadre (II:557). This is not to say that all of these types have been realized in every phase of development (III:170). Individuals may exhibit a specific geno-type not previously realized, but there can be no question of individuals in their genesis and evolution giving rise to new structural principles.

Ideovariations (mutations) which occur within the vegetable or animal kingdoms cannot give rise to new structural principles, but only to individuals which exhibit a specific geno-type not yet realized before. (III:94)

The inner nature of things can not be dependent on variable historical conditions; as soon as a type of thing is actually realized, it is bound to its structural principle. The realization of those principles is subject to the process of genesis, but not the principles themselves (III:95). Law- and subject-sides remain strictly irreducible.24

All the types we have been concerned with thus far relate to the inner articulation of a radical type; the structural particularities they indicate "are to be ascribed to the internal structure or inner nature of the individual whole" (III:93). The distinction between "the inner coherence of the structural functions within a typical structural whole" and "the inter-structural coherence due to its interlacement with other types of individual totalities" (III:92-93) gives rise to a general division of structural types into those which relate to the inner nature of a whole and those which relate to the
interlacement of wholes of different types. "The interlace-
ments between structures of a different type only find expres-
sion within the latter in special types of individuality which
are clearly distinct from those belonging to the irreducible
inner structure of the whole" (III:93). Dooyeweerd calls
types which are dependent on the interlacement of one thing
with others of a different radical- or geno-type, "variability
types." So, for example, a tree in a garden shows a variability-
type in its interlacement with the garden; "it has become a
garden-tree whose appearance typically differs from that of an
un-cultivated individual of the same geno-type" (III:97). Or,
individuals of a certain geno-type of animal will display cer-
tain variations relating to the environment in which they live
(III:94). The variability-types, then, do not relate to the
internal structures of things, as do geno-types; they only
"give expression to a variety of types of interlacement which,
as such, cannot determine the inner nature of the totalities
interlaced" (III:93). 25

It is not precisely clear what status Dooyeweerd gives
these variability-types. Subjectively speaking, they result
from the interlacements of individuals, but they remain vari-
ability types, and a type, for Dooyeweerd, has the character
of a law (III:97). They relate to the "law-side" of a thing's
"individuality" (III:97), but they do not determine the inner
nature of a thing. They present themselves within a radical
type (III:92), and the structural particularities they desig-
nate also seem to belong to the articulation of a radical
type (III:93), but some variability-types are "unnatural"
(III:93), and their basis is no longer to be found in their
genotype (III:639).

It seems possible, and perhaps even likely, given the
above, that Dooyeweerd views variability-types in much the
same manner as positive law. Positive law relates to the
variable human positivizing of normative principles, the
specification of those principles in a way more or less
accommodated to the course of cultural development (II:237-
238), and so differing with the various cultural areas and
their respective levels of historical development (III:172).
In this case it is only the normative principles which are
invariant, while the specified norms in which the principles
receive a variable positive content have a certain temporal
duration and are variable in time (III:174); they are distinct
both from the principles, as products of human formation, and
from individual subjects, as specifications of the principle
with a temporary validity and relative constancy. Positive
law can in a sense be seen as an "interlacement" of the
invariant principle with a certain historical situation.

Dooyeweerd self-consciously reserves the term "structural
principle" to internal-structural types, types which determine
the inner nature of a thing (specifically, to genotype-types in
their inner articulation and enclosure by the radical type).
The key passage relating to the relationship of structural type
and subjective individuality of a thing (III:97-98) consistently maintains a distinction between the internal structural principle of a thing, and the variability-types it exhibits. Hence "the ultimate sub-type of its geno-type is the boundary of the internal differentiation of its structural principle," but "in addition, it shows a variability-type in its interlacement" (III:97). That variability-types do not concern the inner nature of things in this context is very significant, for Dooyeweerd's argument concerning the invariance of structural principles relates to their determining the inner nature of things, and hence would not apply to variability-types. Further, the typical variations which accrue upon interlacement with other things are referred to as "pheno-typical mutable variations" (III:94; "pheno-type" is another name for "variability-type"). Finally, in a general discussion of the plastic horizon of cosmic time, Dooyeweerd adduces as one of its characteristics "that the structural principles themselves show different types of individual meaning" (II:558-559); these "types of individual meaning" which the principles show can only refer to variability-types—which hence seem to stand in much the same relation to principles as do positive norms, which give a "concrete sense" to normative principles (II:239).

All this is not to suggest that there are no real differences between positive law and variability-types, for there are marked differences. Positive law represents an internal specification of a normative principle, and is necessary for
the latter to take effect, or be "realized" (II:237), on the sub-
ject-side, being the "necessary link" between the principle and
that which is subject to it (III:173). Being the specification
of a normative principle, positive law is itself also of a norma-
tive character; because of the human formation involved, it rep-
resents an "human intervention" (II:237) with respect to the real-
ization of law, and can be itself more or less in accord with the
principle. In Dooyeweerd's view "interlaces are a necessary
requirement for the realization of the inner nature of a thing"
(III:93), and one could perhaps argue that with respect to non-
human types, although we do not have a "human intervention" with
respect to their realization, we do have a non-human intervention.
But even so, the variability-types which arise do not internally
specify the structural type, and serve as a link between the type
and things, but accrue only due to linkages of different types
of things. They are not results of "intervention" in the same
sense, but are of a de facto character; hence, neither are they
of a normative character, though they can be "unnatural."

In the ways we have mentioned, however, there are similar-
ities. Variability-types would seem to be law, as they are types,
but just as positive law, they are variable and temporary, giving
structural principles a variability of meaning.

So much for Dooyeweerd's thinking on structural types.
With this we have covered the main aspects of Dooyeweerd's theory
of things, at least insofar as the "introductory phase" (III:101)
of his theory is concerned, and we are now ready for a more inten-
sive comparison of his position with a substance view.
Notes

1 I will be avoiding as much as possible Dooyeweerd's usual designation "structure of individuality," or "individuality structure," because of the ambiguous way he employs "individuality." At times "individuality" is synonymous with "thinghood" or "thingness," being a thing rather than a non-thing, exceeding functionality. Sometimes "individuality" refers simply to a concrete, actual thing (an "individuality"). Often it refers to all constituents of the plastic dimension—acts, events, societal relationships as well as things. At yet other times it means the kind something is of, its kind-identity ("what is its individuality?"), and elsewhere refers to the a-typical, uniquely individual dimension of things. In this last instance the phrase "structure of individuality" becomes a misnomer, since for Dooyeweerd, individuality in this sense "can never be reduced to a general rule" (I:105).

Further, whatever the precise signification of "individuality," "structure of individuality" is used to refer to both law-structures and factual structures.

2 We mentioned previously that in the introductory phase of his inquiry, Dooyeweerd restricts his attention to the macro-wholes available to naive experience. It should be mentioned, however, that "what appears to naive experience as a simple structural whole will appear not to be simple at all from a theoretical point of view. Really simple structures are not to be found in the macro-world of human experience. Even in its inner structure of individuality everything in this world shows a more or less complicated interlacement of typical structures" (III:54-55).

The subject of enkapsis here referred to, which Dooyeweerd later builds out from his introductory investigations, will not be treated in this study. The introductory section of Dooyeweerd's argument in main lines indicates his own position overagainst a substance view on such key issues as the unity and wholeness of a thing amid its functional diversity, and hence will be sufficient for our purposes of a comparison with Aristotle.

3 In the case of the things we are interested in, the qualifying function will also be the thing's last (in the temporal order of modal aspects) subject-function. All later functions will be object-functions, which depend for their disclosure on corresponding subject-functions, not found in the thing itself.

4 The "typical groupage" of functions mentioned here refers to the same state of affairs as the "internal inter-modal structural coherence" of functions in the lengthy passage cited above. On a functional level what is involved is earlier func-
tions anticipating the qualifying function; the functions are "typically grouped," following the lead of or being directed toward that function which is the qualifying function. Since each of the earlier functions anticipates within its own limits another function which is also an internal subjective function of the thing, it is possible to speak of an "internal inter-modal structural coherence" of functions. We have seen that this process depends on the typical structure of a thing, that in this process internal structural functions are giving expression to the total structure of the thing (see III:133); hence it is "through the typical structure of our linden, as an individual living whole," that earlier functions acquire such a coherence, and likewise it is this same structure which "individualizes the modal functions and groups them together in a typical way."

That the "typical structure" in question "determines" the central role of the biotic function in the temporal coherence of functions indicates that it is a law-structure, not a factual structure. We saw earlier, also, that the type of individuality of a thing's modal functions was determined by the law-structure. The laws of the plastic dimension are structural types, so the typical character of the unfolding process is evidence of the determination of the law. This means that the structure on which the unfolding process is said to depend is not a structure internal to the thing; qua law, it belongs to the law-side of cosmic time. On the subject-side is the "temporal coherence of functions" or "typical internal coherence of functions."

We have seen that the law also, in its own determining way, lies at the foundation of the unfolding process in a thing. The law, however, is not a factor internal to the thing.

This does not constitute an "explanation" of thing-causality, nor is such possible in Doooyewaard's view. "The way in which the internal unfolding-process in a tree, in its inter-modal structure of individuality, is possible, is an unsolvable problem" (III:66), for the inter-modal continuity of a thing can not become a gegenstand of theoretical thought. Doooyewaard is establishing the proper framework within which to approach the state of affairs at issue. It is not a matter of modal-functional causality, levelling out modal boundaries--this "would only result in a pseudo-explanation" (III:62)--nor is the order of time the causal agent. Other than acknowledging that functions continue to hang together in an operational coherence in which the sphere-sovereignty of those functions is maintained, there is no explanation possible.

The Dutch version adds: "... in de continue tijdelijke dieptelaag der ding-realiteit." (WdW:45).
As was the case also with individual thing-causality, Dooyeweerd is not, I think, purporting to "explain" continuity of identity. As an attempt at explanation, the above is rather clearly empty; the question of continuity of identity is simply pushed back one step to a new, equally difficult, question, viz. continuity of internal structure, or inner operational coherence. To say that a thing remains the same because it maintains its internal structure is not an explanation, but either the raising of a further question—viz. how or why does a thing retain its internal structure?—or simply the statement of the same thing in different words, a mere truism. Dooyeweerd is aware of this, for he admits that saying what he has does "not penetrate to the inter-modal continuity of the individual whole" (III:65), and that indeed, "the way in which the internal unfolding-process in a tree, in its inter-modal structure of individuality, is possible, is an unsolvable problem" (III:66). The above should be understood, then, not as an attempted explanation, but as putting the problem of identity in an alternative conceptual framework.

So, for example, Dooyeweerd says that "the internal unfolding-process is executed so completely that the tree, as an individual thing (marked by its qualifying function), exhibits an integral internal unity" (III:60).

So, for example, "Want de interne eenheid kan niet in een wetskring besloten zijn, daar zij veeleer alle binnen de wetskringen besloten functies van het ding tot een individueele structuur-totaliteit samenbindt" (WdW:53).

If this not be understood, Dooyeweerd's ultimate reliance on the point of view of naive experience, after trying to approach the unity of a thing theoretically through the idea of the continuity of cosmic time, will seem like a "cop-out," or to use Dooyeweerd's word, a "deficiency" (III:66). Theory's approach to a thing can not but be from the point of view of its functional diversity, and so it will never be able to hold the unity of a thing in its view. At best it can get the typical groupage of functions within a whole in its grasp (III:63,77), but the unity and totality of a thing must continually recede before it. That unity is nonetheless there, as testified to by naive experience, which relates to a thing precisely as a unified whole, experiencing its modal aspects as "being together in a continuous uninterrupted coherence" (I:38).

This mention of a "supra-modal centre" is a reference to the selfhood of man, which in Dooyeweerd's view is supra-modal, and simultaneously supra-temporal. Dooyeweerd is evidently using "supra-" in the same manner that we earlier noticed he uses "transcend," viz. to lie above and beyond. The unity of a thing is not "supra-modal" in this sense; it does not lie
above and beyond modal diversity.

By this Dooyeweerd apparently means that the unity of a thing can not be resolved or exhausted in a single modal aspect (see WdW:53). In this instance the unity of a thing would be no different from its modal diversity, which is indeed modal diversity.

Also involved here is our earlier finding that the qualifying function can not guarantee the unity or identity of a thing; sphere-sovereignty entails that the "leading" of the qualifying function with respect to earlier functions can not be explained causally in terms of the qualifying function alone. The latter can not cross over its boundaries and "do" things to earlier functions.

It should be clear that we are dealing here with cosmological, not epistemological, limitations—with limitations that present themselves once a certain cosmological position has been taken.

We shall see that in all of this Dooyeweerd is motivated by his rejection of a substance solution. The latter can be avoided, in his view, only if a thing is thoroughly "meaning," and since "meaning" takes the shape of a coherent modal diversity, this means tying a thing as closely as possible to its functional diversity.

Just for purposes of clarity, "subjective individuality" means that the whole is qualified by a subject-function; "objective individuality" means that it is qualified by an object-function.

The phrase "internal structural principle" is unfortunate, as it suggests that the principle is internal to, or inside, the thing. This clearly is not the case, however, as these principles are stated to belong to the law-side of cosmic time—which means that they are not subject to genesis or change (III:94, II:557), have no real duration (III:79), and indeed are in no way dependent upon the genesis of individuals (III:106). Structural principles form a "transcendental cadre" (II:557) or "structural frame" (III:106) within which temporal things come to be and pass away, "in which alone the process of genesis and decay of individual beings is possible" (III:106); they are the "transcendental hypothesis" of the temporal unfolding process (WdW:55). They are realized in individual things, which is to say the structural integration of functions they call for shows up factually in things, but they are internal to them only in the sense that they rule the "inner workings" of a thing, its inner operational coherence. Realization does not mean internalization.

To continue this a bit further, if principles were internal to things, then properly speaking there would not be a correlation of structural principles and things, for "things"
would already include their structural principles; things would not be subject to law, but only the "subject-side" of things. Just such a correlation is affirmed in numerous passages, however (e.g. III:80, II:557, III:94-95, III:104,106); the law determines the whole, the individual totality (III:98). Reference could also be made to the comparable distinction in Dooyeweerd's theory of societal relationships; Dooyeweerd here speaks of "structural principles and the factual transitory societal relationships subject to them" (III:173-174).

If the structural principles were internal to things, then all the problems Aristotle has because his "form" is internal to things— questions, for example, of whether forms come into and go out of being, since the things they are in do come into and go out of being; whether one and the same principle is in all the individual things of that kind, and how that could possibly be; whether there must not consequently be a single paradigmatic form to which all forms in individual things correspond— such problems would then loom also for Dooyeweerd. He avoids these problems, however, by making the law external to and independent of things. To point up the extent of this independence, "unrealized" laws, types of which there are presently no individuals, yet belong to the temporal world-order (see III:94).

17And hence are based on, but not reducible to, the modal horizon.

18"Individuality" here does not refer to the a-typical dimension of a thing. After saying that the structural principle determines the individuality of the whole, Dooyeweerd goes on to clarify that it rules the structural coherence of functions of the thing, which latter can not be identified with the a-typical dimension of the thing; the structural coherence of functions is above all a typical coherence, a typical groupage of functions. Further, the correlation posited between principle as typical unity and thing as individual factual unity would also be out of kilter if the principle determined only the a-typical dimension of the thing. Finally, a "typical law of individuality" in the sense of a "typical law of a-typicality" makes no sense, if it is not a contradiction in terms; what would it mean for a typical law to determine primarily and only a-typicality as such? If individuality were identical with a-typicality, how could there be "types of individuality" (e.g. III:93)?

Alternative formulations of the same matter have the "individual identity" of a thing receiving its determination from its internal structural principle (III:65), structural types determining the whole (III:97), the determination of the individual totality (III:98), and the inner nature of individual totalities being determined (III:95). The latter passage is perhaps most clearly indicative of the thrust of
Dooyeweerd's view; structural principles determine the "inner nature" of things, their kind-identity, which means the "typical groupage" of functions they display. If the typical side of a thing does not relate to the determination of the law, the whole point of the law being a structural type would be lost (see, e.g., III:90: the radical type is the most fundamental principle for the typical groupage of functions within an individual whole).

It should be remembered that the law determines, it makes possible; it does not subjectively carry out what it stipulates. The latter is the realm of the "proper reality and activity" of created things (III:74). Hence although the law in the plastic horizon sets forth a typical unity of modal aspects, there is no actual ongoing operational coherence involved; the latter is found only on the subject-side of cosmic time, in the duration which remains, however, subject to the order of cosmic time (I:28).

The typical side of a thing could in turn be seen as its "law-side." The law-side/subject-side distinction would then be one entirely within, internal to, a thing. But importantly, there would remain in this case a distinction between "law-side" and "law," between the typical side of a thing and its structural principle, for the former is said to owe to the determination of the latter; the "law-side" of a thing would in this case relate to the thing's being determined in conformity with its structural principle, and so would remain distinct from the principle. Hence even if Dooyeweerd intended the distinction to be construed in the manner of above, there would be no ground for arguing that he was identifying the law with the typical side of a thing, so that the law itself would be a "side" of the thing in an internal sense. The identity of a thing, and the structural principle which determines it, are not identified, but remain distinct. (Here also it is the typical side of a thing which above all relates to the thing's being determined by law (see 18) -- another blow against an interpretation of the "internal structural principle" as an internal "side" of a thing, correlated with the thing's a-typicality, so that a "thing" would consist in a correlation of internal principle and a-typicality.)

Dooyeweerd never authorizes a distinction between the "law-side" of a thing and the law itself, however; such a distinction would represent an abrupt departure from his customary use of "law-side" as synonymous with the law, and for this reason also coalescing "law-side" and "subject-side" with the typical and a-typical sides of a thing is suspect as an interpretation. (Since there would remain a distinction between law-side and law, however, systematically it would do no great violence.) The argument against such a coalescing presented in what follows in a sense represents the reverse
tack, taking as its point of departure the usual meaning Dooyeweerd ascribes to being a "subject": the typical side of a thing also belongs to the "subject-side," for it owes to the thing's being determined. Viewing the subject-side as just the a-typical side is also, in short, a departure from Dooyeweerd's customary usage of "subject-side" as equivalent with that which is subject to, determined by, law (i.e. actual individual things).

21 We must remember that Dooyeweerd is "theoretically approaching" the inner articulation of a radical type, which dictates a functional approach. "De structuur-principes zelven zijn structuur-typen . . . , doch slechts vanuit de typische leidende totaliteits-functie theoretisch zijn te benaderen" (WdW:56). It is the structural principles, we have seen, which "individualize" the modal functions of a thing, give them their type of individuality (see III:76).

22 It is at this stage that the concept of "foundational function" enters the picture, but it is unimportant for our purposes.

It is worth remembering that from a strictly modal-functional point of view what is going on here (concomitant to the inner articulation of a radical type) is the "individualizing" of the general modal meaning of the leading aspect (see II: 414-426, pp. 32-34 of this paper). The "types of individuality" the leading function assumes "individualize" the modal meaning of the aspect, which is to say, they give it a material diversity of content.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the Dutch edition Dooyeweerd also spoke of a "gradual individualization" of the radical type, and "individualized" structural types (WdW:58,59). In the English version, however, this terminology has been totally discarded in favor of "inner articulation" or "inner differentiation"; individualization of modal meaning, however, is retained. Even in the Dutch edition, the "individualization" of the radical type ended at ultimate sub-types, i.e. it never reached to actual subjective individuality; modal individualization includes both law figures (e.g. positivizations of modal laws--see II:414) and subjective figures, and on the subject-side reaches complete or a-typical individuality of modal meaning (II:424).

23 Although this is the principle Dooyeweerd enunciates, it may be questioned as to how well he follows it himself. At times it seems that structural types do indeed become so narrowed down that they relate only to a single thing, and so are not types any more. Dooyeweerd speaks, for example, of "the structure of individuality of Praxiteles' sculptural masterpiece: Hermes with the boy Dionysus" (III:111), of "a particular structure of individuality" (III:112), of a peculiarity of Praxiteles'
Hermes which other works of art need not have but which is nonetheless essential to "the internal structure of this particular work of art" (III:117), of "the structural principle of Praxiteles' Hermes" (III:117), and of the further differentiation of the sub-type "sculptured figures of deities" being dependent upon a style-moment (III:121).

There is a certain ironclad logic to this position. Most any other position on the matter within a law/subject framework would have to explain how it is that laws can come into and go out of being—something which seems to jar with their law character, their being transcendental conditions—and almost inevitably would have to make distinctions between laws which do, and laws which do not, come and go, but which qua law, in point of being valid for subjects, are no different—an exercise hence with a certain arbitrariness.

The rigorous consistency of Dooyeweerd's position notwithstanding, allowing laws in the creation order for which there may be no subjects, seems to violate the principle, laid down by Dooyeweerd, that law and subject exist only in correlation; there are no subjects without laws to which they are subject, but also and equally, there are no laws without subjects for which they are laws.

It might be noted that Dooyeweerd's position in this regard is much more similar to that of Plato than of Aristotle. Aristotle maintained that there was no universal without (or apart from) an individual, no forms outside of things; but equally he maintained that there was no individual without a universal. Dooyeweerd allows that there is no individual without a universal law to which it is subject, but does not affirm the converse; in his view, laws can be without the corresponding individuals, and indeed are independent of the genea of individuals in which they are realized (III:106). Types are prior to individuals, given in the creation order, and are but realized in time; they themselves remain high and dry from the transiency and vicissitudes of temporality, without duration or change.

To extend the comparison a bit further, Plato posited an Ideal Form for all things to which the term "many" can be applied (Republic, VI, 507b); for all things of which there are "many" of them, there corresponds to them an Ideal Form. The individual things are what they are by virtue of being "copies" or "imitations" of the Form. This conception gave rise to the charge that Plato was merely duplicating this world with another, perfect world of unchanging Forms behind it, a world which nonetheless resembled this world; this world was merely an imperfect copy of the perfect world.

In Dooyeweerd's view, for every internal-structural type of thing, there is a constant-transcendental, typical law determining the inner nature of individual things of that type; things are what they are by being so determined, by the law
being "realized" in them. The notion of "realization" indicates that there is a sort of resemblance or sameness between law and subject; "in their realization in individual things or events laws have time-duration and actuality as transitory factual structures" (I:105). The law, just as the subject, is an inter-modal unity of order in a modal diversity, a typical structural groupage, only of (constant) aspects, not of functions (although Dooyeweerd even talks of the "qualifying function" of structural types at times—see III:83). In many ways the relationship between law and subject appears to be one of "exemplification." Individual things exemplify, or realize, their type, display the typical groupage in functions which the law has in aspects; the law is a typical unity, the things which realize the law are individual-typical unities.

The law in some respects appears as the lifting-out and raising of the common structure things of a kind display to transcendental type status, which is then seen as being "realized" in those things from which it has been extracted.

To return to the structural point from which the above excursus departed, it is very attractive to conceive geno-types and sub-types in the same manner as Dooyeweerd views "positive law" and possibly also "variability-types," viz. as historically conditioned, temporary-variable positivizations of invariant principles, but since Dooyeweerd identifies a clear distinction between geno- and sub-types on the one hand, and variability-types on the other, on what ontic grounds could this be done, maintaining the distinction Dooyeweerd identifies?

Further, in Dooyeweerd's view positivization is something proper only to "normative principles," laws "which cannot be realized on the subject-side without rational consideration and distinction" (II:237). The structural principles of things, being of a pre-logical modality, are not normative in character, and "are realized in the facts without human intervention" (II:237). The latter suggests, however, that "positivization" could be viewed simply as human or perhaps subjective-logical intervention with regard to the realization of law. Is it not meaningful, however, to speak of non-human or pre-logical "intervention" in the case of the realization of the pre-logical radical types?

25Variability-types testify to the fact that the seemingly "simple" structure of naive experience "only occurs in the full complexity of a universal interlacement of structures" (III:54). This is so because generally speaking, "interlacements are a necessary requirement for the realization of the inner nature of a thing" (III:93). Things only exist "in a universal order of interweaving coherence with all the other individuality structures" (III:632). It is this universal order of coherence that Dooyeweerd calls the "universe" or "temporal cosmos" (III:632).

These interlacements belong properly to the theory of enkapsis, but it should be said that the ever-widening coherences of things with other things in the temporal creation points again to their meaning-character. No thing stands by itself,
isolated, independent of relationship, but the creation is "horizontally" thoroughly referential, inter-dependent. As meaning-aspects are bound into a coherence of aspects, so things are bound into a universal interlacement of structures; where "the inter-modal coherence of the aspects finds expression exactly in their internal structures" (in "analogical moments"), however, interlacements between different types of things find expression only in variability-types, which are distinct from the inner structure of the thing (III:93).
IV. SUBSTANCE AND MEANING

To get at Dooyeweerd's criticism of the substance concept, we must recall the distinction made early on between being and meaning. Most generally, "Being is only to be ascribed to God, whereas creation has only meaning, the dependent mode of reality or existence" (I:73, fn.1). "Meaning" refers to a mode of existence which is thoroughly, to its very core, dependent, non-self-sufficient, and hence is referential to that on which it depends; such a referential mode of existence is proper to the creation. "Meaning is the being of all that has been created" (I:4). Meaning is the creaturely mode of existence; qua creaturely, the creation owes its existence to its Creator and so "constantly points without and beyond itself toward an origin, which is itself no longer meaning. It remains within the bounds of the relative. The true Origin, on the contrary, is absolute and self-sufficient!" (I:10) Qua creatures, things are not explicable in themselves, they do not stand on their own, but their very existence refers to an Origin, a Creator "to which meaning owes its ground and existence" (I:11). "Only God's Being is not meaning, because He alone exists by and through Himself" (I:97). In a general way, then, "being" is existence by and through itself, self-sufficient existence, "meaning" is existence by and through something outside itself, non-self-sufficient existence.
Given this understanding of meaning, "it will not do to conceive of created reality as merely the bearer of meaning, as possessing meaning" (II:30), for then created things must themselves have "another mode of being different from that of the dependent createably existence referring beyond and above itself, and in no way self-sufficient" (II:31). In this case things would have a core of "being," which would violate their createably character; they would stand self-sufficiently on their own, independent with respect to and hence overagainst God. If meaning designates a dependent, non-self-sufficient mode of existence, and it not be the "essence" (I:73,fn.1) or exclusive mode of existence of created things, then those things retain a core of independent, self-sufficient existence—something incompatible with their createably character. Nor will it do to conceive of meaning so defined as the relationship in which created things stand to their Creator, for then again those things in their own being as a distinct pole of that relationship must have a different mode of existence than the dependent mode of meaning. Post-creation things stand in relationship to their Creator, but more than that, their very being as things is createably being.

This puts us on the track of Dooyeweerd's deepest motivations for rejecting a substance concept; substance represents "being" within a creation which has only "meaning." Such a conception of substance Dooyeweerd consequently labels "metaphysical." A substance concept is intended to explain how
through the changes of accidental qualities a thing maintains its identity (II:11), but in Dooyeweerd's view does so by positing "a supra-temporal substance, possessing a permanence unaffected by the process of becoming and decay" (III:4), to which all processes of change are related. Substance exists in itself, being "the independent bearer of the changeable and accidental properties of this thing" (III:11), "the independent point of reference of all ontical relations" (III:11); substance stands in itself, independently behind its changing accidental properties.

So far we have remained on the level of Dooyeweerd's most general conception of meaning, viz. existence having its origin outside itself, depending for its existence on an origin, which corresponds roughly to simply "being a creature." Such existence refers beyond itself because it does not owe its existence to itself, but has its origin outside itself. The confession of creation leaves no room for anything "existing in itself"; fixed points in the creation are not to be found, for "this reality does not rest in itself" (III:109).

We have seen, however, that Dooyeweerd's notion of meaning is much more complex than this. It is informed not only by the confession of creation and the sovereignty of God, but also "of the fulness of created meaning in Christ" (II:31), all given a certain technical-philosophical shape. That creation exists in the mode of meaning means that it is a temporal coherence of a diversity of meaning, referring beyond itself.
and simultaneously beyond the limits of time to its radical concentration in a fulness of meaning, a fulness which is itself expressed in that coherent diversity; this fulness of meaning in turn refers beyond itself to the Origin of meaning, and is also in some way an expression of the image of the Origin. Hence to say that a thing exists in the mode of meaning takes on much more specific contours; it is bound to a temporal coherence, which latter refers to and is an expression of a supra-temporal fulness, which in turn relates similarly to the Origin.

In fact, nobody who speaks about modal aspects of reality, or even about concrete things, can understand them otherwise than in their meaning, that is in their relative mode of reality which points to their temporal coherence, to a totality in the root, and to the Origin of all relative things. (I:97)

A referring and expressing existence, taking the shape of above, is the mode of being of creation; these are the contours its dependency assumes.

Dooyeweerd's criticism of a substance concept, then, also takes on more specific contours. Substance represents "being" within a creation has only "meaning," but the latter must be understood now in the differentiated sense of above. The substance concept posits something standing outside the temporal coherence of meaning, that is not itself bound into it; standing outside, independent of the coherence of meaning, it is also unrelated to the fulness of meaning and the Origin of meaning. Substance stands in itself, independent of the coherences and relations it sustains, the latter being but
"accidents" of the fundamental underlying substance (III:102). Thereby such a substance stands "beyond and behind the horizon of meaning" (III:69), "independent and self-contained" (III:74).

We are now in a general way aware of Dooyeweerd's construction of the differences between a substance position and a position which takes its cue from the meaning-character of reality. It would be instructive to test and probe these differences, however, to see if we can not become more precise as to where the differences lay, and to see if Dooyeweerd's construction will hold up. We must also be alert as to any implications that exist for Dooyeweerd's own position.

Initially it can be established that it is not the general sense of meaning as "creaturely existence" which is primarily operative in Dooyeweerd's rejection of substance; we are no longer simply talking about things as creatures, and as such presupposing a Creator. This sense is present only insofar as the specific contours Dooyeweerd gives "meaning" retain this creaturely sense. Substance is not "being" in the sense of a self-sufficient or independent existence as such, with no further definition; it is "being" in the sense that it does not conform to the specific contours Dooyeweerd sees meaning to have. "Being" as non-meaning retains the sense of self-sufficiency, since "meaning" retains the opposite sense; but primarily it stands outside of the contours Dooyeweerd gives meaning.
That this is the case becomes especially evident in the case of Stoker's concept of substance. Prima facie, the general notion of meaning as "creaturely existence" is insufficient as grounds for rejection of Stoker's concept, for in his view substances are "created substances" (III:67) related immediately to God (III:75). Dooyeweerd recognizes this, but still believes Stoker's conception to be "metaphysical." The grounds for that charge, however, are not that Stoker denies that his substances have an origin outside themselves, are dependent for their existence on something outside their own existence. Those grounds relate rather to the specific way in which Dooyeweerd works out that dependence, and to his own conception of a thing based on that specific understanding. This will become increasingly evident as we pursue the differences between a substance position and Dooyeweerd's position.

That Stoker's view of substance should at least initially be compatible with the most general notion of meaning, viz. existence having its origin outside itself, is not surprising, for Stoker accepts the Christian belief of creation. Aristotle, as a pagan Greek, did not believe the world to be the creation of the Almighty God. Yet even his conception of substance admits certain dependencies of a substance on things outside itself. Primary substances (in the sense of the Categories) do not "exist in themselves" in the sense that they are independent of anything outside themselves, or even in the sense that they have no origin outside themselves. A substance is a
compound of form and matter, and comes to be only when the
appropriate form is introduced into the appropriate matter—
matters over which it has no control. In the case of living
things, the form is contributed by the male parent, matter by
the female parent. The genesis of substances is fully depen­
dent on other substances. The "formal" and "material" causes
are internal to the substance, but themselves are contributed
by other complete substances. In the genesis of a new substance,
there is always also a "moving cause" which contributes the
new form; this new form is indeed "new," for it only comes
into existence at the time of the generation of the new sub­
stance. Further, also as a "moving cause," there is the sun
"and its oblique course" (Meta. A 1071a15, Ross translation).
But there is even more. In all cases of generation, and through­
out the existence of a substance, the "final cause," the "un­
moved mover" pulls all things to their full perfection. Finally,
these substances are not supra-temporal; they come and go, and
simultaneously their forms come and go.

Neither does Aristotle, in short, conceive substances to
be self-sufficient or independent in an absolute sense, which
is the sense Dooyeweerd trades on when he equates substance
with "being." Only "prime matter," the ultimate substratum,
and the "unmoved mover" bear any resemblance to this construal
of substance.  

We must look to the specific contours Dooyeweerd gives
"meaning," then, to find where substance diverges from "meaning"
and becomes "being." The general notion of dependence does not seem adequate as a criterion of distinction; it is not helpful for getting at a substance's "standing in itself."

Our inquiry must turn to what Dooyeweerd refers to as the "cosmic coherence of meaning." From the point of view of creational diversity, this coherence into which diversity is bound is the key to the latter's meaning-character; it is via referring to a coherence of meaning that diversity of meaning is referentially related to the religious root and Origin of meaning. Perhaps this will help us to clarify how it is that a substance "stands in itself."

Initially we should become somewhat more precise as to how Dooyeweerd understands the coherence of meaning. We saw earlier in a general way that by saying a thing or modal aspect does not stand "by itself," Dooyeweerd means that it is related to other things in a coherence; a thing or aspect is not isolated, but refers beyond itself to its coherence with other things, and via that coherence, to its religious root and Origin. There is a very important difference in this regard between things and modal aspects, however. With both modal aspects and things it is possible to distinguish an inner structural coherence of the aspect or thing from an inter-structural coherence between aspects and things; in this regard they are parallel. But in its "analogical moments," every modal aspect refers in its very internal structure to all the others; in this way the coherence of all the modal aspects is expressed
internally in each aspect (see I:3). "In the structure of every aspect is expressed the unbreakable integral coherence with all the others" (I:176). Because of this "sphere-universality," each aspect "may be called a functional modality of the religious fulness of meaning" (II:7); each aspect "in its modal structure reflects the fulness of meaning in its own modality" (I:102).

This is not the case with regard to things, however; they do not express their inter-structural coherence with other things in their very internal structure (and in this way the fulness of meaning), but only in variability-types which remain distinct from their internal structure.

But here the analogy ends. For, whereas the inter-modal coherence of the aspects finds expression exactly in their internal modal structures, a similar state of affairs in the plastic horizon is precluded by the very nature of the structures of individuality. Here the interlacements between structures of a different type only find expression within the latter in special types of individuality which are clearly distinct from those belonging to the irreducible inner structure of the whole. (III:93)

Hence when Dooyeweerd asserts that substance is an independent point of reference of all its ontical relations, which we took to mean that it stood outside or apart from the temporal coherence, it becomes difficult to understand how Dooyeweerd really differs with this position. Not only have we observed that substance is at least genetically related to and dependent on other things (and insofar expresses its coherence with them), but now Dooyeweerd allows that a thing in its internal structure does not refer to and express its coherence
with other things; the latter is expressed only in types of individuality distinct from a thing's inner structure. Dooyeweerd, too, knows a distinction between internal structure and external relations (III:103), even if they always be together. Even in naive experience a thing's "inner destination is implicitly distinguished from its external teleological relations" (III:60); such external teleological relations "can only concern its reference to other beings," and as such they "lie outside of the internal structure of the actual thing" (III:60). The relations and interlacements of things with other things do not enter into their inner nature, but lie outside of the latter; the inner nature, like substance, is not changeable, and "stands behind" these relations.  

This is not to say that a thing does or could exist outside of relationships, that it is internally self-sufficient. Things are realized only in a "universal inter-structural coherence" (III:633), and could not exist independently of relationships; things are dependent on other things in coherences of ever-widening scope. But neither is a substance so independent; neither does it "exist in itself" in this sense. An individual substance is proximately dependent on its parents, but is also dependent on the motion the sun sets up, which in turn is dependent for its own motion on the celestial spheres and ultimately the unmoved mover.

A thing's internal structure remains, however, a point of reference for its external relations, a point of reference
which retains its own character distinct from its relations; its coherence with other things does not find expression in its inner structure, but the latter stands distinct from such reference and expression. 6

We must probe yet deeper, then, and look at the internal structure of a thing itself, as it compares to a substance view. It is here that the charge that a substance "exists in itself" seems to have some validity. Statements such as the following abound in the Aristotelian corpus:

Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the former that are substances. (Meta. A 1071a1, Ross translation)

Further, none of the categories other than substance can exist apart. (Meta. A 1069a25)

... and thirdly the complex of these two [the matter and the formula], which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification, capable of separate existence. (Meta. H 1042a30-31)

(By a "primary" substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something else, i.e. in something which underlies it which acts as matter.) (Meta. Z 1037b2-3)

And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it. . . . for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance . . . . Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others also is. Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance. . . . For of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance. (Meta. Z 1028a17-35)

... if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. (Cat. 2b5)

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called
substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else . . . (Cat. 2b15-16)

Aristotle is talking here about the relationship that exists between the category of substance and all the other (accidental) categories, and the difference between them. None of the other categories (e.g. quality, quantity) can stand on their own, but imply something else underlying them, sub-standing them; color, for example, is always the color of something. It is only substance which "exists apart" or "independently"; it alone does not involve the presence of something in something else underlying it. All the other categories come back to substance, as they represent a certain determination of substance; they can be said to be, but only in a secondary, derivative sense, in virtue of substance. It is substance which is without qualification, alone "existent in complete reality" (Meta. Z 1040b12), and on which the existence of all the other categories depends. As long as this fundamental underlying substance does not change, a thing will remain the same, notwithstanding change in accidents.

Dooyeweerd's view of a thing is in many respects, however, quite similar. "The modal aspects are only realized in structures of individuality, which in principle function in all the modal spheres of our temporal horizon" (III:78). Except for things which actually function, modal aspects would not be realized on the subject-side; their subjective presence always relates back to a thing. Functions and modal aspects, like "accidents," do not stand on their own; they are always functions
and aspects of things. Things, on the other hand, are wholes, totalities, complete realities, and are not "of" something else, as are functions; there is nothing "underlying" them as there is functions. Where Aristotle spoke of substances underlying accidents, Dooyeweerd talks about the "internal structure" (III:60), the "pattern of an individual whole" (III:63), the "internal structural unity" (III:76-77), or the "individual totality" (III:98) "lying at the foundation of" its modal functions; the Dutch version refers to the unity or identity "achter" the modal diversity of functions (WdW:50-51). Modal functions require a "foundation," and the internal structure or unity of a thing provides this foundation, and so is not itself in need of a foundation in the same sense. Just as accidents depend on substance, so functions depend on the "individual totality." Further, as long as a thing maintains its internal structure, it remains the same thing (III:65,79), notwithstanding "all transformation within its so-called 'accidental' properties" (III:97) and changes in functioning (III:97-98, WdW:62-64); it is the internal structure, that which "underlies" functionality, which is essential to the identity of a thing.

This internal structure is the same which we saw earlier provided a stable point of reference for its variable relationships with other things, just as substance was a point of reference for its variable ontical relations. Hence we must continue our inquiry yet deeper to identify where a substance
position diverges from Dooyeweerd's position.

If we look not just at the distinction between substance and accidents, but their relationship to one another, perhaps we will hit upon an important difference. Accidents are dependent on the substance, but what is the reverse relationship, how does substance relate to accidents? Only substance can "exist apart," it is without qualification "capable of separate existence," it alone "can exist independently," it is "self-subsistent." This should not be taken to mean that a substance is or even could actually be without accidents; substances always have accidents, their very nature as substance is to sub-stand accidents. Its own reality as a substance, however, seems to be distinct and separate from that of the accidents; accidents are by virtue of substance, but substance is without qualification. Substance is something itself, apart from its accidents; specifically, of course, it is a union of form and matter. Certainly substance is not in virtue of its accidents; only the reverse is true. But it seems unlikely that substance is in any way dependent on its accidents; it has accidents, but its own being is not integrally bound up with that of accidents, lest it not be without qualification. Substance underlies accidents, but is itself something else behind and apart from those accidents; it is in this sense something "in or by itself," in its own being independent of its accidents. At least theoretically it seems possible to separate a substance from its accidents—though in reality they
are never apart—to strip away all the accidents and leave just the underlying substance, as something (by) itself.

Dooyeweerd conceives the relationship between the unity and totality of a thing, and the modal diversity of functions which it underlies, quite differently. The unity of a thing is a non-modal unity, but it is a unity in a modal diversity of functions. The unity of a thing is nowhere but in its functional diversity; it is not itself a something apart from its functions. Unity remains distinct from diversity, but not as something with a separate, unqualified or primary being behind its modal-functional diversity. Both accidents and functions are dependent on respectively substance and unity, but where substance in its own being is independent of accidents, Dooyeweerd asserts the contrary: the unity of a thing is not independent of or separable from its modal diversity. The theoretical experiment of stripping away the modal diversity of a thing would leave no residue; the unity of a thing would also have disappeared, as it is a unity precisely of the functional diversity.

This is the case also when Dooyeweerd speaks of the internal structure of a thing "expressing itself" in its functions. This "internal structure" is not something by itself apart from functional diversity, but is precisely the typical groupage or inner coherence of functional diversity, the typical "unity of order" (III:80) in functional diversity; that a function is the "expression" of the internal structure means
that it has its place in the typical groupage or coherence, that it is also a "grouped" function, opened under the guidance of the qualifying function and so cohering with it.

The distinction internal structure/functions is not strictly coordinate with substance/accidents, then. The internal structure, the "substance" of a thing, is itself a typical coherence of functions, which maintains itself throughout change. A substance, however, is not merely a groupage of accidents; there is something more, which relates to a union of form and matter. It is worth noting by way of comparison also that the coherence of functions which the internal structure designates is an operational coherence; that is to say, it is a dynamic state of affairs, and in this way is also distinct from a substance conception. A thing maintaining its internal structure, its identity as the same thing, is not a static possession of an unchanging, underlying substance, but involves an ongoing working coherence of functionality.

Being a unity in a diversity of functions, a thing in this way is internally referential to the inter-modal coherence of meaning maintained by cosmic time; the unity of a thing is in fact itself inter-modal in character. Where in terms of its interlacements with other things (which gave it only variability-types of an essentially external nature), the internal structure of a thing was not internally referential to a cosmic coherence of meaning, then, in terms of its own make-up as a unity in a functional diversity, it is—and via reference to the cosmic
coherence of meaning, it is also referential to the radical unity and Origin of meaning.

Even the temporal identity of a thing cannot be experienced apart from the diversity of its modal functions; it is a relative identity, pointing beyond and above itself to the inter-modal meaning-coherence of time and the radical unity of meaning in the central religious sphere of our experiential horizon. (III:67)

Things are internally relative, being themselves a continuous coherence of meaning-diversity which "has its foundation in cosmic time" (III:75); the inter-modal continuous coherence of a thing's functions in cosmic time, which guarantees its unity (III:76), relates a thing in its very inner structure to the broader cosmic coherence of meaning.

A thing, then, refers beyond itself to the temporal coherence in which it is fitted, and itself expresses the inter-modal continuous of cosmic time; within its own inner structure, each of its functions points to its coherence with the others, and each is an expression of that inter-modal coherence. In this way a thing in its internal structure shares in "the universal character of referring and expressing, which is proper to our entire created cosmos" (I:4); it does not stand on its own or by itself behind or apart from this horizon of meaning à la substance in relation to its accidents. A thing does not have a modal diversity in the sense that a substance has accidents, and hence does not merely possess or bear meaning, but internally exists in the mode of meaning.

This would seem to be the key difference between Dooyeweerd's position and a substance position; substance, not being
a unity in a diversity, is not internally referential to a coherence of meaning.® We have narrowed the difference sufficiently to recognize, however, that this is not a case of the broad notion of "meaning" as dependent existence opposed to the correlative notion of "being" as independent existence. This is not what is primarily at issue, for by this criterion alone, Aristotle's substance would qualify as meaning. The issue relates rather to the specific form Dooyeweerd gives the notion of meaning, and to the conception of a thing based on that understanding. Substance is properly speaking "being" not in the sense of an absolute self-sufficiency and independence, but in the restricted sense that it is independent of its accidents, and therefore is not internally caught up in the cosmic inter-modal coherence; it does not internally refer beyond itself to and express a cosmic coherence, but rests by itself behind its accidents. Substance is "being," then, in that it departs from Dooyeweerd's specified understanding of "meaning." As such it retains its metaphysical implications, for meaning remains the mode of being of creaturely existence; but it is the restrictive sense of "meaning" which is operative, not the general-confessional one. Only from that standpoint can Aristotle be indicted for importing "being" into the creation.

Now from Dooyeweerd's standpoint, a position such as Aristotle's, with a substance behind its accidents, is inimical to a thoroughly relative, inter-dependent creation, and there-
fore deserves the indictment "metaphysical"; but it is less than clear that such a view is incompatible with a belief in creation as such. More than that, even if it be granted that such a relativity and inter-dependence is an implication of creaturliness, such a position may not be incompatible with relativity and inter-dependence as such, but only with Dooyeweerd's construal of the latter, which relies on a thing's modal diversity to tie it into a cosmic inter-modal coherence, which is the expression of a religious fulness. To say that a thing is a unity in a diversity of functions and thereby is caught up into a cosmic inter-modal coherence of meaning and an intricate network of back-and-forth reference and expression—to say that is to say much more than that a thing is a creature, and qua creature it is inter-dependently related to other creatures, all of which are dependent on an Origin.

This is the crucial point in the interchange between Dooyeweerd and Stoker vis-à-vis Stoker's "new concept of substance," so it will be instructive to examine that interchange.

Stoker proposes a substance apparently standing "behind" the modal diversity of functions—though some "inner connection" between them is maintained (III:75)—this because "the theory of the modal law-spheres does not explain the absolute internal unity of a thing" (III:62); modal sphere-sovereignty seems to preclude an individual whole, so a substance apart from the modal horizon is needed, and in this way an explanation of the internal unfolding process can be given (III:64).
Dooyeweerd agrees with Stoker as to "the insufficiency of the theory of the modal spheres to account for the internal structural unity of a thing" (III:62), but wants to stress the "unbreakable coherence between the functional structures of the modal aspects and the internal structures of individuality" (III:62). Both modal and plastic horizons are grounded in the same cosmic temporal order, and it is in the continuous duration of cosmic time that they come together; it is here that the unity of a thing and modal sphere-sovereignty have their deeper coherence. Hence the unity of a thing is to be found in the continuous coherence of its functions in cosmic time, rather than in something standing behind the modal diversity (III:63-65). The unity of a thing is consequently unisolatable by theory, and can be grasped only in the "naive experience of time" (III:66).

Stoker apparently does not consider this to be helpful, for time can not operate causally, so if a thing is only its functions and a temporal continuity, there is still no causal factor behind the diversity of functions, and the internal unfolding process yet goes unexplained (III:64). Dooyeweerd replies that Stoker is misconstruing his position at this point, that the continuity of cosmic time is not an external something which is added onto functions, but that functions are intrinsically temporal; further, the temporal horizon not only "lurks behind and in the modal horizon" (III:64), but has its "inter-modal prolongation in the continuity of the
cosmic coherence" (III:64), and thereby embraces also the plastic horizon. "Time, abstracted from empirical reality, cannot work causally" (III:64), but the continuity of cosmic time is "filled with reality" (III:76); it is not an empty abstraction detached from reality, and so Stoker's charge misses the point.

Dooyeweerd's vigorous reply here, however, can divert attention from the fact that functionality and its continuous coherence remain the only factors open to Dooyeweerd in dealing with things; an "inter-modal prolongation" of the modal horizon is the only "reality" which is available to the plastic horizon. Stoker's charge is insofar to the point. Thing-causality remains a problem for Dooyeweerd; he must simply posit that there exists a coherence between directing and directed functions "in the continuous real bottom-layer of a thing" (III:66), and admit that the unfolding process is essentially unexplainable (III:66)—which was Stoker's basic point.

Stoker considers this inexplicability of the unfolding-process on Dooyeweerd's terms, a deficiency in his theory, and so proposes to augment that theory "by an Idea of creation which, apart from the modal horizon of our experience, conceives of the unity of a thing in a new concept of substance" (III:66). It is important to note here that that new concept of substance is conceived as apart from the modal horizon, but not apart from a belief in creation as such. Hence Stoker's claim that the need for a substance concept shows "that created reality
does not exist in the mode of meaning, but only possesses meaning" (III:66), must be understood, as we shall see, as directed to the way Dooyeweerd has worked out the notion of "meaning"; that reality which is said to only possess meaning remains a created reality for Stoker.

Dooyeweerd finally repeats that theory is tied to the modal dimension of our experiential horizon, and the latter is intrinsically connected to the plastic horizon, so trying to theoretically get at the structures of things in a way which ignores the modal dimension is illegitimate; that is, conceiving the unity of a thing as apart from its modal diversity, as belonging to another "conic section" of the cosmos (III:66), will not allow that unity to be theoretically comprehended, and in fact constitutes an "illegitimate extension of the task of philosophical thought" (III:66). This argument does not concern the ontic state of affairs Stoker is proposing, however, but only the limitations of theory in getting at such a state of affairs, or the illegitimacy of the mode of theorizing being employed by Stoker (judged from Dooyeweerd's standpoint).

We have already suggested that Stoker's concept of substance is not an assertion of unqualified self-sufficiency within the creation; substance remains within the creation. His argument that substance does not exist in the mode of meaning, but only possesses meaning (III:66), assumes a belief in creation; substances are created substances (III:67), that
which only possesses meaning is itself still creaturely. What is intended rather is that the unity of a thing is not a unity in a modal diversity in Dooyeweerd's sense, but behind and apart from that diversity; only in this way, Stoker believes, can a real unity be maintained. Nor, accordingly, is that unity internally referential to a cosmic inter-modal coherence which in turn is the expression of a religious fulness. Stoker is rather clearly taking issue with the specific shape Dooyeweerd gives to the general notion of meaning as creaturliness or dependent existence. He accepts the creaturely character of reality, but rejects the way Dooyeweerd construes it in his conception of meaning, considering the view of a thing entailed by that conception to be inadequate. Stoker augments Dooyeweerd's view with a concept of substance which stands outside the network of meaning constructed by Dooyeweerd. Rather than being referential to God only through the intermediaries of a cosmic inter-modal coherence and a religious fulness of meaning, things on Stoker's view are related immediately to God (III:75); hence he criticizes "the Idea of a religious concentration point of our temporal world" (III:75). The legitimacy of Dooyeweerd's construal of meaning—and the conception of a thing implicit therein—is the crux of the issue.

For this reason Dooyeweerd's summary dismissal of Stoker's view as a neo-scholastic attempt "to discover a substantial being of created things as the independent bearer of meaning"
(III:69), an "independent point of reference for meaning" (III:67) which "is to be conceived as a being which cannot be identified with meaning" (III:67) appears as a rather empty and overblown charge, begging the very categories which are at issue. Stoker's substance is conceived to be apart from its modal functions so as to guarantee the unity of a thing, with accordingly no internal functional reference to or expression of a cosmic inter-modal coherence and religious fulness of meaning; it lies "beyond the horizon of meaning" (III:75) only in that sense. Dooyeweerd betrays this in his criticism, but continues to trade on the broader sense of "meaning" and "being."

It is true that Stoker does not intend to deny an inner connection between the modalities and his idea of substance. But he believes his concept of substance enables him to grasp an absolute ontical unity of a thing which lies beyond the horizon of meaning, and is really being, independent of its modal functions, whereas the latter are dependent on substance. And I deny that he is able to do so. (III:75)

Dooyeweerd is saying here both that things have no such ontical unity, independent of their modal functions, and also that a concept of substance does not enable one to theoretically grasp the unity of a thing in a way that is independent of its functions; neither point entails that that unity is something other than creaturely, however.

Now admittedly, Stoker must clarify his conception of substance, as Dooyeweerd insists. He must explain the relationship of substance to its functions in more detail, clarify the "inner connection" that is said to exist between them; he must specify its own nature, and indicate how the coherence of the
creation is to be understood, if not as the expression of a religious fulness. It could be that a unity such as Stoker is proposing would turn out to be incompatible with the full implications of the creaturely character of things, that the confession of creation is not coming through in his theoretical account of things in as rich a way as it could. That could be—but it is a point which must be argued. It will not do to assume the correctness of one's own conceptual rendering of a certain given, and from that standpoint dismiss another position as in conflict with the given, when it is the conceptual rendering and not the given which is being questioned. Dooyeweerd, of course, believes he can maintain the unity of a thing, and allow for its internal unfolding process, within his own conceptual framework, without a concept of substance, but this is not to argue that a concept of substance is in conflict with the creaturely character of reality.

One such argument Dooyeweerd does put forth serves in a way to unwittingly strengthen Stoker's suit. Dooyeweerd argues that a unity such as Stoker is proposing for things is to be found only in the religious concentration-point of meaning.

The radical unity of the different modalities in which they coalesce, is not to be found in a supposed ontical sphere of substances which, as such, is sought beyond and behind the horizon of meaning. On the contrary, it is the concentration-point of meaning in the imago Dei, which is nothing in itself, but rather the reflection of the Divine Being in the central human sphere of creaturely meaning. (III:68-69)

Again, Stoker's unity is beyond the horizon of meaning only
in the sense that it is beyond the horizon of modal diversity. Dooyeweerd argues, however, that it is only the religious concentration-point in the *imago Dei* which presents such a unity; such a unity is not possible within time, and so is not proper to things. That concentration-point is itself also "behind and beyond" modal diversity, however. Dooyeweerd allows, then, for a unity such as Stoker is proposing, but only denies that it can be found within time, that it is proper to things. Such a unity is *ipso facto* beyond the boundary of cosmic time, which fits modal diversity into a coherence. Further, this concentration-point, its supra-temporality notwithstanding, remains itself meaningful; being above and beyond modal diversity does not mean that it is no longer meaningful. Hence it would seem that Stoker's substance qua ontic unity independent of modal diversity is not incompatible even with "meaning" in its restricted sense; it is simply mislocated in Dooyeweerd's view, put where it does not belong, ascribed to things which should not have it. Only man has a "supra-temporal selfhood," not palpably temporal things.

The modal aspects of reality find their deeper identity in the central religious sphere alone. But temporal things are perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal, individual whole, i.e. of a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions. By giving things a radical unity, a unity above and beyond modal diversity, Stoker, says Dooyeweerd, is giving them something supra-temporal, which makes them substances in the metaphysical sense. But Dooyeweerd's position here presupposes
the whole notion of radical unity transcending temporality, that radical unity is indeed supra-temporal—a notion which has become increasingly suspect. He does make the point, however, that there is an important difference between man and non-human things, which must be acknowledged even if a "supra-temporal heart" be discarded. Stoker can reply, however, that granting a unity such as he proposes to things does not necessarily obliterate the difference between man and non-human things, that perhaps the difference does not lie in the relationship of unity to functional diversity, that a unity such as he proposes is not per se an imago Dei or selfhood. How else the difference is to be seen, however, is something Stoker must clarify.

By this time it should be clear that Dooyeweerd's view as to the structure of a thing coheres integrally with his broader philosophical conception of the universe. When Dooyeweerd elevates the radical unity of meaning-diversity outside of time, and equates temporality with the realm of continuous coherence of diversity, it leaves him the problem of the unity of fully temporal things. This problem is accentuated by the fact that Dooyeweerd formulates this all in terms of modal diversity. The religious fulness of meaning is the convergence of all temporal modal aspects of meaning, and conversely is split apart in time into a diversity of modal aspects of meaning. The cosmic coherence of meaning is an inter-modal coherence (I:24), the continuity of cosmic time is inter-modal (III:
64-65); a diversity of modal aspects is bound into a coherence in which every aspect refers beyond itself to and expresses its coherence with the others (I:3-4). Temporality comes to the plastic horizon only by way of the modal horizon, so that remaining to it is only temporal reality's "inter-modal prolongation in the continuity of the cosmic coherence" (III:64); this is all the "more" there can be to a thing.

The above represents the context within which the unity of a thing is to be found, then. That unity can not be such as to stand outside a continuous coherence of modal diversity, for that is all that is possible within cosmic time; it is a unity only in a modal diversity, an inter-modal unity. In its cohering modal diversity, however, it is referential to and expressive of the cosmic inter-modal coherence; precisely by way of the coherence of its functions it is related to the cosmic coherence, and thereby the religious fulness of meaning. Hence in this framework a substance position is avoided, for a thing does not stand on its own but is internally caught up in the referring and expressing of the inter-modal coherence, in the essential unrest of meaning.

All this involves, however, a virtual identification of meaning-diversity and modal diversity, meaning-coherence and modal coherence. A substance position becomes in effect one which conceives the unity of a thing to be behind or apart from its modal diversity; it is in this way that it does not exist in the mode of meaning, but since "meaning" also retains its
sense of "creaturely existence," such a position assumes "metaphysical" proportions. Not being tied into the network of inter-modal reference and expression, substance simultaneously stands outside creatureliness, or at least (Dooyeweerd's construal of) an inter-dependent creation. It appeared, however, that Dooyeweerd has room in his creation for a similar unity which still remains meaning, only outside the boundary of cosmic time, proper only to man. This means, however, that to suggest that if a thing's unity not be a unity in a modal diversity but is independent of its modal diversity, then it will be a "metaphysical" substance incompatible with the creaturely character of things—to suggest that, not only begs the conceptual contours given to "meaning" as creaturely existence, but is not true even granted those contours.

The danger exists that in this set-up a thing will be dissolved into its functionality so as to retain its thorough meaning-character, leaving no stable point of reference for functionality lest the problem of substance loom. Functionality is certainly referential to an inter-modal coherence, but it is always of something. Functions do not just occur, they require something which functions, something lying at their "foundation." It is the strength of a substance position that it can provide this point of reference, this "foundation," for functionality. The question may be asked whether Dooyeweerd in his desire to avoid a metaphysical substance and to assert contra substance the thorough relativity and inter-
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dependence of created things, has, because of the way in which he construes diversity-coherence of meaning and its radical unity, lost also the reference point for functions that substance provides, lost a foundation for functionality which is not itself functionality.

The unity of a thing in Dooyeweerd's view is non-modal, but only in the sense that it is inter-modal, distinct from a merely modal matter, a matter pertaining to a single mode; but this does not really remove that unity from the category of modality as such. The internal coherence of the diversity of functions within a thing is also inter-modal (III:59), so the unity of a thing becomes hard to distinguish from the "inter-functional coherence" it is said to presuppose (III:59). There is no question but that the unity of man can not coalesce with the mutual coherence of his functions (I:16); that unity lies above and beyond the coherent modal diversity maintained by cosmic time, being "the single central point of reference" (II:115) for all its functions, expressing itself alike in all of them. The unity of man "lies at the basis of" all his functions "as their presupposition" (I:5). In the case of things, their unity must also "lie at the foundation of" their internal structural functions, must be "more" than functional, and express itself in functions; but since their unity, unlike the unity of man, remains enclosed within time and its continuous coherence of diversity, there seems to be no room for it. There seems to be no option but that in the
case of things, unity coincide with coherent diversity, and so cease to be able to provide a foundation for the latter; it will itself require the same foundation.

Unity must exceed functional diversity, but not in a way which involves an additional structural factor; within time, there is room only for coherent diversity, for "inter-modal prolongation." Dooyeweerd appeals to the continuous coherence of functionality in the temporal duration of a thing (III:63-65,76), but it is precisely this functionality which qua functional requires a reference point, so looking to its continuous coherence for the unity of a thing does not seem helpful; the continuous coherence of functionality already itself assumes or requires a reference point, so can not itself serve as that reference point. The unity of a thing, to serve as the "foundation" of its coherent diversity, must be distinct (not necessarily apart) from that coherent diversity, must not be the same as it, must "go beyond" it, but there just seems to be no room for that; a continuous coherence of functionality is still a coherence of functionality.\(^{11}\)

Dooyeweerd's own argumentation concerning the inexplicability of the internal unfolding process from a functional point of view, modal sphere sovereignty's seeming preclusion of an individual whole, forced him to posit an "individual thing-causality," to recognize something "behind" functionality, expressing itself in functionality--something "lying at the foundation of" functionality, "achter" the modal diversity,
whether that something be designated "unity," "individual pattern," "internal structure," or perhaps "substance."

But he will allow only an inter-modal continuous coherence of functions to be that which "lies at the foundation." The identity "achter" its modal functions is the cosmic-temporal structure of a thing (WdW:51); individual thing-causality is the coherence between directing and directed functions in the continuity of cosmic time (III:66). That is to say, Dooyeweerd allows only a coherence of functions; there is nothing really behind or at the foundation of functions, but there is only a coherence between, inter-functions. There is nothing of which functions are functions but a coherence between them.

When Dooyeweerd wishes to emphasize the presence of a reference point, he speaks of the unity or internal structure of a thing expressing itself in its internal functions, but we have seen that this is a somewhat misleading formulation. That "internal structure" is itself a typical coherence of functions, and its "expression" in functionality only signifies that those functions are opened under the guidance of the qualifying function, and so cohere with each other. That is to say, the "internal structure" and its "expression" in functions really designate the very same state of affairs, viz. a typical coherence or groupage of functions; that structure can not lie at the foundation of those functions, because it is those functions. A particular function has its place within
the coherence, but it is just that coherence which requires a reference point.

Dooeyeweerd can appeal from the typical pattern of the subjective coherence of functions to a law ruling that coherence, on which it depends, but the law only rules the functioning, it does not itself do it or make it happen; the law will not serve as the needed reference point for functioning. Here an internal structural principle that was indeed "internal," arranging and grouping functions, at work within a thing "expressing itself" on all modal levels, might have been helpful; indeed, a case can be made that Dooeyeweerd's use of the word "internal" is not a mistake. That principle presents the same problem on its own level, however, as it too is represented as an inter-modal unity in a modal diversity, only of aspects, not functions (III:80).

Dooeyeweerd, then, has theoretic difficulty with the unity of temporal things, with maintaining a reference point for their functioning which is not itself dissolved into functionality. His technical construction of meaning, relying so heavily on modal diversity and coherence, and allowing a radical and central unity only beyond time, leaves little room for a temporal unity and reference point. The point Stoker can be seen to be making, I think, is that if meaning is to be the mode of being of reality (in the creaturely sense), and if things are to be irreducible to the modal horizon, then there must be a category of meaning proper to things as things.
Appealing to their modal diversity and inter-modal coherence is not sufficient, for meaning can not be tied to modal diversity. If the latter link is made, it becomes permissible to speak of things as only having meaning, rather than themselves existing in that mode. It remains, however, for Stoker to show that this would not sacrifice the coherence and inter-dependence of the creation—though no longer construed as the expression of a religious fulness which can not be contained in time.

There is another aspect to this problem of a reference point, which goes beyond functionality to larger, more complicated configurations. We can not go into much detail here, largely because Dooyeweerd offers little, but on this level the problem is magnified.

Dooyeweerd apparently allows no essential difference in internal structure between things, acts, events, and societal relationships. They are all individual totalities belonging to the plastic horizon, all possessing "structures of individuality," in principle functioning in all modal aspects; they all present an inner coherence or typical groupage of functions, an inter-modal unity in a functional diversity. A thing in its internal structure manifests no particular differences from the others. They can be discriminated in terms of the aspects in which they have subject-functions, and in terms of relative permanence—"A thing in its proper sense implies a relatively constant realization of its individuality-structure"
(III:111, fn. 1), and "lacks subject-functions in the logical and post-logical aspects" (III:197)—but they are all "individualities" which "function" in the modal spheres, albeit in a more or less stable way. In this regard they seem to be strictly coordinate.

This is highly questionable, however. It seems that a distinction must be made here, a distinction which will have the effect of bringing us, in some ways, close to a substance view. Things (and man) must be granted a prime status, much the same as that granted by Aristotle to primary substance: "if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist," for "they are the entities which underlie everything else." Events, acts, societal relationships all presuppose things; they are either of or between things, or a constellation of a number of things acting in relationship. Relationships require relata, acts actors, events both. Things can exist outside of any particular relationship, act, or event; no event, act, or relationship can occur, however, without things. In this sense things can be said to be "alone capable of separate existence," alone able to exist "independently."

It is only things (and man) which properly speaking should be said to function; they are the fundamental units of activity in the world, from which functioning arise acts, events, relationships. Things-functioning are the primary constituents of the creation. The activity of a thing is its
activity alone, unattributable to something else, whether it be another thing or relationship or law. Laws set limits to functioning, and relationships condition functioning, but they do not themselves do it or make it happen. This is the mystery of subjectivity; subjects are the loci of activity.

Stoker probably has something like this in mind when he speaks of "die eien zijn en die eienwaarde van die kosmos teen-over God" (III:71, fn. 1). Things must stand as genuine existents, irreducible to and undissolvable into something else; their activity and existence is theirs, distinct from that of something else—which is not to say that they are self-sufficient or self-originative.

It is this prime position of things as distinct from all other realities in the creation that a substance view rightly underscores, and which Dooyeweerd only hesitantly and ambiguously honors.

Notes

1 This section of the study should be regarded as rough, initial thoughts indicating areas requiring further reflection and discussion, rather than as finished conclusions. Materials which are centrally relevant to the matters discussed here—Dooyeweerd's series on the "Thomistic Substance-concept" in Philosophia Reformata (1943-1946), Stoker's Die Wijsbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee (1933)—were not consulted due to limitations of time and language.

2 It is telltale that on this general, almost confessional level, the concept of "expression" seems to be unusable.

3 Unless this be understood, that "meaning" has rather specific contours and does not mean simply a creaturely mode of existence, the preliminary question Dooyeweerd insists that Stoker answer becomes rather puzzling.
"Now I stick to my opinion that this question [whether Christian philosophy can do without a concept of substance] can only be considered to some purpose, if beforehand the preliminary question has been answered: What is the creaturely mode of being, what is the being of all created existence?" (III:32)

If that mode of being is creaturely, if the existence is created existence, then the question has already been answered. But Dooyeweerd has more in mind than just this; his own answer of "meaning" goes beyond just a creatural mode of existence. Otherwise we would have a simple pleonasm here.

^Dooyeweerd's criticism of Aristotle proper is somewhat ambiguous on this point. At times he seems to concede that Aristotle's conception of substance as such is not "metaphysical," it is only the form of a substance which is being. But the form of a substance needs matter for its realization, so neither is it substance in the metaphysical sense (III:13, II:12). Dooyeweerd's basic criticism is that Aristotle is unable to achieve a unity of form and matter, so that his conception of substance reaches an impasse. But the general thrust of his argument also seems to be that the conception of substance is indeed metaphysical, or at least wants to be. With his notion the "fatal tendency to confuse the metaphysical concept of substance with the concept of a thing" "received its explicit formulation" (III:18); Aristotle's conception of substance has "a deceitful resemblance to the naive conception of things" (III:9), so it is all the more important to show that it "has nothing to do with the naive conception of individual things" (III:17-18). Dooyeweerd is perhaps saying that a metaphysical substance can not be identified with an actual thing without jeopardizing the metaphysical status of the substance; it is precisely that "metaphysical" status, however, which is the issue.

^It is interesting to note that in the case of things qualified by an object-function, this is not the case; such things refer also in their very internal structure to other things, and hence Dooyeweerd can readily demonstrate their meaning-character.

"The mistake, inherent in the distinction between created reality and meaning, is nowhere more apparent than in things whose qualifying function is only given in a subject-object relation. For it is really impossible to ascribe their typical nature to an independent "substance". Their very nature is meaning, realized in a structural subject-object relation. A bird's nest is not a "thing in itself", which has a specific meaning in the bird's life. It has as such no existence apart from this meaning" (III:107-108).

This demonstration does not apply, however, to things qualified by a subject-function; their internal structure is not internally
referential in the same way. It could be, then, that a distinction between created reality and meaning is getting at the difference between things qualified by a subject-function and things qualified by an object-function, or between internal structure and external relations.

This brings us again into the matter of enkapsis. Dooyeweerd is unequivocal, however, that the things bound into inter-structural enkaptic relationships "have an independent internal leading function and an internal structural principle of their own" (III:637); "the enkaptically interwoven thing with an independent individuality structure of its own is influenced by this union with another thing only in such a way that the interwoven thing maintains its internal structural law" (III:639). The "sphere-sovereignty" of bound structures is left intact (III:639).

Dooyeweerd's theory of enkapsis entails that the macro-wholes of naive experience are themselves interlacements of different typical structures, i.e., that internally things present a coherence of structures. But in the case of each of these structures which are interlaced within a macro-whole we have the same situation we have found on the macro-level with things and their inter-structural interlacements with other totalities; each interlaced structure within a macro-whole retains its "sphere-sovereignty," and expresses its coherence with the other structures within the macro-whole only in external (variability) types of individuality.

It is interesting to note that in regard to its inner structure as a unity in a diversity, a thing parallels the structure of a modal aspect, which is also "a temporal unity in a diversity of modal structural moments" (I:85). Where the inter-structural coherence between things was not exactly parallel to the inter-modal coherence between the different aspects, the latter being expressed precisely in the internal structures of the aspects, in the case of the internal structure of a thing, then, there is a parallel to that of the modal aspects; a modal aspect presents an "inner structural coherence" similar to the "inner coherence of the structural functions" (III:92-93) of a thing.

Other matters could be adduced, for example that things are determined by laws transcending those things, so that in this way also they are not self-sufficient; they exist only within the limits set by the law. Substance, if conceived as a union of form and matter, has its law internal to itself. The latter can be understood, however, as belonging to a substance's "primary and unqualified" existence, so as regards the internal make-up of a thing, the difference we have indicated remains the key one.

This may mean that some of the same problems that attend
Dooyeweerd's religious concentration-point as a unity above and beyond modal diversity (see section II., 13), also apply to the unity Stoker is proposing.

10 The Dutch makes the comparison between a "metaphysical substance" and a "supra-temporal selfhood" more explicit.

"De in de tijdscontinuïteit gewortelde, subjectieve ding-identiteit is echter niet een metaphysieke identiteit der modale zinfuncties van het ding. De modale zin-zijden der werkelijkheid vinden haar diepere identiteit slechts in haar boven-tijdelijke zinvervulling. Maar de tijdelijke dingen zijn vergankelijk, zij hebben geen boven-tijdelijke zelfheid en hun ding-identiteit is geen metaphysische 'substantie'" (WdW:45).

11 This is perhaps the background to Stoker's charge that Dooyeweerd's "more," the continuity of cosmic time or temporal coherence, is "empty" (III:64-65); it relates to what seems more of a historical-durational factor, so that structurally, it adds nothing to the equation.

Dooyeweerd is definitely saying that this is as far as one can go theoretically in approaching the unity of a thing. Beyond this, one can only appeal to the naive experience of a thing as an integral whole. But the suggestion is given that the continuous coherence of functions is the "more," that there is no more. Dooyeweerd's most nearly definitive statement on the matter seems singularly unhelpful from a theoretic point of view: "And this 'more' does not mean an empty temporal coherence . . ., but it lies, within time, in the reality of the thing itself, as an individual and integral whole" (III:65). The temporal coherence is not "empty," but is "filled with reality" (III:76); things also are present in time's continuous coherence (III:64), but only as an "inter-modal prolongation" (III:64). That inter-modal continuous coherence, then, seems to remain the "more," only not as an empty coherence, as Dooyeweerd understands that.

12 Dooyeweerd's ambiguous tendency to view the structural principles of things as "internal" to them moves in the direction of reducing things to their being determined by law—again no doubt motivated by a desire to avoid substance within the creation. Things in this case no longer stand as genuine correlates, having their own proper reality and existence within the determination of the law; their very durational existence, the ongoing operational coherence of functioning, is attributable to the efficacy of the "internal structural principle." All that remains as a correlate to law is a-typical individuality, which is not itself a source of activity, but only a trait of the activity stemming from the efficacy of the law. Things become explained or "accounted for" in terms of the
law. Their activity is attributable to the law, or is the doing of the law, or is the "realization" of the law; functions are themselves "individualized" by the law.

13 The dimension of structures of individuality "manifests itself in concrete things and events, and also in the typical structural relations of human society" (II:557). "In naive experience we grasp reality in the typical total structures of individual things and concrete events" (I:41). The structural laws of the plastic dimension "determine the inner nature of things, events and social relationships functioning within their transcendental cadre" (II:557).

"The temporal unity of an individual whole (no matter whether it is to be conceived as a thing or as an event), in the diversity of its modal functions, is not modal in character . . . " (III:100). "The only radical difference between a human community and a 'thing' is to be found in the fact that the former has subject-functions in all the modal aspect of human experience and human social existence" (III:198).

"As to 'will' . . . we must remark that it is a specific direction of human 'acts', which have different modal aspects and may assume different structures of individuality" (III:69; see II:112-116).
V. BIBLIOGRAPHY


