PAUL TILlich: HIS ANTHropology
as key to the structure
of his thought

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Terry Ray Tollefson
Institute for Christian Studies
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INTRODUCTION

The structure of Tillich's thought has remained somewhat of an enigma to most of his readers. He seems to use common words and concepts, but in apparently confusing ways. Scholars have tried many approaches in an effort to grasp the thought of Paul Tillich. Kenneth Hamilton in The System and the Gospel speculates on the idea that Tillich's system seems to differ somewhat from a more orthodox, authoritative revelation approach. Leonard F. Wheat, in Paul Tillich's Dialectical Humanism takes more of a book-burning approach, portraying Tillich as a deceptive man who attempts to lead Christians astray from basic Biblical truths. A Jewish thinker, Bernard Martin, seems to realize the importance of existentialism for Tillich. In The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich, he consistently points out Tillich's selective use of the Bible, but can only vaguely explain why this might be so.

The most successful approaches to Tillich have been those which have recognized to some extent the pattern of tensions within his thought. James Luther Adams, to this point perhaps the definitive interpreter, often points out the tension in Tillich's thought between the ground of all meaning and every particular meaning. Robert Scharlemann, a more recent excellent source, sees the paradoxical nature of Tillich's thought, and indeed calls it Tillich's great contribution to the solution of the problem of
the historicality of knowledge. Grasping somewhat the contradictory pattern in Tillich, Scharlemann uses this insight to capture Tillich's intent and to even go beyond it with his own ideas.2

Having spent several initial months reading a great variety of Tillich's works, and then concentrating especially on his Systematic Theology, I noted a consistent pattern in Tillich's thought which I was able to capture through the utilization of a modified Vollenhovian Problem-Historical approach.3 There was the repeated pattern of the movement of life described as separation and reunion, along with the continuous tension between the infinite and the finite which served to perpetuate this process. In turn, these universal tensions were mirrored as tensions within man himself.

It is the thesis of this paper that the anthropological type known as "contradictory monism" can be applied to Paul Tillich's thought to aid in understanding the structures and tensions within it. Such an approach is not undertaken to "pigeon-hole" a great thinker, but rather to open him up with the intent to understand more clearly his contribution.

For the Christian, the anthropological approach is indispensable. It unlocks the door to questions of cosmology, of man and the world, and of what is taken to be of ultimate importance in the universe. In short, the anthropological type encapsulates a certain world-view, which is utilized in terms of the spirit of a thinker; in Tillich's case, an existentialist's spirit. Without the integrating function that such a method can provide, one is
seemingly left with only an eclectic or thematic approach at best.

Tillich's work is a tight system in which every part presupposes the other parts. He often uses language in a way that appears confusing and inconsistent. One helpful way to penetrate his thought with a view to clarifying its movements is to employ a method which uses his anthropological model as the key to his thought.

In this thesis, we shall attempt to move through the maze of Tillich's work by first discussing the tensions within man himself. Then we shall note how this tension is caught up in the tension between Creator and creature, so that the creation and fall must coincide as one event. Separation becomes a prerequisite for the full actualization of creaturehood. Chapter III will note how the essential tension within man loses its equilibrium as a result of sin or estrangement. A discussion of redemption in Chapter IV will point to the need to creatively harness the forces of existence in order to achieve greater self-affirmation. This occurs in a reunion with the ground of one's being, and leads to a discussion of the nature of God's directing creativity, or of the relation between God's freedom and man's freedom in Chapter V. Having followed the full course through the pattern and its movements, Chapter VI shall then note the presence of the same movements and tensions in both the act of knowledge itself and in Tillich's conception of the types of knowledge and their relation.
If this approach is successful, it should be of great benefit. For Tillich, a prolific writer, has articles and books on every subject, from psychotherapy to a normative view of the science of geology; from an analysis of an art work to a theology of education. Assuming that there is an underlying structure to his thought which remains formative throughout his works, one can more easily follow and even anticipate Tillich's thought through the volumes of his life's work. Without such a grasp of the central core of his thinking, one is left merely dealing with each subject individually, hoping perhaps to stumble upon some key to unlock his often strange vocabulary and thoughts. The use of the anthropological method has the advantage of being able to integrate and give coherence and understandability to the whole of an author's works.

An awareness of the basic pattern of a thinker, which in Tillich's case I identify with Vollenhoven's category of "contradictory-harmony monism," can be of great help in understanding the elements of a man's thought in a coherent way. The anthropological type of contradictory monism can provide new insights into the intricacies and complexities of Tillich's system. Only when understood in his unity can Tillich's contribution be evaluated.

This thesis sets out to concern itself primarily with the descriptive explanation of the contours of Tillich's system, opening up basic themes in terms of the movements implied in the
anthropological type of contradictory monism. It is my hope that such a descriptive explanation can create a clearer understanding of Tillich’s work, so that an evaluation in terms of one’s own world-and-life view may become possible.
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION


Chapter I

THE ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF MAN AND THE MOVEMENTS OF LIFE

It is the intent of this thesis to show that a thorough understanding of Paul Tillich's anthropology is the key to clarifying his thought. Only through a grasping of the elements and tensions which Tillich identifies in man can one hope to break into the circle of his system with any real success, for man is the microcosmos in Tillich's view:

Man is the microcosmos because in him all levels of reality are present.

TILLICH OPPOSES ANY DUALISTIC APPROACH TO MAN AND MOVES TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF MAN AS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL UNITY IN ORDER TO RECAPTURE A HOLISTIC VIEW

Tillich takes a conscious opposition to dualism in any form in that it must necessarily lead to dividing man into two rival realms, resulting in either an idealistic or materialistic approach to man. Such a division of man into "soul" and "body" contradicts in Tillich's view the Christian concept of spirit, which includes all of the dimensions of man. Thus, Tillich takes a strong stand against the Cartesian division of man into the realms of "pure consciousness" and "pure extension." Such a view, he claims, showed its absurdity when it came to a climax in Kant's statement that the mentally ill should be turned over to the philosophers.
Dr. Tillich found much support for his intuition in the depth psychology movement beginning especially with Freud. The rediscovery of the unconscious and its influence on man's mental life provided much material for him to explain the internal dynamics of man. Utilizing the ideas of Gestalt psychology, he moved first toward an understanding of man as an indissoluble unity in dual form. Man's "pure being" was set over against his "self-consciousness," but the unity was retained in that the self-consciousness aspect gave a special form to all of the lower dimensions.²

Later, Tillich would emphasize the importance of an intermediary sphere, the psychic, which functioned to unite both mental and biological aspects. Man now belonged to three realms, and the principle of unity was mediated through a middle sphere.³

The final terminological advance appears in Systematic Theology when Tillich refers to the "multidimensional unity" of man:

The multidimensional unity of life has functioned to preclude dualistic and supernaturalistic doctrines of man in himself and in his relation to God.⁴

Man is a unity in his many dimensions. Yet it is to the nature of this unity that we must now turn, for it is in Tillich's understanding of the relationship between the dimensions that we find the basic movements and tensions that underlie his whole system. We must understand what Tillich means when he refers to man as a dynamic unity.
THE UNIQUENESS OF MAN LIES IN THE FACT THAT HE ALONE HAS FINITE FREEDOM; THE ABILITY TO TRANSCEND HIS WORLD THROUGH SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Tillich captures the integrality of man by pressing for the use of the term "dimensions" as opposed to "levels" when referring to the various aspects of man. He specifically rejects what he calls a "monarchic" approach, where the higher is not implicit in the lower, seeing it to be merely a modification of dualism:

The replacement of the metaphor "level" by the metaphor "dimension" represents an encounter with reality in which the unity of life is seen above its conflicts.5

Through the use of the word "dimension," he attempts to capture the idea that various realms of being exist but are not pasted on top of one another.6

The existence of the various dimensions is described in evolutionary terms, whereby the presence of a constellation of conditions in one dimension gives rise through a "leap" to the actualization of the next, more complex dimension.

This whole process must be seen in terms of Tillich's idea of self-affirmation. The power of life is the power of self-affirmation. It is not merely a biological impulse for self-preservation, but includes a striving beyond the present state of being. Nor is it merely an endless striving beyond one's present state. Life as self-affirmation includes both self-identity and self-alteration. Comparing it to Nietzsche's "will to power," Tillich says that life not only preserves itself, but also transcends itself.7
The power of a being is distinctively characterized by the highest dimension to which it has attained. Thus, each being finds that all of its dimensions receive a distinct organization from their most complex dimension. In human beings, where freedom and spirituality are uniquely present, the integrality of life is such that "every cell of his body participates in his freedom and spirituality."  

Man shares in all of the "lower dimensions." The first dimension that Tillich identifies is the inorganic or physical-chemical realm. This dimension provides the constellation of conditions necessary for the actualization of all of life. All of reality cannot be explained on the basis of physical-chemical reactions, however, because this dimension is present in more complex beings in such a way that it is centered and directed by a higher organizing principle. Thus, in beings with the next dimension, the biological or organic, chemical causality is organized and governed by a "life principle."

The organic dimension is possessed by two realms: the vegetable and animal realms. It is only in the animal realm that the next dimension appears for Tillich, the psychic. And certain constellations of conditions in the psychic realm make it possible for the next realm to become actual; the realm of spirit. This is the most important distinction for Tillich; that between the realm of the psychic and the realm of the spirit, between self-awareness and mind. For the dimension of spirit represents the unique ability of man to have freedom, to experience himself over against
his world. With the presence of the dimension of spirit we find the existence of man, and the possibility for his greatness or contradiction.

The psychic realm includes both the conscious and unconscious, sense impressions, emotional elements, inclinations, drives and desires. However, in the animal world the being is not yet able to distinguish himself from these elements. It receives and reacts in relation to an environment. It does not yet perceive itself over against a world. It perceives threats, but it is not aware of itself as the one who is threatened.

The psychic is overcome by the realm of spirit when the psychological center comes under the organization of the personal center. The advent of language and with it the cognitive act mark the beginning of man who now has a "world" above the "environment" of his pre-human ancestors.

This ability to distinguish "self" from "world" appears above the psychic and becomes the organizing principle for it. Psychic material of emotions and perceptions are organized, connected, and distinguished. The sense impressions and emotional elements of the psychic are logically connected in the analytic act.

The importance of the advent of the analytic act and with it man's life as spirit lies in Tillich's idea of freedom. Freedom for him implies a transcendence over the material of psychic perception. Freedom is defined as man's capacity for deliberation and decision, manifest first of all in the analytic act. This
freedom is unique to man, and present only analogously in sub-
human creatures. For freedom in the Tillichean sense by defi-
nition can only be properly applied to that being which is free
to deliberate, decide, and to take responsibility. Man is such
a being in the analytic act, for he shows that he is "above" the
material in that he can choose. However, as we shall soon see,
man's freedom is always in correlation with his destiny. His men-
tal acts are never totally separate from his bodilyness.

The doctrine of freedom as linked to the analytic act and
the separation between self and world is called the center of the
doctrine of human nature by Tillich:

Since freedom is the characteristic which distinguishes
man from all other beings and since all other human character-
istics follow from this, the doctrine of human nature has its
center in the doctrine of human freedom.

Not only is it central to his anthropology, but the self-world
distinction and the freedom that it implies is the basic onto-
logical structure of being and the basis of all other structures:

Man must be completely separated from his world in order
to look at it as a world. Otherwise he would remain in the
bondage of mere environment. The interdependence of ego-self
and world is the basic ontological structure and implies all
the others.

While everything participates in being, it is only man who
is aware of this participation. He can perceive his participation
in, and yet separation from, the world. In nature there is the
mere unfolding of possibilities. But in man, the capacity to
reflect on one's relation to nature is the key to freedom. Man
has himself at the same time as subject and object.
This possibility for knowledge of oneself is the key to man's freedom in that man can come to have a consciousness of his possibilities. Tillich was influenced here by the work of Kurt Goldstein, the neuropsychiatrist who speaks of man's ability to know about himself as the ability to live in terms of the possible. With knowledge of himself, man can go beyond what he finds in himself. He can "transcend" his situation, and choose to relate himself to various parts of his world. With the advent of mind and with it decision, man rises out of servitude to pure being to the realm of freedom. He can now build a world above nature.

The present discussion of the various dimensions within man suggests the following diagram:

```
spirit
  mental    SELF knowledge
    psychic
      biological WORLD participation
        physical-chemical
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Diagram I

With the advent of the realm of spirit man has increasing freedom and becomes his unique self.
The realm of spirit

Tillich identifies many of the functions which appear with the realm of spirit. Because they are all manifestations of the dimension of spirit, their occurrence is presumably simultaneous, and thus a precise ordering cannot be given. Tillich discusses them instead in relation to the various ontological polarities that occur within the dimension of spirit, as we shall see below. It is of importance, however, to note the importance of language with relation to the rise of spirit. For language with its universals liberates from the environment and is foundational for man's ability to have a world. "World breaks through environment in every universal," says Tillich. The word is able to bear meaning, and it is this possibility of creating a universe of meaning above nature that characterizes man's freedom. The realm of spirit is therefore the "unity of power and meaning," a unity which is actualized only with the rise of spirit. Spirit is not in contrast to the body, but unites all of man's functions and thus transcends all dualisms and trichotomies.

Our discussion so far has been intended to show the importance of the realm of spirit for Tillich. For it is through participation in this realm that man becomes man. He is emphatic in holding that the realm of spirit cannot be dissolved into the psychological out of which it arises:

The principle of multi-dimensional dualism denies dualism as well as psychologistic (or biologistic) monism.
In the realm of spirit, man is free from the psychological material in a way which allows for deliberation and decision. Now the world is not merely present in him, but it is present to him in such a way that his mind can receive and react to it. Man participates in nature, but through his mental acts he is to a certain degree separate and thus free from it. Tillich wants to emphasize the way in which man's rational side (in the sense of mind) is still related to and influenced by his irrational side (in the sense of body). Though "free" from the psychological and lower realms, man is still determined by them. It is to this relationship between mind and body that we must now turn.

MAN: A DYNAMIC UNITY OF MENTAL AND VITAL ELEMENTS

Just as the body is in a sense "turned toward" the preceding realm, the physical-chemical, so does the mind turn toward reason in the sense of structures, categories, and universals. And just as the body is more than a complex of physical-chemical reactions, so is the mind more than merely logical. Its acts are not merely determined by the structures of reality, but also by the way in which these structures are perceived. Thus the mind, while it intuits the rational structure of reality, is not separate from man, but strongly influenced by the preceding dimensions.

The relation between the mind as the rational side and the psychic and other lower dimensions as the pre-rational side of man becomes the fundamental relationship within man for Tillich. For these two sides represent the interaction between structure (on
the side of reason) and passion (on the side of the emotional). \( ^{18} \)

And the two sides of passion and structure come to reflect the
dynamic and static sides of not only man, but of the divine life
as well, as we shall see later.

Man, then, is not only a static mind relating to the
universe as in the Cartesian scheme, but is rather a mind in
dynamic relation to his vital drives and passions. Without them,
Tillich claims, his mental processes would become "empty" as they
have tended to in the philosophy of consciousness.

When Tillich talks of "power" he seems to be referring to
that side of man which depth psychology has "re-discovered"; the
dark, unconscious, irrational side. For Tillich, this side of man
is comparable to the abyss or divine depth of God which pours it­
self out into the world of forms as structuring logos. It is only
the logos or structure of being which makes definite the darkness
and infinity of the divine ground, the "burning fire,"\(^ {19} \) just as
it is only man's mental activities which can give form to his
irrational, unconscious impulses.

As part of his campaign against the separation of the mind
from the body, Tillich introduces the term "spirit" for that dimen­
sion above the psychic. "Spirit" is for him a better term to re­
capture that power element in mental activity which was lost with
the understanding of man as "intellect."\(^ {20} \)

Man, then, has a vital side wherein lies his power, and a
mental side which is related to reason in the sense of universals
and categories. The relationship between the mental and vital
becomes one of universal-individual for Tillich when he says that "man is not only vital individuality, dynamically realizing himself in a natural process, but he is spirit, creating in unity with the eternal norms and forms of being." 21

The mind not only relates to static structures as if it were a logical machine, but it is influenced strongly by the passions and desires of man’s vital side:

The mind is directed towards the valid norms and structures of reality. . . but the mind is also directed toward the bearer of intentionality, the psyche with its striving forces, for without these striving forces no mental act is possible. 22

Man’s freedom is his ability to transcend his individual existence, and to create a world above the nature that he finds himself in. Through his language, man can transcend nature through the use of universals and have a relation to it. While man participates in nature through his bodily existence, he nevertheless transcends it by knowing it and shaping it with his mind. 23

Tillich, in his emphasis on the relation between mind and body, sees himself as a member of the movement of protest against the philosophy of consciousness, identifying himself especially with Jacob Boehme, who saw unconscious elements in the divine life and therefore all of life. 24 He claims to follow in the line of Paracelsus, Pascal, Schelling, Hartmann, Freud, and Nietzsche when he talks of man as a "dynamic unity." Indeed, Tillich sees only two possibilities for an anthropological view of man:

The central problem of (the) theory of man (is), namely, whether he is a dynamic unity or a static composite. 25
While it is true that Paracelus talked of man in terms of a dynamic harmony, Tillich moves on to talk of the relationship between the mental and vital elements as one of dialectical opposition. The separation between self-consciousness and world-participation creates the conditions for an interaction between man's mental and vital sides. Man is a free self through his mental decisions, and participates in the world "insofar as he is a definite part of nature through his bodily existence." While depth psychology has contributed toward understanding the wholeness of man, Tillich sets the vital elements over against the mental in order that their interaction may provide for movement, change, and creativity. Thus, while concluding a typically insightful historical account of the movement towards understanding the wholeness of man, he quotes Zilboorg in order to say that "modern dynamic psychology considers man in his totality and tries not to overlook the spirit in the animal that he is, or the animal in the spirit that he has." When Tillich says that man must be considered as a dynamic unity as opposed to a static compositeness he is referring to the man who is one being, but "doubled in himself" as a mental and vital creature. In spite of his heavy emphasis of the wholeness of man, his conclusion perpetuates an internal two-sidedness which he refers to as "the interrelation of impulses and interests," or the "dialectical opposition of the vital and mental." In his later writings, Tillich drops any explicit reference to man as a creature with an internal duality, but the basic idea of two interacting sides remains. The mental is in a dynamic relationship with the psychic and lower dimensions, constituting man's life as "spirit."
In attempting to elaborate the ontological structure of man, Tillich posits three polarities in the realm of spirit. These polarities are themselves based on the self-world polarity, which is the foundational polarity of being for Tillich.

When Tillich speaks of a polarity, he is referring to the fact that there can be no division of the world as in the dualistic and trichotomistic schemes. Nothing is merely a self, and nothing is merely a part of the world and devoid of subjectivity. Rather, every being participates in both sides of the self-world polarity in varying degrees. Man is not merely a thing, for he is aware of his separation from the world as a self. But neither is he merely a self. He also participates in the world through his bodily existence. From this basic self-world polarity, Tillich derives three sets of elements which constitute the basic ontological structure and which share in the polar character of self and world. We shall see how these polarities contain seemingly opposite qualities, and how the relation within each polarity is more than one of mutual influence. It is one of dynamic tension.

INDIVIDUALIZATION-PARTICIPATION AND SELF-INTEGRATION

The first pair of elements that Tillich identifies as constituting the basic ontological structure is that of individualization and participation. This polarity reflects the idea that beings are centered selves, but that they also participate in that
which is outside of themselves, be that an environment or world. Individualization is a quality of every being, but comes to its highest fulfillment in man. While everything interacts with its environment, only man is conscious of himself and therefore separate from his environment as a completely centered self.

Participation is necessary for individualization, for the individual discovers itself only through resistance; through an encounter with its environment or world. An individual participates in his environment by acting upon it and by being acted on by it.

A consequence of Tillich's understanding of this polarity is that it sets him off somewhat from more recent existentialism, which absolutizes the self or individual over against participation in the world. The result of absolutizing the individual is that there is ultimately a loss of the world, and eventually a loss of the self. For the loss of one side of the polarity necessarily leads to the loss of both. Thus, Tillich can point out the dilemma of the extreme existentialistic idea of freedom:

Finite freedom is not aseity. Man can affirm himself only if he affirms not an empty shell, a mere possibility, but the structure of being in which he finds himself before action and non-action. Finite freedom has a definite structure, and if the self tries to trespass on this structure it ends in the loss of itself.

The polarities of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny are present in all of the dimensions of man. Individualization and participation can be found under the organic dimension as stimulus and response, and in the psychic as perception and reaction. Tillich, however, never
fully lays out the nature of the polarities in all of the dimensions. His analysis concentrates on the realm of spirit, for this is the important dimension in man. It is the dimension of spirit which comes to characterize the lower dimensions, and the polarities of spirit between self and world, or mind and body functions, are the most important for him.

In conjunction with the three polarities of the ontological structure, Tillich identifies three "movements of life" in the dimension of spirit which are based on these polarities. The movement of "self-integration" is dependent of the polarity of individualization and participation. It is described as a "circular process" of going out and returning. In this process, presumably the encounter with the environment, a centered being draws certain elements into itself (participation) while remaining distinct from the environment itself (individualization). There is a periphery (corresponding to participation) from which the centered self can draw elements into itself. In this process of self-integration based on the polarity of individualization and participation, the centeredness of a being is actualized.

The process of self-integration is integrative only if there is a balance between the tendency for self-identity and self-alteration. Mere self-identity results in death, and mere self-alteration leads to the loss of centeredness. Life must be both centered and able to unite a manifoldness of elements from the periphery. A being must go out from itself and return to itself. This is the process of self-integration, the disruption of which leads to self-disintegration. Tillich speaks of this tension as
the fact that "integrating and disintegrating forces are struggling in every situation and every situation is a compromise between these forces." Man must struggle against the contradictory tendencies of the polarities in an attempt to achieve a momentary harmony. This dynamic interaction between the contradictory forces of the polarities can lead to the disturbance of the personality. Indeed, Tillich talks of disease as "the disturbance of a dynamic balance by conflicting drives" and of health as the restoration of a "dynamic harmony."

It is on the basis of the polarity of individualization and participation that man's moral function is actualized. As an individual which can interact with the world, opposing himself as a self to everything that is, man encounters other selves; that which is a limit to what he can assimilate from the world. Because man is not only an individual self, but also participates in a community, he experiences the moral imperative:

The other self is the unconditional limit to the desire to assimilate one's whole world, and the experience of this limit is the experience of the ought-to-be, the moral imperative. The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of spirit begins with this experience.

Consciousness of self over against the world thus leads to the consciousness of other selves, and hence the actualization of the moral function. The importance of the moral function lies in the fact that it is closely linked to the ideas of norm and freedom. Because man is free in his ability to be above the world in deliberation and decision, he is open to receiving commands to obey or disobey. For Tillich, it is in the moral function that
one receives and responds to commands which express the essence of being. Moral acts are responsive and hence are responsible acts. Because Tillich has reduced freedom in terms of responsability to the realm of spirit where man can have responsibility, the idea of response is restricted to the spiritual realm. Responsibility is a part of man's freedom that only occurs with the actualization of morality in the spiritual realm. Nature is thus more determined for Tillich, and man is characterized by his ability to have freedom.

Because man can reflect on himself, making himself an object, he can note that he is not living up to his potentialities. He can know that he is not responding to the essential structure of his being. He experiences guilt. The call upon man to respond to God is reduced to an ethical matter, necessarily so because freedom and response are both reduced to the realm of spirit. Tillich even says that "the knowledge of values is identical with the knowledge of one's essential being." Thus, "the conscience witnesses to the law," but "if man were reunited with himself and his essential being, there would be no command."

The result of reducing "response" to the awareness of potentialities to actualize is that the existence of these commands become dependent upon man's failure to obey them. When man does obey, they no longer exist. The law is not fulfilled, but rather there is "a morality which fulfills the law by transcending it." Man's life is not a hearted response, but man's life has an ethical side which gives him consciousness of his failure to live up to.
his potentialities. In the end, this moral side must be transcended by a "transmoral conscience"; a state where man is beyond good and evil through a unity with the ground of his being, as we shall see in Chapter IV.

**DYNAMICS - FORM AND SELF-CREATIVITY**

The second pair of elements that Tillich identifies as constituting the basic ontological structure is that of dynamics and form. This polarity is based in the realm of man’s spirit on man’s ability to grasp and shape reality. Man, because he is separate from the world as a self, is able to transcend the world that he finds himself in by using his creative vitality to create a world of forms. Man’s dynamic element of vitality is directed at the world as intentionality. Man creates the new forms through his intentionality, and is thus never completely bound to his world.

Vitality keeps a being alive and growing, but this dynamic quality is always in polarity with form. For "being something" means having a form. Every being thus tends to transcend its present form to new forms, while at the same time every being tends to preserve its form. Again we see a balance of forces that are characteristic of growth, or the movement of life that is referred to by Tillich as self-creativity.

The self-creativity of life based on the polarity of dynamics and form has the character of a horizontal movement of old forms to new forms. Life goes beyond itself, creating itself, ever new.
and changing. This is its dynamic side. But corresponding to form, it is true that life must always exist as form.

The ambiguity of self-creation is that creation and destruction go together. The contradictory forces within the polarity of dynamics and form are these two tendencies; one towards dynamic growth and the other towards the preservation of form. Life must always attempt to reach some sort of balance between them, moving in the horizontal process from old form to new forms:

Every look at nature confirms the reality of struggle as an ambiguous means of the self-creation of life—a fact classically formulated by Heraclitus when he called 'war' the father of all things... (struggle) is a universal structure of life.

Stability is merely the achievement of a temporary balance between forces—a balance about which there is no prior certainty. The movement from form to chaos to form is a necessary one. Through it, man and world determine each other in an ongoing process of becoming which is fueled by the tension between them.

The self-creativity of life under the dimension of spirit is seen as culture. Several functions of man are incorporated in this movement of life under the dimension of spirit. They are all based on the polarity of dynamics and form, of the grasping and shaping of the world by the self.

The importance of language has been alluded to, but it is within the functions of culture under the dimension of spirit that language finds its place. Language is linked with the technical function, for "speaking and using tools belong together." Both
reflect a way of handling the world that "liberates" man from his environment.

Tillich admits that certain higher animals may use tools, but only man creates tools which are not bound to certain plans. They are rather for unlimited use. This is a reflection of the ability to use universals which is the power of language.

All the functions of culture refer to the fact that man is able to create something new, to transcend a given form through his dynamic quality. Man is creative not only in his ability to create something materially (the technical function), but also in his ability to receive and transform. This corresponds to Tillich's idea of "theoria" and "praxis."

In theoria, the encountered world is taken into the self, through images in the aesthetic encounter and concepts in the cognitive. The aim of both is authentic expression; to capture that which is intended.

Praxis refers to the particular way in which life creates itself, including the transforming acts of justice, education, and economy. It seeks to bring to actualization what is potential in humanity through the creation of cultural forms.

The result of the self-creative function of life in the realm of spirit is the creation of a universe of meaning. Meaning is only possible for that being which has transcended the psychic realm. It presupposes a mind which encounters reality and orders it through universals. Through man's self-creative expressions and meaning-creating activity, that which is potential in
his world or in the universe of being is brought to an anticipatory and fragmentary fulfillment, for "the universe of meaning is the fulfillment of the universe of being." Culture creates meaning by actualizing what is potential in being and man himself. Only in man who is spirit, who can relate to the world as a self, is this actualization possible. That which is merely potential in man's bodily side is only brought to full actualization through the mental acts of his self-consciousness.

FREEDOM-DESTINY AND SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

The third pair of elements that Tillich refers to in his ontological analysis is the polarity of freedom and destiny. It is with these concepts that his doctrine of man reaches what he calls the "turning point," because it includes the idea of freedom, that unique quality of man that we have already referred to.

While absolute determinism is impossible, freedom is only properly applied to human beings, in that only man has the freedom afforded by being a centered self. In "decision," a self-centered person reacts as a whole, and by being able to exclude certain possibilities demonstrates that he is "beyond" them in terms of necessity. Through "deliberation," a person can weigh alternatives and is therefore "above" them. In "responsibility," a person recognizes that he must answer for his decisions because they were made through his centered selfhood.

There is no complete freedom, because freedom is always in polarity with destiny. Destiny points to the situation in which
man finds himself, an individual within larger structures, a person with a past and a body structure. One could say that man shapes his own destiny in freedom, but that his destiny in turn shapes him. Again we see an ongoing process of interaction between the free self and his worldly destiny, with the analysis emphasizing how things are becoming through the dynamic movement of life.

While self-integration is described as a circular process and self-creativity is a horizontal process, the process of life corresponding to the polarity of freedom and destiny is characterized as a vertical movement. This is the movement of "self-transcendence."

As self-transcending, life is free from itself; its quality of being finite. This movement occurs only in the mirror of man's consciousness, his mind, where there is a relational awareness of everything finite to the infinite. Nothing is totally an object, but all things have power and dignity, greatness and sublimity. This awareness, or the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit, is what Tillich means by religion. However, religion is not a function under essential conditions. It only becomes so in the state of estrangement. We will discuss the nature of religion in relation to the functions of life after we deal with the essence and existence distinction and with the concept of estrangement. We can note, however, the inability of Tillich to give any structural account of this function of self-transcendence:
The question as to how the self-transcendence of life manifests itself cannot be answered in empirical terms, as is possible in the case of self-integration and self-creativity. One can speak about it only in terms which describe the reflection of the inner self-transcendence of things in man's consciousness. Man is the mirror in which the relation of everything finite to the infinite becomes conscious. 44

Man's relation to God is thus a relation which is distinct from his earthly activity. There is a sharp distinction between finite interdependence and the relation of the finite to the infinite.

As self-transcending, all things manifest their power of being, their potential holiness or ability to represent ultimate being and meaning. All of reality points to the ultimate. Tillich here gives grounds for affirming polytheistic cultures, which recognize the sublimity of all of life. This is in contrast to monotheistic culture, which tends to objectify everything, including their one god at times.

The self-transcendence of life is also ambiguous, containing two contradictory tendencies. It is never present without its opposite; the profane, or resistance to self-transcendence. As the profane, a being hides its potential holiness and shows only its finitude. Because everything is finite, there can never be complete transcendence. Life always remains within itself, even when transcending itself. Therefore there is the presence of the profane in every religious act, and necessarily so. 45

Besides the ambiguity of self-transcendence and self-profanization, there is a second ambiguity in religion—that of the divine and demonic. While the profane resists transcendence,
the demonic distorts it. The demonic in the process of self-transcendence refers to the claim of something finite to be equal to the infinite.

Both of the ambiguities, that between self-transcendence and profanization, and between the divine and demonic, are based on the tension between the infinite and the finite, the main tension in Tillich's thought which we shall discuss later. This tension is also effective in religious symbolism, which necessarily must have some profane elements, and which must resist the demonization of claiming to represent the infinite. The symbol must claim to represent the infinite while at the same time claiming not to represent the infinite.

To summarize, we have seen how Tillich's idea of the three polarities present in the ontological structure of man reflect an ambiguous view of life where all processes are based on conflicting tendencies. The only constancy is the relative stability achieved when conflicting forces reach an equilibrium, but even then it must necessarily be only a moment in the ongoing process. While absolute change is "an impossible notion," the only unchangeable thing is the self-world structure to which man is bound. Man is "finite freedom." This, too, is unchanging. But freedom consists in the ability to change both one's self and one's world:

In a somewhat paradoxical formula we could say: the unchangeable element in man is his freedom to change himself and his world.146

While setting himself off from existentialism which absolutizes man's freedom and thus gives man aseity, the structure of
being to which man is bound for Tillich is the structure of finite freedom, the nature of which is change itself. The self-world structure is one of dynamic interaction, where both self and world change on the basis of the polar elements of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. I agree with Young when he says that to understand man in Tillich one must see that "man is the relation of these elements in tension." Any understanding of Tillich's anthropology must capture this dynamic relationship between contradictory tendencies.

Tillich speaks of the tension between the polar elements, of their tendency to move away from one another. He describes the hypostatized tension within all things:

Tension refers to the tendency of elements within a unity to draw away from one another, to attempt to move in opposite direction. For Heraclitus everything is in inner tension like a bent bow.

To aid us in keeping these conflicting tendencies in mind, along with the spiritual functions which are based on them, the following diagram may prove helpful:

Diagram II
In light of the contradictory forces that Tillich describes within the ontological elements that make up man, he must attempt to defend his claim that man is indeed a multi-dimensional unity. He therefore attempts to capture this dynamic unity through the integrating function that he gives to man's creation of symbols.

THE RELATION OF FAITH AND SYMBOL TO AN INTEGRATED PERSONAL LIFE

The realm of spirit is a dynamic relation between power and meaning, between the mind and body. Every spiritual act unites both elements. Yet one act seems to stand out in that it unites not only man within himself, but man and his Maker. The symbolic aspect, manifest in the act of faith, unites not only man with himself, but with his ultimate concern.

According to Tillich, all functions of man are united in the act of faith. Faith, then, is not a special function among others, but an act of the total personality. In fact, personality itself is not possible without faith. Faith is the power which integrates a personality, which creates a personal life. For "man is a unity and not composed of parts." To this point we have merely discussed the various dimensions and polarities. But for Tillich man is a whole. Tillich's system is monistic in that everything has a common origin. The bifurcation of the polarities disappears in the ground of being; in being-itself, for "both self and world are rooted in the divine life," and it is through faith that man can recapture this sense of wholeness.
Tillich’s discussion of faith reveals its synthetic character. He stresses the need for a dynamic theory of faith which considers the relationship between the personal, decision making center and the unconscious elements.

Faith becomes the centered movement of the whole personality, uniting every function in a movement toward the ultimate ground of meaning and being; toward that which is the ground of both mind and body and can therefore unite the two.

Language is necessary for faith: "Without language there is no act of faith, no religious experience." According to Tillich, the word has both intellectual and psychic power. Originally, words were considered to have special powers, and it is only through the process of rationalization that words have not been seen as having suggestive power to the subconscious. Thus, religion has one foot in what Tillich calls the universe of sympathy, or the psychic dimension. Religious words have suggestive power.
Pointing to the duality of word and sacrament, Tillich explains that reality can be communicated by either a subject or object. Because he emphasizes that language is foundational to the dimension of spirit, Tillich claims that the experience of the sacrament is not opened up prior to the presence of language. Therefore the word is even "implicit in the completely silent sacramental material." The lingual opens up the sympathetic to the religious experience which is manifest in both the word and sacraments. The symbol serves to unite the unconscious elements of the sympathetic or psychic dimensions with objectifications of the mental sphere.

It is toward a rediscovery of the unconscious mediation through the sacraments that Tillich moves when he attacks the reduction of the practice of sacramental activities in Protestantism. This development, he believes, is linked to dualistic tendencies which deny the multidimensional unity of man. For him, the unconscious element is indispensable in the reception of the Spiritual Presence. He states:

One could even say that a Spiritual Presence apprehended through the consciousness alone is intellectual and not truly spiritual. This means that the Spiritual Presence cannot be received without a sacramental element, however hidden the latter may be.

While claiming that the word is somehow implicit in the sacrament, there nevertheless remains a tension between the religion of the word (emphasizing personal decision) and the religion of the sacrament (emphasizing being grasped through the suggestive power of objects). The attempt to achieve a unity between the word of
the mind and the openness for suggestion of the body comes for Tillich in the idea of symbol. It is an attempt to recapture the idea of the power of words and the unifying power of the symbol.

The language of faith is the language of symbols. As faith functions to integrate the totality of man, so do symbols reflect the immediate experience of the "soul" in its totality. Tillich uses "soul" to refer to the whole of man, and when the soul expresses itself as a totality the cultural and vital, the mental and bodily elements are united.

While man as a totality will use symbols to express himself as a totality, he can also be grasped as a totality only by symbols. Thus, "there are dimensions within us of which we cannot become aware except through symbols." When these symbols are reduced to mere rational words, their power and hence grasping ability is lost. While symbols can be "determinized," demythologizing with the intent to replace symbolic language is misguided in Tillich's view. Individual symbols can lose their power and become mere signs, but this is reflective of the fact that they have lost their influence on the unconscious and does not mean that symbols are chosen arbitrarily. Rather, their power is derived from life which begins with unconscious acceptance.

There are two elements in every symbol which seem to correspond to the mental and vital sides of man. There is the element of concreteness (which refers to the concrete, objectified content), and the element of ultimacy (alluding to the immediacy of experience which accompanies each symbol). Both
elements are necessary not only for the presence of symbols, but for faith itself.61

The element of ultimacy refers to the sacramental presence or the personal participation of man in the symbol. The suggestive power of the symbol grasps man's sympathetic aspect. Symbols are not arbitrary, then, but arise out of and are dependent upon the unconscious side of man. They cannot be arbitrarily replaced. They arise and are rooted in a unity between the bodily and mental spheres.62 This means that while there is a conscious acceptance by personal decision, there are also elements of the situation which must grasp the unconscious in order for there to be faith.

Tillich can then talk about the body's participation in faith.63 The unconscious strivings influence the choice of symbols. This is the passionate element of faith, the immediate experience of ultimacy rooted in the sympathetic and bodily side of man which corresponds to the experience of certainty in faith. The participatory side of faith results in such an immediate certainty; the experience of the holy.

There is another side of faith which corresponds to the element of concreteness in the symbol. This element in the religious symbol corresponds to the concrete content which the mind gives to reflect on the passionate concern which man has. However, because of the great tension between the infinite and finite in Tillich's thought, this side of the symbol is uncertain and relative. The choice of content is reflective of a "decision," and because man's ability to decide is rooted in separation from
the world, there is no immediate participation or certainty in the selection of concrete content. This element in the symbol corresponds to the presence of doubt in faith.

Doubt cannot be removed. In fact, great doubt shows that one has great concern about the proper content to reflect his passionate "ultimate concern." Here we see the importance of language for faith. It allows for faith to have content, to be directed toward a content; to be conscious of itself. Yet in doing so faith comes to participate in the separation within man himself, that of the man who participates in the world but who is separate from the world; the man who is both a subject and an object.

Faith, then, is based on a tension between separation and participation, between doubt and certainty, in the same way that this tension is present in man as the ontological separation of self and world. It falls upon faith to attempt to unify these elements of man which are in tension. Faith is thus not one aspect of man, but the unifying act which brings together all of the aspects:

Faith is not an act of any of his rational functions, as it is not an act of the unconscious, but it is an act in which both the rational and nonrational elements of his being are transcended.

This understanding of the unifying function of faith can perhaps be clarified with the following diagram:
In faith, neither experienced certainty nor reflective doubt can be eliminated. Can the certainty of participation and the relativity of mental concepts which reflect this participation ever come together? Tillich seems to think so, but only in a state which even "transcends the state of faith." This is the state of "absolute faith," the complete reunion with the ground of one's being. How one can come to arrive at such a state is a mystery, for the way itself is impossible:

He must always try to break through the limits of his finitude and reach what can never be reached, the ultimate itself.

To have absolute faith, man must overcome the subject-object distinction within himself. He must overcome who he is. He has to find the perfect symbol which will properly reflect and represent his passionate concern; that manifestation of himself which can reflect himself as a totality and withstand all doubt. It must be a symbol which can even contain its own negation. To
the extent that man fails, he remains divided. But he must continually try and hope for moments where he will be united not only within himself, but with the ground of his being. This is the moment of transformation, where man can achieve a unification of the contradictory forces within himself:

There is a place where the ultimate is present within the finite world, namely, the depth of the human soul. This depth is the point of contact between the infinite and the finite.71

Diagram V

In the end, Tillich moves toward a faith which has "no special content."72 Because all content can be doubted, he can affirm no content at all. Thus, in absolute faith, theism is transcended because there is no objective content to the ground of our being. It is only "simple faith," a personal, unspecifiable existential experience which we will outline further in our section of knowledge.

What is important in this discussion of the essential structure of man is that Tillich attempts to bridge the tension between the mental and vital sides of man in the symbol. In the
symbol, the lingual is closely connected to the psychic, in that symbolic words have suggestive power as well as objective content. Symbols cannot be reduced to concepts, however, and are therefore pre-analytic. Tillich would thus seem to argue then for a modal order of inorganic, organic, psychic (sympathetic), lingual (formative), and analytic with the symbol being a result of the lingual opening up the psychic or sympathetic dimension. Because the dimension of spirit is based on tensions between the mental and vital, the symbol becomes the unifier in man as a spiritual being in that it has both elements within itself. However, Dr. Tillich never successfully resolved the tensions that this led to within the symbol itself. While attempting to unify the contradictory forces of the mental and vital sides in the symbol, his identification of the two elements within the symbol itself (the element of ultimacy and the element of concreteness) merely serves to carry that same tension back another step. In the end he sacrifices the content side to emphasize the passion side. This amounts to a glorification of the body’s participation in faith at the expense of the negation of all concrete content supplied by mental reflection. This emphasis led him to the idea that faith "precedes" obedience to any content or authority and to an emphasis on whatever ultimate concern the individual finds in himself. This opened up the possibility for a universal faith without content, a theme which we shall pick up in Chapter VI.
TILLICH'S ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MAN MOVES TOWARD AN "EXISTENTIAL" UNDERSTANDING WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE CONSTANCY OF CHANGE

Tillich's analysis must be seen in terms of his reaction to the mechanistic conception of man's bodiliness prevalent today. Many of his earlier thoughts had to do with the necessity of moving toward a more holistic approach to man in order to facilitate healing. He believed that to the extent that one could unite the functions of psychiatrist, doctor, and priest, one would have a better chance of helping his patient.74

In an even larger sense, the move toward understanding man holistically by Tillich reflects the strong influence of the "existential" understanding of man. In reaction to the scientific understanding of man as a conditioned "thing" or mechanical entity with the emphasis on "technique," Tillich sides with those who want to move toward an understanding of man as a "self." For the thingification of man is merely reflective of the philosophy of consciousness, and ultimately loses the "powerful quality" in things—the possibility for communion between the knower and the known.75 Against the transformation of persons into things which can be controlled and calculated by technical science, the "natural" or "biological" man, Tillich wants to move toward the "existential man"—the man who participates in every situation as a whole person. Against the objectification of the self which leads to dehumanization, Tillich wants to return to an affirmation of the self in the world.76 This leads him to an ontological analysis of the basic structure of reality in an attempt to explicate the nature of both
self and world (which he sees as the basic articulation of being) and their common participation in each other via their common root in the ground of being.

Such an analysis would seemingly attempt to root itself somehow, seeking something constant in relation to which it could elaborate on structure and change. It soon becomes apparent, however, that Tillich's ontological analysis does not deal with some unchanging structure, but with the structure of change and the movements of life. Claiming to avoid both relativism and absolutism, he talks of "a relatively but not absolutely static a-priori." The only unchangeable thing seems to be the principle that as long as there is experience, there is a structure of experience which can be recognized and elaborated. This means that the only dependable thing is a relation. The relationship between the mind and reality changes, as does the relationship between these two sides and their common structuring principle, the logos of being:

Reality itself creates structural possibilities within itself. Life, as well as mind, is creative. This means that for Tillich "human nature changes in history." The structure of being itself changes in the dynamic process of interaction. From this statement, as well as from Tillich's opposition to the static tendency of a "monarchic" approach, we can see Tillich's geneticistic tendency. The only unchangeable thing seems to be change itself, and man's capacity for that change.
Tillich therefore holds to the absence of an absolute in creation, but moves toward relativism by not seeing creational structures as responses to a constant logos of being. For him, as we shall see in Chapter V, the ground of being must itself change. The ground of being must also become the abyss of being in order to guarantee the continual movement of this geneticistic system.

Tillich's emphasis on the multidimensional unity of man has certainly done much to move toward a more holistic approach to man as a religious creature. His analysis often captures the integrality of man graphically. Yet the attempt to account for change in terms of tensions within man which bring about the movement of life from potential to the actual ultimately makes man a creature of unrest. Man comes to consist of two sides which can never achieve unity while in creation. At the same time, man's multidimensional unity is related to the ground of its being only directly in the symbol. This problem is based on the idea of a tension between the infinite and the finite, the basic tension in Tillich's thought that we shall be noting throughout this thesis.

We have attempted to outline the major features of Tillich's anthropology in this chapter. We have noted how Tillich's strong opposition to dualism led him to a theory of interaction where the mental and vital sides of man (corresponding to the "lower" dimensions and the dimension of spirit) are caught in an unending geneticistic "war" within the three polarities that he identifies. Man must struggle within himself to bring these contradictory
forces into a dynamic harmony in the functions of morality, culture, and religion. Through faith and its symbolic expression, man moves ever closer to achieving a unity with his ground and thus within himself, reaching that transformation point of absolute faith. It is the mysterious place where the infinite is present in the finite, even though "there is an absolute break, an infinite jump" between the finite and the infinite. To reach this experience:

Man must empty himself of all the finite contents of his ordinary life.  

Both the self and the world find their original unity in being--itself. But for Tillich, one is either in the self-world bifurcation of existence, or he has an experience of God. These are two different things, and they must be kept distinct, for the finite and the infinite can only "touch" in the mysterious depth of a contentless soul.

However, man lives in a world of content. Therefore he must find his existence in a perpetual process of back and forth movement from his situation of diversity to the mysterious experience of unity and back again. We shall see in Chapter II how this movement from the original unity to the diversity of the self-world bifurcation is a necessary part of the unfolding geneticistic process. Indeed, Chapter V will show that this back and forth movement is in fact Tillich's understanding of the process of life.

We shall now utilize and expand on the basic pattern of
dynamic interaction and balance described in this chapter. We shall deepen our understanding with a further description of the process of separation and the attempt to achieve a reunion in order to show that this pattern of movements clarifies a number of ideas in Tillich's thought.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I


2Man was seen as "one being, but doubled within himself, in his unity." The Interpretation of History. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 205.

3The discovery of this middle area was attributed by Tillich to the attempt to explain and understand mental illness. Under the old dualistic system, the mentally ill were either morally depraved (illness of the soul) or the mental disorder was symptomatic of a bodily disease. In order to conceive of the concept of mental illness, an intermediate area had to be recognized. "The Relation of Religion and Health," Review of Religion 10 (May 1946): 376.

4ST III, p. 113.

5ST III, p. 15.

6Thomas Aquinas's idea of grace fulfilling nature is thus rejected as it is seen to be an expression of the hierarchical type of thinking. ST III, p. 13.


8Ibid., p. 83.

9Thus, Tillich is highly critical of the reduction of healing in modern medicine to physical-chemical treatment. "Religion and Health," p. 380.

10"Man is different from all finite creatures because he has the quality of freedom." "Psychotherapy and a Christian Interpretation of Human Nature," Review of Religion 13 (March 1949): 264. "Freedom can be applied to subhuman nature only by way of analogy." ST I, p. 185.

11While somewhat restrictive in his use of "freedom" due to the importance of the subject-object separation in the cognitive act, Tillich does seem to take the "analogous" application of the term "freedom" in the broadest sense. Absolute determinism is impossible in any being. ST I, p. 186.

13ST I, p. 171.

14Nature is more determined for Tillich. With the rise of self consciousness, man does not become a composite of nature and mind, but is one being, "doubled within himself." This unity of consciousness and reality gives the "nature" side of man a special qualification from consciousness, "down to the most primitive instincts." *Interpretation of History*, pp. 204-205.

15ST III, p. 62.

16ST I, pp. 249, 251.

17ST III, p. 28.

18The passionate, emotional side of man becomes the "vital reservoir" for the mental side. It provides the element of power, the potentialities which the mind can actualize. "Religion and Health," pp. 382-383.

19ST III, p. 51.

20"God is Spirit" can never mean that "God is Mind" or "Intellect" for Tillich, for spirit is the unity of power and meaning of rationality and sensuality. ST III, pp. 22, 23.


22"Religion and Health," p. 381.

23*Courage to Be*, p. 91.

24This is one of the main differences that Tillich sees between Calvin and Luther. Calvin is identified with an emphasis on the moral consciousness, whereas Luther emphasized the irrational will. See "Psychoanalysis, Existentialism, and Theology," *Pastoral Psychology* 9 (October 1958): 11.


26*Courage to Be*, p. 91.


28Ibid., p. 380.

29*Interpretation of History*, p. 205.
Courage to Be, p. 152. Chapters IV and V of The Courage to Be illustrate how there is a loss of the self in collectivism and a loss of the world in radical existentialism.


Guilt is reduced to being the result of defying one's potentialities. See Leon Salzman, "Observations of Dr. Tillich's Views on Guilt, Sin and Reconciliation," Journal of Pastoral Care 11 (Spring 1957): 11-19.


"Conscience in Western Thought," p. 299.

This "inescapable ambiguity of life" is the basic tension of religion; the finite points to the infinite, but remains finite. ST III, p. 100.


"Finite freedom is not aseity." See Courage to Be, p. 152.
The text does not provide a clear question or task that can be directly answered. However, it appears to be a page from a document containing bibliographic citations and some explanatory text. The citations are references to books and articles, and the text seems to be discussing the nature of faith and the role of doubt in maintaining or confirming faith. The text references works by various authors, such as "The Dynamics of Faith" by unknown authors, and "Anxiety Reducing Agencies in Our Culture," among others. There are also references to pages within the text, indicating that the document is likely part of a larger work or a thesis.
Courage to Be, p. 176. This idea of absolute faith has been compared favorably with Freud's idea of destroying the transference god. See Peter Homans, "Transference and Transcendence: Freud and Tillich on the Nature of Personal Relatedness," The Journal of Religion.

Interpretation of History, p. 117.

Tillich specifically refers to the dehumanization of man which has resulted from reductionistic ontologies which have attempted to deal with man by absolutizing the mathematical, moral, logical, economic, and creative (formative) aspects. Courage to Be, p. 138.

Human nature changes in history. It is not clear whether Tillich intends to mean man's essential nature at this point, but later indications concerning the movement of the divine life and the changing logos of being would seem to indicate so. ST I, p. 167.

ST I, p. 237.

Dynamics of Faith, p. 61.
CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF FINITUDE: ACTUALIZED CREATION AS FALLEN CREATION

While Tillich speaks of both a "creation" and a "fall," it is the intent of this chapter to show how for Tillich an actualized creation is necessarily a fallen one. We shall pick up on the point discussed in the first chapter where the unity with the ground of being moved toward the diversity of the self-world bifurcation. I shall show how this movement toward diversity implies a necessary separation from the ground of being, and how for Tillich the actualization of this movement (what he calls "creation") results in man's unavoidable, "fallen" state. Creation when actualized, is a fallen world which must attempt to reunite itself with the ground while simultaneously being in the diversity of life. Chapter IV will continue the discussion of redemption as a unity achieved while in the diversity; a redemption which ultimately transcends the original state of creation into which man was "thrown."

In this chapter, we shall further elaborate on our diagram in terms of the movement from the unity with the ground of being to the diversity of the fallen creation. A discussion of the "infinite" and the "finite" shall serve to explicate the "absolute jump" which constitutes the transition to creation. The tension between the infinite and the finite, as well as the tension between being and non-being, shall be shown as tensions in man which
reflect the very tension between the fallen creation and its original unity with the ground of being. Ultimately the tensions within man by the fact of his very existence in an actualized creation, prior to any "sin," are so great that they can only be overcome by a redemption which goes beyond the original creation.

Creation, then, is equivalent to the movement away from the ground toward diversity. This movement has the beneficial effect for Tillich of leading to the actualization of many latent potentialities. However, the negative side of this movement is the necessary appearance of the elements of non-being and the results of estrangement which will be discussed in Chapter III. Accordingly, redemption as discussed in Chapter IV will be the reverse movement; a return to a unity with the ground of being. The combination of these movements becomes the description of the movement of life itself at every moment:

There is always creation and consummation, beginning and end...Everything temporal comes from the eternal and returns to the eternal.¹

Chapter V will bring together this whole picture, but we must first continue to lay the groundwork with a discussion of Paul Tillich's doctrine of creation.

**BEING AND NON-BEING, INFINITE AND FINITE**

The basic tension which Tillich sees in man can be attributed to a large extent to his view that man participates in two contradictory forces—being and non-being. While claiming that being precedes non-being in ontological validity, every
creature which exists as a being necessarily participates in both forces, according to Tillich's definitions. The very existence of a creature implies an ontological tension, for "man participates not only in being but also in non-being." Man's existence is a dialectical relationship between being and non-being.

The dialectical relationship between being and non-being must be seen as being rooted in the tension which Tillich finds between the infinite and the finite. Tillich's version of Nicolaus Cusanus's "coincidence of opposites" implies the infinite transcendence of the infinite over the finite, while holding to its presence in everything finite. Tillich rejects the use of the phrase "immanence and transcendence" in that these are spatial terms with a dualistic heritage. He prefers to speak of the "qualitative relation" to which they point:

It was not until Nicolaus Cusanus formulated the principle of the "coincidence of opposites" (for example, of the infinite and the finite) and Luther formulated the principle of "justification of the sinner" (calling the saint a sinner and the sinner a saint if accepted by God) that the hierarchical principle lost its power and was replaced.

In Tillich's system, God is "immanent" in the world not in a spatial sense, but in the sense that he is its creative ground, and he is transcendent to the world through the fact of man's freedom. God is both for the world as its ground and against the world in the sense of mutual freedom. There is the coincidence of a unity with the ground of the world and the freedom of the world from that ground. The problem then becomes one of the reconciliation of the freedom of man and the freedom of God.
Tillich expresses his "coincidence of opposites" thusly:

There is no proportion or gradation between the infinite and the finite. There is an absolute break, an infinite "jump." On the other hand, everything finite participates in being-itself and its infinity.  

Tillich is somewhat ambiguous in the use of the term infinite. At times it is synonymous with the Creator, while at other times he notes that God is beyond even the infinite. I believe this ambiguity is rooted in the fact that the tension between God and creation is ultimately worked out as a tension within man himself. This seems to be the most feasible explanation for Tillich saying that: "If man and his world are described as finite, God is infinite in contrast to them," while at the same time holding that "Being-itself is not infinity; it is that which lies beyond the polarity of finitude and infinite self-transcendence."  

Part of the explanation for this lies in Tillich's two uses of the term "infinite." While it does find a place in pointing to the qualitative relationship between God and creation, it is also used to refer to a quality of man. "Infinitude is finitude transcending itself without any a priori limit," says Tillich, and this is a quality of man himself. There is the coincidence of opposites within man; between man's quality of infinite transcendence and his finite creatureliness.

The nature of the infinite and finite in man is linked to the split in man between potentiality and actuality. When Tillich says that God is beyond both the infinite and the finite, he means that God "transcends" the split between actuality and potentiality.
Both are contained within the process of the divine life. In Chapter V we shall see that the divine life is eternally creative, bringing to fulfillment the potentialities that are contained in the ground. But in man the split between potentiality and actuality is precisely the reason that man experiences his infinite quality at all. Man's awareness of his infinite quality arises because man is not what he essentially is; because his potentiality is not identical with his actuality. Infinity is the quality of man which leads him to experience his unlimited potentialities.

At this point we must return to our discussion of the relationship between being and non-being, for it is here where we will find that finitude is ultimately rooted in a force which is contradictory to the power of being.

While pointing to the form/matter dualism of the Greeks as being a result of the dialectical understanding of the relationship between being and non-being, Tillich concludes that the problem is inescapable. His conclusion that "man's finitude is unintelligible without the concept of dialectical non-being" is influenced by the idea that there must be a negative principle in God himself to account for sin and evil. Tillich does not follow the speculative philosophy of Schelling in his discussion of the possible existence of such a principle in God, but he does accept the existence of something which infinitely resists form, namely that side of God which can never be exhausted as logos. While Tillich never admits to an ultimate duality in being-itself, he does hold to the existence of something which infinitely resists
the power of being; indeed, something which draws this power out through its resistance.

While speaking of the fact that "being precedes non-being in ontological validity" in Volume I of his Systematic Theology in 1951, The Courage to Be of 1952 says that "non-being is as basic as being." This does not imply a decision of priority, he claims, but only that one finds both being and non-being at the same time. This is presumably because man in his existence always experiences both at the same time. In this later work it is clear that Tillich opposes an ultimate dualism, preferring to talk instead of being, the negation of being, and their unity. The relationship between being and non-being is not a dualistic one, but a cooperative tension mediated through their unity in God. Thus, all things are rooted in Jacob Boehme's "Yes and No," and man experiences this tension in that he is a mixture of being and non-being.

Tillich generally speaks of the power of being (which resists non-being) synonymously with the ground of being. He equates man's participation in the ground with man's power of being which resists non-being. While the power of being is clearly the power of being-itself, non-being seems to be that which the power of being must negate. When Tillich speaks of the "Divine life," the necessity of non-being as something for the power of being to overcome is seen:

Theology must take the problems of the philosophers of becoming seriously. It must try to combine the doctrine of eternal blessedness with the negative element without which life is not possible and blessedness ceases to be
blessed. It is the nature of blessedness itself that requires a negative element in the eternity of the Divine Life. This leads to the fundamental assertion: The Divine Life is the eternal conquest of the negative; this is its blessedness. Eternal blessedness is not a static state of immovable perfection--the philosophy of becoming was right in rejecting such a concept. But the Divine Life is blessedness through fight and victory. 12

Many Tillichian elements can be seen in this statement. In contrast to a monarchic approach he offers a more geneticistic view where both good and evil are utilized for the Divine purpose. Non-being merely functions to force the power of being (present in finite creatures as their "infinite quality" of self-transcendence) to affirm itself.

It is clear that finite being exists only through its participation in the resistance of the power of being to non-being. To be finite means to be limited by non-being. The presence of the infinite in the finite is the participation of the finite in being-itself and its power of being. Man's participation in the power of being is reflected in his "infinite" quality, the quality of self-transcendence.13

The relationship between the infinite and finite quality in man is not one of a structural polarity for Tillich:

Infinity is related to finitude in a different way than the other polar elements are related to each other. 14

Man is finite, but possesses the ability to infinitely transcend his present stage of development. This quality of infinite self-transcendence reflects man's participation in the power of being and its eternal resistance to non-being. Transcendence, or the self-affirmation of the power of being, can only
occur in a finite situation where there is finitude to be transcended. Being requires non-being in order to affirm itself. As Tillich puts it:

Being must be thought as the negation of the negation of being.\(^{15}\)

Man cannot exercise his infinite quality unless he is in the state of finitude where he must resist non-being. The purpose of creation is to put man in a struggle with non-being so that the power of being might be drawn out through self-affirmation. Indeed, where Tillich speaks of man's self-transcending quality as "vitality" and "courage," it is the one who can take the most non-being into himself that has the most power of being:

The more power of creating beyond itself a being has the more vitality it has.\(^{16}\)

We see that the movement beyond oneself into greater diversity brings with it a greater risk of non-being, but also a chance for greater self-affirmation. While this idea of courage will be discussed further in Chapter IV, it is important for our present purposes to note how man's existence in diversity is an existence which is coupled with finitude and non-being. The movement away from the ground (creation) leads man toward non-being and finitude. In Chapter IV we shall see how the "courage to be" and man's infinite ability to transcend himself are manifestations of the reverse movement; towards a reunion with the ground of being. The terms "infinite" and "finite" are therefore not structural polarities, but directing qualities, representing the movement of life to (redemption) and from (creation) the ground of
being. Likewise the "cooperative tension" between being and non-being also reflects this to and from movement and not a structural polarity. Chapter V will show how both being and non-being find a place in the divine life.

Non-being is necessary for finitude. "There can be no world unless there is a dialectical participation of non-being in being." In order for something to be, it must be finite; it must be caught between being and non-being. Finiteness or creatureliness is thus rooted in force which is contradictory to the power of being. This leads to the idea that man's existence essentially implies a tension. For man to be a creature means that he must participate in the resistance to the ground of being by non-being. We also see the tension between having to be something here and now, and the necessity of transcending the present situation before one is swallowed up by non-being.

To be a finite creature is to be imprisoned in finitude and threatened. The heritage of finitude is part of man's essential structure, prior to sin. To exist is to experience anxiety—to feel threatened. Tillich posits the being and non-being tension to account for the presence of sin, but in making it part of the essential structure of being eliminates any idea of man's "disobedience." Something is wrong with the structure of creation itself. It is ambiguous. Everything is only a transitory unity. Even prior to sin man has no stability in his life, experiencing physical evil, suffering, and death as part of the essential nature of being caught in the tension within existence.
Finitude manifests itself in the ontological elements, creating the tendency for the elements to draw away from each other, and the possibility of their separation. The threat of non-being is experienced as the anxiety which results from this tension. There is a dynamic tension between finite individualization and finite participation. Man experiences the threat of either loneliness or complete collectivization. There is a dynamic tension between dynamics and form, in that the dynamics might be lost in rigid forms or that there might be a formless chaos. And there is a dynamic tension between freedom and destiny, as man experiences the threat of losing both.

THE CATEGORIES: FORMS OF FINITUDE

The struggle between being and non-being is also manifest in what Tillich calls the forms of finitude. The being and non-being tension is parallel to the "affirmative and negative element" that these forms unite; the qualities of courage and anxiety.

The forms of finitude are Tillich's rendering of what has classically been called the "categories" of time, space, causality, and substance. They are forms of thought and being, or of self and world.

The negative element of time is transitoriness. As a finite creature, man is aware that he must ultimately die. Yet the experience of the power of being creates a positive element in time. This is the affirmation of the present moment as a chance to experience the creation of the new in time.
The experience of non-being is manifest in the category of space as the anxiety of ultimately losing one's own space. Nothing possesses a space of its own eternally. The experience of the power of being is reflected in the fact that a being affirms the space that it does have.

The so-called negative side of the category of causality is the awareness that nothing is self-caused, but that everything is contingent. This raises the question of being for man, the question of "to be or not to be." It is offset only by a courageous affirmation that one has some necessity in spite of his contingency.

Likewise in the category of substance, man realizes that changing reality necessarily lacks substantiality, and that he must ultimately lose his substance. Yet there is the positive experience of the "relatively static" amidst the flux of things. This in Tillich's mind is reason for courage.

It must be noted that Tillich's analysis of the categories assumes that anxiety is not only universal, but a part of man's essential nature. At this point his existential analysis seems to overflow into his idea of man's essential nature. He conceives the tension between being and non-being to be manifest in a struggle between the power of self-affirmation in courage and the negative resistance of finitude. Just as the divine life "eternally" overcomes non-being through the power of being, so must man, experiencing the threat of non-being as a finite creature, continually engage in self-affirmation. In doing so he participates
in the universal self-affirmation of the power of being over non-being. The evidence of such self-affirmation is evidence of the experience of the power of being. It is evidence of the presence of the infinite in the finite. Things emerge out of non-being as it were through a unity with the power of being. Everything which exists must participate in this power of being. But because of the ambiguous nature of creaturahood, a complete union is not possible. Man comes from nothing and is on his way to nothing. He always has one foot in non-being. Man is "being in the process of coming from and going toward non-being."20

Man's very existence is rooted in this tension. It is the tension of participation in, yet separation from, the power of being. It is in this context that Tillich says that the doctrine of creation is not an event, but rather a description of the relationship between the power of being and the creature of finitude:

The doctrine of creation is not the story of an event which took place "once upon a time." It is the basic description of the relation between God and the world.21

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

"Life" for Tillich means a mixture of essential and existential elements.22 "Essential" is generally used to refer to "created goodness," but actually comes to mean something like "possibilities for actualization." "Existential" is generally used to refer to the state of being estranged from the essential, but the existential is always mixed with the essential, and this is the root of the ambiguity of life. In a broader sense,
(what Tillich refers to as "religiously speaking"), the essence and existence distinction is the distinction between the "created" and "actual" world. This is an important and subtle distinction, for Tillich really means to distinguish "creation" from "actualized creation," as we shall see.

The fact that Tillich does make this distinction gives him a certain advantage over other doctrines of man. He uses it for his criticism of Freud. In Freud's thought about the libido, it became clear to Tillich that Freud did not distinguish between man's essential and existential nature.

Tillich also attacks Hegel on this very distinction. For in Hegel, non-being has been conquered in the totality of the system. When essence is actualized in existence, man is reconciled with his true being and there is no danger of non-being. Against this approach which presumably captures the "Yes" and not the "No," Tillich prefers to side with the existentialists who say that "existence is estrangement."

However, Tillich sets himself off somewhat from 20th century existentialism on this point. But he is critical of these existentialists in such a way that shows that they really do agree with him even if they claim not to. For instance, while Sartre says that man's essence is his existence, Tillich claims that by saying that man "loses himself," there is in fact an essence/existence distinction between the self which has lost itself and the self which is lost. In the same sense Heidegger talks as if there were no norms, but in order to say anything at all he must
assume what man should be essentially. Even Freud had to be optimistic about his therapy.

The essential or "created goodness" of man is the source of the norms for life in Tillich's system. He is quite right in pointing out that we can only know about these elements through their ambiguous manifestations in life, and that their identification is both a necessity and risk. His emphasis on the essential goodness of man does much to overcome negative evaluations of creation.

But we must not be misled by his words, for what Tillich says in traditional language is usually redefined in his system. He says that "the essential or potential in man and his world is the same as the norms for life."27 It is the possibilities in man which he can actualize that become the law for Tillich. The norms for life originate in life, originating first when man becomes aware of the possibilities that he can actualize when he can reflect on himself over against his world. It is with this in mind when Tillich says that "the purpose of creation is the creature itself and the actualization of its potentialities."28 The law becomes what man chooses to see as potentialities to attempt to actualize. This explains how the law no longer holds when a potentiality is actualized,29 for the law arises only through the separation of potential and actual. Once actualized, the only law is in terms of other potentials to actualize.
While sin is not created for Tillich, the story of the fall is merely a mythical way of speaking about a non-temporal event. The existence of sin cannot be derived. This means that the transition from essence to existence is irrational and not a derived dialectical step:

... the transition from essence to existence, from the potential to the actual, from dreaming innocence to existential guilt and tragedy, is irrational. It is an undeniable fact which must be accepted, although it certainly contradicts the essential structure of everything created.

While considering the fall as a-temporal, Tillich goes on to speak as if it were indeed a temporal event. Because it is not a derived dialectical step, the "fact" of this transition cannot be explained other than in story form, although Tillich claims that his version is a "half-way" demythologization.

The "pre-fall" period is not one of perfection; of creature obedient to his Creator. Rather, Tillich views the whole matter of the fall and transition from essence to existence in terms of potentiality and actuality. In this sense the essential is the potential which is present at all times in man's life.

Tillich equates potentiality with the power to become actual. Yet in order for something to become actual, it must be finite, falling under the structures of finitude where it becomes mixed with non-being. The tension between the power of being of an existent and its necessary link with finitude in order to be
is compared favorably to the Greek idea of a lasting ontological tension between form and matter.\textsuperscript{31}

In this language, "the fall" does not have bad connotations. In fact, it appears to be positive in that the fall allows man to actualize his potential. Having denied a pre-fall state of shalom, the "fall" is not a loss, but a gain.

The relationship between potentiality and actuality is directly comparable to the nature of the participation of a creature in the power of being and non-being. In the Greek sense of me on, everything at first has a relative non-being. It is in the state of potentiality. To become actual, a thing must leave the state of relative non-being:

In order to become actual, it must overcome relative non-being, the state of me on. But again, it cannot be completely out of it. It must stand out and stand in at the same time. An actual thing stands out of mere potentiality, but it also remains in it.\textsuperscript{32}

To become actual, a thing must participate in the power of being; the power of self-affirmation. It must separate itself to become actual, but by its continuous link with the power of being it will always have potentialities to actualize. By choosing to actualize itself, a being comes to participate in the structures of finitude and non-being. It must affirm itself in its power of being, but it can only do so by becoming mixed with non-being. Negation is required as a condition for self-affirmation. A being stands in and out of the power of being at the same time. Existence has the built in characteristic of being necessarily a mixture of affirming and negating forces.
Tillich's discussion of the pre-fall period is extremely difficult to comprehend when one tries to keep in mind that he is not talking about an event in time. It is clear, however, that in this state of what he calls "dreaming innocence," man was merely in a potential state, one to which we cannot attribute perfection.33

One of the driving forces which moves man towards the actualization is what Tillich calls "freedom in anxiety." When man first becomes aware of his freedom, he experiences anxiety. He experiences the anxiety of possibly losing himself by not actualizing his potential, and of losing himself by actualizing his potential. What Tillich really seems to mean here is that the source of man's anxiety is rooted in the self/world separation which, when it occurs to give rise to man, consists of a consciousness of possibilities to actualize through free decisions. The anxiety consists of the fact that man can never entertain all of his possibilities, but he must still choose in order not to lose them. Man can affirm himself but he can never know a life that does not also contain the negating forces of non-being.

In order to shed some light on why man "fell" or decided (and continually decides) for actualization, Tillich appeals to adolescent psychology. He compares man's decision for actualization to the usual decision for the actualization of one's sexuality. However, it must be remembered that the fall is a reference to man's continuous living in terms of the possible; that the event of creation is transhistorical, for: "the actual state is that of existence in which man finds himself along with the whole universe, and there is no time when this was otherwise."34
What, then, can Tillich mean by the term "created goodness?" It appears that he wants to maintain the goodness of creation while not wanting to blame estrangement on any disobedience by man. The only way to accomplish this is through the merging of creation and fall, and by explaining the transition to estrangement as having some positive attribute—namely, the actualization of what was potential.

The coincidence of creation and fall for Tillich seems clear from a number of statements. For instance:

Creation and fall coincide in so far as there is no point in time and space where created goodness was actualized and had existence. 35

Can Tillich maintain the essential goodness of creation while not attributing the fall to a temporal event? He seems to attempt to do just that by means of a subtle distinction. "Actualized creation" is distinguished from what was prior to it. It is actualized creation which is identical with estranged existence. In the original state of dreaming innocence, man was not fully man. Only with the actualization of creation does man have complete freedom to actualize possibilities, and such actualization can only take place through a fall which throws man into the ambiguous situation of a struggle between being and non-being.

The distinction between "actualized creation" and "created goodness" is a weak one, for:

The goodness of man's created nature is that he is given the possibility and necessity of actualizing himself and of becoming independent by his self-actualization, in spite of the estrangement unavoidably connected with it. 36
What is good about created goodness is the possibility of the fall, which is then equated with "actualized creation."

It is finite freedom which mediates the transition from essence to existence. It is because man's freedom must be actualized that the "fall" occurs. In order to be able to freely choose his possibilities, man must be in a state where he is above them. He must be a self over against a world. This necessitates that there be an "actualized creation." Yet what must necessarily accompany such a transition is the fact that man can only choose certain possibilities. He can never fulfill every potentiality.

The relationship between Creator and creature is thus one of both unity and separation. There is a continual unity with the divine ground in the sense of the power of being to resist non-being, but there is also a separation from the divine ground in order for man to freely choose his possibilities. For man to "image" God does not mean to walk in His ways, but for man to exercise his freedom to choose his possibilities. Man's freedom is conceived in such a way that separation and estrangement become a necessary part of the process of life. Freedom is not freedom to respond, but freedom is conceived of as the ability to choose one's possibilities, to give the law to oneself.

In spite of this idea of the necessity of separation for freedom, Tillich is aware of the continual link between the Creator and creature. He realizes the dependency of man upon his Lord, but conceives of freedom as freedom from the law instead of freedom to respond to it. Therefore he is left with a tension between
God and creation, with man necessarily trying to be "separate" from God in order to be free, while at the same time being constantly dependent upon God in every way in order to be at all:

Man is grounded in, but is not kept within the ground. Man has left the ground in order to "stand upon" himself, to actualize what he essentially is, in order to be finite freedom. This is the point at which the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the fall join. It is the most difficult and dialectical point in the doctrine of creation . . . it is the most mysterious point in human experience. Fully developed creatureliness is fallen creatureliness. 37

What happens to sin in this scheme? Sin is the consequence of having freedom, not the misuse of that freedom. Sin is merely reflective of the fact that one cannot actualize every possibility.

Freedom means being able to separate oneself from God, or to have within oneself the separation of potentiality and actuality. Man's full creatureliness entails that he be separate from God in a way that brings his freedom into conflict with God's freedom.

Still, Tillich believes that man's freedom can be reconciled with God's freedom. In fact, it seems to be the case that God is the driving force in the fall itself, for Tillich says that "the divine command threw Adam into self-actualization through freedom and destiny." 38 Man's being in the world is a state of "throwness."

The whole idea of creation and fall must be seen in terms of the movement of life from potential to actual. The fall becomes merely a part of God's plan for the full actualization of creatureliness. Only in existence, which unites the struggling
forces of being and non-being, can Tillich point to "the power of the essential behind and within the existential." Only in such a mixed situation can the power of being engage in true self-affirmation; bringing what is potential to actuality in response to the resistance of non-being in the ambiguous process of life.

Diagrammatically, I suggest the following picture:

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POWER OF BEING

creation

unity (potentiality)

actuality (existence)

FALL

NON-BEING

finitude

self

DIVERSITY

world

"absolute break"

"infinite jump"

Diagram VI

The movement of creation is one of separation from the ground of being; the inevitable consequence of an actualized creation. The movement is from potentiality to actuality; from man in his essential state of created goodness to his actualized state of fallenness; from his unity with the power of being to the participation in non-being which characterizes finitude. Man's actualized life is a mixture of being and non-being, of essential and existential elements. The movement of creation towards non-being is necessary to achieve actualization and diversity. The idea of separation as a movement in the divine life and indeed in
all of life will find its place in the discussion of Chapter V.

It should only be noted here that creation involves a separation from the ground; the creation of an "otherness."

In spite of the separation from the ground necessary for his freedom, man remains linked to his creative ground. His life is an ambiguous mixture that also contains new potentialities, power of being, and an infinite quality of self-transcendence. Though he moves in the direction of diversity, he still has his origin in a unity with the ground of being from which he derives his power and courage to be. With the creation event, man takes on the elements of non-being, and without an awareness of the source of his courage, the elements of man's existence tend to move against one another. The resultant estrangement is the subject of our next chapter.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1ST III, p. 420.
2ST I, p. 187.
3ST III, p. 13.
4ST I, pp. 237. See also ST I, p. 263, and ST II, pp. 7, 8, 31.
5ST I, pp. 251, 252, 191.
6ST I, p. 191.
7ST II, pp. 21-23.
8ST I, pp. 252-252, 206, 190.
9ST I, p. 189.
10Ibid.
11Courage to Be, p. 32.
12ST III, p. 405.
13ST I, p. 191.
14ST I, p. 190.
15Courage to Be, p. 179.
16Ibid., p. 81.
17ST I, p. 187.
18ST I, pp. 254, 269 and ST II, p. 70.
19ST I, p. 192.
20ST I, p. 189.
21ST I, pp. 252, 253.
22ST III, p. 12.
23ST I, p. 204.

25. ST II, p. 25.

26. Theology of Culture, p. 121.

27. ST III, p. 29.

28. ST I, p. 263.


30. ST II, p. 91.

31. ST III, pp. 11-12.

32. ST II, p. 41.

33. ST II, p. 34.

34. ST II, pp. 40-41.

35. ST II, p. 44.

36. ST I, p. 259.

37. ST I, pp. 255-256.

38. ST I, p. 260.

Chapter III

EXISTENCE AS ESTRANGEMENT

We have seen how man is essentially a unity of conflicting elements. We have traced the problem of separation from the ground as "creation" or "fall," also calling attention to the continued unity with the power of being necessary to resist non-being. We must now look at the effect that the separation from the ground of being has on the elements within man. This brings us to an examination of the nature of man's existence. Because existence as a creature presupposed the separation or "fall," man's existence is one of separation from the ground of being, or "estrangement." And without the unifying experience of absolute faith, the elements within man experience disruption. Man actually loses his wholeness as the elements within him tend to separate:

In finitude and estrangement man is not a whole but is disrupted into different elements.

Thus, the separation from God results in a further separation within man. In Chapter IV we shall see that reunion with God results in a re-establishment of man's lost wholeness.

In this chapter, we will see how man no longer experiences a cooperative tension between the elements of his life, but rather a disruptive tendency. This results in inevitable contradictions within man. When man leaves the ground to actualize himself, his self-ness is raised beyond its finite capacity. He attempts to dominate the world, which in reaction dominates him. Man
establishes religious functions in an attempt to recapture his lost sense of being grounded in God. But this function of self-transcendence merely arises as a result of the fact that the self-transcending quality of all functionality has been lost or obscured. We will examine how religious functionality arises as a result of estrangement, and how to overcome religion as a function puts one on the road toward real salvation.

**THE LAW FOR MAN IS A RESULT OF SIN; UNBELIEF A NECESSARY PART OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION**

Essentially, there is a tension between the ontological elements which creates anxiety in man, although this tension does not necessarily lead to a break. Once man actualizes his freedom through the unavoidable separation from God that imperative for that freedom, however, there is a tendency for the elements to separate. This "transition" from essence to existence separates man from God, as well as from his own true being. Man's essential being now becomes law for him, and essence and existence are mixed as the split between potentiality and actuality.

But this law is only a result of man's separation from God for Tillich. Disobedience, then, was only a possibility after the fall. Sin is not disobedience to God's Word, but the unavoidable state that one finds himself in as a being "thrown" into the world. Sin is another word for expressing the necessary condition for man's freedom, i.e. his separation from God in order to become a completely centered self or his "fall:"

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It is not disobedience to a law which makes an act sinful, but the fact that it is an expression of man's estrangement from God.\(^4\)

In this system, the intentions for creation only enter for man to disobey after the fall. On this point I would only ask Tillich with Jewish rabbi Bernard Martin, "Cannot the law be an aspect of the 'good' creation?"\(^5\)

Estrangement or separation refers to the fact that man's will is separated from God's will; that man's center is "outside of" the divine center. The immediate result of the situation of "thrownness" discussed in Chapter II is a disruption of the basic elements of man's structure. Tillich's idea of health as a state of relative balance between the elements is effective here, for he conceives of sin in a way parallel to the disruption of the elements by disease:

The elements of essential being which move against each other tend to annihilate each other and the whole to which they belong.\(^6\)

SELF VS. GROUND

In order for man to "actualize" himself fully, Tillich believes that he must separate himself from God. This means that the self-actualization of man makes necessary what Tillich calls "unbelief." For unbelief is:

... the act or state in which man in the totality of his being turns away from God. In his existential self-realization he turns toward himself and his world and loses his essential unity with the ground of his being and his world.\(^7\)
Sin is an unavoidable part of self-realization. Unbelief means that man's will must become separate from God's will. This separation is in no way considered to be disobedient, for the response relationship to God is not conceived to be possible before this separation or fall:

Unbelief is the separation of man's will from the will of God. It should not be called "disobedience," for command, obedience, and disobedience already presuppose the separation of will from will.  

Tillich's definition of unbelief as separation of will from will is the same as his prerequisite for freedom. The whole motive behind the fall was the need for man to actualize his freedom through his separation from God. Unbelief and freedom seem to coincide:

The freedom of turning away from God is a quality of the structure of freedom as such.

Tillich commits himself to more than just saying that freedom implies the possibility of unbelief. In fact, unbelief, or separation from God's will in order to make "free" decisions, is the only way to actualize oneself:

It is finite freedom which makes possible the transition from essence to existence.

Unbelief, then, is not disobedience to God. Man is apparently with excuse, for the response relationship only occurs after the fall. In this sense, the fall is both good and necessary for man to fully realize himself. Man is caught in a paradox. He must actualize his freedom, but to have it he faces the loss of his unity with God. Tillich captures this tension in his own idea of freedom well when he says of man that "His greatness and his weakness are identical."
SELF VS. SELF

The fact that man is free as a fully centered creature to make decisions reflects the "image of God" in man for Tillich. Because man had the infinite quality of self-transcendence through his freedom, he can separate himself from the divine center and elevate himself to the place of God. This is likened to the "hubris" of the Greek tradition. Removed from the divine center, man makes himself the center of his world. Because man can transcend any situation, he does not admit that he is finite, and tries to be infinite.

By identifying the centeredness of man as the "image of God," Tillich focuses on man's decisions in such a way that he gives man a relative autonomy. Decisions of man are placed in the context of a struggle against God's will, and the achievement of the centeredness necessary for free decisions becomes evidence of separation from God's will. For man to actualize his centeredness, he must separate himself from God's will.

SELF VS. WORLD

Because man elevates himself to the level of the infinite, he attempts to draw all of reality into himself. This Tillich calls "concupiscence." Having lost the sense of the unity of the self with the world through their common root in the ground of being, man attempts to achieve that union through his own efforts. Man attempts to become universal and to draw everything into what is really his finite particularity. Because this contradicts man's
essential nature (he always must have both individualization and participation), there is a reaction which disrupts man's centeredness. Man loses his determining center and his world is no longer under his control. Man no longer transcends his world, but becomes determined by his environment. Tillich cites the unlimited drive for power, knowledge, and sex as examples of the desire to experience a reunion with the whole.

SIN AND FREEDOM

The situations described all contradict man's "created goodness" or essential structure. The result of actualized creatureliness is "unavoidable" war between the elements. The tension previously described in the basic structure of man is heightened, and the balance is lost. The elements tend to move away from one another, to break apart. Man's necessary actualization of his centeredness seems to lead to an unavoidable uncenteredness.

There is a great deal of validity to this analysis if one sees it as pointing to the fact that man is basically a response creature, and necessarily must choose something to have the place of God in his life. If it is a "no god" that he chooses, then the order of his life will be disrupted. But it seems clear that Tillich makes no distinction between those who choose God and those who don't. All must experience disruption before their lives can become centered. The disruption of sin becomes a precondition of freedom.

Tillich's view of the separation of man's will from God's
will denies that man's will always remains a response to God's will. Man does not find his freedom in his response. Rather, the complete separation of man from God is necessary for Tillich in order that man might be a free, finite creature. Yet even Tillich admits that man is still dependent on God for his power of being. Man is dependent, yet he must become independent. We shall show how Tillich attempts to resolve the tension within his idea of freedom, between God's immanence and transcendence, and between God's will and man's will, in Chapter V.

Tillich tries to explain sin solely on the basis of man's necessary separation from God's will in order to have freedom. This assumes that freedom is necessary, good, and bad at the same time. Any idea of God's good intentions with the creation from the beginning, that man should live with the freedom to respond normatively, is opposed by Tillich's view where sin is necessary for freedom; unbelief a prior necessity to fully developed creatureliness. This makes Tillich's view redemptive centered rather than creation-restored-in-redemption centered. Man's relatively autonomous existence as a free, finite creature is limited only by non-being.

ESTRANGEMENT AND THE SEPARATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ELEMENTS AND THE CATEGORIES AS STRUCTURES OF DESTRUCTION

Besides disrupting the self-world polarity and their unity in the ground of being, estrangement results in the tendency for the ontological elements to separate. The essential unity of individualization and participation is disrupted. Man becomes
cut off from his world, experiencing isolation and loneliness. Man becomes empty, and the objects of his world tend to make him into an object. He is submerged into the collective.

Whereas man's vitality is directed to meaningful content in the essential state, in estrangement there is the separation of dynamics from form. Man experiences chaos and emptiness, and the formless urge for self-transcendence. Form isolated from vitality becomes legalistic, abstract, external law.

Without a deciding center, freedom itself loses its definiteness, becoming arbitrary, willful, and without purpose. In turn, destiny becomes a compulsion that determines man's actions. Thus, in estrangement there is some validity to speaking of determinism and indeterminism, but this is not an essential state of affairs.

Diagram VII shows the results of estrangement, where individualization separates from participation, dynamics from form, and freedom from destiny. The sense of the unity of the whole in the ground of being is lost, and the self-world interaction is disrupted.

Diagram VII
Because the unity of being and non-being is expressed in the structures of finitude, or the categories, a predominance of the feeling of non-being will cause one to experience despair in them. In this case they become "structures of evil." Cut off from the ultimate power of being which gives one the essence of the "eternal now," time becomes experienced as mere transitoriness. Without the presence of the power of being as the "eternal here," man experiences spatial contingency and ultimate uprootedness. Without the ground of dependence, man attempts to make himself the absolute cause. Failing, he feels that he is governed by mere necessitation. Without the ground, man attempts to give himself absolute substance, but fails and experiences change as haphazard.

While Tillich's discussion of anxiety leading to despair does describe the results of sin in creation, it is more significant for him that as a result of estrangement, non-being comes to prevent the self-affirmation of being. Governed by despair, a being no longer uses its power of being to courageously affirm itself. Thrown into this situation as the natural result of actualizing himself, man must wait for God to redeem the situation so that for the first time he can be a full creature who is not disrupted.

**THE LIFE OF SPIRIT UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF EXISTENCE**

An initial discussion of Tillich's concept of religion is possible in conjunction with a discussion of his view of estrangement. For it is as a result of the separation that what is ordinarily called the "religious function" first appears, according to
Tillich. Tillich believes that religion as a special function is merely a result of sin, and that part of redemption is the transcendence of this function.

Essentially, morality, culture, and religion interpenetrate. We have noted that morality is based on the polarity of individualization and participation, culture on the polarity of dynamics and form, and religion on the polarity of freedom and destiny. However, because religion was defined as the self-transcendence of life it is not essentially a function but rather a quality of the functions of morality and culture. Life transcends itself within the processes of self-integration and self-creation, and this self-transcending quality is the "religious" aspect of these functions:

The definition of religion as self-transcendence of life in the dimension of the spirit has the decisive implication that religion must first of all be considered as a quality of the two other functions of spirit and not as an independent function. Religion is thus a reflection of the fact that man is separated from the ground of his being. The self-transcending "quality" within the essential functionality of life is that quality which moves toward a reunion with the ground. Religion as a special function occurs as a result of man's separation from the ground of his being, and can itself be transcended in the periodic experience of absolute faith:

True religion (absolute religion) is generally hidden. It becomes manifest "now and then" . . . Religion is abolished through its presence.

Tillich accounts for what is normally called the "religious" function by saying that it arises as a result of the separation of
man from the ground of his being:

Religion is the consequence of the estrangement of man from the ground of his being.19

We shall discuss just how this function is eliminated for Tillich in the non-conceptual experience of absolute faith in the discussion of Chapter V. But of importance for our discussion of the result of separation is that in making what is ordinarily called "religion" the result of separation, Tillich may not be able to do justice to the reality of life that this concept represents.

Tillich believes that religion should not exist. Indeed, while he has already called it a "function" of life, he now says that it should rather be called a "quality" of morality and culture.20 Self-transcendence cannot be a function, for a function of life cannot transcend itself in his opinion.

In religion, something is transcended but not transcended. Life transcends itself "but at the same time remains within itself."21 Tillich tries to consider a broader understanding of "religion" as the experience of the unconditional in morality and culture. "Religion" is the quality of ultimate concern in all functions of the spiritual life. Religion is a quality of each function, indeed, the self-transcending quality. But can there be a function whose function it is to transcend itself—to point beyond itself to what one takes to be ultimate? Tillich denies that such a reality can be a proper function.

One of the attractive things about Tillich is that he does move toward the broader understanding of religion as being at the root of all functions of man. But in moving toward this broader
understanding of the concept of religion, Tillich does not give full due to the creational place of a self-transcending or depth expressing function. For him, its existence is merely reflective of the fact of separation, and its necessity as a function is based upon this separation. Essentially, it should not exist, and salvation implies its removal as a function. Once there is a reunion with the ground, this function is no longer necessary. The function (quality for Tillich) of transcendence is itself transcended by a direct encounter with the ground.

Thus, Tillich points to the faith-rootedness of all functions in the ground through their self-transcending qualities:

Religion is not a special function of man's spiritual life, but it is the dimension of depth in all of its functions.22

This points to the origin of all diversity in a unity. But by emphasizing that this link is based on the self-transcending quality of each function, the relation of other functional qualities to the ground becomes seemingly less direct. Chapter VI will deal further with the relationship between religion and culture. Also, Tillich denies a proper self-transcending function. The functionality of the diversity is directly linked to the unity only in its self-transcending quality. While functionality is reflective of the diversity which results from the separation (→) from the origin, the self-transcending quality of each function harkens back to the ground (←). By identifying it as being the "religious" quality, self-transcendence is thus on the road toward a reunion with the origin in the experience of absolute faith or absolute religion:
How does Tillich account for the presence of a self-transcending function? Under estrangement, morality is caught between the poles of legalism and relativism, and culture between chaotic creation and meaningless forms. For Tillich, it is under such conditions that religion arises. It is incomprehensible to him that there is a function called "religion." Indeed, he says that "there should be no religion," and that its presence can only be attributed to the decline in the self-transcending aspects of the functions of spirit; to the presence of a conditional imperative in morality and to meaningless forms in culture.

Thus, the need for man to functionally formulate what he takes to be ultimate through his religious symbols and myths is the aspect of life which links man to the origin. Every function has this quality within itself, the quality of pointing to the ultimate, and Tillich utilizes this fact for all that it is worth. Because it serves as the link to the origin, its importance is emphasized. But redeemed man no longer has to functionally formulate his faith in finite language. This reflects Tillich's
movement towards the idea of "absolute faith," where he believes that content can be eliminated as one experiences the ground of being directly in the depth of the self-transcending personality. As we shall see in Chapter VI, the "religious function" of symbolic or confessional language must ultimately be transcended. The best symbol is the one which denies or transcends itself.

Having thus distinguished between functionality on the one hand and the link to the ground by the self-transcending quality on the other, Tillich creates a tension between the experience of absolute faith (a direct experience of the self-transcendent quality) and functionality. The question arises as to the relationship between absolute faith and functionality. Functionality only retains a direct link to the Creator by periodic returns to the ground in experiences of the depth. It is to the nature of this return and the results of this "redemption" that we must now turn.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1"Religion and Health," p. 353.
2Dynamics of Faith, p. 110.
3ST II, p. 119.
4ST II, p. 117.
6ST II, p. 60.
7ST II, p. 47.
8ST II, p. 47.
9ST II, p. 32.
10ST II, p. 31.
11ST II, p. 33.
12Courage to Be, p. 66.
13ST II, p. 67.
14ST II, p. 69.
15Courage to Be, p. 41.
16ST III, p. 96.
17Ibid.
19ST III, pp. 95, 403.
20ST III, pp. 95, 96.
21ST III, p. 100.
22Theology of Culture, pp. 5-6.
23ST III, p. 97.
Chapter IV

REDEMPTION AS REUNION: COURAGEOUS DIALECTICS

It is Jesus as the Christ who bridges the infinite gap between the finite and the infinite in Tillich's system, reuniting man with his ground. He "re-establishes" the unity of God and man, but for the first time under the conditions of existence. Being in Christ for Tillich means to experience such a unity with God, and to manifest the re-integrating power of faith in the elements of one's life. While man is always separated in finitude, his experience of faith as a participation in the infinite makes him fragmentarily whole. The subject of this chapter is to point out the results of such an experience, to note how the faith-rootedness of life's functionality is reduced to a self-transcending moment, and to show how the man of faith comes to accept non-being as a necessary part of the process of life.

JESUS AS THE CHRIST: AN UNBROKEN UNITY WITH GOD

For Tillich, it is not the death and resurrection of Jesus that are important, nor His miracles or signs of healing. The main thrust of the Christ story as seen through his glasses is the fact that the Christ maintained an unbroken unity with God while under the conditions of existence. Even though he experienced anxiety, this never led him to despair. In light of
this "picture" of Christ, Tillich believes that it is possible to
distinguish between essential finitude and existential disruption.
Christ "represents" essential man under the conditions of existence,
and is thus an example of what God wants man to be under these
conditions.

The Christ story, then, must be liberated from "literalistic
connotations."¹ At the root of the story Tillich does hold to the
factuality of a divine manifestation, but beyond that the Bible is
only transmitting a "picture" created by its authors under the
impact of this reality. The reality of this manifestation and its
ability to be transmitted through the Biblical picture is attested
to for Tillich by the presence of faith and its transforming power.

Those who participate through such faith in Christ are
participating in what Tillich calls the "New Being." The New Being
is indeed new, for it is essential being maintaining its unity with
God while under the conditions of existence. This condition is
"new" in that it is more than the merely "potential" character of
essential being:

The New Being is new not only over against
existence but also over against essence, in so far
as essence remains mere potentiality. . . The New
Being participates in existence and conquers it.²

Because man in his potential state before the fall was not yet
actualized as created man, redemption becomes the first time that
man can actualize himself and his potential without turning from
God. Thus, redemption is not the restoration of creation, but is
in a real sense a totally new creation. Not until redemption is
man allowed to be fully man. Only now can he fully serve the
Lord in his freedom to respond.

The power of Christ is the power of being; the power which overcomes non-being. In this power, Christ was able to conquer the forces of estrangement. The presence of this power was evidenced by the fact that Christ maintained an essential unity with God or being-itself while under the conditions of existence. This "unbroken unity" was supposedly shown by the lack of traces of estrangement between himself and God and himself and his world.

Tillich wants to replace the old two-nature theory of Christ with more dynamic-relational concepts. The assertion that Christ had a divine and human nature must be replaced by the idea that in Christ, there was a unique community between God and the center of a personal life which enabled Him to avoid disruption. This God-man unity idea anticipates the correlation that Tillich makes between God's life and man's life, the subject of Chapter V, and the healing, integrating power of faith in the center of one's personality that we shall be discussing here. He is against the "orthodox" position of two-natures, and the liberal position of a unique man. But his third alternative is rooted in the idea that God is behind all life processes, moving everything (good and evil) to fulfillment. As we shall see, this God-man unity idea leads to a blurring of the distinction between sin and salvation.

As I have previously pointed out, sin and salvation are closely tied up in Tillich's mind with the ideas of sickness and disruption, and healing means achieving a balance of sorts. Thus, in terms of the power of the New Being, its effect on a personal
life is to restore the balance of the ontological elements which was disrupted by the separation from God. Healing overcomes what is split. It makes whole again, reuniting man with God, his world, and himself.

FAITH: MAKING MAN WHOLE

It should be recalled that under the conditions of estrangement, man is not a whole, but is disrupted into different elements (see Chapter III). The self pulls in the opposite direction from its ground, its world, and even its own self. It is the function of faith as "reconciliation" to re-unify man:

This is the function of reconciliation, to make whole the man who struggles against himself. It reaches the center of the personality and unites man not only with his god and with himself, but also with other men and with nature.3

It is the function of faith to re-integrate the personality as a whole; to re-unify the different elements in man.

THE CREATION OF FAITH: REGENERATION

Regeneration describes the condition of being grasped by the divine presence. For Tillich, faith is not something that man does, but is the work of the Divine Spirit, the power which creates the New Being in man. It is best described as participation or "reunion." The separation of estrangement is overcome in a direct experience of the presence of the ground of being.
SALVATION AS JUSTIFICATION

While regeneration points to reunion, justification is its paradoxical character whereby what is unacceptable is accepted. Again, Tillich emphasizes that there is nothing in man which enables God to accept him. However, man's side of it is that man must accept the fact that he is accepted. Tillich does well here in going a bit beyond Luther, Barth, and others. His emphasis on man's need to accept acceptance is one of his best contributions to psychotherapy.

SALVATION AS SANCTIFICATION

Sanctification is the process of transformation of spiritual life under the impact of the Spiritual Presence. It is a process of increasing awareness of the struggling forces of existence, presumably so that one can learn to master them:

Man in the process of sanctification becomes increasingly aware of his actual situation and of the forces struggling around him and his humanity, but also becomes aware of answers to the questions implied in this situation. This follows from Tillich's idea of the law, or man's essential being. When man is "reunited" with his essential being, he is no longer subject to it for Tillich. When man becomes aware of the struggling forces which are life itself, he also becomes aware of his potentiality and how to master his situation in order to produce increasing actualization of his powers.
Tillich seems to be quite influenced at this point by the idea of the law as a burden. In order for the law to cease being a burden, it must cease to be totally in his view. The fact that man is accepted by grace does not eliminate the need for him to respond in faith, as Tillich himself has affirmed. Yet what substance can be given to channel faith if the law for one’s life disappears upon the creation of faith?

In Tillich’s system, the law is basically representative for the potentialities which man chooses to actualize. Man has the law within himself, and can overcome it by actualizing himself. This is the "demand" which man constantly experiences—that which drives him on towards increasing self-affirmation.

In typical Lutheran fashion, Tillich describes this "Christian life" as always remaining on an up-and-down course. Yet he also speaks of a "movement toward maturity."6 In all of the movements of life, the impact of the Spiritual Presence is one of bringing about "increasing self-transcendence" or devotion toward, and participation in, the holy.

Can the impact of faith be merely an increasing self-transcendence in the midst of an up and down experience? As the moment of directedness to the holy within every spiritual act, faith is reduced to one moment in addition to other moments in any given act.

If Tillich wants to identify a particular function whose nuclear moment would be the explicit confession of the ultimate meaning in one’s life, he could speak of a self-transcending function. Even though he has seen the religious root of all
functionality, he unfortunately eliminates just such a function because of the dangers of restricting what is "religious" to it. Instead, he talks of the depth dimension within all of the other functions. "Self-transcendence" as an attitude of devotion to what one considers to be ultimate becomes a moment within other functions, while other moments within these functions are less directly related to the ultimate. The bulk of man's life is thus religious in an indirect sense. The end result is the idea that symbols are more direct expressions of faith than the other cultural activities, which become indirectly religious. It is only one more step for Tillich to choose theology as the unifying science of life instead of finding a place for it as a modal science. This will become clear in Chapter VI.

Certainly, though, we must give Tillich credit for speaking out for the central role of faith in the diverse aspects of life, even though the reduction of religious response to one quality within all functionality limits his understanding of its role. His idea of the multidimensional unity of life allows him to speak of the impact of faith on the psyche, cells, and even the physical elements of man. The idea of faith as effective in all of the dimensions of human life counter-acts the intellectual distortion of faith. However, the functional expression of faith is reduced to the self-transcending moment within each function. The effect of faith is the creation of such things as the self-transcending morality and self-transcending culture. Thus, there is a certain autonomy relegated to the qualifying moments of these functions.
The kingdom of God does manifest itself in history for Tillich, but only in certain moments when it "breaks through." These are called the "kairos." The moment of a kairos revelatory experience cannot be predicted. One can only be ready in the condition of faith, remaining open to the impact of the Spiritual Presence.

 Rejecting both the dualistic idea of a transcendent heaven and the progressive idea of a future utopia, Tillich winds up with an emphasis on the importance of the "now." Man must be ready to participate in the divine life in history, for there will be no future utopia. The important time is now, and one must be ready to act with courage in great historical moments.

 The "infinite distance" between God and man is never bridged, for man remains a finite creature. Man's participation in eternal life is therefore a transtemporal participation. The eternal is only now:

 The eternal is not a future state of things. It is always present, not only in man (who is aware of it) but also in everything that has being within the whole of being. The eternal is always present. It is the possibility for actualization that can occur if one can unite the tension within the elements of existence in a creative act. Such creative acts occur through union with the ground of one's being in the great historical kairos.
MORALITY

Under the conditions of estrangement, morality was caught between legalism and relativism. Under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, Tillich envisions a "theonomous" or "self-transcending" morality through the creation of a "transmoral conscience."

Theonomous morals are morals of love created by the spirit to fulfill the demands of concrete situations. Yet the creation of these morals occurs only by a transcending of man's moral function. This is an example of how redemption does not fulfill the law, but in fact eliminates it. For the transmoral conscience does not judge in obedience to a moral law, but now bypasses that functionality for something apparently more direct—a "participation in a reality which transcends the sphere of moral commands."  

Theonomous morality is "beyond morality." Because the moral realm is so caught in the ambiguities of law, one must go beyond it and have a "transmoral conscience."

There are no eternal norms or commands as in the "supernaturalistic" solution, nor is truth produced in the dynamic process of life, as in the "dynamic rationalistic" solution of the pragmatists. For Tillich, the former cannot deal with a changing world, while the latter led to the collective merging of consciousness in National Socialism and dynamic irrationalism. He also criticizes the "rationalistic-progressive solution" which makes certain ultimate principles the goal of mankind, in that these principles can never be made comprehensive enough to cover all periods of a changing world.
In his idea of Love and the kairos, Tillich believes that he has found the solution to the ambiguity of change and constancy. Love is the eternal demand which is expressed and realized in laws and institutions. While these forms are necessary to contain Love, Love is beyond them. Love realizes itself in new forms in a creative act of intuition at a special time or kairos:

Love demands laws and institutions, but love is always able to break through them in a new kairos, and to create new laws and a new system of ethics. Tillich seems to wind up with a negative view of positivized law. While he admits that it is necessary for love to manifest itself at all, he seems to be saying that it is unfortunately necessary. Indeed, in these great moments of intuition man's creatureliness seems to be momentarily set aside in favor of a direct knowledge of Love itself in a kairos. In this way, the transmoral conscience really transcends man's functionality. This stage is comparable to the last stage of Rollo May's four stages of consciousness, where creative insight and ecstasy actually transcends the limits of the personality, or Nietzsche's man who is beyond good and evil through an enthusiastic unity with life itself.

Tillich criticizes any idea of eternal laws because he says that they cannot hope to work in a changing world. Yet his idea of Love is certainly a constant demand upon man's existence.

Tillich seems to negate positivizations completely, and to believe that a direct incarnation of the law in an historical kairos can overcome the fallibility of positivizations. By not seeing the positivizations as responses, he approaches absolutization of the
kairos, and by attempting to transcend the moral function, he
approaches relativism in man's moral life.

CULTURE

Under the conditions of estrangement, culture oscillates
between the creation and destruction of meaning. Under the impact
of the Spiritual Presence, there is the occurrence of "self-trans-
scending" or "theonomous culture." In such a situation, there is
the expression of ultimate meaning in every cultural act. Theono-
ymous culture "communicates the experience of holiness, of something
ultimate in being and meaning, in all of its creations." Man
determines the autonomous forms of self-creation, and they come to
contain an expression of ultimate meaning:

Where the Spiritual Presence is effective, life
is turned into the direction which is more than one
direction among others—the direction toward the ultimate
within all directions. This direction does not replace
the others but appears within them as their ultimate end.

With this statement, Tillich seems to realize that the
spiritual direction of life is somehow related to all of life's
functions. But again he further defines that relationship as being
one of "ultimate ends." In light of his relegation of autonomy to
cultural acts, it is clear that he does not see the spirituality of
each function in toto. He fears the idea of "spiritual" because
he does not wish to subsume culture into religion. Religion is
within culture as its pointing aspect. There should be no religion
as a special function, but every cultural and moral act should have
a "moment" of self-transcendence.
RELIGION

Under the conditions of estrangement, religion appears as a special function and is faced with the ambiguities of transcendence, profanization, and demonization. Under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, Tillich envisions a theonomous religion.

Part of this redemptive process is the conquering of religion as a particular function of life. This is accomplished by what Tillich calls "the Protestant Principle," which denies the absolute claim of any church to represent the Divine. However, Tillich carries this negation of an absolute claim to the extreme. Ultimately religion can only exist by a total denial of its content. Far surpassing the valid idea that confessional doctrine is fallible, Tillich seems to deny that it should even function in any authoritative way in man's life. Thus, the claim of the Christian church to represent God to the exclusion of other churches is rejected, and the move toward the "absolute faith" which is both "beyond" faith and without content is fostered. True religion becomes the rare apprehension of self-certainty through the eruption of the ground of being into the autonomous forms of self-consciousness. Religion is the moment in a functional act when one is aware of the certainty of the Unconditioned. True religion is "generally hidden," becoming manifest only "now and then" in a "vital breakthrough of the Unconditioned." The function of this religion is to give certainty. By speaking of the experience of certainty, Tillich perhaps comes closest to the Biblical understanding of faith:
There is a function of the spirit which neither stands alongside the other functions nor is their unity, but rather comes to expression in and through them, namely, the function in which the spirit breaks through all of its forms and penetrates to its ground. For that reason it is not (properly) a form of the spirit and can only paradoxically be called a function.18

Because sanctification remains only fragmentary under the conditions of existence even when one participates in the New Being, religion remains as a function. But its redemptive task is to eliminate itself as a function; to negate itself. Religion must sacrifice itself as man moves toward an inner, almost mystical experience of certainty which occurs when he is raised above his functionality; the religion above religion.

DESTRUCTION AS SALVATION

Because man exists as a finite creature, he faces non-being. As a result of estrangement, he is cut off from the ground of his being or source of courage to face non-being. This turns his anxiety about non-being into despair. The question of salvation is thus one of how man can face the fact that he is finite. How can we face non-being in such a way that our anxiety does not lead us to despair?

Central to Tillich's idea of "salvation" is that we must accept finitude. The acceptance of finitude means implicitly the acceptance of the ambiguity of the world which includes non-being and the negativities of existence. Because non-being functions to account for most of what is usually called "evil," Tillich's idea of salvation implies the ability to accept evil as a necessary part
of the ambiguous process of life. Salvation does not remove non-being but rather accepts it.

"Courage" is defined as the self-affirmation of being in spite of non-being. Such courage recognizes the necessity of a negative principle. In this courage, one has to realize that what is apparently destruction is actually salvation:

The vitality that can stand the abyss of meaninglessness is aware of a hidden meaning within the destruction of meaning.

The answer does not remove the state of meaninglessness, but it is the precondition of salvation that it merely explains this state. For the answer cannot demand that the state be changed:

The answer must accept, as its precondition, the state of meaninglessness. It is not an answer if it demands the removal of this state; for that is just what cannot be done.

Man not only becomes aware of the forces struggling around him, but accepts them as necessary.

Salvation does not bring judgement upon man's life-as-response, but rather affirms the meaningfulness of all activity under the guise that "being as being is good." Salvation affirms the necessity of non-being. Indeed, being needs non-being for its process of self-affirmation. For non-being is the force which ultimately accounts for change. Without the need for being to continually overcome non-being, life would be a process of "immovable self-identity:

Being could not be the ground of life without non-being. The self-affirmation of being without non-being would not even be self-affirmation but an immovable self-identity. Nothing would be manifest, nothing expressed, nothing revealed. But non-being drives being out of its seclusion, it forces it to affirm itself dynamically.
COURAGE AND THE CATEGORIES

The courage created under the impact of the Spiritual Presence allows man to overcome the despair in the categories or forms of finitude. Part of this courage comes from the knowledge that there is a process to life, and that one therefore participates in a transtemporal reality. As the "eternal now," (where one becomes aware of the process), the temporal and spatial come to have meaning in the face of non-being. For God is working himself out in each particular time and place, not in some future utopia or in some already complete higher level of reality. In light of the affirmation of the ground of being as the source of courage, the causal and substantial are also affirmed.

THE NEW BEING IN EXISTENCE

Tillich's idea of redemption is highly dependent upon his world-view, which sees creation as an unfolding process of actualization where all being is affirmed merely because all being has a structured existence. Because Tillich focuses on the fact that existence is dependent upon a ground of being by saying that "everything that is participates in being-itself," he tends to obscure the directedness of action. All being automatically is going God's way so to speak merely by "participating" in God through its existence. The greater the power of self-affirmation in one's life, the greater the courage, and the more one participates in eternity now. There is no directional idea of for God or against God. Rather everything is for God because everything has the power of being.
Everything which exists because of the ground of being is said to participate in the ground of being. There is no distinction made between existence because of structuring and participation because of directional response.

Tillich's departure from much traditional Christian doctrine is starkly apparent. In place of the resurrection, he prefers what he terms a "restitution theory" where the disciples envisioned the unity of God and Jesus in their minds. This is to replace the "absurd" idea that someone could rise from the dead. Of course, because the importance of Christ lies in his ability to draw courage from his union with the Father, Tillich even goes so far as to say that the experience of the New Being in Jesus actually must precede the resurrection "experience."

It is quite clear that the situation of New Being is far beyond the mere potential state of Adam. While Adam represents the "essential" unity with God, only with Christ does there come actual man who has a unity with God:

... actual being is the true expression of potential being, an expression, however, which is not immediate, as in "dreaming innocence," but which is realized only after estrangement, contest, and decision. In the reunion of essential and existential being, ambiguous life is raised above itself to a transcendence that it could not have achieved by its own power.

A true spiritual life can thus only take place in the context of existence with its destructive powers. Because non-being is necessary for the ambiguity, one can conclude that sin is a necessary aspect of creation. This notion makes it clear that the full meaning of man's responsibility for sin at any given time in history is virtually lost.
While this life of New Being takes place amidst finitude and non-being, the source of its power of being is derived from a link with the infinite:

Faith is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself.\textsuperscript{29} It is the power of being which lies behind and within every act of courage or faith, and this experience of the power of self-affirmation is evidence of a reunion with the ground:

Being-itself transcends every finite being infinitely; God in the divine-human encounter transcends man unconditionally. Faith bridges this infinite gap.\textsuperscript{30}

Thus, while the infinite distance between God and man "can never be bridged":\textsuperscript{31}

It is faith, nevertheless, overcoming the infinite gap between the infinite and the finite.\textsuperscript{32}

Man experiences this unity with the ground if he is grasped from the side of the infinite:

In spite of all forces of separation between God and man this is overcome from the side of God.\textsuperscript{33}

The point of contact between man and God is not directly in man's functionality. Rather, it is in the "depth" of the human soul. Thus, man is caught in the oscillation of "having and not having,"\textsuperscript{34} for he finds his life in his functionality but the power for this life in a "transcendent" unity with God:

The "transcendent union" answers the general question implied in all ambiguities of life. It appears within the human spirit as the ecstatic movement which from one point of view is called "faith," from another, "love."\textsuperscript{35}

This unity does not do away with the tensions of existence that Tillich identifies as being at the root of all life processes:
The dynamics of all life, even the unambiguous life of the transcendent union, implies tensions. But only in the estrangement of ambiguous life do the tensions become conflicts. 36

Faith is the state of being in an ecstatic union with the ground of being. Man experiences integration and healing, but only fragmentarily. 37 The state of faith, then is one where man is beyond his ordinary functionality:

The divine Spirit does not eliminate centered selves and their encounters, but it does sublimate them into states of mind which transcend their ordinary possibilities. 38

Indeed, this experience is shrouded in mystery:

There is no faith (but only belief) without the Spirit’s grasping the personal center of him who is in the state of faith, and this is a mystical experience, an experience of the presence of the infinite in the finite. 39

While Tillich describes man as having a multidimensional unity, it is clear that for him man can never be whole because he must always exist in finitude. Man is integrated only fragmentarily in these mystical experiences, and has elements of disintegration in all dimensions of his being. 40 Man must strive to gain his wholeness by being "open for the power of faith," 41 for "such openness is what religion calls ‘grace.’" 42 When man is re-united with God, he becomes whole, but this union with God is rooted in a quality within his functionality, not directly in the functionality itself. It is but one direction within others. In the state of faith, man is actually beyond his own functionality:

Man’s spirit cannot reach the ultimate, that toward which it transcends itself, through any of its functions. But the ultimate can grasp all of these functions and raise them beyond themselves by the creation of faith. 43
We can perhaps illustrate Tillich’s idea of redemption through the following diagram:

![Diagram IX]

While separation (see Diagram VI) was a movement away from the ground, redemption constitutes a return. Courage as a manifestation of the New Being brings healing and integration to the life of man, although such healing is only fragmentary in light of the in and out nature of the direct experience of the ground in absolute faith.

The experience of redemption is one of a reunion with the ground of being. Man experiences that which is the ground of both himself and his world, and hence is able to integrate all of the aspects within himself. Yet because of the gap between the infinite and the finite, man can only achieve this integration and reunion fragmentally. He can return to the ground, but must find his existence in the functionality of finitude. His consolation is the knowledge that even non-being works for good, and that everything participates in an unambiguous, eternal dimension, with which he can have direct contact in redemptive, integrative returns or
kairoi. It is to the description of this back and forth process of separation and reunion that we must now turn.

The reunion with the ground also raises the question as to the status of man's freedom (for which the separation originally took place) with regard to the power of the ground of being. Chapter V must also lay out Tillich's solution to this dilemma.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1ST II, p. 112.
2ST II, p. 150.
3"Religion and Health," p. 353.
4ST III, p. 231.
5ST III, p. 232.
6ST III, p. 237.
7ST III, pp. 276, 220.
8ST III, p. 239.
9ST III, p. 400.
12Ibid., p. 94.
14ST III, p. 251.
15ST III, p. 270.
16ST III, p. 245.
17What is Religion? pp. 139-140, 146-147.
18Ibid., p. 142.
19Courage to Be, p. 155.
20Ibid., p. 175.
21Ibid., p. 175.
22Tillich adapts the Augustinian statement in a way which relativizes all good and evil. See ST III, p. 408.
23Courage to Be, p. 179.
24Ibid., p. 169.
25Ibid., p. 156.
27ST II, p. 129.
28ST III, p. 129.
29Courage to Be, p. 172.
30Ibid.
31ST III, p. 239.
32ST III, p. 155.
33Dynamics of Faith, p. 104.
34Ibid., p. 61.
35ST III, p. 129.
37Dynamics of Faith, p. 108.
38ST III, p. 143.
40Dynamics of Faith, p. 108.
41Ibid., p. 109.
42Ibid.
43ST III, p. 133.
Chapter V

THE LIFE OF GOD IN THE LIFE OF MAN

Chapters I through IV have given us a description of Tillich's view of the nature of man. Man is composed of separate elements which interact in such a way that new potentialities are constantly actualized. Not only is the basic separation within man between his self-ness and his world-participation, or between his mental and vital elements, necessary for the interaction, but the separation of man from God is also a prerequisite for actualization. We have noted the role of faith in fragmentarily integrating the human personality in great creative moments or kairos. We must now turn our attention to the relationship of this whole process of separation and reunion to the life of God, and to a discussion of the place of man's freedom within the divine life.

GOD, THE MOVEMENT OF LIFE, AND THE TRINITARIAN PROBLEM

The question of the relationship between God and the world is the immanence-transcendence problem. In the history of theology, all systems have tried to do justice to both God's immanence and His transcendence, but usually wind up stressing one at the expense of the other.

Tillich reformulates this problem to suit his own needs. For him, it is not so much a question of how man can respond to God, but it is a question of how man's finite freedom can be reconciled with God's infinite freedom. How can man's engagement in
free, creative activity be reconciled with God's creativity which is directing creation?

The trinitarian problem enters into this discussion not only to explain how God relates to creation and thus to man's finite freedom, but also as a way for Tillich to account for the movement of life. He attempts to explain the ambiguous nature of creational response by calling it the movement of the divine life.

God is immanent in the world as its creative ground. This means that the structure of being is grounded in God. In fact, Tillich says at one point that God is this structure. This structural side is God's self-manifestation, his "logos" which he speaks both in himself and beyond himself. The "logos" is the "mirror of the divine depth." It makes definite what is otherwise inexhaustible in the burning fire or chaos of the divine depth.¹ The logos may change as God manifests his depth within it. One side of God, then, is the definite, structuring side which is manifest in the structure of the world. God can be known through the structural elements of being because they are his manifestation. This is the static, forming side of God; the objectification of the dynamic and inexhaustible divine depth.

God is transcendent to the world through freedom. The question of God's transcendence becomes a question of the possibility of conflicting freedoms. Ultimately, Tillich will do less justice to man's free decisions than he wants to. The only way to allow the kind of freedom that Tillich wants is to say that in the end, all decisions are correct responses to God's will. While this
may appear to do justice to freedom, it also can result in a complacent determinism.

From his study of the history of religions, Tillich has concluded that the idea of God always oscillates between an absolute idea of God (transcendent emphasis) and a concrete idea (immanent emphasis). He concludes that this "tension" between the absolute and concrete in the idea that people have of God must be a tension which exists within God Himself. It is the same tension which has led via the absolute emphasis toward the idea of pure identity and via the concrete emphasis to the idea of diversity. Tillich hopes to solve this problem by showing the presence of both elements in the divine life itself. Through the use of trinitarian symbolism, he hopes not to resolve these tensions, but to express them in a meaningful way.

Because he defines life as the movement from the potential to the actual, of a self which goes out from itself and then returns to itself, Tillich sees the number three as being implicit in this process. Therefore he concludes that the divine life should be expressed in the symbols of a dialectical trinitarianism.

Earlier Tillich has said that to speak of God as "living" is to speak symbolically. However, it is clear that God cannot become pure identity for Tillich. Such a God would be a "dead" identity, not a "living" God. God is rather both otherness and identity, "the eternal process in which separation is posited and overcome by reunion." God's life includes both unity and diversity.

We have, then, two sides which participate in this movement, the "ground" and the "form" in God, or the principle of the "abyss"
and the principle of self-manifestation or "logos." The "abyss" side of God represents the divine depth or element of power; the inexhaustible ground of being which infinitely resists non-being and which gives the power of being to everything which has being. This is the side of God which Tillich calls the "basis of the Godhead, that which makes God God." On the "form" side we find the characteristics previously described as God's immanent presence in the world. The form or logos is the mirror of the divine depth, that which "opens" the divine ground and makes its fullness finite and meaningful. Tillich mentions Parmenides on this point. For him, being and the logos of being could not be separated. Without the logos, the ground would remain chaos and fire. We can note a developing tension at this point. The logos is necessary in order for the abyss to manifest itself meaningfully. However, as a result of this manifestation in the mirror of the divine depth, there enters an element of finiteness and limitation; a static character. The logos is necessary to make concrete the absoluteness of the inexhaustible abyss, but it can never exhaust the abyss in a concrete manifestation. The tension is between inexhaustibility and finiteness; between the infinite depth and the need for a finite, concrete manifestation. God contains both, and therefore is comprised of both "becoming" and "rest." The abysmal and formal elements are united in a spiritual unity. There is a third principle in God, and this principle is called "Spirit." In Spirit, God makes actual what is potential in
the divine ground. Spirit is the unifying principle which governs the movement of the divine life, controlling the static and dynamic sides. For Paul Tillich, God as Spirit unites the elements of power and meaning. "God is the living God because he is Spirit." The life of Spirit reflects the movement of all life. The finite is posited with the process by a separation and reunion process. The outspoken manifestation is separated from the divine depth, and then reunited so that the process may continue.

The advantage of this system for Tillich is that God is not just the infinite or identity. By talking of the "divine life," God can also contain diversity and finitude within himself. And it is Spirit as the third principle which unites both elements and makes them creative.

Life, then, has a dialectical character, constantly moving between two poles:

Life itself is dialectical. . . God. . . has the character of all life, namely to go beyond himself in order to return to himself. The trinitarian symbols reflect this dialectical movement of life, the movement from identity to alteration and back to identity. God has within himself the unity of all identity and alteration.

From out of the divine abyss emerges a form, an "otherness" which is then reunited with the abyss. Just what is the nature of this finite otherness which is posited? Apparently, this otherness is necessary for the potential to become actual, for without it there would be no life—only an endless self-identity.
In Volume One of his *Systematic Theology*, Tillich says that:

"God is infinite because he has the finite (and with it that element of non-being which belongs to finitude) within himself united with his infinity."\(^{11}\) Apparently, for God to be a living God, he needs an element of non-being within himself to fuel the eternal movement from potentiality to actuality. To account for creational change, Tillich is saying that God's logos must change. For the logos, as the direct manifestation of God's depth, contains a static, and therefore finite element. There is an element of non-being within the divine life. While being-itself is said to be beyond the split between being and non-being, the divine life definitely includes non-being. This finite concrete element acts to fuel the movement from potentiality to actuality, for this element of non-being must continually be overcome.\(^{12}\) The necessity of non-being seems clear when Tillich says that "non-being drives being out of its seclusion, it forces it to affirm itself dynamically."\(^{13}\) It is the non-being, finite element in the divine life which makes the divine self-affirmation, and hence the nature of creation, dynamic.

The identification of form with otherness and otherness with an element of non-being makes it clear that there is always a priority to be given to transcending form, although form is always necessary. This is the basic contradiction of reality. Form must be transcended, yet one must have form to be. The new must be created, but because of the inexhaustibility of the abyss, it, too, will have to be transcended. Man does not unfold creation
in response to a constant logos, but the logos itself changes. Man must constantly transcend himself, for his own possibilities are also inexhaustible.

This whole process is one of "Yes" and "No." God eternally overcomes the "No" in himself and his creature:

Without the No he has to overcome in himself and his creature, the divine Yes to himself would be lifeless... there would be no life.14

By basing the movement of life on the necessary presence of an element of non-being, can Tillich avoid an ultimate duality? This is indeed problematic when he says things like "non-being makes God a living God," or "being could not be the ground of life without non-being." He even defines being as "the negation of the negation of being."15

However, it must be remembered that the discussion of the divine life is undertaken in the context of the creature's participation in God or of God's participation in creation. This means that the divine life refers to the participation of the infinite being-itself in the life of its finite creatures. "Being-itself does not participate in non-being," says Tillich, meaning that non-being only occurs in the process of the necessary separation between Creator and creature demanded for finite freedom.16 The participation of God in non-being must be understood as the way in which finite creatureliness creatively actualizes what is potential. When Tillich points to a dialectical negativity in God himself, he is referring to the tension between God's infinity and man's finitude. God is not ultimately a duality, but creation
unfolds what is potential in the divine ground only through the creation of finite forms which must continually be transcended. The tension in the divine life between logos and abyss really refers to the tension between God and creation as finite forms attempt to manifest an inexhaustible ground.

In yet another sense, the tension referred to in God between the logos and abyss can be seen as a tension within man himself:

The tension within the idea of God... in the last analysis, is the expression of man's basic situation: man is finite, yet at the same time he transcends his finitude. Man is finite creature in that he contains an element of non-being, but man has the infinite quality of inexhaustibility. He can always transcend his situation by a dynamic actualization of new potentialities. Just as God can re-manifest himself to overcome the static, finite character of his logos, so can man continually rise above his present situation by utilizing his infinite power of self-transcendence.

GOD'S WILL AND MAN'S FREEDOM: FREEDOM = NECESSITY IN GOD

Man is not related to God at a certain level of his being, but man's life as spirit is essentially related to the divine life as Spirit. Tillich does not mean by this a mere correlation, but rather calls this unity of spiritual activity one of "mutual immanence." Tillich attempts to account for the effect of the Spiritual Presence on man's life by three ideas of man's relationship to God. Man's life is life "in God," and in such a life
Tillich believes that his idea of man's freedom can be preserved.

The first meaning of "in God" refers to man's created origin. Man is present first as a being merely in the potential state within the divine ground. The second sense of "in God" refers to man who has actualized himself. Although he is free when actualized, he still remains dependent upon God at every moment in order to be. The third sense of "in God" refers to man's being driven to fulfillment beyond the separation of potentiality and actuality, although this separation is never totally overcome.

These meanings of "in God" reflect the dialectical character of life; the movement from identity through alteration to identity again. They also show the meaning of this movement. For the reunion after separation actually adds something to the original identity. Tillich talks about "the enrichment of being after the negation of the negative in everything that has being." 19

The world process means something to God, for the resultant actualization of potentiality through the movement of separation and reunion results in the "essentialization" of creatures. This essentialization or fulfillment represents the eternal dimension of temporal existence. 20

The process of life is one of separation and reunion. The inexhaustible abyss manifests itself in existence, but to do so it must create an "otherness," becoming mixed with non-being. These finite forms must ultimately receive a "No" from the ground, and a return to the ground takes place as a prerequisite for the actualization of new potentialities. We can picture this geneticistic process with its two-way movement:
This same movement of life is reflected in Tillich's discussion of God's originating, sustaining, and directing creativity. God's originating creativity refers to the creation of the creature; the positing of the finite otherness within the divine life. God's sustaining creativity refers to the fact that there cannot be a total separation of form from depth, for the creature must receive power of being from the divine ground at every moment in order to exist. God's directing creativity refers to the reunion of God and man, for God creates through man's freedom.

God's directing creativity is most important, for it is here that Tillich attempts to reconcile man's freedom with God's freedom. Directing creativity is not considered to be interference;
rather it works to drive every creature to fulfillment:

God's directing creativity always works through the freedom of man and through the spontaneity and structural wholeness of all creatures. Providence works through the polar elements of being. It works through the conditions of individual, social, and universal existence, through finitude, non-being, anxiety, through the interdependence of all finite things, through their resistance against the divine activity and through the destructive consequences of this resistance. All existential conditions are included in God's directing creativity.22

God's will includes everything which happens. This is how man's freedom is preserved. Man can act in either of two radically opposed ways and know that even a decision against God is a decision for him. The freedom dilemma is solved when all decisions become God's decisions.

Man faces despair because he can never recapture his essential being. Salvation for Tillich means accepting this fact as a victory. The fact that we continually fail turns out to be salvation in the end, for all of our activity is included in God's will. Therefore, in the end, freedom equals necessity in God:

There is no undetermined contingency in the negative and positive situation of mankind, but there is the unity of freedom and destiny under God's directing creativity.23

God's directing creativity works through the freedom of creatures by utilizing every "free" decision (no matter what that decision might be) to drive all creatures toward essentialization or the full actualization of their potential.

Man is not heading toward eternity, but rather every moment of time "reaches into the eternal."24 God is driving creation at every moment toward fulfillment.
Under the movement of self-integration, God is driving creation toward a harmony of power, justice, and love. Tillich's discussion of their relationship follows the basic ideas of his trinitarian doctrine and the movements of life.

Pointing to the trinity of structures in being-itself, Tillich outlines the three functions in terms of the tensions of his system. In order to understand this discussion, one must understand that the tension between love and power refers to creation, and that the tension between love and justice refers to the continual process of salvation.

Love is the ultimate quality of being-itself which drives all of life. However, in order for love to be more than chaotic self-surrender, it needs to manifest itself structurally. This is the same necessity that underlies the discussion of the abyss and logos side of God—the basic tension within the divine life between the inexhaustible and its finite manifestation. Love, therefore, needs separation in order to manifest itself. This is the tension of creation between love and the structures of power necessary for existence.

For something to be means for it to have a power structure. Every self is a power structure, and hence every being becomes involved in the power struggles of existence. This is not without its advantages in Tillich's mind. For these power struggles are necessary tensions in existence. And through the struggle with non-being in existence, the creature can experience increasing
self-affirmation. It is only through the encounter of a being with non-being that one's power of being can become manifest. The dynamic struggle of life (the dynamics of power) is in fact necessary for life not to become mere self-identity.\textsuperscript{28} It is necessary for the creature to be separate from the Creator in order that the creature might reach greater self-affirmation through a struggle with non-being. Tillich says that:

The basic formula for power and the basic formula for love are identical: Separation and Reunion or Being taking Non-Being into itself.\textsuperscript{29}

This means that love separates creator and creature in order that the creature may reach a greater self-affirmation through the process of struggle between powers of being. The fall is necessary in order that the creature may become actual. The tension between Creator and creature as expressed in love and its necessary manifestations in structures of power is reflective of the tension within man himself between being and non-being; between transcendence through actualization and finitude.

The tension between love and power is one of universal and particular. The diverse forms of power are necessary expressions of love, but there is a tension in that the diversity can never exhaust the unity within love itself. The universal law is seen by Tillich as being in eternal tension with the particular situation, and it is only a dynamic, creative justice which can bridge the gap.\textsuperscript{30}

Justice must include both diversity and unity; separated, actualized creaturehood and unity with the creator. Justice must
paradoxically contain both separation and reunion. Creative justice is an act of daring decision. One is grasped in an I-Thou encounter and the resultant "justice in ecstasy" contains as its creative element love-itself, manifest as *agape*. The manifestation of love is thus great power. Creative justice unites man with the power of being toward a greater self-affirmation. Indeed, justice with regards to the self means:

... to actualize as many potentialities as possible without losing oneself in disruption and chaos.  

The tension of salvation between love and justice is that justice can never claim to represent or exhaust love, although it seems to be a more direct expression in these daring, creative moments.

Tillich's discussion of love, power, and justice does not distinguish between the structures of existence and the directional response of those structures. Thus, power appears as good in itself. A display of superior power is not unjust, he says, but rather creative. In fact, decisions should be made according to the degree of power, even if in certain cases what is considered to be justice at the time is violated. Tillich's confusion between having power as a being with "participation" in being-itself leads him to say that subjection to a great power is ultimately a chance to participate in the Lord's directing creativity:

Those who are subjected acknowledge silently that they have become participants of a superior power of being and meaning.
Tillich again has pointed to the need for the creature to be separate from the Creator:

Actualization of one's potentialities includes, unavoidably, estrangement; estrangement from one's essential being so that we may find it again in maturity. 35

Creaturely suffering is both necessary and good, for through it comes the dynamic interaction between being and non-being that drives creation in a continuous struggle, and Tillich cannot conceive of life without it. 36

THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND SELF-CREATIVITY

Under the movement of self-creativity, history is driven toward a balance between the old and the new. A victory of the Kingdom of God is the ability to achieve a balance at a particular time; to unite tradition and revolution in a "creative" solution. History has a dynamic rhythm; tradition accumulating until it comes under prophetic attack. A social group must attempt to unite the conflicting powers of existence of their time in such a creative solution, or "the dynamics of history will leave them behind." 37

While feudalism may be right for one time, capitalism may be right for another. One never knows what is coming, for the balance is not a response to a norm, but the creation of the balance is the creation of the norm itself. The norm represents a synthesis of current forms with the dynamic impulse of life in a creative solution for the tensions within existence at a given time. There is no possibility of determining anything about the nature of the solution prior to the creative, mysterious moment in which it is born.
Under the movement of self-transcendence, Tillich speaks of the tension between the "now" and the "not-yet" presence of the Kingdom of God. This fact points to the need for active participation in history, in that all of the decisions of life have an ultimate significance. However, because in this system freedom equals destiny, in the end this tends to counteract the importance of these decisions. The elimination of a directional response within existence can ultimately lead to a complacent attitude about history. For everything is caught up in the divine life. God uses everything, "even if his creativity takes the way of destruction." 38

ETERNAL PARTICIPATION

Man's participation in the process that is existence comes through the decisions that he makes, or more properly, that are made through him. The ultimate purpose or telos of man is "determined by the decisions he makes in existence on the basis of potentialities given to him by destiny." 39

Man's telos is his inner aim, the meaning of his being. It is a quality of man which transcends the various moments of life. It is the eternal dimension of man; his participation in ultimate reality.

The relationship between man and his telos is like that of man's essential being to himself. Tillich compares the function of the inner telos to the function of universals which appear in and determine the nature of the individual. 40 However, man
determines his own telos according to the decisions that he makes. He chooses the conditions for his existence that he wishes to actualize. And what he does actualize is "elevated" into the "eternal memory." This constitutes his participation in eternity. There is no ultimate Kingdom of God on earth. Man's experience of salvation is dependent upon his participation in the eternal now.

THE EXCLUSION OF NON-BEING

As we have seen before, non-being is necessary in order for the divine process to occur. Without the eternal conquest of non-being, it could not be said that the divine life is blessedness through fight and victory. However, in terms of the eternal, the "elevation" of everything which has being into the eternal includes the exclusion of non-being from the eternal. Everything which is created ultimately "returns" to the ground of being, for all creatures contain the power of being. This guarantees that non-being cannot prevail against anything created. Nothing can be completely evil, for everything participates in being itself. Therefore, salvation is universal. There is no ultimate condemnation. Because Tillich has blurred structure and direction, the idea of eternal condemnation becomes a contradiction in terms for him. Nothing can be condemned because everything "participates" in God merely by existing.

Rejecting the idea of predestination unto either salvation or condemnation, Tillich prefers to talk of "universal essentialization." The positive or power of being in man's existence from
the past, present, and future is elevated into the eternity of the divine life.

At this point it is interesting to note how Tillich describes the purpose of creation. Within the dialectical process, essentialization presupposes the fall from God into existence. Diversity is necessary for the creature to actualize himself. Thus, non-being is necessary to prepare for essentialization, for essentialization is called: "essence, creatively enriched in existence."^45

Again we can see how the trinitarian movement plays a crucial role. There is a dialectical movement from identity to separation and back to identity through reunion. The new identity represents growth, a creative enrichment, and therefore the risk of separation is necessary for continued movement within the divine life.

Everything exists potentially in the divine ground, and therefore nothing is "new" in that sense. But actuality refers to newness in existence. For this actuality to occur, separation from the ground is necessary. The separation of creature from the Creator is necessary, as is the separation within the creature himself. Both tensions supplement the dynamic process of actualization which is life.

Man must become finite freedom, for freedom is the basis for all actualization.^46 Through man's freedom, a universe of meaning is created which fulfills the potentialities of being. Yet every act of man is included in the divine creativity, so that
it is ultimately God who is creative:

God is eternally creative, that through himself he creates the world and through the world himself.\(^{147}\)

Everything is part of the divine life. This is the ultimate nature of things. Someone with this knowledge will realize that every moment in history presents potentialities to be actualized. The nature of life is restlessness. What is important in life is to transcend where you are, to experience greater power of self-affirmation and self-actualization, and to risk decisions knowing that actualization of the creatively new is evidence of a "return" to the eternal.

We have touched on Tillich's idea of religion and its relationship to faith. Man experiences the "return" to the eternal in the experience of faith. In light of the seemingly "indirect" religious nature of the other aspects of life, such as morality and culture, we must further investigate the relationship between religion and culture in terms of the movements of life just described. We shall do this in terms of the difference between religious knowledge (or knowledge from the faith encounter) and theoretical knowledge (or knowledge based on detachment and the subject-object structure of existence.) Chapter VI will show how Tillich ultimately devalues cultural functionality in favor of a mystical religious encounter, and how he sides with the existentialists who choose silent, participatory knowledge over theoretical knowledge.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1ST I, pp. 263, 251.
2ST I, p. 242.
3ST III, p. 288.
4ST I, p. 250.
5ST I, p. 251.
6ST I, p. 247.
7ST I, p. 250.
8ST II, p. 90.
9ST III, pp. 329, 420.
11ST I, p. 251.
12ST II, p. 175.
13Courage to Be, p. 179.
14Ibid., p. 180.
15Ibid., pp. 179, 180.
16ST I, p. 236.
17ST I, p. 237.
18ST III, p. 114.
19ST III, p. 418.
20ST III, p. 422.
21ST I, p. 257.
22ST I, p. 266.
23ST II, p. 130.


26. Ibid., p. 97.

27. Ibid., p. 53.

28. Ibid., pp. 37, 41, 123, 124.

29. Ibid., p. 49.

30. Ibid., p. 15.

31. Ibid., p. 62.

32. Ibid., p. 70.

33. Ibid., p. 88 and ST III, p. 386.

34. Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 102-104.

35. Ibid., p. 112.

36. Ibid., pp. 123, 124.

37. ST III, pp. 388, 389.

38. ST II, p. 78.


40. ST I, p. 255.

41. ST III, p. 399.

42. "There will be no utopia in the future." See ST II, p. 44. Also, Tillich denies an empirical end to history. See Interpretation of History, p. 250.

43. ST III, p. 405.

44. ST III, p. 406.

45. ST III, p. 408.

46. ST III, p. 402.

47. ST III, p. 398.

48. ST II, p. 147.
Chapter VI

KNOWLEDGE IN LIGHT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

We have seen how the basic tension in Tillich's thought between the infinite and the finite leads him to posit the coincidence of creation and fall, as well as to a view of faith that ultimately means the transcendence of one's own finitude. We have discussed the fact that this tension is a necessary one to create room for freedom; so that man can actualize potentialities through free decisions based on the self-world polarity. The tension within man between self and world, between his mental and bodily aspects, is thus a reflection of this larger tension between God and man. And we have seen how man's freedom reflects God's will in that all decisions are God's decisions. Chapter V also pointed out the tension between God's inexhaustible abyss and its manifestation as logos.

In light of these tensions that we have found to be operative in Tillich's thought about creation, fall, redemption, justice, and morality (to name only a few), we shall now discuss the function of these tensions within Tillich's idea of knowledge. Within the act of knowing we shall see the static, forming side of mental thought processes in tension with the dynamic inexhaustibility of being. In terms of the types of knowledge and their relation to one another, we shall see the tension between faith knowledge based on participation and encounter (direct, inexpressible) and theoretical knowledge of the world based on separation and detachment (philosophy), between religion and culture, which Tillich then attempts to correlate through his definition of the task of theology.
THE BASIC POLARITY OF KNOWING:  
THE SUBJECT-OBJECT STRUCTURE OF REASON

Tillich uses the term "ontological reason" to refer to what is common to both the mind and reality. It is "the logos of being." In Chapter I, the basic interdependence of "self" and "world" was discussed. Corresponding to self and world in terms of the problem of knowledge are the terms "subject" and "object."

According to Tillich, reason in the sense of "logos" is the structuring principle of both the mind and reality. 1 In the human mind, the self actualizes its rational structure as subjective reason. Directing itself at the world, the mind sees it as the bearer of objective reason. There is a correspondence between the mind and reality in that they have the common structure of ontological reason or the logos of being. The creation is structured, and self and world both have a common source of structure in the logos of the ground of being.

The world can be known because it has the character of being knowable. There is a correlation between the functioning of the mind and the structure of reality. Tillich notes Fichte's idea that there must be a correspondence of structure between self and world in order for there to be knowledge, yet he does not claim himself to choose between realism or idealism, saying only that he presupposes that the subject and object are somehow related; 2 that there is a point where subject and object are one. Within the world Tillich speaks of the polarity, rather than identity, of subject and object. 3
Following his usual idea of a polarity, Tillich claims that every being contains both subjective and objective elements. Thus, nothing is devoid of subjectivity and therefore nothing is merely a thing (Ding).

The split between subject and object is the precondition of all knowledge, but also the negative side of knowledge. In trying to reach the object, one engages in abstraction through the use of concepts. Such abstraction has the effect of creating a greater distance between the knower and the known, in that concepts need definitions ad infinitum. In observing an object, the object is changed in such a way that it is distorted. This basic gap between subject and object cannot be bridged by method. What, then, is truth? Truth is "the fragmentary reunion of the knowing subject and known object in the act of knowledge."

Knowledge is union or reunion of elements that essentially belong together. In existence, this reunion is fragmentary.

Because the mind and reality share a common structure, man can "grasp" and "shape" anything. The logos-structure of the grasping self receives and reacts to the logos-structure of the grasped and shaped world. In receiving, the mind grasps the world. In reacting, it shapes the world. These functions of grasping and shaping correspond to the ideas of theory and practice. Essentially, every act of grasping should result in an act of shaping. The "truth must be done," says Tillich echoing a very Biblical view of truth.

Through grasping and shaping, the subject-object gap is fragmentarily overcome. The subject grasps the object, adapting
it to itself, while at the same time adapting itself to the object. For Tillich, true knowledge must include openness to receive that with which one unites. "Out of knowing the good, doing the good follows."  

Thus, in the act of thinking we have two elements: das Meinen (thought) and das Gemeinte (what is thought), or Denken (thought) and Sein (being). Not only is knowledge fragmentary as reunion, but the relationship between thought and being is one of the strangeness of being over against thought ("Fremdheit des Seins gegen das Denken") which Tillich describes as an endless battle between the two ("die undendliche Kluft, die zwischen beiden gesetzt ist").

Thought grasps being, but being resists being grasped. Knowledge is only fragmentary. Reality cannot be exhausted in thought. To the degree that one grasps reality it has been "formed," denoting a static quality. To the extent that being resists, it is "substance," the dynamic side of reality. When united, these dynamic and static poles of reality constitute truth, but the infinite resistance between them remains.

While it is true that thought can never exhaust being, Tillich's perception of this matter has a greater significance than merely a stating of the obvious. Perhaps this can be seen by attempting to capture the sense in which Tillich speaks of being as "Gehalt" (which I have rendered as "substance"). For "Gehalt" has active connotations. "Gehalt" is not merely what is grasped and formed (and never exhausted by this grasping and forming), but "Gehalt" refers to both that which is grasped by form and that which resists
the forming act. It is that dynamic, inexhaustible, irrational side of life which can never be formed. Thus, within the act of knowledge we have both static and dynamic elements. Both sides are necessary; neither side can be subsumed by the other. While thinking grasps being, being also responds.

The mind corresponds to the forming, structuring side of reality, while the dynamic impulse arises out of the infinite ability of being to resist thought. Thus, in every act of knowing, there is a tension between thought and being which remains unresolved. Being infinitely resists and transcends thought, while at the same time providing a basis for thought. Again, there is a dynamic interaction that provides the impetus for change as in the interaction between the mental and vital aspects of man.

THE ESSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AS THE BASIS OF THE SYSTEM OF THE SCIENCES: ATTEMPTING TO OVERCOME THE CONTEMPORARY DISRUPTION OF MEANING BY GROUNDING ALL OF THE SCIENCES IN ONE TRUTH

It was more than a coincidence that Tillich's first major publication after World War II was his System of the Sciences. Having experienced the crisis of that era, and the disruption of meaning and truth that it contained, he was determined to restore a unity in aim and meaning to the sciences and knowledge. Central to his concern was the desire to overcome the struggles between religion and science; between theological truth and other forms of truth. His later work reflects his attempt to coordinate knowledge of faith and scientific knowledge, giving each its place and outlining the relationship between them. At the beginning of his System he expresses the fact that he became convinced of the need
to outline a system of the sciences as the starting point of all knowledge in order to overcome the disruption of meaning of the time.

His goals were certainly not modest. The System really reflects an attempt to reunite theology, philosophy, and the empirical sciences. Not only did he wish to regain a place for theology among the sciences, but indeed it would be the central, unifying science.

The System is based on the idea that the essence of knowledge has to do with the separation and reunion of subject and object or thought and being. We now find a further specification of the relationship between these two elements of thought, as well as the positing of the place of the person who does the knowing, as Tillich outlines three basic principles upon which he elaborates to form his system of the sciences.

The principle of absolute thinking (der Satz des absoluten Denken) refers to the pole of thought. Thinking creates and intuits forms, concepts, and universal principles which it then applies to reality. Thought has to do with validity through its application of universal principles (forms of thought) to the particular in reality. Thinking thus seeks to create unity, but its content is supplied by existence.

The principle of absolute existence (der Satz des absoluten Seins) points to the infinite resistance of being to thought (den Widerstreit von Denken und Sein). Existence is the "other," that which is grasped only incompletely by thought. Being or existence is "alien" and "elusive" to thought. It points to the "depth" or inexhaustibility of reality.
In existence, the polarity of thought and being reflects the tension in the divine life between the logos and abyss. The inexhaustible depth of God (abyss) which is manifested in the structure of the world as logos is a relationship parallel to that between the inability of thought to exhaust being on the one hand and the necessity of the forming of being by thought. Thought is the "logos" element which gives structure to the inexhaustible chaos of existence.

Diagram XI

Tillich identifies not only the pure act of thinking and that which is referred to in this act (pure being), but also a process in which thought becomes conscious of itself. This is the principle of spirit (der Satz des Geistes). As spirit, thought can become part of existence. Spirit is thought directed toward itself, observing itself in the act of thinking; making itself an object. As spirit, thought can project itself into existence and create something. This occurs in man's self-consciousness, and is reflected in man's cultural life. As spirit, man can unite thought and being in creative cultural acts. He can unite the universal element of form with the concrete element of existence. As spirit, man has "living knowledge" (lebendige Denken), and thought has become a
part of being (Denken ist selbst Sein). Thus, in every act of knowledge there is some one (subject) who knows something (object). And this act of knowledge originates from a being who thinks, or spirit.

A tripartite division of the sciences follows from these three principles of knowledge, so that the elements in the act of knowledge form the basic framework for the system. Tillich identifies the sciences of thought, or Denkwissenschaften, the sciences of being or Seinwissenschaften, and the sciences dealing with the creations of spirit, the Geisteswissenschaften.

The Denkwissenschaften are concerned chiefly with logic and mathematics; with thought forms and the idea of validity. The Seinwissenschaften or empirical sciences deal with existence insofar as these thought forms are applied to it. They are the law sciences, form physics and biology to history. The thought sciences are concerned with universal forms, while the empirical sciences employ these forms in grasping the particular. Again, thought can never be completely successful, in that existence resists it.

Most important are the Geisteswissenschaften, or sciences of spirit. They have a synthetic character, uniting elements of the thought and empirical sciences; reflecting the synthetic character, uniting elements of the thought and empirical sciences; reflecting the synthetic character by uniting both thought and being.

In the spiritual act, the elements of thought and being come together as an original cultural creation. Existence is "formed." The universal element from thought is united with the concrete, individual element from existence, and individual realization
of the universal is achieved. This creative character of spirit is what distinguishes the Geisteswissenschaftern from the other two groups of sciences. Cultural forms are synthetic, uniting both validity and existence.

Tillich admits that the tripartite division of the sciences has many parallels with the division of the Platonic school between Logic, Physics, and Ethics. His Denkwissenschaften directs itself primarily at pure forms, the Seinwissenschaften with content or being, and the Geisteswissenschaften are concerned with the creative synthesis of the universal and particular. He also designates the three groups of sciences as the Ideal, Real and Normwissenschaften. The Idealwissenschaften deal with the pure forms of thought, the Realwissenschaften with empirical structures, and the Normwissenschaften with the cultural creations of spirit.

Every spiritual act is a norm positing act. It is an actualization of meaning. The cultural sciences themselves are divided into three categories: the theory of the principles of meaning (philosophy of religion), the theory of the material of meaning (history of thought), and the normative system of meaning (systematics).

Creative solutions to the tension between thinking and being are what Tillich calls "norms." They are the individual realizations of the universal (which does not exist outside of its realization) in the creative kairoi.

While distinguishing between essences and norms (essences in the sense of potentialities, and norms as the creative actuali-
zation of these potentialities in history), Tillich emphasizes that norms do not reside in an ideal sphere, but that they are "created" in history.

Tillich thus roots all knowledge in certain decisions made in history. While philosophy deals with the categories universally present in thought and interpretive history with the content that is shaped by these forms, systematics brings together both the static and dynamic sides in the creation and application of norms. Norms are the concrete embodiments of principles which are both universally relevant and historically concrete. It is the task of systematics to both create and apply norms. Systematics, then, is circular. It applies the norm which it creates. The norm that it applies is also the norm that it presents. All knowledge, or the whole system of the sciences, is thus dependent upon the norm created by systematics in its historical decisions.

Norms are not subjective, however, in that they are filled with the "import of meaning." The norm of systematics is the representation of the ground of meaning. It represents the presence of the infinite in the finite, and is created in an historical "kairos."

THE THEORY OF MEANING

Because Tillich's system of the sciences is based on a belief in the nature of spirit as norm creating and meaning actualizing, it is now necessary to outline the theory of meaning which underlies his theory of knowledge. In this theory we shall find the same tensions that we have seen throughout Tillich's thought.
In the discussion of subject and object, it was mentioned that Tillich presupposes an underlying identity between them. There is an ultimate principle beyond thought and existence which unites and transcends them both. It is not the mind that gives laws to nature, nor does the mind merely discover laws in nature. Rather, Tillich presupposes that thought and being are both governed by the same principle of meaning. Every creative spiritual act brings together thought and being, and is called a meaningful act.

Thought and being retain their infinite inner tension. However, this tension is seen as the positive impetus for creative acts:

The essence of spirit, its inner tension, its dynamic character, is based on the unending contradiction between thought and being. (my translation)

Yet beyond existence there is even a more important element in this meaning theory which propels spirit in its process of meaning realization or norm creation. This is the element of meaning which also serves as the common principle of meaning for thought and being; the underlying unity of subject and object. This is the import or inexhaustible ground of meaning. The contradiction between thought and being is merely a reflection of the relationship between this unconditioned meaning and every particular, actualized meaning.

Every spiritual act contains a form, content, and import. The content (or existence) is raised through unity with form (or thought) into the cultural sphere where it is given import or significance. The significance of these cultural forms is grounded in the import or substance of meaning; the ultimate, unconditioned
meaning. This unconditioned meaning is present in every particular meaning, but it is not itself a meaning. It is rather the ground of meaning.\textsuperscript{15}

We recall the tension between thought and being; in this context between form and content. Yet with regards to the relationship of every particular meaning to the ground of meaning, we see a similar tension, indeed a reflection of the main tension in Tillich between the infinite and the finite. James Luther Adams seems to see this parallel when he says that "within and beyond both form and content there is a meaning. Here the form and content are not to be understood as opposites. Rather they both stand at one pole, while at the other stands the import of meaning."\textsuperscript{16}

Just as form can never exhaust content, neither can the particular meanings exhaust the import of meaning.\textsuperscript{17} In a similar manner to the way in which being is infinitely transcendent to all thought, the unconditioned meaning transcends every particular meaning. Just as the resistance between matter and form is endless,\textsuperscript{18} so is the contradiction between the import and forms of meaning an endless one.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Diagram XII}
\end{center}

Diagram XII
There is an "inner infinity" to meaning in that there is an inexhaustibility to it. Yet at every moment there is the demand to exhaust this meaning into the particular. This demand acts as the catalyst for meaning actualization, even though a unity between import and form can never be realized:

A complete unity, however, would be an exhaustion of the inner infinity of meaning. Nevertheless, the demand for this unity is present in every act of meaning. Nevertheless, the demand for this unity is present in every act of meaning. 19

There is always the demand to exhaust the import of meaning, but it can never be fulfilled. While the import of meaning is the ground of every particular meaning, it is also the abyss in that it infinitely transcends every actualized meaning. There can never be a complete identity between the transcendent and immanent meaning as in the Hegelian system. To further emphasize this inexhaustibility of the import of meaning, Tillich defines it negatively as the "unconditioned." The unconditioned is the import of reality, but is itself beyond reality, just as the infinite is present in the finite while at the same time it must infinitely transcend it.

THE IMPORT IS EXPRESSED IN VARIOUS PERIODS AS THE "STYLE" OF A CULTURE, AND IS REFLECTIVE OF A RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION.

Because culture is historically conditioned, while the import of meaning is eternal, the temporal expression of this import changes. The temporal, cultural expression of the import is termed the "style" of a period, characteristic of a group and its experience of the import of meaning. Through style, an historical period gives structure to the experience it has of the import of meaning. All of the cultural forms of a period will express an experience of the eternal import of meaning.
A style reflects man's "self-interpretation," and answers the question of the ultimate meaning of life for each period. Tillich says that style is evident in all cultural creations, but particularly so in painting; a field from which he gives several examples of the relationship between the elements of meaning.

Every work of art has all of the elements of meaning, identified as a subject matter, a form, and a style. The subject matter is derived through man's sensory experience of existence. This subject matter is given form, a uniqueness and universality. Both form and subject matter are further qualified by style; the expressive element. This expressive element is not merely the subjective experience of the artist, but style expresses "the dimension of depth in encountered reality, the ground and abyss in which everything is rooted."20

Tillich sees expressionist painting as being the most normative style, in that it allows the import of meaning to break through; bracketing the content in favor of the import of meaning. This concept of meaning becomes crucial in my opinion for Tillich's idea of the relationship between religion and culture, which we shall discuss later.

For any religious analysis of culture, the concept of style is all important in Tillich's mind: "He who can read the style of a culture can discover its ultimate concern, its religious substance."21 Tillich himself was greatly sensitive to the style of his age, the spirit of industrial society, and the way in which that spirit found its expression throughout people's lives, even
in their language and their thinking. Style "expresses the ultimacy of meaning even in the most limited vehicles of meaning - a painted flower, a family habit, a technical tool, a form of social intercourse, the vision of a historical figure, an epistemological theory, a political document, and so on." Style, then, is closely related to the religious experience of the depth and to the idea of symbol.

Diagram XIII

THE DEPTH OF REASON

In existence, subject and object are separate. Yet Tillich presupposes an underlying unity of subject and object. This unity comes on a "deeper" level of reality, the level of the unconditioned, the ground of meaning, or "the depth of reason." This is not really at a level in the spatial sense, but the depth of reason is a quality which is within while at the same time transcendent to every finite existent. The infinite is present in the finite, even though by definition the infinite must be removed from the finite. This is the basic contradiction of the system; the paradoxical presence of the infinite in the finite. There is an
infinite gap, which we have diagrammed as to point to the periodic experience of this depth as Tillich has described it.

It has been said that Tillich liked to spend time looking at the ocean while reflecting. For him, no doubt the ocean exemplified his idea of truth as that which lies below the surface; beyond the ordinary appearance of things. Truth is not apparent on the surface of things, which change as the surface of the water, but "the truth which does not disappoint dwells below the surface, in the depth." There is a difference between appearance and reality:

Things hide their true being; it must be discovered under the surface of sense impressions, changing appearances, and unfounded opinions. . . The surface must be penetrated, the appearance undercut, the "depth" must be reached, namely, the ousia, the "essence" of things, that which gives them the power of being. This is their truth, the "really real" in difference from the seemingly real. It would not be called "true," however, if it were not true for someone, namely, for the mind which in the power of the rational word, the logos, grasps the level of reality in which the really real dwells.

Truth, then, is the essence of a thing which we try to grasp in the cognitive act. In every rational act the dimension of depth manifests itself, as truth-itself in the cognitive realm, beauty-itself in the aesthetic, justice-itself in the legal, and love-itself in the communal. The depth element is the transcendent, inexhaustible element of every rational act. Every actualized form in these acts is an expression of the depth or import, but no form can ever claim to represent or exhaust the dimension of depth. The essences are also referred to as trans-temporal potentialities.
While the potential is infinite, the temporal actualities are finite manifestations which can change.

Certainly Tillich is getting at something here, yet what is the relationship between the essences or potentialities in the divine depth of reason and their temporal manifestations? The paradoxical contradiction in Tillich's conception seems to come to the fore here. He says that "every step into the depth of thought is a breaking away from the surface of former thoughts... Everything is reversed." Ultimately for him, while finite manifestations are demanded, the infinite transcendence of the depth of reason negates our lives and thoughts. Tillich has taken the command of the jealous god to the extreme. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" is extended to justify the contradiction of our total existence in the face of the infinite and inexhaustible depth. The "road to the depth" means that God demands "the loss of our lives for the gain of our lives."27

The truth of existence is contradicted by the truth of the depth. Human everyday existence is sacrificed in order that we might seek the mysterious truth of the depth. Knowledge in existence is not affirmed because it is supported and based on God's order for existence, but knowledge in existence is devalued for a higher, mystical, direct intuiting of essences. For "eternal joy is not to be reached by living on the surface."28

Certainly we must agree with Tillich's stand against nominalism, but his statement that "the seemingly real is not unreal, but it is deceptive if it is taken to be the really real,"29
must be understood with an awareness of his understanding of the relationship between the infinite and the finite. Tillich's discussion of depth, while pointing to the dependent nature of creatures, ultimately tends to negate existence by relegating truth to a place outside of creation. For a creature to have truth, he must transcend his own existence and participate in the eternal. The truth of this life is only a finite representation of the import. Real truth can only be gained by a direct contact with this import. Yet man's life is temporal. Therefore he can only really have the truth of the really real when the temporal and the eternal meet in great historical moments known as kairos. Again we see a two-way movement. There are finite actualizations of meaning in this life (----→), and a return to an experience of the depth where the infinite, inexhaustible import meets the finite(←——). This paradoxical unity occurs in the kairos (←→).

**KNOWLEDGE IS HISTORICAL AND DEMANDS A DYNAMIC THEORY**

None of the contemporaneous epistemological theories were adequate to be applied to Tillich's theory of meaning. Kant's rationalistic approach was too formalistic for him, leading to empty logical principles. Phenomenology attempted to deal with essences, but became too abstract and missed the importance of the individual. Pragmatism recognized the concrete, but became relativistic. Tillich claimed that what was needed was the development of a "Protestant" conception of truth in order to do justice to all of the elements of meaning. In a more dynamic conception of truth,
he attempts to express his idea of the relationship between the eternal import of meaning and knowledge in existence.

Opposing what he characterizes as the "rational and static" idea of knowledge characteristic of the classical-humanists and the "super-rational and static idea" of the Catholic medieval era, Tillich envisions a "Protestant conception of knowledge" which stresses the irrational and the dynamic. Denying any kind of "absolute" position of the subject, Tillich claims that we must recognize the historicality and decision character of all knowledge, in that knowledge is based on the norm created and used by systematics which represents the ground of meaning in existence for a particular time.

Tillich's understanding of knowledge in the historical, temporal world sheds light on his view of essences. They are not the static essences of Plato, embodying the universal qualities of many individual things. Tillich says that we must replace this static conception of essences with a dynamic one. He suggests the use of the term "principles." These principles contain the possibilities, the power for historical realizations. We see a move from talking of essence and existence as two realms to a more dynamic relationship between principles and their realization. It is a conscious move by Tillich to get us out of a "timeless" view of knowledge to a view where we can see the actualization of meaning in existence, the form creating process, the "fullness of time," which occurs when the temporal meets the eternal, when the import is actualized, but not exhausted in, particular meanings.
Knowledge is historical. Knowledge cannot assume the absolute position of the subject because the act of knowing occurs within history and not outside it. Moving away from Plato's more static conception of the laws or ideas, Tillich follows the paths of Schelling, who gave the ideas a polar relationship of light and dark, and Boehme, who saw a tension between them. The ideas are not eternally at rest, but have an inner infinity, an ambiguity between rest and unrest; both a dynamic and static element. The ideas themselves are dynamic. And any conception of truth in history must first grasp this dynamic understanding of ideas. The ideas or potentialities are inexhaustible:

The idea... drives on toward existence, toward the pouring out of its inner infinity in the historical fate... The knowledge of ideas participates in the inner infinity of ideas. \[^{33}\]

In existence the inner infinity of the idea becomes manifest. This manifestation is "realization." The relationship between the ideas and existence is the same as that between principle and realization, import and form. The latter always is an expression of the former, but cannot exhaust it. Thus, all knowledge contains a "Yes" and a "No." Because the principles are inexhaustible, all knowledge is partial and cannot claim to represent the principle. It stands under the "No" of the unconditioned. This "No" element provides the impetus for new knowledge, \textit{ad infinitum}, so that the potentialities of essence are drawn into existence as a result of their inexhaustibility.

The "Yes" and "No" elements in all knowledge are reflected in the fact that everything has both a creative and a destructive
character. Nothing in existence is totally creative; it must also have a destructive element. This destructive element points back to the tendency for being to actively resist thought. Through this tension will come new creative acts. Nothing can embody total meaning in Tillich's view. In existence, everything contains both a meaningful element and an element which is contrary to meaning. This is what he calls the simultaneity of the "divine and demonic" in everything. This tension is always present, for "the equivalence of the divine and demonic is impossible." Presumably such an equivalence would exhaust the idea in existence, an impossibility in Tillich's geneticistic conception, for "the reality of knowledge, like all reality, is engaged in the struggle of the divine and demonic." The cognitive act shares in the ambiguity of the world, an ambiguity which is necessary to maintain the inner infinity or infinite inexhaustibility of the infinite over against its finite manifestation. The element of non-being, the tension between thinking and being, and the resistance of matter to form are all necessary tensions to maintain the ambiguity of existence. Without this ambiguity, the idea of the inner inexhaustibility of the idea (based on the tension between the infinite and the finite) would easily be lost. To maintain this dynamic conception of the nature of things as containing both a "Yes" and a "No," Tillich needs to maintain not only the tension between the Creator and creature, but also a tension within existence itself between thinking and being.
There is no absolute knowledge in existence. True knowledge is not absolute knowledge for Tillich. True knowledge is rather knowledge for the time that one is in. Can Tillich avoid relativism in this solution? He attempts to by speaking of the realizations in existence as manifestations of principles. The realizations change because the principles themselves can never be exhausted; they have an inner infinity.

Tillich claims that the real danger comes from a static conception of truth. He moves away from any notion of eternally unchanging laws for existence and prefers to talk of dynamic essences or principles in order to account for historical change. In the creative act of Geist (spirit), there is an individual realization of the universal. But this universal does not exist apart from its individual realization.

To avoid relativism, Tillich claims that there is an ultimate seriousness to each moment of decision or "kairos." Truth is truth for a time. However, Tillich cannot consistently carry out his conception. While claiming that the realizations can never be more than an imperfect representation of truth, he does tend to talk of the truth of the kairos as if it were the direct incarnation of the idea.

We see here the same relationship between principles and their realization as between love and its realization in justice. Just as love needed the forms of justice to express itself, so do principles find it necessary to enter into existence and hence to take on the limitation of form. And just as justice could never
claim to exhaust love, so can the realizations never really claim to represent the essences. While this is true in certain respects, Tillich does not do justice in the end to this relationship. For him, it is a tension which becomes the dynamic drive behind the necessity for new incarnations of truth. During the great moments or kairos, the realization seems to be a direct approximation of truth, but as time passes it fades, resulting in the necessity for new actualizations. This is the dialectical process which moves from Yes to No. What is Yes today may be No tomorrow. There is a real uncertainty in existence. Tillich accounts for change by positing a tension within the process of the actualization of ideas.

Again, the inability of existence to exhaust the unconditioned is a positive factor when this tension is worked out in existence. In each moment of decision or kairos, what was potential is made actual. Precisely because of the separation between subject, and object, the inexhaustibility of reality can be actualized further. In each moment of decision, reality "transcends" itself. "Being rises above itself" and a new meaning is created. The separation of consciousness from being is thus a precondition for the actualization of meaning, for through this separation being can transcend itself and create the new. Nature lacks this internal duality of subject and object; only man can actualize meaning in history. Thus, the separation and tension within existence supplements the separation and tension between God and creation, creating the conditions for a perpetual process of actualization and change.
Tillich, then, stands against what he calls a flight from existence to the idea (utopianism), and the approximation of existence to the idea (static rationalism). He attempts to show that the structure of the essential contains both the dynamic and static; the dynamic quality of inexhaustibility, and actualizations in existence (static quality). Knowledge does not merely express the idea, but realizes it by actualizing it as truth for each time. However, the truth must be continually re-actualized, as the dynamic and static elements combine to create the inner infinity of the idea.

FAITH, DECISION, AND THE ACT OF KNOWING

Knowledge and action for a given time flow out of a certain attitude toward the unconditioned meaning. This "third element" in knowledge is the decision element, involving a meaningful interpretation of reality. This understanding of reality is present in all scientific work as a presupposition, and reflects "original views" and "basic decisions." Even biology, sociology, mathematics, and logic contain an element of interpretation for Tillich. These fundamental attitudes have the status for Tillich of being a "hidden, transcendental decision which is never apparent, but which may be the innermost meaning of each single decision." In this respect, this element of knowledge is very close to his concepts of "style" and "symbol."

In his discussion of the interpretation of history, Tillich alludes again to the circular nature of the underlying presuppositions. The choosing of a key and what the key opens are experienced in one and the same act. Tillich admits that his own
presuppositions with regard to theology are in the theological circle, but he talks of a "vocational consciousness;" presumably a belief that he has the proper truth for the kairos of our time. Later we will discuss Tillich's criterion, or lack of one, for conflicts between vocational consciousness or faith.

One's directedness toward the unconditioned meaning is thus the basis for knowledge and actions. There is an immediate certainty in faith which is prior to all knowledge. "Faith is the prin of cognition and meaning-fulfilling action." This belief in the directedness to the import of meaning as underlying all knowledge forms the basis for Tillich to call his idea of epistemology "belief-ful realism" or "belief-ful relativism." There is a directedness to something beyond the temporal order of subject and object; the reality encountered in the faith correlation. Faith or a relatedness to the unconditioned or import of meaning is the basis for all meaningful activity. "Belief-ful realism" or "self-transcending realism" asserts that the relationship to the unconditioned or depth of reality is the basis of all knowledge.

Diagram XIV
Man is aware of an element of power, "something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object." This prius is the point of identity which precedes all separation into subject and object. It is the power of being encountered in faith, not an object.

RELIGION AND CULTURE:
THE AUTONOMOUS AND THEONOMOUS ATTITUDES

Meaning fulfilling acts always have a certain unity, and just as a style is recognizable, the unity of acts is called a "system." Such a system occurs in a community which is centered around certain symbols. Systematics is the field which creates the norms and attempts to maintain the life of the symbols. Before we can discuss the task of theology in this respect, we must explore the tension wherein theology does its work; the tension between religion and culture, or more narrowly, between the autonomous and theonomous attitudes.

In his article "Religion as a dimension of man's spiritual life," Tillich attempts to make the case that religion is not merely one dimension among others, but that it is indeed "the dimension of depth" in all of the dimensions. This is certainly an approach which seems attractive at the outset. When Tillich refers to the criticism he received in Europe whenever he used the concept "religion," one is inclined to see him as a lone fighter for the faith. Yet in making religion the root function, he winds up with a distinction between religion and culture based on "directedness."
The basic distinction between religion and culture is one of directedness. Tillich says that "religion is directedness toward the unconditioned, and culture is directedness toward the conditioned forms and their unity." Therefore, although every cultural act must necessarily contain the unconditioned meaning, culture is "not religious by intention." Culture is "substantially, but not intentionally, religious."

Culture, and religion do need each other. For religion must use the forms of culture (i.e. language, etc.). Another way of seeing their difference is to talk of religion as that which tries to penetrate through the forms of meaning, to leave them behind, while culture "stops short," as it were, not going behind the forms of meaning.

Culture, then, is only indirectly religious. Only in those acts or that attitude in which one reflects on the "depth" of life can one be said to be acting religiously. Yet for a meaningful culture it is necessary that there be this direct relatedness to the unconditioned. The trick, then, is to face two directions at once. The back and forth movement can be seen, where one lives in culture but must return periodically to the depth to receive meaning.

We have discussed Tillich's view of religion as a function. He maintains that the religious function is not one function among others, but that it is actualized through cultural forms, intending to pass through them to the unconditioned. For him, there is a special set of "religious acts" only because man has been cut off from the ground of his being. Religion, then, is only "the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit."
How does religion affect culture, now that they have been distinguished? Culture needs faith or it becomes empty, but how is religion affective in culture? For Tillich, the cultural act is not intentionally religious. It remains pre-occupied with the world and does not attempt to go beyond it to the depth. Pre-occupation with creation is what Tillich calls an "unbelief-ful attitude." It is the attitude which properly belongs to culture; the autonomous attitude. The autonomous attitude is proper for culture and philosophy. There is nothing on earth or in heaven, to paraphrase Tillich, to which the autonomous culture former must subject himself, except the "logos of being" which is common to all, and which guarantees for Tillich that one could never contradict the incarnate logos. The philosophers act of seeing is autonomous. There can be no intentionally Christian philosophy, for the same reason that the artist cannot intentionally give himself a style. Creativity cannot be intended, but must arise if we just let man act autonomously. If we really want creativity, however, then we must combine our autonomous cultural attitude with the religious attitude. Then we can fill our autonomous forms with the import of meaning.

Some of Tillich's statements about autonomy seem to contradict much of what he says elsewhere. While on the one hand he holds that all cultural activity is meaning-fulfillment, he then seems to talk as if the cultural activity takes place first (autonomous seeing) and then the religious act gives it meaning. Certainly there is a great difference here. If Tillich maintained the former
consistently, he would be closer to describing a religious battle in culture itself. As it is, he has culture in a neutral area where autonomous action takes place, followed by a meaning-giving from the religious attitude.

"Autonomy does not mean the freedom of the individual to be a law unto himself," Tillich says. It is rather "obedience of the individual to the law of reason" which one finds in himself. And because this reason is the structure of the mind and reality, one can trust apparently that it will not lead us astray.

The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy, the claim of something outside of oneself to represent the unconditioned. Tillich's view of heteronomy and autonomy must be seen in light of his childhood. Tillich himself admits that his father was a strong authority figure, against which he rebelled:

My father's authority, which was at once personal and intellectual, and which because of his position in the church coincided for me with the religious authority of revelation, made every manifestation of autonomous thinking a piece of religious daring and involved the critique of authority in a sense of guilt. The immemorial experience of mankind that new knowledge can be won only by breaking a taboo, that all autonomous thinking is accompanied by a consciousness of guilt, has been a fundamental experience of my own life.

Heteronomous is anything which claims to represent the unconditioned. Tillich takes the infinite-finite distinction to the extreme here. While it is true that nothing finite can claim to be infinite, this is not the same thing as something claiming to represent the infinite, or to possess authority. Tillich's distinction between heteronomy and autonomy would remove all authority other than that of one's own reason, or of a cultural form that proves to have superior power of being.
How does religion function in this scheme? When the religious attitude is combined with the autonomous cultural attitude, says Tillich, we have theonomy. In theonomy, autonomous reason (one direction) is united with its own depth or power (the other direction). The culture/religion distinction thus becomes the two directions of autonomy and theonomy. The theonomous spiritual attitude is directedness toward the import, while the autonomous attitude remains in the world (literally) of cultural forms.

The tension between autonomy and theonomy is based on the tension between the infinite and the finite. The autonomous attitude is directed at the forms of existence, while the theonomous attitude is directed at the inexhaustible ground of meaning through these forms. Also, just as thinking objectifies being and thus makes it static and fixed, so the autonomous attitude deals with the objects of existence, and as being resists thought, being is like the ungraspable substance which the theonomous spiritual attitude directs itself at.

Being and thinking, import and form, religion and culture, autonomy and theonomy, all reflect the tension Tillich sees between the infinite and the finite, between the Creator and creature. To bring these dialectical relationships together becomes the task of theology. Theology functions right at the center of these tensions, and in the case of theonomy and autonomy, must insure that heteronomy is avoided. The point where all of these poles meet is in the symbol, which contains elements from both sides. The construction and maintenance of the symbols is thus a task for theology.
We must now distinguish between the knowledge of faith, where one encounters the ground, and knowledge by detachment, based on the subject-object structure of existence.

In faith there is a directedness to the power of being, or import of meaning. Yet this is not the objectifying orientation as in theoretical knowledge. Rather, the unconditional grasps us. It is not theoretical truth which is received as in the world of subject and object and controlling knowledge, but it is "existential truth," a truth which requires surrender in order to possess it. Tillich compares it with Kierkegaard's knowledge which is only graspable in infinite passion.\(^7\)

Faith is "the state of being grasped by ultimate reality."\(^8\) The whole man is grasped, including all of his functions. "Man, not his cognitive function alone, is aware of the Unconditioned."\(^9\) The act of faith involves man as a unity moving toward the ground of being and meaning; the man who seeks to become whole.

Truth existentially received cannot be communicated, however. The existential thinker "can only create in his pupil by..."
indirect communication that 'Existential state' or personal experience out of which the pupil may think and act.\textsuperscript{50} It is truth received in an inner experience. It is the truth that Existentialist philosophy attempts to attain by trying to reach a level where there is no subject-object split. Tillich compares his own approach favorably with Jaspers attempt to reach the "Ursprung" or "Source," where one can have an immediate creative experience.

The "existential truth" approach stands in opposition to the rationalistic system of the West. He agrees with Nietzsche that the objective world is useful, but ultimately deceptive. In the end, we must turn away from the world of subject and object to a personal, non-objective thinking; a return to the creative source of life, to a "personal existence." There is a creative realm of being "prior to and beyond the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity."\textsuperscript{51} For Tillich, the ordinary subject-object scheme disappears in the correlation of faith; in an experience of the unconditional. Faith can overcome the subject-object structure of finitude. In the depth there is a point of contact between the infinite and the finite.

Again, however, the absolute difference between the finite and infinite becomes the determining factor for Tillich's analysis of faith. To be in faith, one must go beyond existence:

He must transcend the division of existence, even the deepest and most universal of all divisions, that between subject and object. The ultimate is beyond this division, and he who wants to reach the ultimate must overcome this division in himself by meditation, contemplation, and ecstasy... Man must empty himself of all finite contents of his ordinary life; he must surrender all preliminary concerns for the sake of the ultimate.\textsuperscript{52}
Here we see two distinct directions being posited. One is the direction of ordinary life, and the other is the direction of faith. The two are quite opposite, and the result is a devaluation of man's existence and the relegation of faith to something out of existence. For the unbeliever, the "death of God" can be accomplished by merely eliminating the faith direction.

The truth of faith is truth about the "really real." It lies in another dimension than the truth of ordinary life. Tillich will attempt to bring these two truths together in his method of correlation. However, his emphasis on this mystical awareness of reality ultimately devalues creation. True reality can only come through an inner experience, not the senses. One must move out of the finite world of shadows to the "really real," the substance and import of reality. While Tillich disagrees with those who speak of an absolute standpoint for knowledge, he seems to transgress this boundary himself with his idea of the truth received in faith. Indeed, Tillich's idea of revelation is one in which reason goes beyond itself.

Faith is being in the state of ecstasy. Ecstasy is Tillich's word for reason when it is beyond the ordinary subject-object structure of reality, the basic situation of finite rationality. In the case of ecstasy there is an awareness of truth that is beyond ordinary truth. Although man's reason is finite, it is not bound to finitude. It can come into contact with the infinite in the state of faith and be "driven beyond the limits of its finitude." Such an ecstatic experience is an experience of revelation.
In revelation, the depth of reason and the ground of being manifests itself. The knowledge received is knowledge about the "mystery of being," not ordinary knowledge of the subject-object type. Tillich is careful to distinguish between the knowledge of the mystery (faith knowledge), and ordinary knowledge, claiming that neither can interfere with the other. In fact, they deal with two opposite directions:

A genuine mystery, however, is experienced as an attitude which contradicts the attitude of ordinary cognition.54 The knowledge of revelation is a different dimension of knowledge. It does not add anything to man's ordinary knowledge. Neither is natural knowledge revelation. Yet in revelation the import of meaning is received, which is the basis for all cultural activity. The depth manifest in revelation is that which gives substance to all forms of rational creativity. Indeed, the criterion for revelation is the manifestation of creativity.55

Revelation, faith, and existential knowledge thus reside in the gray area between the infinite and the finite. Through his idea of symbol, Tillich endeavors to explain how knowledge of the infinite can be transmitted to finite man.

Certainly revelation cannot create a language of its own. Rather, ordinary language is used, and becomes "a vehicle for expressing and denoting the extraordinary experience of mind and reality in ecstasy."56 The symbolic form becomes this vehicle, residing in myth and cult. Tillich says that "there should be neither myth or cult."57 For him, they are only present because man has lost the unity with the depth of reason.
We have discussed Tillich's idea of symbol in Chapter I from the standpoint of its integrative role in the life of man. It is the point where man unifies the contradictory forces within himself. Now we must explore the type of knowledge which is manifested in the symbol.

Symbols open up the level of the depth which would otherwise be closed to us. They mediate between the infinite and the finite. To accomplish this task, the symbol contains the two elements referred to in Chapter I as the elements of ultimacy and concreteness. The element of ultimacy is the immediate awareness experienced as absolute certainty, corresponding to the body's participation in faith. The element of concreteness refers to the fact that something from ordinary experience is taken and symbolically applied to God. This reflects the mind's objectification of its faith. Both elements are always present. This is the "double-edged" character of religious symbols:

They are directed toward the infinite which they symbolize and toward the finite through which they symbolize it. They force the infinite down to finitude and the finite up to infinity.56

Tillich's emphasis on the silent knowledge of encounter leads him to reject content in favor of the immediately experienced presence of the holy. We must explore how symbolic language points to the holy.

Symbolic language is "transparent language." It uses finite material to speak of the infinite. To do this, it must both affirm and deny itself. Every religious symbol denies its lateral meaning but "affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning."59 This
represents Tillich's attempt to bridge the gap between the infinite and the finite. Cusanus's "coincidence of opposites" becomes finite reason's awareness of its infinite depth.60

Knowledge in existence is always deficient knowledge for Tillich. It remains distorted and ambiguous because of the subject-object distinction. To know, one must be a subject. But to objectify is to distort. We never know the real object, there is only the known object. Therefore Tillich seeks a higher kind of knowledge, a knowledge which comes only through transcending existence; the immediate knowledge of faith where the subject is not only a subject but also an object, and where the object is also a subject. This is the I-Thou relationship of Buber. It is from such faith knowledge that man as spirit must derive creative solutions for the tension between thinking and being.

THE CORRELATION OF FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY

While giving a priority to the knowledge of faith and to the truth of the depth, Tillich does not totally deny a place for thought based on detachment. Indeed, it can be very useful if it is correlated with the eternal message received in revelation.

Theology unites expressions of the depth (theo) with expressions of the structure (logy). Systematic theology unites the existential truth of the religious experience of faith with the theoretical truth of philosophy. This is Tillich's method of correlation. The concepts and categories which are developed autonomously are "imbued" with the substance of the eternal message.
The method of correlation is an attempt to synthesize what Tillich calls "the modern mind" and its self-interpretation with Biblical religion. Important to this approach is the idea that revelation is never pure; it is always received in the conditioned forms of existence. We have it, but at the same time we don't have it. The infinite is present in the finite, but it cannot be. Therefore, the religious symbols somehow contain the revelation, but are themselves conditioned forms.

The correlation that theology undertakes is really one of bringing together faith and philosophy. Religious symbols are matched up with ontological concepts developed by "autonomous" philosophy. Thus, we have statements like "God is (religious) Being-itself (ontological concept.)." Knowledge of ontological concepts comes theoretically through the mind grasping reality. Religious knowledge comes from our being grasped by the ultimate in the faith correlation. What Tillich calls "living knowledge" is thus a synthesis of what was formerly called supernatural revelation and natural revelation. Philosophy attains knowledge of God through an I-It analysis of creation, coming up with ontological concepts. Faith gives immediate knowledge of God in an I-Thou encounter, expressing itself in religious symbols. The task of theology is to correlate the ontological concepts with the religious symbols.

Tillich does not seem to see any possibility of conflict between philosophy and faith. He does admit that most great philosophers were driven by faith, but he does not see the possibility that our choice of ontology might lead to a conflict of
faiths: "There is no special ontology that we must accept in the name of the biblical message."61 While this appears to be a problem in Tillich's conception, it is only seemingly so. When we deal with the criterion of symbols, we will see that ultimately all faith is one.

 thought tries to grasp being. To the extent that it does, it obtains objective, though ambiguous, knowledge. Theoretical thought remains bound to the subject-object structure. However, if thinking should encounter the "holy," (or become engaged in an I-Thou relationship), it will find itself grasped. The first experience can be expressed in terms of ontological concepts, and the second in terms of religious symbols. A correlation of the two types of knowledge is what Tillich attempts to do in his system. Though never complete, each type of knowledge (I-Thou, I-It) is corrected by the other.

PARADOXICAL SYMBOLS

Tillich's separation of the infinite and finite when it is worked out as a tension in the directedness of the religious and cultural acts ultimately relativizes all cultural forms in relation to the unconditioned. In order to correlate faith with every philosophy that might appear on the scene, Tillich has to remove the possibility that faith might contain any sort of content that could be considered authoritative and hence come into conflict with a philosophy. He does this through his idea of the religious symbol as a paradox. The "silent" character of the experience of the mystery comes through here.
"Grace is always a paradox," says Tillich. "It breaks through the immediate form but has no form of its own." This is an axiom which theology must keep in mind when it goes about its task of choosing a concrete symbol. It must remember that every symbol that it creates stands under the "No"; it cannot claim to represent the infinite. The criterion for symbol choosing, then, is the element of self-negation that it contains: "That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy." Hence, no man can claim to possess the truth to the exclusion of others.

The most adequate symbol is one which can include the "No" of the unconditioned within itself. The more it succeeds in doing this, "it will stand all the deeper in the religion of paradox." According to this criterion, Tillich points out that Christ negated himself, not only by giving up his life, but by constantly denying that he was God in order to point beyond himself to the ultimate. Christ "is a person and the negation of himself as a person."

The symbol of the cross is especially powerful in Tillich's eyes because it "stands against the self-elevation of a concrete religion to ultimacy, including Christianity." The cross is a perfect example of a religious symbol which is "universal but not heteronomous." By this Tillich means that the symbol of the cross is so universal and open to be correlated with any content that it could survive even when correlated with a content that denied it. This symbol is so universal that it can include contents within itself that appear to conflict to an outsider who does not understand.
Tillich's idea of conversion follows directly from this idea of symbol. The "ultimate concern" or faith does not really change. Rather, one merely takes on a more adequate content. This leads to the possibility of a universal faith, an idea that Tillich sees as feasible for a religion which can provide the all-embracing symbol. The key to this approach lies for him in "distinguishing ultimacy itself from that in which ultimacy expresses itself." This points to the tension between the inexhaustible ground of meaning and the particular forms of its expression. To be more precise, one could say that by relativizing all religions, one can see their unity. True knowledge is to know that even when you're wrong (symbols inadequate) you're right (they all refer to the same ultimate anyway).

Tillich consistently confuses idolatry with authority (which he calls heteronomous). It is one thing for a symbol to cease pointing beyond itself, and another for it to claim to represent the ultimate in a way which affirms the necessity of that representation. Tillich's hermeneutic demonstrates this idea. He consistently denies any authority of the Bible, preferring to concentrate instead on the elements which lend themselves to correlation. He even says that "there is no ontological thought in biblical religion," just symbols which can have ontological implications. There is no ontology that we must accept because of the biblical message, he says, because ontology is what we correlate the message with. The "message" is thus reduced to symbols; the content then being supplied by the self-interpretation of a period.
THEOLOGY OF CULTURE

Theology, besides correlating the symbols of a religious community with the philosophical concepts of a time, also must be central in the synthesis of the religious and cultural attitudes. This is the proper task of a "theology of culture." To avoid any kind of double truth or disruption of meaning in existence, religious knowledge must not be allowed to become heteronomous (or authoritative), but must be actualized in cultural forms. Science must retain full autonomy, while "subordinated to a fundamental religious experience which is paradoxical." In this way, "the possibilities of conflict (between faith and science) are radically eliminated." The question can be raised as to whether or not this is indeed true in that religion has been totally emptied of both content and authority.

A theology of culture analyzes cultural creations according to the dialectic of form and import that we have been describing in this chapter. In doing so, it can express the unity of all cultural functions (including science) as they actualize the import of meaning, showing their religious quality.

Perhaps most exciting is Tillich's idea of the religious community's function within culture. He sees the task of such a specifically religious sphere as one of collecting the religious elements:

... concentrating them in theory and practice, and in this way making them into a powerful—indeed, into the most powerful cultural factor, capable of supporting everything else.
Yet when Tillich fleshes out the actual activity of the theologian of culture, one is left with the impression that Christians should refrain from being cultural leaders; waiting rather for others to do the building, and then coming in to correlate their symbols with what has been done to give it a depth dimension. For instance, Tillich says that the theologian of culture can "visualize" the realization of a truly religious system of culture, but "he cannot produce the system himself." Because theology is promoting the "theonomous attitude," in that religion has been reduced to that, the theologian of culture cannot create forms. He brings the theonomous intention together with cultural forms, but he creates neither. He can select, but he cannot create his material. He can show the style and religious roots of a culture, but he cannot himself be creative in the autonomous production of forms.

In Tillich's case, he saw how the spirit of industrial society was destructive. Instead of being able to suggest Christian alternatives, he could only note the protest of existentialism against this spirit. By joining his tradition's religious symbols with existentialism, (and socialism politically), he hoped to suggest possible alternatives. His critique became dependent on other spirits, to which he attempted to wed Christianity.

THE WAGES OF RELIGIOUS RELATIVISM

The basic tension of Tillich's system lies between the infinite and the finite. The infinite is present in the finite as that which gives meaning to every creative act, but no act can
exhaust the infinite import of meaning. The same tension is found between thought and being, in that thought can never exhaust being which infinitely resists it. Yet for Tillich there remains in both cases the demand to exhaust, in spite of the impossibility of it, and this demand provides the impetus for continued cultural creative action by bringing the potential to actuality. Through man's create efforts "being transcends itself." The possibilities become actualities; the universals become concrete. The essences, principles, or ideas themselves are part of this dynamic process, so that nothing is really dependable. One must just maintain a "belief-ful relativism," believing that one's creative acts have value in that they have actualized certain potentialities from the ground of the divine life, but knowing that all of one's acts stand under the "No" of the infinite.

Tillich is trying to get away from the static idea of essences of the Platonic system; the supernatural world above the natural world of the medieval church. But his speculations about the nature of the possibilities for existence are beyond what man as a creature can know. Indeed, his idea of absolute faith admits to being beyond ordinary creaturely possibilities. To account for change in history as well as some structure of creation, he speaks only of structures which exist as "norms," being direct incarnations of the essences in the creative kairoi. Dynamic change is attributed to the essences themselves, in that they have to continually re-manifest themselves. God is both ground and abyss. There is both Yes and No. Yet all actualizations are rooted in the ground. This
leads to a sort of deterministic idea of actualization in which fate and man's freedom coincide. Man's responsibility is lost in that he cannot help but actualize what God determines.

In terms of truth, theoretical knowledge remains eternally within the subject-object structure of detachment. It can never be complete, always distorting its object in the I-It relationship. Knowledge of the really real demands a different type of relationship, one of involvement. In the I-Thou encounter, one finds that the subject-object structure is preserved and overcome, in that one's object is also a subject. Such an encounter with a bearer of the holy results in existential truth, which is an inner awareness that cannot be specified. Reason in this state of ecstasy formulates its truth in symbols, uniting the infinite and the finite:

Symbols provide no objective knowledge, but yet a true awareness, namely, of the mystery of the ground, which can never become an object for a subject, but which draws the subject into the object and thus overcomes the cleavage between them.²³

A "living truth" can be obtained by correlating the symbols with theoretical, objective knowledge. Yet it is hard to get a hold on what this "inner knowledge" really is. It has no content, but gives meaning to the content that is brought to it, although in the end all content must include its self-negation. It is a mystical truth, in which man literally rises above his creatureli-ness and probes into the mysteries of God. The world is a shadow, and one must know the substance. In my opinion, Tillich confuses the fact that the world is dependent with the idea that it is deceptive or not real. For him, one must "change directions" to
meet God. To this I would answer that all of our functional
directions are God's directions. We know about that upon which
our existence is dependent by being involved in our existence, not
by trying to rise out of it.

God as infinite is not present in existence as the inex­
haustibility of being in thought. The presence of God in existence
must be seen as the Word of God; the conditions that hold for
existence. These conditions provide both the limits and calling
for everything that is, not just their infinite possibilities.

Tillich would relativize everything in creation because
he has no directional idea in culture, only in religion: "Reason
gives the tools for recognizing and controlling reality, and faith
gives the direction in which this control must be exercised."74
And because all action stands under the "No" of the infinite, he
can say that "there are no right decisions."75 All actualized
meaning is God's meaning. That is why Adams is perplexed and unable
to determine what Tillich's criterion is for testing meaning ful­
fillments:

There can be little doubt that his concept of the
Unconditioned is a devouring abyss for all symbols. . .
There is nothing to distinguish the symbols of one
religion from those of another religion.76

All that Adams can conclude is that "form is thus deprived of
significance in favor of import."77 Lacking a directional criterion,
Tillich relativizes all forms in his heavy emphasis on the inexhaust­
ibility of import; the distinction or gap between the infinite and
finite overshadows any distinctions concerning creaturely action.
This relativization is perhaps best seen when Tillich agrees with Luther that "God is effective even in the hand of the murderer, giving the power to the arm of the murderer to drive home the murderous knife." Because Tillich does not distinguish man's dependence on the Word for his very existence and man's response to that Word in the direction of life or death, he is left equating dependence with response.

Tillich is right in taking a stand against any situation where a double truth could arise. But his attempt to bring the Christian faith and the modern mind together makes Christian faith both relative and contentless, and Tillich takes his stand for the full autonomy of modern man and the culture that he creates in obedience to his innate reason. The cultural theologian's task of bringing theonomous intention to bear on autonomous cultural forms does not make those forms Christian.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1ST III, p. 24.
3ST I, p. 174.
4ST III, p. 71.
5ST III, p. 64.
6ST I, p. 92.
7ST I, p. 95.
9What is Religion?, p. 66.
10Wissenschaften, p. 122.
11In spite of his fleeting references to essences, it must be remembered that they have no independent status apart from their presence in existence: "There is no import apart from form, and no form apart from import." See What is Religion?, p. 53.
12Ibid., p. 42.
13Ibid., p. 57.
15What is Religion?, p. 58.
16James Luther Adams, Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science, and Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 78. "Form" in this context must not be confused with "form" in the structural polarity of dynamics and form. In that case, "form" refers to the bodily substance of a being and "dynamics" refers to the creative impulse of mental acts. In the present context, "form" refers to "forms of thought" and "content" designates the "subject matter" or "substance" to which these forms refer.
17For this relationship, Tillich combines form and content (unified in the creative act) into the phrase "forms of meaning," while the unconditioned meaning is designated as the import of meaning.
20. Theology of Culture, p. 74.
21. Ibid., p. 42.
22. ST III, p. 250.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 325.
31. Ibid., p. 214.
32. Ibid., p. 129.
33. Ibid., p. 164.
34. Ibid., p. 101.
35. Ibid., p. 118.
36. Ibid., p. 143.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 137.
39. ST III, p. 349.
40. What is Religion?, p. 78.
41. Theology of Culture, p. 22.
42. What is Religion?, p. 59.
43. Ibid., p. 77.
Interpretation of History, pp. 22-23.


Theology of Culture, p. 24.

Dynamics of Faith, p. 61.

Ibid., p. 77.

Ibid., p. 108.

Ibid., p. 120.

Ibid., p. 123.

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid., p. 120.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid., p. 81.


Ibid., p. 84.

Dynamics of Faith, p. 97.

What is Religion?, p. 97.


Dynamics of Faith, pp. 122-123.

Ibid., p. 134.

Dynamics of Faith, p. 125.

Ibid., p. 12.
70. What is Religion?, p. 163.
71. Ibid., p. 179.
72. Ibid., p. 167.
74. Dynamics of Faith, p. 75.
75. ST I, p. 152.
76. Adams, Tillich's Philosophy, p. 265.
77. Ibid., p. 263.
78. Biblical Religion, p. 84.
CONCLUSION

We have traced the pattern of contradictory monism in Tillich's view of man, as well as in his theory of meaning actualization and knowledge. This has necessarily been largely a descriptive approach. However, in light of the fact that one's own worldview must inevitably condition one's perceptions and analysis, I cannot claim to have refrained from incorporating my own critique into the text, especially in Chapter VI. The main thrust of this thesis was to uncover the basic pattern in Tillich's thought in order to consistently explain his work. The anthropological type known as "contradictory monism" was applied to illustrate basic aspects of his thinking. Once the tensions in his thought can be readily seen, a more detailed critique can be undertaken in terms of one's own view of man. I shall not undertake such an in-depth critique here, but this conclusion will admittedly go beyond mere description.

We have seen how the tension between God as infinite and creation as finite is the major tension in Tillich's thought. This tension is also worked out in creation as a tension within man himself between his dynamic, irrational side and his structuring, mental side. Tillich attempts to reconcile these two interacting forces in his doctrine of faith, where he tends to glorify the bodily participation in certainty at the expense of all concrete content. Also, Tillich's idea of faith, serving to unite all of man's functionality, has to go beyond existence to do so because of the
tension between the infinite and the finite:

Man's spirit cannot reach to ultimate, that toward which it transcends itself, through any of his functions. But the ultimate can grasp all of these functions and raise them beyond themselves by the creation of faith.¹

The ordinary direction of man's life is negated in order to emphasize another direction; the movement into the depth, toward the ground of meaning and being. Because Tillich does not see that all of life's directions are God's directions, he winds up emphasizing the reverse movement noted in part six, where every movement toward the depth is a movement away from ordinary life. This reverse movement becomes the religious quality of ultimate concern, and cultural acts remain only indirectly religious. In knowledge, too, there is an absolutization of an inner experience of ecstasy which creates gnosis of God.²

The same tension can be seen in Tillich's idea of love, power, and justice, as well as in his theory of meaning, view of knowledge, and the idea of the "transmoral conscience." In each case, there is the inexhaustible ground which manifests itself in the forms of creation. Separation becomes necessary for this manifestation, but because of the inexhaustibility of the ground, every concrete manifestation ultimately falls under the "No." This necessitates a reunion with the ground so that a new creative manifestation can take place. There is a demand for fulfillment, but because of the element of non-being necessarily assumed when the manifestation of the ground appears in creation, it can never be fulfilled. Yet the demand remains, perpetuating the eternal movement of life from separation to reunion, from the "Yes" in the kairos to the "No," from creation to destruction.
In a real sense, Tillich seems to absolutize the drive for self-affirmation. This is especially reflected in his analysis of power and in *The Courage to Be*. The more Non-Being that one can take into himself, the greater will be his power of self-affirmation. The further that one moves away from the ground of being in the separation that leads to diversity, the greater will be the creativity of the moment of reunion because of the great amount of reality that will be united. Tillich's view of creation and fall is governed by the need for this separation as a prerequisite for reunion, and his view of redemption and salvation refers only to the momentary reunion and temporary, creative balance achieved in the great kairos.

While Tillich wants to emphasize the importance of the present moment, of the temporal, he ultimately winds up leaving his reader with a fatalistic feeling of determinism. All acts are God's acts, and man's freedom which he is apparently attempting to preserve comes to have no real meaning because of the lack of a directional idea of response. Direction and structure are blurred into a geneticistic process in which every being "participates" in the divine life.

Tillich does make a contribution in his analysis of the "style" of a culture, but his view of the dynamics of life processes limits his use of this tool:

Has the Church the task and power to attack and transform the spirit of industrial society? It certainly cannot try to replace the present social reality by another one, in terms of a progress to the realized Kingdom of God. It cannot sketch perfect social structures or suggest concrete reforms. Cultural changes occur by the inner dynamics of culture itself.
Perhaps most remarkable is the consistency in Tillich's thought. In his last public lecture, one finds the same emphasis on the priority of the infinite over against the finite, this time in such a way as to pave the way for a universal religion:

The Holy as the Ultimate lies beyond any of its embodiments. The embodiments are justified. They are accepted but secondary. One must go beyond them to reach the highest, the Ultimate itself. The particular is denied for the Ultimate One. The concrete is devalued.\footnote{4}

But this emphasis is not really new. In one of his earliest works, The Religious Situation, a best seller, we see the same move toward a source of agreement upon which to find common ground with all mankind. He speaks of:

... an unconscious, self-evident faith which lies at a deeper level than the apparent antithesis of the belief and unbelief which both arise out of it and are both equally rooted in it. This unconscious faith which is not assailed because it is the presupposition of life and is lived rather than thought of... We must attempt to penetrate through to this faith.\footnote{5}

It is my opinion that this universal, unconscious faith refers to the drive for self-affirmation. It is that universal drive of all life:

Self-affirmation is not an isolated act which originates in the individual being but is participation in the universal drive or divine act of self-affirmation, which is the originating power in every individual act.\footnote{6}

The appearance of this courage to be is evidenced in Tillich's idea of absolute faith, and is rooted in the idea of vitality:

The courage to be is a function of vitality... To strengthen vitality means to strengthen the courage to be.\footnote{7}

Thus, the vital drive for self-affirmation becomes the common denominator for mankind; the basis for a universal faith which absolutizes this drive.
One of the most telling features in Tillich's thought is the way in which he accounts for change. The divine life includes both the dynamic, inexhaustible side and the structural, manifesting side. The process of life incorporates change within itself. There is nothing certain, only a temporary balance of the elements.

Niebuhr's criticism of Tillich was always that he made the dynamic aspect of life ontological, and therefore wound up saying that the nature of things involved both creation and destruction. Niebuhr intuited this, but never worked it out philosophically. As we have tried to show, the nature of reality as contradictory is a central tenet of his anthropology and ontology. All reality participates in the movement of life through a Yes and a No. All reality participates in the ground of being and the unfolding of God's will, but no reality can claim to fulfill the Yes. The initial Yes of the kairos must inevitably become a No. The creative moments where all elements are once again united with the ground must be followed by destructive ones. One must only be prepared to act at the creative moment of kairos.

The roots of this contradiction can perhaps be found in Tillich's life. Growing up in the nineteenth century, he experienced much of the idealism of that time concerning the state of peace that had been achieved. With the outbreak of World War I, he experienced with many of the intellectuals of that period "the shock of non-being." The only way to account for this seemingly unpredictable reversal in Tillich's mind was to posit these creative and destructive moments as part of the process of the divine life. This appeared to him
not as a bitter truth, but indeed as a joy:

The real miracle of time and of every present is not only that it can transcend itself but that as a result of unpredictable catastrophes it must transcend itself ever and again.8

Thus, even the defeat of Germany in World War II was a great kairos, a moment in which a new and unified Europe could be actualized.

It is not that man is disobedient to the calling of the Word for his existence, but that man is merely a determined actor in the divine process:

So instead of a progresstivistic, Utopian, or empty vision of history, let us think of the great moments for which we must keep ourselves open, and in which the struggle of the divine and the demonic in history may be decided for one moment for the divine against the demonic, though there is no guarantee that this will happen.9

It can perhaps be seen that the commitment to such a world-view can only help to perpetuate the occurrence of such destructive moments, in that it not only accepts them but affirms them as a part of the divine process and as the will of God.
NOTES FOR CONCLUSION

1ST III, p. 133.


3Theology of Culture, p. 50.

4Future of Religions, p. 87.


6Courage to Be, p. 23.

7Ibid., p. 79.

8Religious Situation, p. 38.

9Future of Religions, p. 78.
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