ONE MAN'S GOD. . .ANOTHER'S DEMON

A Study into the Relativity of Value and the Remoteness of Science in the Sociology of Max Weber.

A Paper toward the Master of Philosophy Requirement

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Max Weber personifies the social sciences which have grown into the peculiar social theories of the twentieth century. The portrait of his stern face hangs over the halls of sociological research and teaching in Europe, parts of Asia, and North America, and has done so since the early part of the century.

His attitude of the separation of "facts" and "values" epitomizes the currently prevalent notion that one can be a scientist, but need not involve oneself with the exigencies of the present. Three generations of sociologists have carried on the tradition which was immensely assisted, if not formally begun by this complex man. Although much of what is attributed to Weber is not so rightfully, nevertheless, it is fair to say that he definitely and consciously attempted to separate his theorizing from the beliefs which he held.

In order to distantiate himself and his theories from immediatecies, he established an imposing theoretical system which is referred to in this study as Verstehende sociology. Stated briefly, this system allows the social scientist to study human action and society, seek empathically to understand it and thus arrive at the root of the meaning of this action. The insight thus gained can then be utilized by the scientist or by the object of study himself in determining what the final end of
such an action would be. Strict avoidance of suggesting a particular course of action is maintained.

Weber did not build his system apart from the influences of his time, since this is an impossibility. A variety of theoretical and historical reasons exist for such a development. One must be aware of the various conditions and influences existent at his time to fully understand Weber and the theories which he expounded.

This study has two main purposes: 1) to understand the social theory of Max Weber with particular emphasis on his starting point and his methodological principles; 2) to critique his theory and point out its inconsistencies from the position of a Christian philosophy.

In order to achieve these goals, the study contains a survey of the corpus of Weber's methodological writings. Several specific concepts are extracted from the system and examined so that the underlying principles of Weber's view of reality can be manifestly experienced. Particularly, Weber's treatment of Wertfreiheit is investigated.

Little attention is given to the application of this methodology to the numerous practical studies in which Weber engaged. For example, no extensive analysis is assayed concerning his studies in the sociology of religion, the history of economic theories, or his sociologies of art and music. While all of these are extremely interesting, they are but the applications of the object of this study's critique -- viz. starting point and methodology.
The critical sections of this work elaborate the points already made, in order to emphasize the areas in which internal contradictions occur. In addition the philosophical perspective from which this study proceeds also allows an external criticism.

Since the confessional, and therefore also the theoretical, starting point of the writer of this study are different from Weber's, criticism of the latter's theories are evident even in their initial sections, simply by the way in which they are presented. Nevertheless, a studious attempt is made to present the views of Weber honestly. There is an effort to restrict critique to the appropriate sections, and to indicate the direction to alternatives.

Implicit in this study is the assumption that reality functions according to regularities. These are laws which were established and are consistently maintained by the Lord God, Who is revealed in the Scriptures. Humans are to acknowledge these laws; they are free to posit norms on their basis and act in accordance with them.

Meaning is given in creation and is not conferred upon reality by supposedly autonomous human subjects. All of life has meaning since it is purposefully created to be harmonious and integrated.

This Philosophy of the Law Idea is a Biblically rooted philosophical attempt to grapple the same primal elements of existence as Weber valiantly struggled to do in his system.
I. BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

Two people of contrasting interests, beliefs and dispositions married in 1863. The man was trained in law and had already worked for the city of Berlin in an official capacity. He was also a politically active person supporting, "a strong Hohenzollern monarchy and full recognition of the rights guaranteed the people."1 The woman was of a Pietist Christian background, her mother's family being French Calvinist in the late seventeenth century. The family was of the noble class. Her father was a civil servant. These two ill-matched people were Max Weber and Helene Fallenstein Weber, Max Weber Jr.'s parents. Max Jr. was born on April 21, 1864, in Erfurt where his father was a magistrate at the time.2

Weber was the eldest of six children, but was pampered excessively because, at the age of four, he suffered an attack of meningitis. His childhood was marked by his frailty, along with the fretting of his mother.

In 1869, the family moved to Berlin where Max Weber Sr. became a member of the Prussian House of Deputies (1868) and later of the Reichstag as well (1872).

Due to his physical frailty, Max Jr. preoccupied himself with studying and reading. He received stimulation from both his intelligent mother and his political-pandering father. The latter invited and entertained many of the prominent liberal intellectuals and politicians of his day.

The precocious Weber was writing historical essays by the age of 13. By 1882, he had finished secondary school and was ready to enter the University of Heidelberg. During this time
Weber's mother persisted in her attempts to instill in the boy a knowledge of the Christian beliefs which she held. From most evidences, the Christianity which she held was oriented toward moralism and pacifism or a negation of cultural activity. Although Weber respected his mother's own convictions, he did not adopt her views and ways himself.

Despite his dislike for his father's authoritarianism, which permeated the older man's paternal and husband roles, Max Jr. was attracted to politics and law through the exposure permitted him by his father. Consequently, when he went to the University of Heidelberg in 1882, he enrolled at the law faculty. He did not restrict himself to the study of law, but also took courses in history, philosophy and economics.

Not all that Weber learned that first year in Heidelberg was academic, however. He joined the same duelling (fencing) fraternity to which his father had once belonged. Along with this, he discovered the student's art of carousing and drinking. This combination of lessons altered both his attitude and his physical appearance. In fact, greeting her enlarged, bearded and worldly son, upon his first visit home from University, the surprised Frau Weber slapped his face.

The following year, Weber, then 19, went to Strassburg for a year of military training. During the first period of his stay he was an ordinary soldier. Later he was moved into officer's training and became an officer before the end of his allotted time. He despised the training, but acknowledged that one's body functions better when he is not thinking.
The feeling which begins in the morning and increases toward the end of the day, of sinking slowly into the night of abysmal stupidity is actually the most disagreeable thing of all.

The forcing of men to become like machines bothered Weber a great deal and his distaste for it reappeared later in his hatred of rationalized bureaucratization. Once he received the status of officer, however, he began to enjoy military life and became proud of his rank as a Prussian officer. In fact, he returned to the army for the two summers following his one full year of service.

Another significant aspect of his residence in Strassburg was his involvement with members of his mother's family there. These people were also a curious mixture of intellectual prominence and religious oddity -- some of them prone to trance-like phenomena and others to mental instability related to confessional feelings. One of his uncles there was Herman Baumgarten, a rather prominent historian and professor. Herman's wife, Ida, was Max's mother's sister. She held views similar to Helene but explained them more lucidly. She was able to practice what she believed because her husband did not interfere to the extent that Max Sr. did with his wife. The young Weber experienced a certain stability within this family that he had missed in his own. In fact the comparison in which he engaged caused him to resent his pompous, egocentric, authoritarian father with greater certainty and vehemence.

Regarding the mystic experiences and psychic irregularities which he observed in other Strassburg relatives, he became an arbitrator. He was guided by the principle: "Given the existing conflict, how can I solve it with the least internal
and external damage for all concerned?" The suggestion is warranted that this represented an early formulation of the later distinction of science and values and, more specifically, of the "ethics of responsibility" and the "ethics of conviction."

An additional facet of the Strassburg period is the relationship with his cousin Emmy Baumgarten, a troubled girl who went into a mental institution several times. There was a curious love between them which seemed to be more filial than sexual. Lacking sisters his age, Weber related to her somewhat as a brother, although his aunt Ida was concerned enough about the consequences of their feelings to move Emmy out of Strassburg for awhile. Emmy's moral principles paralleled those of Max's mother and therefore reinforced them. As a result he often identified her feelings and suggestions with his mother's, a fact recorded in his extensive correspondence with her. This correspondence provided biographers with a rich source of Weber's psychic processes and his attitudes toward women and authority.

After the 1884 military break, Weber returned to the university, this time to Berlin and Göttingen, to continue his law studies. His doctoral dissertation was written in 1889, the year of his graduation. He wrote about the history of commercial enterprises in the Middle Ages, particularly in Spain and Italy. He continued to study in law after obtaining his degree. He commenced a study for the Verein für Sozialpolitik (which he joined in 1888), a conservative-leaning organization founded in 1874 by Schmoller, a professor at the University of Berlin whom he later had occasion to vehemently criticize.
This study concentrated his attention for the first time on the worker situation in Prussia east of the Elbe River where the aristocratic Junkers owned and operated large farms. Interest in the peasant vs. aristocracy problem continued throughout Weber's career.

The history of agriculture in ancient Rome was the topic of a thesis which he defended in 1891 after passing his second set of law exams in 1890. Upon completion of this thesis, he received a position in the law faculty at the University of Berlin as a Privatdozent (somewhat of a student-teacher).

1893 was the year in which he married Marianne Schnitger, an educated third cousin who had come to Berlin to study in 1892. This romance meant a termination of the earlier affair with Emmy Baumgarten in Strassburg. Weber was somewhat troubled by doing this because he knew the fragile condition of Emmy's psychic condition. However, he resolved to do what he thought he should. Although Marianne proved to be a faithful companion, there is some evidence mentioned by Arthur Mitzman, that their marriage remained un consummated by sexual intercourse.

The University of Freiburg offered him a position in economics in 1894, which he accepted. In accepting the position, he delivered an inaugural in which he presented his stance boldly.

The Freiburger Antrittsrede is not only the culmination of Weber's early Weltanschauung; it merges this Weltanschauung into the demonic dynamism of German revolutionary nationalism.

What Weber did in the Antrittsrede was outline the ideology later known as liberal imperialism. He mixed some of the ideas of the old liberalism with a strict nationalism. Under liberalism,
various blocs within the society had been tolerated as part of a number of co-existents in the society. He retained some of this sentiment, but maintained that Germany should be ready to bear the consequences of the emigration of its peasants from the farms to the cities. Concomitantly, there would then be an immigration of others, notably Poles, as workers on the great Junker estates. His nationalism came through in that he suggested the seizure of these estates by the government to prevent their being used merely as bastions of the particular, wealthy class, while the rest of Germany went hungry or bought food at high import prices. In addition, Weber called for imperial expansion and a build-up of the naval power of Germany. He held that the power of leadership in Germany should come not from the Junkers, nor from the bourgeoisie, but from a "labor aristocracy" which he hoped would arise with the leadership of the new generation of intellectual scholars, including himself. This perhaps was Weber's most significant and advanced statement prior to 1897. In it he brought the full weight of both his intellect and convictions in order to balance an issue which he considered crucial.

Only two years later, he moved to Heidelberg where he assumed a position as professor of economics. At this time, when he was apparently at the threshold of a highly successful academic career, he suffered a psychic collapse so severe that he was virtually inactive as a scholar for five years and did not resume teaching duties for nearly twenty years. The breakdown happened in 1897 after Max's parents came to visit him in Heidelberg. Although they had come by train, Max Jr. refused
to let his father stay. The strong emotions which had formed within him against his father had never been released. This time he withstood his father and prevailed. According to calculations based on references to several time periods, together with the official death record of Max Sr., one can conclude that this confrontation occurred on or only slightly after the parents' wedding anniversary. Max Weber Sr. had presented an uncommon threat to his son's freedom throughout much of the first twenty-eight years of the latter's life. He had treated his children and his wife with military authoritarianism. In fact, at one time he even interfered with an academic appointment, which Max Jr. would almost certainly have obtained otherwise. In short, Max Jr. had a great amount of repressed hatred against his father. At any time that stance which he took against the older man would have been difficult. Doing so on his parents' anniversary, however, was perhaps more than Max Jr. could bear. This was so because guilt and responsibility were also deeply engrained in him.

Seven weeks later Max Sr. died. Although he showed no signs of sorrow at his father's funeral, Max Jr. experienced his first serious breakdown only a few weeks later. A partial recovery ensued, only to be reversed on his father's birthday of the following year. From then on he interspersed trips abroad in Europe with occasional periods at his home or a sanitorium. At various times he even lost the use of his arms.

By 1902, he was able to return to the University of Heidelberg, but to a reduced teaching load. He had no regular
schedule, but was retained as a lecturer.

Teaching seemed to make him unduly anxious, but he gradually resumed his other activities. In fact, in 1903, he co-founded the journal, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, along with Werner Sombart. As he stated in one of the essays written for this publication, its purpose was:

.. the education of judgment about practical social problems and. . .the criticism of practical social policy, extending even as far as legislation.13

Most of his future writing was first published in this journal. The first installment of his "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" appeared on the pages of this periodical in 1904.

Also in 1904, Weber travelled to the United States to deliver an address at the "Congress of Art and Science," held at the Universal Exposition in St. Louis. Weber was immensely impressed by America. Here he had a chance to see the American democracy and its operation. He keenly felt the possibility of corruption which underlay the American system. His comments about New York for example indicated that he held some degree of awe for capitalism and what it could produce. The skyscrapers, for example, he called "'fortresses of capital.'"14 He later suggested that voluntary associations in which leaders had to prove themselves to remain in office were more apt to "toughen" a person than the authoritarian institutions of Germany. This was one of the results of his United States tour. Another was the completion of "The Protestant Ethic," for which he researched while in America.

By way of brief survey, one can notice that in 1907, Weber inherited some money through his wife, which allowed them to be
relieved of formal ties with any university. Thereafter he engaged in various studies of interest to him. One of these was an investigation into socio-psychological problems and factors in industry.

Freudianism was making its initial appearance in Heidelberg in 1909. Weber expressed his disapproval of the trend toward infidelity and the relaxed attitude toward divorce. This attitude was inconsistent with his beliefs that the opinions of the scientist were to be free from judgments. For this reason, he did not reveal his disapproval from the lectern. Another of Weber's activities in these years was the organizing of the German Sociological Society in 1908. The organization originated from among the many brilliant people who surrounded Weber. For several years his home had been the meeting place, each Sunday afternoon in particular, for some of Germany's leading philosophers, social thinkers and artists. The sociological society, which Weber administered alone in the first years, was erected to provide a practical outlet for the experimentation and implementation of the ideas of these academic circles.

In 1909, he began to collect information on the social and economic sciences. He hoped to finish this project in two years. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, as he called the work, consumed much of his time and energies up to the time of his death. Even then it remained unfinished; his wife published it posthumously.

The years between 1909 and 1914 were full of strange and new experiences and relationships for Weber. In fact, his
entire post-recovery period was characterized by a loosening of the compulsive, ascetic work habits and attitudes of his earlier life. During this period, Weber met two men who particularly affected his outlook. They were the poet, Stefan George, and the aesthetician-philosopher-poet Georg Lukács.

The first of these — Stefan George — was an extreme non-conformist and an avant-garde poet. George attracted Weber because of their rapport on the level of sensitivity and consciousness of the power of the mind. Apparently Weber saw something heroic in the way George confronted the world around him and in the beliefs to which he clung despite their lack of popularity or rational basis.

The second of the men who influenced him at the time was Georg Lukács, a young Polish scholar. Lukács apparently opened Weber's eyes to the formal and theoretical analysis of the arts in a way to which he was not accustomed. An interest in Slavic culture and frequent references to Tolstoy and Dostoevski made him a person different from the typical German student, whom Weber came to resent as being too complacent. In Lukacs, Weber saw a representative of the Tolstoyan view of life which was an "absolute, uncompromising dissociation from the entire worldly culture of violence and exploitation. . . ." One of the most amazing discoveries to the student of Max Weber is Arthur Mitzman's revelation that Weber had an extramarital sexual relationship with a young woman between 1911 and 1914. This, probably more than any other event in Weber's life, indicated the colossal transformation from a life of rigid authority but blurring of science and values, to one of relaxed attitudes.
but strict separation of science and values. In his own living he exemplified the distinction: his own passions were being fulfilled while he opposed the theoretical justification of the new Freudian influence that was becoming popular in his time.

When the war broke out Weber wanted to serve his country in his capacity as an officer in the army. Since he was fifty years old at the time, he was placed in an administrative role. Here he came into first-hand contact with the bureaucracy he so much despised. He was not antagonistic to the principle of Germany's entering into war, given his nationalistic ideals. However, he despised the way in which the Kaiser fought and the reasons for which he continued the war. Weber realized Germany's inevitable defeat and regarded the continuation as foolishness. He journeyed to Berlin to try to persuade people there of the necessity of a speedy resolution of the war. He served as an adviser to the party which finally drew up the conditions of a peace treaty in Versailles in 1918.

The years of 1916 and 1917 were filled with travelling and writing. He wrote his *Sociology of Religion* in 1916 and an additional chapter on "Ancient Judaism" in 1917. The University of Vienna was the scene of Weber's academic comeback. In the summer of 1918, he taught a course in politics, and the sociology of religion entitled "A Positive Critique of the Materialist Conception of History." It was during the winter of 1918 that Weber lectured at the University of Munich. He gave two lectures there, which became among his most famous: "Politics as a Vocation" and "Science as a Vocation."²¹

In 1919, Weber accepted a position in economics at the
University of Munich. Apart from the summer courses of the previous year, this was Weber's first teaching assignment in nearly twenty years.

The Promethean struggle to overcome the complex forces which shaped his life seemed to be completed. An equilibrium had been reached in which his mature position finally could be articulated. Perhaps Weber himself was just beginning to look forward to another ten years of active teaching followed by a leisurely retirement, reserved for finishing his life's work.

Such was not the case. Already in the summer of 1919 he was ill. In the middle of revisions on the *Sociology of Religion*, he became sick again. He died of pneumonia on June 14, 1920.
II. WEBER'S SOCIOLOGY

A. Definition

For Max Weber sociology is that science which attempts at the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects.22

To begin, the object of scientific analysis, viz. social action, must be more clearly understood before proceeding. However, like the heart of an onion, social action is not immediately obvious. Some peeling (and perhaps a few tears) are required before one can be certain of the object. Action in a more general sense must be regarded first. This includes "all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches subjective meaning to it."23 Not to forget the description of social action, Weber declares,

Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.24

This orientation to the behavior of others must be recognized as a factor in the analysis of action by the scientist. In dealing with human action, the sociologist attempts not merely to observe it, but to understand it comprehendingly. As a human who studies the actions of other humans, the sociologist possesses the ability to see into the depths of social action if he sets up the situation humanly, accounting sensitively for each feature of the action.

B. The Purpose of Social Science

Sociology, as a social science, has diverse functions but all of them aim for greater understanding of the concrete reality of human life. According to Albert Salomon, Weber felt
that science can bring order into a chaotic and disordered world by the use of rationality. This order is ascribed by the scientist because it is not given in reality. In general, Raymond Aron agrees with this assessment. Science for Weber is "a rational activity whose goal is to arrive at judgments of fact that will be universally valid," claims Aron.

More specifically what will these judgments of fact be about, or what elements of reality should be ordered through the medium of the social sciences? At least three areas call for the assistance of such a science. First of all science is essential to make sense of the values that have motivated humanity throughout history and those which continue to do so. One finds Weber saying, for example, that science can elevate "these ultimate standards, which are manifested in concrete value judgments, to the level of explicitness." In this quotation, the emphasis is on the study of ultimate standards. However, no "binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived" are possible by the use of science. Weber, then, holds that value-judgments can be scientifically analyzed to the point where the ideals which underlie them may be "judged" as well as merely understood. He hastens to add that this judging may only be of the kind which tests the logical consistency of such ideals in relation to the ends which they serve.

The study of the connection between the Puritans' values and the accumulation of capital in their communities exemplifies the careful testing of the logical implications of a system of ideals (in this case, late Puritan doctrines). In this study
Weber attempts to explain and understand how the doctrines of predestination and calling, as interpreted by the Puritans, could lead them to shun the pleasures of the world while successfully engaging in all sorts of business and entrepreneurial activities.30

A second area in which science assists in the study of societal phenomena is one in which the emphasis is placed on the concrete reality rather than on values — a distinction which Weber has maintained despite his general opposition to Positivism. To this end, he says that social science is an empirical science of concrete reality.31 Science, looked upon from this angle, "has its point of departure...in the real, i.e. concrete, individually-structured configuration of our cultural life in its universal relationships..."32 At another point in his discussion, Weber states that science is not identical with empirical reality, but that it provides concepts and judgments which help to order this reality.33 This ordering function, of course, is the recurring theme of Weber's science and remains ambiguously close to the verge of subjective ordering. He admits that there is only a hair line separating faith and science:

The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value.34

This does not deter Weber from insisting on the value of science himself and on the possibility of the "objective validity of
all empirical knowledge." He also proclaims unabashedly that the one who does not accept science's value simply cannot be convinced of the validity of empirical knowledge in any other way.

Science is also helpful in the making of decisions, which must be formed by accounting for the various options that are available -- both external circumstances and the internal values, which the individual holds. This is the third area of scientific involvement. Science cannot tell one what he should do, but it can help him decide what he wants to do and what he must do if he wishes to remain within the range of a particular end. More schematically, science can give assistance in alerting one to the appropriateness of the means he chooses in order to meet an end; it can inform him of the adequacy of the ends in terms of its logical tenability; and it can foretell the consequences and by-products which accompany or issue from the execution of certain means toward an end. As one comes to know the ultimate criteria by which he lives and chooses, he can live in greater harmony and consistency with them as well. The "conscious responsibility" which ensues from the utilization of science to analyze the elements of decision-making has great consequence for the level at which the individual makes his choice. It elevates decisions from the dark gross levels of being to where Jacôb wrestled with the angel, i.e. the realm of ultimate self-expression of the human personality which lights up the darkest recesses of existence.

Although this is not Weber himself speaking, it is an apt summary of what he does say, and also quite in tune with the spirit of his entire attitude toward the extraordinary power of
Weber mentions that the first purposes of social science were practical. The State, for example, wanted to have advice on particular policies. In order to legitimate these policies, it increasingly resorted to the newly formed social sciences, which were supported by and expected to cater to specialized interests. Against such a background, Weber determines to set up a sociology separate from these specific influences. He endeavors to make social choices more accurate by making available the methods of science to those who must choose between one value and another. Furthermore, "Weber seeks to develop a wissenschaft of the individual event" in contrast to the patron-age type developed earlier, which sought to establish general and binding laws.

C. The Conceptual Tools of Weber's Sociology

To bring about a science that could understand individual and collective societal actions in order to arrive at explanations of causality, a highly technical set of conceptual tools had to be developed. Borrowing from several traditions, Weber devised a unique way of looking at societal reality.

Weber's methodological reflections are clearly indebted to the philosophy of the enlightenment. His point of departure and the ultimate unit of his analysis is the individual person.

However, the influences on Weber do not stop with the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Kant is the source of a great deal of the thinking of Weber's time. The dualism between nature and culture in both methodology and epistemology is particularly strong, with a predilection for the methods of the natural sciences. Insofar as human experience is analyzable
according to the methods of the natural sciences (complete with experimentation and the inductive method), it is part of the "natural" sphere. Only to this extent can human action be generalized in a conceptual scheme, suitable for genuine analysis. However, the Geisteswissenschaften or Kulturwissenschaften (the spiritual-intellectual or cultural sciences) are also traditionally recognized in German thought of this time. They are, nevertheless, separated from the natural sciences in the area of methodology particularly in the erection of models for analysis. This is the point of Weber's contribution of the ideal or pure type.

Although the subjective point of view of the investigation (or investigator) of cultural phenomena is recognized at the time, this factor diminishes in importance in the face of the historicism of the period. This means that the individual situation is treated as a unique sequence of development which cannot be related to or even compared with other similar sequences. Alongside this tendency is the conviction that science can gain definitive and complete insight into these events.

Weber accepts the nature-culture distinction of German historicism and idealism. What he does not accept is the condition that the Kultur- or Geisteswissenschaften must use the methodology of the natural sciences. Account must be given of the fact that selection is used in the social sciences, since only the facts that are relevant to the immediate problem under scrutiny are important. What he does, nonetheless, accept from idealism is the idea that judgments of fact can be empirically validated while those of value cannot. In place of this pos-
sibility of validation, Weber maintains his value free sociology, along with its methodological apparatus, to prevent the interjection of elements that would destroy the validity of observation.\textsuperscript{46}

Another factor which influenced the development of Weber's conceptual tools was the prominence of Marx's thought at the time.\textsuperscript{47} Marx's analysis of the advancing control of the means of production by a small group of capital-owners aroused Weber's interest in the phenomenon as well. Whereas Marx holds to the class struggle as the single most important expression of the discrepancies in society, Weber emphasizes the inevitable trend toward "rational bureaucratization." Bearing all the trademarks of the modern exaggeration of rationalization, bureaucracy threatens to topple all that is uniquely human in society. To counteract this tendency, such concepts as "meaning," "significance," "ultimate values," and "qualitative existence" became part of the Weberian system.\textsuperscript{48}

Collecting strands from each of these varied influences, Max Weber passionately weaves a system in which he wishes to maintain the distinction between science and value, with the destruction or dilution of neither. The explanation of this sociology requires the setting forth of its major concepts.

1. \textit{Meaning}

Meaning is an indispensable concept in Max Weber. The object of sociology is social action, which in turn, is taken as behavior to which subjective meaning (\textit{Sinn}) is attached.\textsuperscript{49} "Processes and phenomena which are devoid of subjective meaning (\textit{Sinnfremd}) are merely accepted as stimuli or results in the
process of action. They do not contribute to either the means or the end of the human action." Thus, if no meaning is attached by a person (either by the actor or an observer), action does not occur.

The suggestion that "meaning is the word Weber used to get at the motive and intention of the actor" is accurate as far as it goes, but Weber ascribes more to the term than that. For Weber, meaning is that which ultimate values provide -- a reason for living or a way of circumscribing the limits of one's world.

The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself.

"We confer meaning on life." The certainty of meaning must occur even before analysis can yield its results. The reference to the tree of knowledge indicates still more about the nature of meaning. Simplicity disappears after the fruit of the tree is eaten. No longer is meaning given, but it must be conferred at the end of a process involving decisions and the positing of ultimate values. Thus, the meaning of the world is never the same for all people; there is never an "objectively correct" or "metaphysically true" meaning. In this vein, Weber warns that there is no "'presuppositionless' investigation of empirical data." Rather, one must first of all have some "perception of its meaningfulness" and, on the basis of that, select the data which become the object of investigation.

The uniqueness of the social sciences is characterized by and differentiated from the natural sciences by the understanding
of social reality on the "level of meaning." Understanding of, or adequacy on the level of meaning is defined as,

the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and in so far as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts recognized in their mutual relations are recognized to constitute a typical complex of meaning.

The important phrases are "according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling" and "recognized to constitute," for they accentuate the importance of the subjective component of meaning. A human being (i.e. the social scientist) can study human action and recognize it as "typical" because he is human and he himself has the bounds of what he accepts as meaning (i.e. "habitual modes of thought and feeling"). Quoting from Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Theodore Abel, for example, notes that, "We cannot 'understand the behavior of cells,'" but "the possibility of understanding is peculiar to human behavior."

This textual investigation of "meaning" in Weber concludes with a reference which indisputably links it with "ends" (or ultimate values). Weber remarks that,

all serious reflection about the ultimate elements of meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories "end" and "means."

One sees, therefore, that Weber not only stresses what can be called tritely "the quest for meaning," but he makes it the presupposition of human action. More specifically, this meaning is in the service of an end to which the individual is committed.

2. Choice

Varying degrees of significance according to dissimilar sets of values provide a vexing array of choices which must be made. Weber does not deny the inevitability of making them:
The social sciences, which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to presume to save the individual the difficulty of making a choice. . . .\textsuperscript{63}

And yet, one also reads, in the same essay that "the fate of one's soul" is determined by the choice that is implicit in one's every action.\textsuperscript{64}

Science, as has been indicated earlier, has a battery of tasks in informing the individual of the adequacy of his means and the legitimacy of his conclusions, according to Weber. Science cannot prescribe the answer nor the precise manner in which the results of the analysis are to be used. The person who uses this information must make his own choices.

He weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world. . . . The act of choice is his own responsibility.\textsuperscript{65}

Choice, which by its decisive exclusion of the rational process of analysis is irrational, is still very important and indispensable for Weber and his system. "Choices" also involve "values" in the full-circle pattern that is observed in the discussion of "meaning" and "significance." In fact, the relevance of values to life is all pervasive in Weber, countered only by the aloofness from values which the sciences must maintain.

3. Verstehen

Weber's concern for meaning and his attempt to do justice to its presence as a determinative factor in human action demand that he find a method by which to arrive at this meaning without conforming it to his own values.\textsuperscript{66} This method he calls Verstehen (understanding). Although Weber did not adopt this concept exclusively from Wilhelm Dilthey, he was the most
It is important to acknowledge that Verstehen, as a concept, is much older than either German Idealism or the Historical School which sprang from it. The historical method devised in Germany merely took over a practice that had been used as the classical manner of getting at the meaning of ancient texts. Theodore Abel concurs with this appraisal, mentioning several people, either non-German or predating the Historical School who use variations of the method. The first he cites is Vico (1668-1744), who held that a special knowledge of human history can be obtained because it was of man's own making. "We can know for certain only that which we ourselves have made or created." Abel also mentions Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who is purported to hold that the methods of sociology are known to man because of man's "knowledge of human nature." More recently, American sociologists Cooley, Znaniecki, Sorokin, and Mac Iver also have similar concepts which indicate the unique understandability of social phenomena because of the sympathy or empathy that the human investigator has in regard to human action.

However, the importance of Dilthey's thought at the time of Max Weber, and the personal contact with the man makes the plausibility of the influence of the former on the latter quite great indeed. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) develops a philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie), which emphasizes that human life is much more than biological. He prefers to look at human life as a whole, composed of all of men's actions -- his art, literature,
religion, and views of life. We experience life in its wholeness and variety, not in its abstraction, or as isolated, disconnected facts. The philosopher assumes that life is meaningful. Since meaning is familiar to the philosopher as well, he can discern this meaning in the reality that he analyzes. Dilthey rejected the notion, propounded by Positivism, that man only experiences sensations in isolation from the reality in which they are found or from which they originate.

Dilthey's "philosophy of life," with its particular definition of life, guided his interests to the human studies (Geisteswissenschaften) as opposed to the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). Human studies include such sciences as psychology, philology, history, economics, literary criticism, comparative religions, and jurisprudence. In these areas, and all others dealing with mankind, a particularly empathic methodology must be used.

Certain methods — e.g. induction, deduction, observation, description, generalization, comparison, in short, all characteristics of modern science in the empiricist tradition — are shared with the natural sciences. Nevertheless, there must be some method which distinguishes the human or cultural sciences from the natural sciences. This is where Verstehen as a methodological concept provided Dilthey the tool to analyze what is human or a human product. Humans experience life as meaningful, they express this meaning, and this expression can be understood. This verstehen of human experience and expression enables the geisteswissenschaften to give insight into human action impossible in any other manner. Three conditions must
be met to make this understanding possible. First, one must know personally the processes through which meaning is expressed and conveyed. For example, one must know what it is to love or abhor something before he can understand love. Secondly, the concrete context within which expressions occur must be known to the investigator. Thirdly, the social and cultural systems which determine expressions must be known.

One does well to look at a quotation from Dilthey himself to get a grasp of this concept:

What I understand may be something small and simple, such as a momentary feeling or simple idea or purpose; or it may be more complex, even to the point where I understand a lengthy historical process or a tangled dramatic plot. The more complex it is, the greater the labour which I have put into understanding it.

The amount of sheer intellectual labour which goes into a historian's work, testing the meaning and the value of his sources, filling gaps, resolving inconsistencies, detecting causal connections, and so working out a coherent and well grounded narrative, needs no emphasis. But he is only doing on a large scale what we all do when we understand the sayings and goings of our neighbours.76

From the first part of this passage, one senses the versatility which Dilthey wishes to provide with his method. The latter paragraph indicates the thoroughness ("sheer intellectual labour") of the process. One must meticulously trace the progress of the event which he has under scrutiny.

For Dilthey, Verstehen is the only method by which man can obtain knowledge about social phenomena.

"Unlike Dilthey, Weber gave Verstehen limited tasks within a broader methodology."77 According to Carl Baar, Weber's methodology used Verstehen as only one device, along with science and the ideal type to study human behavior.78 This seems to be
true. Verstehen cannot be equated with science in Weber, since even the initial definition of sociology maintains that sociology is a science, which attempts the interpretive understanding (Verstehen) of social action. . . ." However, it is certainly erroneous to assume that Verstehen is always separate from the scientific analysis. Any discussion about whether or not Verstehen is an extension of science seems to miss the point that all that is required of Verstehen is the provision of sociology with enough insight to allow it to be the science of "subjectively meaningful" human action. "Weber's Verstehen might best be viewed as a methodological tool designed to discover the nature of a situation." This seems to be the most fruitful attitude that can be followed in analyzing this concept. Furthermore, Theodore Abel adds assistance when he remarks:

Thus we understand a given human action if we can apply it to a generalization based on personal experience. We can apply such a rule of behavior if we are able to "internalize" the facts of the situation.

The fact that one is a human being with feelings and experiences similar to those of the individuals whose action he analyzes, allows him to make assumptions about this behavior. The "internalizing" that Abel mentions here is the process of empathy in which the investigator is involved as he "lives through" the situations which he observes. According to Weber, one can investigate human beings and human-related events or actions in ways foreign to the treatment of the behavior of cells or physical elements. Insofar as there is meaning present in these individuals or collectivities, one can subjectively understand them. Because the investigator himself possesses
love, hate, pride, ambition and all sorts of other human characteristics, he can know what all of these things are.

Just as meaning is of two kinds -- either "actual existing meaning" or a "pure type of subjective meaning" -- so also the understanding of this meaning follows similar lines. There can be understanding of the action of individuals (either in the actual context of their intended actions or in the sense of the statistical average of a group of individuals). Or there can be the understanding of ideal type-constructions which the investigator erects for accurate analysis.  

There can also be two "bases of certainty of understanding" (Evidenz des Verstehens). One can rationally understand an action or event which is susceptible to such understanding, while an emotionally-based action must be understood in an "emotionally empathic" or artistically appreciative" manner. A mathematical equation or a logical syllogism has a basis of the former type. In this manner one can even understand an error as merely a deviation from a purely rational basis. To understand that which has an irrational basis, Weber maintains that the latter type of understanding must be used. However, the further from one's own values the actions under investigation are, the more difficult it is to comprehend them. In fact, there are some cases that are "devoid of subjective meaning" and therefore cannot be understood other than via relation to human intention. Although these are the two ways that one gains certainty of his interpretation, he must realize that the "understandable and the non-understandable components of a process are often intermingled and bound up together."
Webber also introduces a distinction between two kinds of Verstehen -- aktuell and erklärendes, translated as "direct observational" and "explanatory." The former of these is used to understand that $2 \times 2 = 4$ or that anger is being displayed when one's face contorts and his fists pound the table, or that reaching for the doorknob, turning it, and pushing the door, is the act of door-opening. With the latter type (erklärendes verstehen), one understands events in terms of motives. Although the same operation may be observed, it is interpreted differently. To use the example of the mathematical equation again, when one sees an accountant sitting before an open ledger or a physicist conducting an experiment, he can understand the usage of $2 \times 2 = 4$.\textsuperscript{89}

The variety of situations that are susceptible to the method of Verstehen is as wide as the scope of activities involving the subjective meaning of human beings. However, a point that Weber stresses is that the sociologist, using Verstehen, does not view human beings as collections of particular elements, for example, feelings, collections of cells, or bio-chemical reactions; but as individual humans or groups consisting of individuals. This means that, although a knowledge of any of the above relationships may be helpful in determining cause-effect relationships, such relationships are not subjectively understandable and therefore are not part of the process of sociological analysis. Again, Weber mentions that in some cases it is possible to speak of large collectivities or organizations -- e.g. states, associations, or corporations -- as though they are persons. This is not the correct way of obtaining the services
of sociology. He writes,

But for the subjective interpretation of action in sociological works these collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action.90

All of Weber's discussion of Verstehen as the method of analyzing human behavior has the purpose of maintaining the uniqueness of the discipline of sociology in distinction from the natural sciences. One is conscious of his efforts to withstand the imposition of the methods of the Naturwissenschaften, while still retaining the rigor of the "scientific method."

In the case of social collectivities, precisely as distinguished from organisms, we are in a position to go beyond merely demonstrating functional relationships and uniformities. We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals. The natural sciences on the other hand cannot do this, being limited to the formulation of causal uniformities in objects and events and the explanation of individual facts by applying them. We do not understand the behaviour of cells, but can only observe the relevant functional relationships and generalize on the basis of these observations.91

Weber develops the case that the sociologist can surpass the natural scientist in gaining insight into the internal motivations of the object of his analysis. In this he seems to follow the Lebensphilosophie of Dilthey, while de-emphasizing the intense passion which he elsewhere acclaims as inherent in the choices, meanings, and actions of the human beings whose actions he analyzes. The advances that the sociologist makes in his methodology are not achieved without cost however:

This additional achievement of explanation by interpretive understanding, as distinguished from external observation, is of course attained only at a price -- the more hypothetical and fragmentary character of its
results. Nevertheless, subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociological knowledge. The cost, apparently, is not great enough to deter him from holding onto the achievement of uniqueness which Verstehen allows him.

The methodology developed around the usage of Verstehen as a means of analyzing human action, is so important because it allows for the explanation of the motive of the actor. Motive is defined as the "complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself and to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question." This adequacy is now subdivided into two kinds: adequacy on the level of meaning (Sinnhafte Adäquanz) and adequacy on the level of cause (Kausal adäquat). It is adequacy on the level of meaning which is so unique in Verstehende Soziologie because it allows one to attribute significance to his actions, despite the lack of verifiable causal proof. A situation is considered adequate on the level of meaning when, taken as a whole, it appears to be understandable and to conform to "habitual modes of thought and feeling." It is this type of adequacy which allows the legitimacy of action without proof of causality and, as a result, allows an individual to go ahead with his actions while giving room for the investigator to make sense of these actions as well.

4. Ideal Type

Another of what Baar calls "Weber's two methodological contributions" is the ideal type. It is an essential part of Weber's consuming interest in the freedom of science and methodology from values. In his "Methodische Grundlagen der Soziologie,"
Weber says that, "It has continually been assumed as obvious that the science of sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process." This is said to distinguish sociology from history which seeks out the "causal analysis and explanation of individual actions." The problem which Weber says exists, is that a generalizing science such as sociology has a deficiency as far as the concreteness of the content of its concepts is concerned. But sociology has an advantage which compensates for this lack of concreteness in that it has a greater degree of adequacy on the level of meaning. When dealing with either rationally or irrationally based events or actions, sociological analysis abstracts from these events, but it also helps to understand them by measuring the degree of approximation of the actual phenomenon to the concept which sociology has formed of this situation. In order to make these concepts as accurate as possible, Weber suggests that ideal types be set up. This insures that there will be the "highest possible degree of logical integration by virtue of their complete adequacy on the level of meaning." Weber warns that, in using ideal types, one must be aware that hardly any phenomenon compares exactly to the ideal type. He compares it to the physical scientist's use of an absolute vacuum in which to conduct his experiments. In the case of the vacuum situation, everyone knows that in reality air pressure must be considered as a factor; but it is a complication as far as the experiment is concerned and it affects the predictability of the outcome. Despite the obvious deficiencies of the procedure
of erecting ideal types, Weber considers its use essential: "Theoretical analysis in the field of sociology is possible only in terms of such pure types."\(^{103}\)

One must realize what is involved in the construction and employment of such ideal types. Writing about ideal types, a sociologist remarks that, as a concept, it refers to a number of instances taken together. But it is a special kind of concept -- "purified" or "cultivated," he calls it. Only selected characteristics that fit together logically are admitted as components of this concept.\(^{104}\) As an example, Weber's concept of bureaucracy, has no irrational elements in it. As anyone who knows about bureaucracies can attest, there are many parts thereof which aren't rational. However, in the ideal type, all such irrational elements are regarded as deviations from the type.\(^{105}\) Weber himself also says the same,

> The ideal types of social action which for instance are used in economic theory are thus "unrealistic" or abstract in that they always ask what course of action would take place if it were purely rational and oriented to economic ends alone.\(^{106}\)

He continues by insisting that when the ideal type is "sharply and precisely" defined, it becomes more unrealistic and abstract, but at the same time, it is more able to "perform its methodological functions in formulating the clarification of terminology, and in the formulation of classifications, and of hypotheses."\(^{107}\) Thus, Weber opts for an abstract method which he claims brings with it the possibility of an increased capacity to clarify, to classify, and hypothesize.\(^{108}\)

Albert Salomon comments, in regard to the nature of the ideal type, that it is not a copy of the real world but...
Weber) "an ideal boundary concept."¹⁰⁹ In addition, Salomon points out that this concept leads the way in combatting "conceptual realism" -- the derivation of understanding directly from the givens of reality.¹¹⁰ "Certain key elements are abstracted from a number of instances and then generalized."¹¹¹ Therefore, it is not strange to find Weber maintaining that the components are not found in reality.

"Heuristic" and "expository" are two of the adjectives Weber uses to describe the function of his 'ideal type. "Substantively, this construction in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality," claims Weber.¹¹² It is further described as,

... the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and... the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild).¹¹³

In addition to the fact that the ideal type is not to be equated with reality it is also not to be conceived as a schema which has real situations as instances of it. Rather,

It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.¹¹⁴

He mentions as an example that the "essence" of Christianity, as it is explained by some, can be no more than an ideal type, with all of the limitations and advantages that that implies. Examples of Christianity can then be compared to this ideal type to highlight ("explicate") certain of its significant features.
Weber does not want the concept to be limited to stable relationships or events (e.g. Christianity, charisma, bureaucracy, feudalism); he wants to include "developmental sequences" as well.\textsuperscript{115} By this he means that a dynamic, changing situation can be investigated in terms of the end of the changes through which it passes. The actual end can then be measured against the ideally constructed one for measurement of the degree of deviation, in much the same way as in more static situations.\textsuperscript{116} The only difficulty which Weber re-emphasizes is that of too great a readiness to identify the ideal type construction with reality.\textsuperscript{117}

Writing about Weber's use of the ideal type, one commentator suggests that since the ideal type consists of that which is culturally significant, values are implicit in this concept.\textsuperscript{118} While this indeed seems to be the case, Weber's intentions are otherwise. Weber does state that there are various "points of view" from which the elements that go into the making of an ideal type can be chosen. "It is possible, or rather it must be accepted as certain that numerous, indeed a very great many utopias of this sort can be worked out, of which none is like another."\textsuperscript{119} This, of course, would lead one to believe that Weber assumes the legitimacy of the value systems or orientations which lead to the establishment of ideal types according to specific criteria. These criteria obviously, it seems, lead to the acceptance of some elements and the exclusion of others. This assumption is fortified by another statement:

Whoever accepts the proposition that the knowledge of historical reality can or should be a "presupposition-less" copy of "objective" facts will deny the value of the ideal type.\textsuperscript{120}
Again, what other conclusion can be drawn but that values or "presuppositions" are the indispensable prerequisites of the formation of ideal types?

Yet, only a few pages later, one finds all of this apparently called into question. He affirms that ideal types are intended to be valid in a logical sense.\textsuperscript{121} However, the values of the expositor sometimes creep in, and this bothers Weber a great deal. A Christian, for example, may make his type of Christianity in such a way that early Christians would be excluded.

In this sense... the "ideas" are naturally no longer purely logical auxiliary devices, no longer concepts with which reality is compared but ideals with which it is evaluatively judged. ... The sphere of empirical science has been left behind and we are confronted with a profession of faith, not an ideal-typical construction.\textsuperscript{122}

Although there seems to be no structured difference between an ideal type so constructed and one done by a person who does not hold the beliefs of Christianity, the type which is proposed by the believer is suspected more than the other.

An ideal type, to repeat, has no connection at all with value-judgments, and it has nothing to do with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one.\textsuperscript{123}

To reinforce this, he declares that "there are ideal types of brothels as well as religions."\textsuperscript{124} What one gathers from this statement is that one ideal type is not to be valued over another in the sense of the subject matter that goes into its composition. Any topical event, action, institution, or humanly-related phenomenon appears to be open to the method and is logically valid, despite the values that the investigator may have, which may cause him to abhor the object of his analysis.
Although his point is that anything is susceptible to ideal type construction and not that everyone will necessarily endorse them, he confuses the two quite thoroughly here. By his own admission, one's values determine what he will select as elements of the ideal type. What cannot be arbitrarily determined -- and this is Weber's point -- is which phenomena are worthy of being part of an ideal type.
III. Wertfreiheit

A. Evaluation and Value Judgments

The most striking of Weber's concepts, and perhaps the one that has had the deepest impact on the subsequent development of sociology has been Weber's notion of Wertfreiheit. 125

Weber defines judgments as "practical evaluations of the satisfactory or unsatisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence."126 Although Weber certainly doesn't want to say that one can never make such evaluations he wants to put them in their place. This desire to separate value judgments from empirical statements is evident for example in the university lecture hall. Intellectual integrity is the only virtue that the professor should seek to impart to his students -- i.e. to instill in the students a desire to search for the truth of an academic fact.127 Outside of the classroom, the professor can be free to follow his own God or Demon.128 There are still enough things to teach the student, including how to fulfill one's task in a workmanlike manner, to recognize all facts, even those which are somewhat inconvenient for one's own position, in short, to subordinate oneself and one's own values in the interest of allowing what is before one to speak. The professor should never confuse his legitimate desire to demonstrate his personality with the injection into his lectures of all sorts of personal evaluations to impress and satisfy the students.129

In connection with his theory of the separation of values and science, Weber lists three problems that people bring up with the assumption that they have thereby refuted his theory. They are as follows: 1) Since science arrives at "valuable
results, meaning thereby logically and factually concrete results which are scientifically significant, this precludes a value free science;" 2) his critics say that in choosing his subject matter, he is already making an evaluation; 3) he maintains that he is further misunderstood by people who interpret him to say that "...empirical science cannot treat 'subjective' evaluations as subject matter of its analysis."130 Weber indignantly claims that he intends no such implication, as is found in this last point, to issue from his views. The activities of the human subject, including subjective evaluation, can be a part of the value free sociologists' field of study. The simple rule which must be observed, however, is that there is a logical distinction between the "...establishment of empirical facts (including the 'value-oriented' conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and his own practical evaluation, i.e., his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including in these facts evaluations made by the empirical persons who are objects of the investigation)."131 Thereby he makes the distinction between evaluations as objects of analysis and as personal biases of the researcher.

Of the first two "misunderstandings" of his theory, Weber has no disagreement whatever. He simply does not acknowledge them as objections but rather agrees with their point. First of all, he feels that science does aim for valuable results which are scientifically significant. "Value" in this sense is not the object of Weber's polemics, presumably since it is value in a "logically and factually correct" sense which he
feels should prevent anyone's disapproval. He doesn't want people to stumble over the words "value" and "valuable" every time they appear in his writings. In other words, he still wants to use these words, especially "valuable" in the correct sense, because the idea presented is exactly what he wishes to hold, namely that logically established propositions are indeed helpful (valuable) in the clear presentation of the opinions and facts of one's analysis. The "practical evaluations" about which Weber is concerned presuppose the value (read valuable-ness) of the results in the very way which his critics choose to discount his claim to value freedom.

He also neatly dodges the second criticism, which he deems a misunderstanding of his policies, in a manner similar to his evasion on the preceding point. This "misunderstanding," one recalls, goes as follows: since one must choose the topic or subject matter of his studies in a manner which demands choice or evaluation, no one can claim freedom from values in this case either. Again Weber disarms his critics by professing agreement with their general statement. He does not deny that preference plays a prominent role in the selection of that which the social scientist wishes to study, but he does deny that this preference for the topic in any way destroys the objectivity of the analysis which follows. When one has chosen his object of study he can either allow his personal biases to influence his detailed analysis and the formation of his opinion and conclusions, based on the discovered data, or he can firmly resist the influences of such biases and disregard his personal evaluations for the purposes of this research. Thus, for
Weber, the initial selection of the topic recedes in importance in the face of the rigorous pursuit of the empirical truth.

The scientist (be he a social scientist or not) can be immune from the disease of allowing his personal evaluations to destroy the validity of his findings, provided he exercise the only value that is permissible -- intellectual integrity, which means that one must rigorously search for the truth of an empirical fact.133 Not even entering into the realm of the subjective evaluations itself can damage the objectivity of the dauntless ones who subscribe to the strict separation of evaluation and empirical reality.

In an attempt to expand on his defense against the three "misunderstandings," Weber introduces the distinction between axiology and the empirical disciplines.134 He implies, therefore, that the misunderstandings miss the point of his theory and criticize him only on the axiological level. Comparison of the relative worth of various values or value-systems and the ranking of them in a particular order is the general meaning of an axiology. Such an endeavor is definitely not what Weber wants to promote as the primary method of achieving a scientific niche for sociology. To this end he states:

We are not concerned with the question of the extent to which different types of evaluations may claim different degrees of normative dignity -- in other words, we are not interested in the extent to which ethical evaluations, for example, differ in character from the question whether blondes are to be preferred to brunettes or some similar judgment of taste. These are problems in axiology, not in the methodology of the empirical disciplines.135

As far as the empirical disciplines are concerned, Weber claims that their concern is "only with the fact that the validity of
a practical imperative as a norm and the truth-value of an empirical proposition are absolutely heterogeneous in character.\(^{136}\)

What this apparently means, in the context of Weber's concern for empirical purity, is that one must distinguish between the experience of a particular imperative as a valid norm, and whether or not the empirical proposition is logically true. The empirical disciplines therefore, and specifically the methodology of these sciences, care little about whether or not the "truths," have absolute validity. Looked at from the empirical point of view, then, one must admit a profusion of norms or values as legitimate determinants of the course of actions. In his essay on "Science as a Vocation," Weber speaks as a scientist: "According to our ultimate standpoint, the one is the devil and the other God, and the individual has to decide which is God for him and which is the devil."\(^{137}\)

Without the desire to find out which types of evaluations are more important or pressing than others (axiology), Weber's sociology is of service only by being available to interpret for the devotees the results of holding a position. Evaluations of ethical matters are no more or less important than those concerning empirical matters.\(^{138}\)

A point which Weber wants to make sure that his hearers get is that an evaluation, once made, is not binding forever. Instead it applies only to those who made it in the first place, no matter how highly the evaluation may have been rated by the one who held it.\(^{139}\) There is no single right or correct ethics which can be used as a standard by all. Likewise, there is no "correct" evaluation of any other sort. "The empirical-psychological and historical analysis of certain evaluations with
respect to the individual social conditions of their emergence and continued existence can never...lead to other than an 'understanding explanation,' says Weber. By this he means that one can investigate evaluations all he wants, but he can gain no more than an insight into what the evaluations mean to those who hold them. There are both non-scientific and scientific uses for such understanding, however. Non-scientifically one can "do justice" more easily to the entire thought pattern of one who thinks differently. Scientifically, one can establish more certainly the real motives behind human actions when attempting a causal analysis. Secondly, scientific analysis can be furthered by an "understanding explanation" of evaluation in that the real rather than alleged factors which separate two discussants (or prevent understanding) can be determined. Once one can know conclusively another's values, he can understand positions which would remain alien to him otherwise.

Verstehen (understanding) then, is the pivotal concept in Weber's attempt to keep the realms of empirical facts and personal evaluations or value judgments apart. One can comprehend another's position without becoming personally involved himself -- "'understanding all' does not mean 'pardonning all' nor does mere understanding of another's viewpoint as such lead, in principle, to its approval." Weber does not want to involve his social science in the debates about which positions (in politics, for example) are good and which are bad. He leaves that up to the individual, with his own gods and demons, to decide; he merely wants to make these decisions more accurate and, if possible, easier. "Understanding explanation" or "interpretive understanding," as Verstehen is alternatively translated, enables one to
theoretically interpret what one does. In all of this, the social scientist can remain the cool observer, not getting too deeply involved as far as the alignment of his own system of values is concerned. Verstehen then, is the tool which the concept of value freedom can utilize to maintain its integrity while still claiming to be part of a valuable scientific enterprise, viz. analysis of empirical facts.

In all of his emphasis on the empathic understanding of the positions of one's opponents through the use of his approach to social science, Weber may have left the impression that he feels that all differences are ultimately resolvable. His pleas to refrain from influencing the ultimate views of university students from behind the lectern indicate, however, that this is not the case. Rephrased, this means that a study of ethics which leads to a more proper understanding of the actions which ensue, does not automatically lead to the production of an "imperative" or "normative" ethic which becomes universally valid. Instead, he states that there are certain "unbridgeably divergent ultimate evaluations" which must be recognized as real. The strong terminology ("unbridgeably divergent") used here, indicates that there is absolutely no hope of rapprochement in many cases involving the primary motivation for legitimatizing action. (This also underscores the sanctity of ultimate values within Weber's thought.) It does not preclude the possibility, of course, of a "discussion of evaluations." Such a discussion does, he admits, lead more often than not to the scepticism of and eventual rejection of values.

Since people hold values which are "unbridgeably divergent,"
one can expect firm entrenchments within fixed positions. Weber conjectures what may happen when an unpopular opinion is held at all costs. He maintains that even the most absurd position is not refuted by science nor by another value position. Any position to which a person subscribes is not merely relative (i.e., one among many) to the adherent.

There is, in fact, an "absolute polytheism" of independent values. At that point the analyst must stop and accept the fact of this diversity. Axiology can be used to measure the relative differences between value systems and possibly even rank them according to the ordering principle subscribed to by the axiologist, but more than a relative choice is at issue in the case of ultimate values. Weber compares such choices to those between God and the Devil. One chooses either one or the other; he cannot choose both, he cannot relativize nor compromise. This leaves the weight of one's own absolute values as the only one by which balance can be attained concerning these kinds of absolute practical evaluations. This at first seems to be a surprising statement from Weber and may be construed as a concession. However, a wavering from his basic premise it is not. Value freedom, one must remember, involves among other things, the freedom of empirical analyses from values. Weber knows well that this is enough of a realm for the sciences. If one can determine how he would act in a given situation if he only were to follow a perfectly rational process of thought, this would already have tremendous repercussions on the way he would act in reality. In short, his ultimate system of values will doubtlessly be affected by the unwavering standard of the
rational order. Thus the victory, which one who holds to a particular set of values thinks that he has won by Weber's "concessions," is perhaps somewhat deceptive, or at least not as drastic as might be thought at first.

From a brief glance at Weber's own personal activities and inclinations, one can quickly gather that he himself had strong opinions on a number of important issues, particularly political and economic ones. This means that he himself believed very strongly according to a system of values. Undoubtedly, he wants to accord some legitimacy to this very real element of human life and action. In fact, he is concerned to safeguard individual freedom on these basic matters. The question with which he wrestles is the extent to which he should allow a place for such discussion within his theory. One could say that his theory and his value spheres are separate. While wanting to recognize the existence and even the function of values, he still does not want the investigator's personal values to bias the empirical task of social science, i.e. its methodology.

Arguing then, from the data about Weber's own personality, one can say that his most empassioned writing occurs when he is talking, not about factual analysis, but about ultimate values. For example, in regard to these ultimate choices, he uses symbols and metaphors which are rooted in Biblical accounts of serious choices. Elsewhere he speaks of how men in his time seem to do everything in pianissimo in contrast to the bold, daring, and reckless acts of the past when men acted on their convictions. In this present passage he goes on to say that although one ought to make such absolute and grandiose choices,
people seldom do this:

The shallowness of our routinized daily existence in the most significant sense of the word consists indeed in the fact that persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all do not wish to become aware, of this partly psychologically, part pragmatically conditioned motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values.\textsuperscript{146}

All this to merely describe the object of one's theoretical system? This talk about values adds not one whit to the perfection of a method by which to scrutinize these values for their internal consistency and external application to action.

There seems to be the implication that the empirical disciplines are being undercut. This is not the case, however, because again the fundamental purpose of the social sciences is not even being discussed. Weber has never said that they should spare someone the difficulty of making a choice. What he does say repeatedly is that they can help in making this choice by providing the instruments by which the elements of this choice can be clearly and unambiguously seen and utilized. At this point the empirical disciplines' task is restated. When one seeks directives from practical political evaluation, for example, one can obtain "(1) The indispensable means, and (2) the inevitable repercussions, and (3) the thus conditioned competition of numerous possible evaluations in their practical consequences. . . ."\textsuperscript{147}

There are three areas in which a discussion of value judgments can be helpful. The three points are:

a) the elaboration and explication of the ultimate, internally "consistent" value axioms, from which the divergent attitudes are derived. . . .

b) the deduction of "implications" . . .which follow from certain irreducible value axioms, when the
practical evaluation of factual situations is based on these axioms alone. . . .

c) The determination of the factual consequences which the realization of certain practical evaluations must have: (1) in consequence of being bound to certain means, (2) in consequence of the inevitability of certain, not directly desired repercussions.\textsuperscript{148}

The first of these three areas of the study of value judgments (point "a" above), does not involve the use of the techniques of the empirical disciplines. Clarification is the primary interest of such an analysis rather than strict verification. The validity of this "elaboration and explication" type of value judgment is "similar to that of logic," which Weber has characterized elsewhere as a "dogmatic rather than an "empirical discipline."\textsuperscript{149}

"The deduction of 'implications' . . . from . . . value axioms" demands a somewhat different approach from the one used to elaborate and explicate. Since deduction is involved, one would expect the use of a logical approach -- and this is exactly what is proposed by Weber as well. However, he also points out the necessity for a "casuistic analysis of all such empirical situations as are in principle subject to practical evaluation."\textsuperscript{150} Here we have a complication of the first method of value judgment. First of all one is no longer concerned merely with value axioms but now with the practical evaluations which derive from these axioms. No longer is a strictly logical approach necessary, but a more empirical approach is also required. This second way of judging values does not concern only the so-called "value axioms," but it deals as much with those "practical evaluations," which are the everyday judgments based on the premises set forth in the value axioms. As various
situations are evaluated, certain implications emerge which must be recognized and for which account somehow must be made. These implications are part of the evaluator's system of values and yet they also include elements of empirical validity based on the actual existence of a factual situation. This brings the value and factual spheres quite close to each other without actually touching one another. They are still separated by the same gulf, namely that, although implications follow from factual situations, they are nonetheless implications and they are deduced on the basis of alignment with a particular value axiom.

In the last way of value judgment, one comes to the fine line which divides values and facts in Max Weber. At this point, values are no longer merely elaborated nor are implications deduced, but "factual consequences" are "determined." This means that the practical evaluation is no longer regarded from the point of view of its connection to a system of value axioms, but it is seen as a self-contained system which can be analyzed with no consideration to the rightness or incorrectness of its position. Instead, what we have is a simple measurement of consequences that will occur once the value axiom has been accepted and certain practical judgments are made from it. On the basis of the purely empirical observations that are made on the factual consequences of value judgments, one may come to a variety of conclusions. These conclusions are also inevitable and binding so that, despite what preference one may have from a practical value point of view, the empirical observation determines what can or cannot be accepted. Basically,
there are four possible conclusions to which this type of value judgment can lead. First of all, one can conclude that his preference is simply beyond his means to attain. Secondly he may discover that this preference is quite possibly out of the range of his means or that the realization of the preference would probably involve adverse repercussions. In the third place such a value judgment, when done in a thorough manner, may involve the sudden discovery of new means or repercussions which must be taken into account and which alter the complete nature of the evaluation to the point where it must be dropped. Finally, new axioms may also be discovered which have the same effect as the finding of new means. Since the axiom was not previously known, no attitude was formed toward it. In any of these four cases the result is that one relinquishes the execution of actions based on a particular "practical evaluation" because he has been convinced by scientific evidence that the consequences are not worthy of acceptance. "Far from being meaningless, value discussions of this type can be of the greatest utility as long as their potentialities are correctly understood."151

Value judgments "considerably reduce, or at any rate lighten, the task of 'value-interpretation' -- an extremely important preparation for empirical work -- for the scientific investigator. . . ."152 The significance of this statement is that one can see the intimate link between value judgments and empirical work. Value judgments indispensably point out the areas where evaluative interests affect the actions with which the scientific investigator must deal. One must notice that
Weber remains consistent here by saying that this value interpretation is a "preparation for empirical work." In this way he can maintain the evaluative-scientific split while acknowledging the legitimacy of both sides. What Weber is saying in this is that value interpretation is an inevitable part of all empirical analysis regardless of what preliminary evaluative work precedes it. The work that is involved is the rigorous separation of the value elements from the strictly empirical facts, and for this the judging of values is very helpful. As it is, value interpretation is essential. A section of "The Logic of the Cultural Sciences" is devoted to an explanation of this procedure. Here one finds that "it teaches us to 'understand' the intellectual, psychological and spiritual content of the object of analysis; it develops and raises to the level of explicit 'evaluation' that which we 'feel' dimly and vaguely. . . . What it actually suggests in the course of analysis are. . . various possible relationships of the object to value." Therefore, again the link between values and the objects of analysis is made. This time one is led to see how Weber raises "feelings" which are not yet "evaluations" to the level at which they can be used in the social scientific process. The "value-relations of the objects" (Wertbeziehungen des Objektes) are the phenomena which value interpretation is concerned to show. But one must notice that he specifies "possible relationships," indicating that value interpretation is a tentative, working procedure, perhaps the first step in raising "dim and vague" hunches to the light as potential evaluations of a particular object of empirical work.
B. The Task of the Ethically Neutral Science

The task of an ethically neutral science in the analysis of a social phenomenon is completed when it has reduced this phenomenon to its most rational and internally consistent form and has empirically investigated the pre-conditions for its existence and its practical consequences. Whether one should or should not be a follower of this phenomenon can never be proved without reference to very definite metaphysical premises which are never demonstrable by science.

Weber firmly believes that such a limited task for the social sciences not only ensures the accuracy and precision of these sciences but also assists the value positions to maintain their peculiar integrities. He comes out squarely in favor of those convinced people who have an ideal for which to fight when he declares, "I, for my part, will not try to dissuade the nation from the view that actions are to be judged not merely by their instrumental value but by their intrinsic value as well." This is said in the context of the comparison between those who follow "trends" ("instrumental values") and those who act according to the convictions of a firm position ("intrinsic values"). However, Weber firmly maintains that science, rather than taking sides in a debate such as this, should stick to an analysis of the facts contained. "The convinced person's kingdom, like that of every 'absolute value' ethics, is not of this world." Therefore, in the analysis of facts, one can merely point out the internal consistency of the actions to determine whether they are indeed carried out in a rational manner from the basis of the absolute value that has been accepted at the outset. Although values are of the utmost consequence to their adherent and although there would be few
actions to analyze without them, the professor or scientist who wishes to remain truly scientific must leave them alone. He must recognize them as realities, but he must neither advocate nor oppose these values before his students.

Even more than his concern about what university professors tell their students, is his anxiety about the effect that certain accepted terms or concepts have on social theories of his day. He feels that the mixture of values and scientific work is so common that the vocabulary is sprinkled with words which hide the implicit value character of many of the actions, situations, or phenomena that they purport to describe. One such term is "adaptation," which he feels is too ambiguous to be used as it is accepted and understood in his time. In order to avoid the term "adaptation" becoming a euphemism for those who want to "choose" a value on the basis of their convenience, he wishes to drop it altogether.

Another term of equal confusion in his time, according to Weber, is "progress." He feels that it too has come to refer to an "increase in 'inner richness'" as well as the "'progressive differentiation'" of a given phenomenon. At this point he feels that the term, like "adaptation," becomes a front for certain undeclared value judgments, which eliminates the clear distinction between values and scientific analysis. Wishing to investigate examples of what has been called progress he begins with the emotional sphere, in which claims were being made in his day about the increase in the quantity and quality of feelings that were able to be expressed. Weber feels that the great trademark of all thought of his day -- viz. rationalization --
along with a tendency toward greater attention to the individual, has caused people to think that feelings now have a greater power than before. The fact that people pay more attention to feelings, therefore, is undisputed by Weber. What he does not condone is the evaluative implication that this proves that the progress which has occurred has been a positive advance:

...whether one designates progressive differentiation as "progress" is a matter of terminological convenience. But as to whether one should evaluate it as "progress" in the sense of an increase in "inner richness" cannot be decided by any empirical discipline.¹⁵⁶

Thus, we see that his argument does not preclude the use of the term progress. He seeks to strip it of all evaluative significance and use it only to designate technical change. Moving to the use of the term in art, Weber attempts to set the record straight. He feels that a great disservice is done to art to use the concept of progress in an aesthetic sense. Aesthetics deals with evaluation and judgment according to the degree of success between "attempt" and "realization."

The complete distinction between the evaluative sphere and the empirical sphere emerges characteristically in the fact that the application of a certain particularly "progressive" technique tells us nothing at all about the aesthetic value of a work of art. (underlining mine) Works of art with an ever so "primitive" technique... may aesthetically be absolutely equal to those created completely by means of rational technique... The creation of new techniques signifies primarily increasing differentiation and merely offers the possibility of increasing the "richness" of a work of art in the sense of intensifying its value.¹⁵⁷

Since "nothing at all" can be found about the aesthetic value of a work of art by empirical work, what is its function? Weber is trying to put empirical scientific work in its place; he isn't trying to eliminate it altogether. Therefore, he is
ready to admit that, in many cases, the development of new techniques is also responsible for development in art in the aesthetic-evaluative sense as well, when looked at from the empirical point of view. The fact that he says that new techniques do offer at least the "possibility of increasing the 'richness' of a work of art" also testifies to their usefulness.

A further point which emphasizes the need for separation of evaluation and scientific enquiry is yet adduced by Weber. He states that, in his experience, when

the historian begins to "evaluate," causal analysis almost always ceases -- to the prejudice of scientific results. He runs the risk, for example, of "explaining" as the result of a "mistake" or a "decline" what is perhaps the consequence of ideals other than his own, and so he fails in his most important task, that is, the task of "understanding."  

C. Restatement of the Reason for a Value-Science Distinction

This brings us back to the original reason that Weber felt moved to force his fact-value distinction to its limits and also why he wrote his famous essay on "ethical neutrality." He was troubled by science as it was taught in the major German universities. This teaching was far too permeated by the personal opinions of the professors. This caused what Weber felt was a decline in the influence of true science throughout the country. Professors were spinning out theories which were calculated to agree with the policies of the German state so that they would be favored by the chancellor or his officials. Against this background, "understanding" (verstehen) became the most outstanding trademark of the Weberian position. In every way, the scientist should try to understand genuinely the position of all other theorists and social patterns of those
whom he analyzed. Whenever the possibility for this un­
standing becomes obscured by the injection of the investigator's
evaluations, Weber feels duly convinced of the correctness of
his position and recommends it more strongly than ever.
In fact, Weber concludes this concise essay on "ethical
neutrality" with a rallying call for all "professional thinkers"
to "keep a cool head in the face of the ideals prevailing at
the time, even those which are associated with the throne,
and if necessary, 'to swim against the stream.'"160 To acknow­
ledge and comprehend the values that prevail, that is necessary
for Max Weber. Equally important, however, must be the refusal
of the investigator to hold these views as his own while he
seeks to analyze them and their impact. Or, should he subscribe
to them, he must either hold them at abeyance or relinquish his
task as a scientist.
IV. THE VALUE-SCIENCE POLARITY

All of the methodological tools and the definitions of concepts within Weber's sociology are a prelude to the most fundamental distinction in his thought.

Weber struggled with all his might to "proclaim and bring about a complete divorce between the empiric sciences and practical ideals," a leading commentator suggests. This commonly held opinion, is true in only a limited way. A central feature of Weber's system is that he does not want to eliminate either the realm of science, or the realm of values. Each is important in its own right but must not interfere with the other. Each represents different interests and has different purposes. In light of this diversity in the face of equality of importance, it is helpful to investigate Weber's ideas of values and science separately.

A. The Importance of Values

Looking at values first of all, one discovers that their presence in human decisions and actions is indispensable. "Today one usually speaks of science as 'free from presuppositions,'" says Weber in his 1918 lecture in Munich. "Is there such a thing?" he continues. The answer: "It depends on what one understands thereby." At least two things must be assumed or presupposed for science, Weber acknowledges. First, all scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid. Science further presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is "worth being known." These words, spoken after years of struggle and reflection on the matter of values, indicate that values of other kinds are
also permissible for Weber.

Speaking of culture for example, Weber suggests that one selects from the "empirical reality" around him the elements that are significant to him because of their "value-relevance." "Only a small part of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us." One's values, therefore, are seen as the possessions of his individual self which determine what are to be the elements of reality that are meaningful and significant to him. "All knowledge of cultural reality, as it may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view." It is simply naive to hold that all reality is equally important to all people and that the facts themselves determine the relative importance for each individual of that which he chooses to study or brush aside. Weber comes out boldly maintaining that each investigator of reality has his own criteria of selection, principles according to which the subject matter is chosen and the "concrete reality" becomes meaningful or meaningless.

As a man who is keenly aware of the erratic course of history, Weber asserts that only a small, finite part of all phenomena may be significant if there is to be any meaning at all.

The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention.

This merely reinforces the contention that it is the investigator who imposes his values on the data of his research; it is not the data which order themselves. One more statement, from the
A chaos of "existential judgments" about countless individual events would be the only result of a serious attempt to analyze reality "without presuppositions." On this point, Carl Baar, whose comments have been used rather extensively in this study, connects the function of the ideal type in theory formulation with the task of values within Weber's methodology. According to him, "values serve as a tool by which 'the meaningless infinity of the world process' could be brought into a manageable framework." Although the attempt to characterize values as that which imposes a framework may be helpful, the metaphor of a tool is perhaps inadequate because the function of a tool is seldom selective, at least this image is difficult to conjure. A more helpful mental comparison would perhaps be that of a person throwing a lasso, which encircles whatever is its target and holds together what it has grasped. For the period of time that the lassoer holds the rope, that which is contained in it occupies his attention -- it is significant to him and he can perform on it the operations which he wishes. All analogies have limited usefulness, but one may perhaps continue with the lasso image to apply to the next point in relation to values as well. How strong is the rope: i.e., how valid are the value judgments with which the investigator approaches "empirical reality?"

It is true that we regard as objectively valuable those innermost elements of the "personality," those highest and most ultimate value-judgments which determine our conduct and give meaning and significance to our life.

Weber recognizes the fervor with which individuals cling to their ultimate ideals and values. During the first World War -- 1917 --
for example, Weber writes about the values that people hold. He mentions the example of an officer who is willing to blow himself up in his bunker rather than surrender himself to the enemy and face the possible humiliation of reneging his country. Weber goes as far as to say that the "objective validity of all empirical knowledge" also derives from subjective presuppositions concerning the "value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us." These evaluative ideas, Weber continues, are "empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity can not be deduced from empirical data as such." The validity of values is "meta-empirical" and it alone gives meaning to the empirical work that is done. In view of the importance which Weber attaches to meaning, this is indeed a significant task. Value judgments can be meaningfully employed only when the validity of values is accepted. Since they cannot be "deduced from empirical data," "to judge the validity of such values is a matter of faith." One now sees that, despite everything, the acceptance of ultimate values comes down to a matter of faith. It is not something that the increasing rationalization of life (about which Weber is worried) can touch without consequence. Back to the lasso analogy: the rope is usable because of the lassoer's confidence that it is strong enough to hold that which is secured by its noose. This confidence is independent from the operation that is carried out on the captive object. Similarly, the faith in the validity of a value is independent of the analysis that is carried out on the elements within the framework of value relevance.
Having established that one's values or presuppositions set conditions for the segment of reality that is significant and also that these ultimate values have a validity of their own, one must still ask how practical life — actions — obtains its legitimacy and impetus. Weber states that empirical science gives no binding norms or ideals which give the individual the "directives" for immediate action. The answer lies in the fact that all decisions are made on the basis of one's own conscience and Weltanschauung, chosen from among the values that are available to him. He chooses his values and presumably acts according to their provisions. Science merely quotes the cost of attaining such ends. "The act of choice itself is his own responsibility." In reference to choices of values in another context, Weber states the much quoted phrase, "It is really a question not only of alternatives between values but of an irreconcilable death-struggle, like that between 'God' and the 'Devil.'" A statement such as this puts the choice between values in an urgent light, tersely calling attention to the results of actions which are done on the basis of these values. Questions about existential action are made no easier just because they are asked on the basis of values which the individual holds. Raymond Aron refers to this choice as an existentialism involving two negations: science doesn't tell men how to live or what is their future. Another writer states that evaluation (and the actions committed on the basis of evaluation) is abandoned to the realm of the irrational -- to the unconscious. . . ."178

In the final analysis, perhaps the most one can say is,
agreeing with Salomon, that man conducts himself on the basis of his set of values, which are tempered by the impersonal forces external to these values. The source of actions beyond that becomes excessively murky.\textsuperscript{179}

Values of life; erotic, political and artistic values; the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount: all these sets of values are in a state of relentless strife with one another -- as deadly as the conflict "between God and devil."\textsuperscript{180}

Despite the continuous struggling in which men in a world of values must engage, the fight continues, for there is really no other choice. Man has eaten of the "fruit of the tree of knowledge" and now knows that there are many choices which he can make. The meaning of his life, therefore, must be created by the struggling choice between ideals that are sacred to all adherents.\textsuperscript{181}

This preliminary look at the position of values in Weber must include an example of the power which he both assumes and desires values to hold. The speech in the winter of 1918, delivered at the University of Munich, is essentially a plea for the infusion of the right kind of values into the scientific task. "For nothing is worthy of man as man \textsuperscript{\textendash}including science\textsuperscript{\textendash} unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion."\textsuperscript{182} He again mentions the "passionate devotion," with which the scientist must pursue his task, in connection with the way ideas come to the scientist.\textsuperscript{183} The task of the social scientist, part of which he claims is to bring "self-clarification and a sense of responsibility" to those who use his results, is said to be "in the service of 'moral' forces."\textsuperscript{184} He also laments the "intellectualization," "rationalization," and "disenchantment"
of the world. "Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life..." he claims. Finally, he concludes his speech by calling for the virtue of integrity. He urges his hearers to "set to work and meet the 'demands of the day'... This... is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very life." These selected instances testify to the intensity with which Weber advocated principles and values in the social scientific process.

B. The Importance of Science

The concomitant development of Weber's view of science must also be considered. Max Weber, after all is said, wishes to be known as a scientist.

The essay which first appeared in the lead issue of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in 1903, contains the seminal concepts of his view of the nature and task of science. He begins by recounting that social science was formed for "practical considerations." The reason for its existence, claims Weber, originally was to attain "value-judgments concerning measures of economic policy." In this stage, sociology was a mere technique. This view eventually passed without the new form having a proper "formulation of the logical distinction between 'existential knowledge,' i.e., knowledge of what 'is,' and 'normative knowledge,' i.e. knowledge of what 'should be.'" This fact, so inimical with Weber's position, exists for several reasons. Early in the science's existence, a natural law theory about the principles of science held that there are immutable laws governing social and economic life. One need merely investigate these laws in a positivistic fashion to
understand social reality. Evolutionary principles, rather than static, immutable ones, followed the natural law period. In this case the "inevitably emergent" is considered normative, but the positivistic attitude remains, with its emphasis on the similarity of social and natural sciences. With the use of historicism, comes "a combination of ethical evolutionism and historical relativism." In this movement all ethical norms lose their formal character and, in an attempt to make them substantive, all the cultural values are incorporated into the ethical sphere.

To the extent that an "ethical" label was given to all possible cultural ideals, the particular autonomy of the ethical imperative was obliterated, without however increasing the "objective" validity of those ideals.

Weber is thus concerned that a continuation of this historicist position will eventually lead to the ethical sphere -- i.e. the sphere of ultimate values -- being eliminated. This is obviously not the kind of science he wishes. In order for science to be strong, there must be an equally strong means of selection of the analyzable data.

Not only is sociology considered to have originated in connection with practical considerations but, more specifically, Weber connects the social sciences with the rise to prominence of the natural sciences. Weber does not approve of this identification for a number of reasons, the most prominent being that the Weltanschauung which gives rise to the present methodology of the natural sciences is a rationalistic one, based on the concept of natural law.
In the natural sciences, the practical evaluative attitude toward what was immediately and technically useful was closely associated from the very first with the hope, taken over as a heritage from antiquity and further elaborated, of attaining a purely "objective" (i.e., independent of all individual contingencies) monistic knowledge of the totality of reality in a conceptual system of metaphysical validity and mathematical form. It was thought that this hope could be realized by the method of generalizing abstraction and the formulation of laws based on empirical analysis.\(^{193}\)

Both the idea of purely objective knowledge and the possibility of metaphysical validity are incongruous with Weber's own formulations.\(^{194}\) In the natural sciences, all reality is thought to be subsumed under universally valid laws which science must discover. Individual events are seen as types of these laws, the analysis of the event itself being non-scientific. The idea emerges that "science can make human behavior directly intelligible with axiomatic evidentness and accordingly reveal its laws."\(^{195}\) At the same time, these laws are supposed to make intelligible the events which themselves make possible the construction of these laws.

Again, this is in contradiction with what Weber wants of the social sciences. In contrast to the establishment of universally valid laws which govern reality, Weber concentrates on the individual event and sets up ideal types of these. The ideal type is an analytical construction but it is not a binding, universal law. One may recall that the ideal type is compared to the use of a complete vacuum in physical experiments. That is, it is not a law, but the demonstration of how an individual event would be carried out given perfect conditions. This, combined with \textit{Verstehen} -- the empathic understanding of the total event or action -- provides the framework for a science
which does not proceed on the basis of universal laws, but of individual events.\textsuperscript{196}

Science is an aspect of rationalization for Weber, according to Raymond Aron.\textsuperscript{197} It may be recalled that rationalization of all reality is the characteristic of modern man, who tries to comprehend reality by subjecting it to laws of thought. Aron, via a footnote, wisely directs his readers to the introduction of Weber's \textit{Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism} for a thorough discussion of the extent and ramifications of rationalization. Here one finds Weber writing, "Only in the West does science exist at a stage of development which we recognize today as valid."\textsuperscript{198} Weber explains how, in almost every conceivable area of the human endeavor to understand his universe, the Western idea of rational understanding constitutes an advance over previous attempts.\textsuperscript{199} The sociological study of human action (including the study of capitalism as a social phenomenon, for example) is, then, one of these ways in which rationalization is exhibited in modern science.

The tasks of this science are varied. In keeping with the rationalization of science noted above, Weber claims at one point that "one of the most important tasks of every science of cultural life is to arrive at a rational understanding of these 'ideas' for which men either really or allegedly struggle."\textsuperscript{200} In doing this, all that science can do legitimately is to bring these value judgments "to the level of explicitness."\textsuperscript{201} This means that the science can do no more in regard to values than to clarify them in rational terms. The further question, as to whether the scientist thinks such values are good or bad,
or whether he thinks someone should be holding these values, is beyond the scope of science. Along with the explication of the values for which men strive, science gives one the "methods of thinking, the tools and the training for thought." Applying these methods leads one to be able to gain clarity about the means he must use to achieve the ends which science has already allowed him to understand more explicitly.

If you take such and such a stand, then, according to scientific experience, you have to use such and such a means in order to carry out your conviction practically. These means, of course may become extremely dubious, whether or not the end seems to be legitimate. At this point, the scientist may pose the question whether or not the end justifies the means, but he must stop short of providing the answer.

Science must also be able to account for certain consequences of action which are not explicitly evident in the understanding of the value, but which are the "by-products of the means used to achieve the end." Social science, then, has a double function: It makes people aware of ultimate values without imposing them. It makes them, furthermore, aware of means which have to be used to attain a given end.

This is a good summary of the general function which Weber wants science to have.

One must realize that such a science is particularly geared to be used rationally and to bring order into that which is already existent. It is not intended to yield a "copy of reality" because there is not such a thing as "objective reality" aside from the meanings that are given to it by the ultimate values which shape the selection of the science's field of research.
In another context Weber restates what he has said about science but in somewhat different words: "Science today is a 'vocation' organized in special disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts."209

The social sciences, like the natural sciences, have "objective validity," according to Weber. However, given his opposition to the social sciences' being governed by "objectively true" or "metaphysical" laws, he may be expected to have a slightly different version of it.210 The only use of the term "objectivity" in the essay which deals with the concept of objectivity is found near the end. (The quotation which follows is lengthy because the objectivity of science is linked tightly with that of values.)

In the empirical social sciences, as we have seen, the possibility of meaningful knowledge of what is essential for us in the infinite richness of events is bound up with the unremitting application of viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which, in the last analysis, are oriented on the basis of evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct, but their validity cannot be deduced from empirical data as such. The "objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is deriveć from these evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the evaluative idea.211

Upon reading this passage, one may correctly conclude that it really offers more evidence about the nature of "evaluative ideas" than about "objectivity." What must be noticed here, however, is the extent to which Weber goes to maintain the distinction between the social sciences and the evaluative viewpoints from which the empirical data of these sciences
In an actual instance of human action there are both external factors, imposed from the environment, and the values with which the individual selects the course of his action as well as he can. In this hypothetical human action both of these elements can be "empirical data" to the social science. Even values, says Weber, are "empirically discoverable and analyzable as elements of meaningful human conduct. . . ." This is where the "'objectivity' of the social sciences" enters the discussion: "their (i.e. the evaluative ideas') validity can not be deduced from empirical data as such." The social sciences may never specify which of the evaluative ideas are valid; this is outside their domain altogether. The sciences must be content to separate the value judgments from the mass of empirical data and acknowledge that they alone give significance and meaning to these data. To this extent, the social sciences are, and must remain, objective.

Weber also describes the type of science which he feels social science to be. It must be an "empirical science of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft)." He goes on to explain that he is concerned to understand the "characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move." He wants to understand both the cultural significance and the historical uniqueness of the individual events which he chooses to analyze. This forces him again to denounce any view which holds that the regular occurrence of certain phenomena constitutes the presence of an immutable law which is seen to hold for all further similar events. He feels that such a view leads to reality being seen
as a system of such laws: "a system of propositions from which reality can be 'deduced.'"\textsuperscript{213} He continues to stress that social science must have its "departure in the real. . . ."\textsuperscript{214} The "real" is not some scientific creation which has its origin in a number of factors or regular occurrences which are assumed as real for purposes of analysis. No, it is the "concrete individually-structured configuration of our cultural life in its universal relationships which are themselves no less individually-structured, and in its development out of other social cultural conditions which themselves are obviously likewise individually structured."\textsuperscript{215} This is perhaps Weber's clearest indication of how concrete, down-to-earth, and real the object of the social sciences must be. At other times he is too concerned about the relation of his science to the values which surround them to become specific about the precise nature or type of science he really desires. One does get the impression at this point that he is trying to be empirical without becoming empiricistic; empiricism would allow the data of reality to structure completely the scientific observation of it.

For, as far as the selection of the object of study is concerned, one need only recall what Weber says about the role of values in the process of sociological analysis. Briefly, this selection includes the realization that social phenomena are studied only from "one-sided viewpoints. . . .according to which they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes." On the same page, Weber states further that "only a finite portion of. . . .reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation. . . ."\textsuperscript{216}
To conclude this investigation of Weber's notion of science, one does well to recognize a few of the passages in which Weber presents the limitations of science. In this connection, it is helpful to realize first that Weber himself admits that there is only a "hair-line" which separates science from faith. This, of course, means, among other things, that the limits of science are not always so clearly defined and a certain amount of danger of a cross-over may be expected from time to time.

As noted in the previous section, which deals with values, science can analyze a situation or event, come to its own conclusions on it, inform the participants in the action of their options, but it cannot help them make a decision about what they should do.218

Raymond Aron commendably summarizes the dilemma which Weber poses. He writes:

If you are passionately interested in the object of your research, you will be neither impartial nor objective; but if you regard religion, for example, as a mere tissue of superstitions, there is danger that you will never have a deep understanding of the religious life of men.219

A "distinction between questions and answers" is what Aron calls Weber's solution to this dilemma. The investigator must understand the questions of the men whom he is analyzing. In fact science must ask precisely those questions and seek to arrive at the same feelings and solutions which the individuals within the situation feel themselves. But, regardless of the strength of identification with the "question," one must not impose an "answer" under any circumstances. That is left to the individual to decide for himself.220
At the outset of his essay on the relation of capitalism and Puritanism, Weber characteristically notes that he will not give "a single word" to the matter of relative values in the topic which he discusses. For through his science he wants to present only the relevant facts of the phenomenon of capitalism and its roots, in this case. Although some of his concluding statements call this into question, at least his intention is clear.

At the conclusion of his essay on objectivity he illustrates how cultural science comes to the point at which it no longer considers important the values that at first it esteems. The analysis of data becomes an end in itself -- "Indeed, it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value ideas in general." After saying this, however, Weber again tempers the force of this differentiation. He mystically concludes by saying that science, in the face of changing cultures, "views the streams of events from the height of thought." Science "follows those stars that alone give meaning and direction to its labors." As he closes with a quotation from Faust, one sees that the "hairline between faith and science" is fine indeed.
V. POLITICAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND PERSONAL INFLUENCES ON WEBER'S SYSTEM

It has become obvious that one of the most important features of Weber's system is the dichotomy between social science as the discipline which analyzes social reality on the one hand, and the values with which social reality and the investigation thereof are infused on the other.

No simple cause can be attributed to the use of Weber's formulation of Wertfreiheit. At the risk of appearing simplistic, one can note T.S. Simey's suggestion that there are two main reasons for it. The first is the political situation of his time. The second is his theoretical heritage. 225

A. Socio-Political Cause for Weber's Theories

As far as the historical necessitation of Wertfreiheit is concerned, there was a great deal of partisanship at the time of Weber. Weber was not adverse to science having an interest in evaluation; rather he detested the special pleading that occurred in the name of science for or against a particular point of view. The social situation at the time of his formative pre-nervous collapse period (before 1897) was dominated by Bismark's political escapades and intrigues. He was infuriated by Bismark's attempts to eliminate any real opposition to his policies by limiting the positions of power which his opponents could hold. He also criticized the trend toward discouraging independent thinking. The State and those in control wanted the people to accept (without question) what they proposed. "Efficiency" and "bureaucracy" came to be the watchwords of this attempt to squelch counter-developments. 226 Later, when
Wilhelm II was in complete control, Weber witnessed similar attempts to inhibit freedom. Weber was particularly incensed by Wilhelm's attempts to regulate academic appointments in his favor within the universities.\textsuperscript{227} In the cases of both of these officials, attempts were made to solicit science's support for particular societal policies. This Weber despised. In fact, the whole idea of leadership became abhorrent to him insofar as it came to mean the imposition of the opinions and values (often with the blessings of science) of the stronger over the weaker. At a time when young people were asking him for advice tantamount to a request for leadership, he replied, "Become that which you are."\textsuperscript{228}

As noted previously in this paper, Weber himself declares that the social sciences first emerge because of "practical considerations" in connection with State economic policies.\textsuperscript{229}

In addition to the fear about science being used indiscreetly by unscrupulous State officials, Weber had more personal reasons for demanding the Wertfreiheit of the social sciences. He himself was deeply devoted to politics and had strong opinions in regard to specific policies.\textsuperscript{230} "How can glowing passion and cool perspective be coerced to live in one soul?" he asks.\textsuperscript{231} Although he doesn't precisely answer this question in his essay (translated into English as "Politics as a Vocation"), his answer goes in the direction of suggesting an absolute categorization of politics along with the values which drive it and the rational, scientific study of these values and actions. He calls for the social scientist to "keep a cool head in the face of the ideals prevailing at the time, even those which
are associated with the throne, and if necessary, to 'swim against the stream.'" He calls the ideas of the Germany of 1914 products of "dilettantes," who wanted more rationalization with a combination of bureaucracy and "interest-group administration." He calls those who tried to justify government's policies by scientific means "fanatical, office-holding patriots," and their activities "a highly objectionable form of poor taste." He wanted no part of such activities, although he certainly did not promote non-activity as an alternative.

Fred Blum describes the tension of Weber's political activity and his demands for objectivity thus:

...Weber was so deeply involved in the political struggles of his country that he had a psychological need to counteract the power of his emotions. His demand for objectivity is of crucial importance in this respect because it created dikes against the onslaught of his own emotions and irrationalities. He who had difficulty "keeping a cool mind" needed to be objective in the midst of his passionate devotion to politics and the call for which he really waited.

Given his own attempts to distinguish his scientific work from his political values, one can better understand his demand for a similar attitude on the part of some of his contemporaries who were in influential positions.

Weber's Position Against Social and Political Rationalization

Aside from these personal and politically-motivated reasons for suggesting Wertfreiheit, Weber had another (what one could call) historical reason. This is the fact that he observed a general trend toward what he called "rationalization" in Western society. Weber says:

The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the "disenchantment of the world."
Although science is a manifestation of this rationalization, it certainly doesn't exhaust what it means. Neither does rationalization mean that the "general conditions under which one lives" are so much more generally and thoroughly known. In fact, Weber suggests that "the savage knows incomparably more about his tools" than the "modern" rider of a streetcar or user of monetary currency knows about these everyday phenomena. What it does mean is that,

One no longer need have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage for whom...mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualization or rationalization means.237

An example of Weber's attitude toward the process of rationalization is found in a speech which appears as an appendix of a book by J.P. Mayer. In a section entitled "Max Weber on Bureaucratization in 1909," he draws analogies between the general cultural drift toward rationalization, the trend toward increased mechanization in production, and bureaucratization at government and corporate levels. He paints the picture of a society consisting of individual human units who fit into a larger pattern as cogs in a wheel. Everything must be rationally organized and ordered and properly monitored by "minor officials." "I only wish to challenge the unquestioning idolization of bureaucracy," he lectured — and one might add "the idolization of rationalization in general as well."238

Detesting this encroachment of rationalization as he does, Weber, nevertheless, accepted its approach as inevitable. If one cannot bear the "fate of the times i.e. rationalization like a man" he should not be in science at all. Instead, "the
arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him."

He can make his "intellectual sacrifice" by entering one of them, believing in an enchanted world once more and letting the process of rationalization take its own course. If, on the other hand, he wants to fight, he must "meet the demands of the day" and seek to render his services as a scientist to the society. "Redemption from the rationalism and intellectualism of science is the fundamental presupposition of living in union with the divine." In fact this is also the leitmotiv of the German youth of his day, says Weber.

Having accepted the inevitability of this rationalization process, what can be done to integrate human freedom into the reality of its presence? First of all, it is important to note that, while Weber decried the excesses of rationalization, he did not want to go back to the past in which the world was enchanted and magical. Thus, inasmuch as scientific analysis frees humanity from some of the "fetters of a traditional pattern of values," it is acceptable. As such, Weber accepted the differentiation of reality into a dichotomy, one side of which is the realm of human freedom and self-responsibility, the other being the objective and rational world of science. One "acts with reservation," Weber claims. This means that he finally does what his values require of him.

Weber's science -- free from value judgments -- is the expression of a disenchanted world void of any meaning in itself. The individual is thus "thrown back upon himself, forced to choose his own values and to set his own goal." As he chooses from among the various values, therefore, the individual can receive the assistance of rationalized views
of the world, but Weber does not wish that science may dictate the results of the choice. Although it is true that, according to Weber, "science is the searchlight in the hands of men," \textsuperscript{247} it remains a light and not a firebrand used as a goad. The purpose of much of Weber's science was to "educate judgment about practical social problems." \textsuperscript{248} This does not mean that it rules to the extent that the individual must accept the conclusions of such education.

Since science has disenchanted the world, people wonder to what they can resort to gain their bearings once more. Weber's answer is to return within oneself to those values which one finds most compelling and act accordingly. If one then finds the need to consult the oracle of science, so be it. But the message from it can only point out the advantages and disadvantages, the logicality and illogicality of the actions. Rationalization and its agents may never become so presumptuous as to suggest the absolute direction in which one must move. Weber needed Wertfreiheit to keep increasing rationalization from taking over a greater segment of peoples' lives and freedom than it already had.

B. \textbf{Theoretical Influences on Max Weber}

Social and political reasons for the postulation of Wertfreiheit are important, but they do not exhaust the rationale for Weber's usage of this concept; there are also theoretical reasons for it. Weber traced the development of the social sciences from an association with natural law theory, evolutionism, and historicism. In each of these cases, he saw inadequacies
in the methods which were employed as a consequence of this association. He deplored what he saw as a positivistic influence in both the natural law and evolutionistic theories. "What was normatively right was identical -- in the former case -- with the immutably existent -- and in the latter -- with the inevitably emergent," he writes. In the case of historicism, he regarded the ethical sphere, or sphere of values, as losing all of its uniqueness by denying it formal status and making it "substantive." In this case, according to Weber, there were no more "formal" requirements, but all "cultural values" became ethical in nature and exercised demands on the individual. These trends in thought threatened to eliminate the sphere of ultimate values as Weber wanted to view them.

Weber was influenced in his development by German idealism which led him to think that judgments of fact can be empirically established while those of value cannot. Therefore, in order to maintain sociology as a science, he wondered whether all one need do is caution the sociologist against the introduction of values into his work. This he found to be impossible because the data with which the sociologist deals involve ideas which people formulate in certain ways in order to influence or shape their societal configurations. This left only the possibility, also derived from idealism, of using the distinction between the sciences of nature and those of culture. This means, of course that the methodology of the natural sciences does not apply directly to the cultural sciences. In other words, he did not accept the positivistic assumption that "contingence on value judgments destroys the scientific status
of social theory."

Weber did not hold that science can be divorced from value judgments. However, as Simey points out, Weber was fighting a two-front war. While it is true that he opposed positivism (or "naturalism" as he also called it), he also had difficulties with idealism. While accepting the distinction between the natural and cultural sciences to which idealism also held, he wanted to provide for the possibility of a systematic and complete analysis of the cultural data. He did not accept the situation in which the natural sphere, because it does not involve the subjective actions of human decisions, is therefore more knowable. He held that the method of analysis of the cultural sciences is different. For this, in fact, he used the method of Verstehen. The subjective nature of the analysis of human processes, however, does not mean, for Weber, that the objectivity of the results of such analysis need be forfeited. This is where he differs significantly from the bulk of idealism. Indeed, as Simey correctly remarks, Weber, therefore, was attempting to establish a via media between, on the one hand, realism (in its positivistic form), and, on the other, philosophical idealism. He accepted both alternatives in that he sought to establish a synthesis between them.

In rejecting each of these alternatives just as they stand, Weber said that neither is adequate. He did not hold to a strict empiricism because such a stance does not do justice to the distinctly human element of social action. Such phenomena as intention and evaluation, for example, are simply off limits for empiricism. Since these human phenomena, along with others, were considered as legitimate and important features of his analysis, he felt that he must account for them. Equally, he
considered idealism to handle existent reality too lightly. Since its emphasis was on the categories of theoretical thought, rather than the actual, concrete reality, he found this inadequate as well. Parsons sees this in a somewhat different, although related manner. He notes that there was, at Weber's time, a tendency to identify the "sciences of human behavior" with the "natural sciences." In so doing, the natural sciences were interpreted in a largely empiricistic fashion in which "the result was to squeeze out all that was distinctive in the traditional and common-sense treatment of human problems, notably the use of subjective categories." When this essentially natural science approach was used in the "sciences of human behavior," the element of logical and "generalized theoretical categories" simply was eliminated to accommodate the method to the situation of a different type of conditions. Now, what Parsons suggests is that Weber took "an enormous step in the direction of bridging the gap between the two types of science, and to make possible the treatment of social material in a systematic scientific manner rather than as an art." In other words, Weber introduced the possibility of treating the "sciences of human behavior" logically without making them identical with the natural sciences in the process. However, a problem remains in Weber's system which causes considerable dismay among those who would otherwise wholeheartedly subscribe to his methodology. Parsons, for example, claims that the process of "bridging the gap" between the natural and human sciences was incomplete with Weber and this has caused difficulties since Weber's time. Simey picks up this theme and states that,
because of this half-way attempt, the field of evaluation, which is not made an object of scientific analysis, is relegated "'to the realm of the irrational -- to the unconscious -- a vast field that could never be more than partially comprehensible.'"260 This escape from the grasp of science of the area of evaluation causes great concern among those who wish to see complete scientific precision and control over the entire range of human activity -- a move which Weber himself would neither make nor condone.

Weber's sociology, however, provides for the analysis, in a more or less scientific fashion, of that which is not considered under the jurisdiction of the natural sciences. His exclusion of "desire, prejudice, whim, and special pleading" make this system palatable -- even attractive -- to many of his scientific posterity.261

One can observe, therefore, that there was a driving force which continually led Weber to separate the social sciences from the values which both the actors and investigators hold in their approach to the data. He accepted idealism's split between nature and culture while not equating their methodologies as in empiricism.

A Personal Reason for the Rejection of Idealism and Positivism While Maintaining the Science-Value Split

There is one additional point which bears mention here, and which contributes to the personal necessity of separating values from science. In actual life Max Weber "wanted to be on the side of the angels in social policy."262 This means that he made attempts to bring about changes which he felt would best serve societal interests and welfare. He called for an
end to the monopolistic control over the rich farm land in eastern Germany and for the aristocratic landlords to realize their responsibility to their workers and their nation. He opposed the importation of Polish migrant workers into Germany to work on farms and in factories. He opposed the oppression of trade unionists and their movements (Syndicalism) in Germany. Although he opposed many of Germany's policies which led up to World War I, he remained an ardent nationalist and volunteered to be recalled into military service in 1914 (at the age of 50) to serve his country. Throughout his life he tiraded against bureaucracy and the increasing role of rationalization in modern society. In other words, as mentioned earlier, it was essential, from his point of view given his theoretical assumptions, to draw the line between his scientific analysis and the values, which he held and also encouraged in others.

A particularly poignant statement about the struggles in which Weber was engaged in his attempts to live an active life and still be a scientist in the modern bloodless sense is found in one of Blum's essays:

What is certain is that the ultimate truth for Max Weber was an eternal struggle of values which he had experienced at the depth of his being because he was both a Christian and a Stoic, and these are the two ultimately irreconcilable world views which Western man has developed.

C. Personal and Cultural Causes for the Direction of Weber's Sociology

In the case of every theoretical system, the personality of the individual who is mainly responsible for its formulation is evident and important. Such is certainly the case with Max Weber and his epistemology and methodology. From the
evidence presented in the introductory section of this paper, certain obvious characteristics appear to set Weber apart from other theorists. The extremely fragile condition of his emotions made him exceptionally sensitive to the political, technological, ideological and confessional changes that occurred during his time. Although Weber's psychic difficulties certainly did not detract from his acumen, the reasons for some of his particular theories undoubtedly derived from these difficulties and the situations which caused them. Almost everyone who writes about Max Weber mentions the struggles through which he went to grow from an over-protected child to a stern, but sensitive professor, lecturer, pundit, and sage. Blum summarizes this situation quite well:

The relationship between Weber's personality, his political thought and actions, and his insistence on objectivity and rationality is more significantly described by saying that Weber was so deeply involved in the political struggles of his country that he had a psychological need to counteract the power of his emotions. His demand for objectivity is of crucial importance in this respect because it created the dikes against the onslaught of his own emotions and irrationalities.264

It would seem undeniable, therefore, that the contours of Weber's system, particularly the science-value split, were affected by the personality and emotional character of the man, Max Weber. While he had his own strong personal views on politics and a host of other matters, he subdued or sublimated them in favor of a completely objective analysis. This resulted in great personal agony for him. Blum suggests that this is the possible cause for the breakdown and depressions rather than vice versa, as has also been held to be the case. Regardless of whether his emotional state drove him to his theoretical
formulations, or whether these formulations caused his disorders, the two are certainly linked.

His intellectual brilliance, his restless nature, and his family's status in German politics combined to force Weber's interest into the political arena. Although he never held political office, he sincerely wanted to do so at various times. Nonetheless, he was a politically influential figure because of the kind and caliber of advice and critique he offered to the politicians of his day.

The life of the politician has many tensions in it, Weber holds. The dichotomy between what is best for the nation as a whole in contrast with the interests of particular groups of people is one such unalterable tension. To make these kinds of decisions more accurate and appropriate, Weber attempted to draw certain important distinctions. He called for the differentiation of what he termed Verantwortungsethik and Gesinnungsethik -- the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction. He also wrote about the nature and types of power, domination, and subordination. He made speeches about politics, including his famous "Politik als Beruf" of 1918. In these ways Weber sought to be relevant. Of course, this also means that some of his appeal for universality was lost in the specificity of the political suggestions for his own time and place. Early in his politically formative years he held to the party in which his father was an official -- the National-Liberal Party of the bourgeois class. However, he never was rigidly partisan. As Marianne Weber writes later, his outstanding political qualities were:
the endeavour to understand the happenings objectively, to grasp them in relation to facts, and to do justice to different motives for political action. While this attempt at being non-partisan sounds laudable, it reflects a deeper problem associated with Weber's particular ideas. He wished to remain unshackled by the chains of party allegiance so that he could freely support another position which more clearly espoused, for example, individual spiritual freedom and responsibility to history. What Weber really wanted was the "'education of the nation to independent political thought and spiritual freedom.' "

One example of the suspension of certain specific desires for the well-being of the entire nation is the advocating of the republican form of government after World War I, although he personally favored a parliamentary monarchy. Again, this may appear to be the maximum that one could do to be objective. Keeping in mind, however, that self-responsibility and individual freedom (and especially its correlate: national interest) were ultimate values for Weber, one can notice that the republican form of government is the only suitable one in these circumstances. For, at this time, popularly elected officials would be the best equipped to obtain the cooperation of the people. This was especially true in light of the fact that the people were not willing to acquiesce easily to the will of Kaiser Wilhelm II at this time. Therefore, not strict objectivity at all, but a very specific interest in particular values was the leading motivation for what he promoted. Clearly, this contradicts the postulate of freedom from values which Weber supposedly championed. His political involvements entangled
him in problems and decisions from which there was no escape unless he made a conscious decision on the basis of values to accept a particular course of action. An example of such a specific choice of a course is outlined by Blum in his 1959 essay on Weber. He demonstrates how Weber took a stand against bureaucracy because it curtails the freedom of the individual to act in a self-motivated and responsible manner. This choice, based on his prior elevation of individual and collective freedom, operates in his suggestions about the form of government for post-war Germany and the type of people who should govern. He chose the entrepreneurial type of person, working on an incentive basis, over the bureaucratic type, who works "by the hour." Furthermore, these entrepreneurs were encouraged to seek credit to build up the supply of capital with which to begin the rebuilding process. The bureaucrats were described in extremely non-complimentary terms which bespeak Weber's dislike of them. Despite this choice for the support of the bourgeois class with its entrepreneurial methods, Weber apparently had no real love for them -- he merely considered them indispensable for the present. In fact he wrote:

We really have no reason to love the gentlemen from heavy industry, and one of the main tasks of democracy is to break their nefarious political influence. . . . But from an economic point of view their abilities are indispensable.

The expediency of such support, of course, does not have the character of a universal appeal. It can be explained only by an appeal to the ultimate values which lay behind the actual decision. This, of course, is the prerogative of the theorist; however, such a decision is then incompatible with a system
which claims to be free from values and which advocates such freedom to all social scientific endeavors. One can turn to Weber's statements regarding the person who wishes to apply the principles of the Gospel to political activity. Weber immediately scolded such a person, reminding him that he must choose "either-or." If he wished to follow the Gospel, he must become like a hermit and abandon all that is worldly. There is no compromise.  

Having taken such a stand in regard to the antithesis of politics and the Christian gospel, one would expect similar precision and delineation with regard to stances within the political area itself. However, here expediency prevailed to the extent that Weber's preference was not executed, but a compromise was devised instead.

Weber, the man, is responsible for many of the peculiarities of his system. Being sensitive to the occurrences around him, he tried to maintain an equilibrium of remoteness from the values, which he chose, and action, which is unavoidably bound to those values.
VI. THE DIALECTICS OF WEBER'S SYSTEM

Rejection of natural or universal law theory lies behind what one may call Weber's dialectics. No individual should be bound by laws which are considered valid by others. Such laws, Weber feels, are an imposition on the freedom of all subsequent investigators of the phenomena that are allegedly under the law. In the place of universals, Weber advocates that each individual must decide for himself by what principles he will live. To do this most consistently, the intelligent individual should use the systematic approach, offered only by science.

Weber's ideas follow a familiar pattern. Briefly, this commonly held view proposes that reality consists of free subjects and manipulatable objects. The former can order the latter. Societal relationships, for example, exist to provide a manner in which specific objects can be organized so that they can be made more predictable. The human subject, seeking his own satisfaction, establishes or accepts the set of values that best suits the achievement of the ends which he considers important. This process is conditioned by certain external physical conditions, by traditions, and by psychological factors. The meaning of reality, according to this view, is not absolute or unchanging; it is created and given by the subject. Objects are also referred to as facts and are regarded as the materials from which an individual's system is constructed.275

The implications of Weber's holding of such a position are that he looks upon values as individual and, at the same time, setting limits for science. This science, in turn, is
used to organize efficiently the details of one's actions.

The impression with which one is left after noticing the depth of the value-science dichotomy in Max Weber, is that Weber is not certain of the direction in which he wants to move. Perhaps this is true in an ultimate sense; forever suspending judgment about which value is ultimate when all values are given equal status becomes a confusing enterprise.

Historically, the result has been that most of Weber's progeny select the value free science side of his theory and appeal to his writings to validate their choice. The force of Weber's value promoting statements is lost to these people. The result has been a purely objective scientific approach to the study of human social and societal behavior.

Perhaps foreseeing the eventuality that values would be eliminated from social science, Weber pleads for science to be infused with a "passionate devotion" to a meaningful calling. He approves the virtue of integrity and also encourages the following of that which drives the scientist's life.\textsuperscript{276}

A constant seesaw struggle between science and value goes on in Weber's theory. A closer analysis of this dialectical character of Weber's work gives one insight into its peculiarities and failures.

A. The Ideal Type in Weber's Dialectics

Just as the natural scientist may use an evacuated bell jar for conducting his experiments, Weber wants the social scientist to be able to use the ideal type "utopia" for his. Purged of all unnecessary components, the ideal type serves as a standard against which the scientist can measure the real situations with which he works.
Weber recommends this device as one which enhances the utility of his value-free sociology. Yet, according to his own description, the ideal type is abstract, unrealistic, utopian, and a one-sided accentuation, to list a few of the terms referring to it. The possibility that no values whatever enter such a formulation are minimal indeed, although Weber may say that the types have "no connection at all with value judgements. . . ."277

The use of the word "ideal" itself indicates that some evaluation has occurred, which eliminates all undesirable elements of the action, event, or situation which is being described. The criterion that is used for such a selection is important because the situations that are compared to this type are, in turn, measured according to their deviation from or conformity to it. To say that no values enter this analysis is incorrect and cannot be consistently argued.

B. Verstehen in Weber's Dialectics

Weber attempts to inaugurate a new method of analyzing human action and social situations by taking up Verstehen. With this method, the scientist would be allowed to put himself theoretically in the place of the object, live through the experiences of the object, without actually going all the way to become that object. Such was the best-of-both-worlds approach which Weber proposed in order to discover the "nature of the situation."278

Thinking back upon the tormented struggles through which he passed as he tried to reconcile the forces within him, Weber longed for a method whereby he could rationally and coolly
accept the viewpoint of another and, with equal rationality, point out the logical consequences of such action. To understand empathically without losing one's balance -- that is the ideal for a social science. Even after devising the method of Verstehen, however, he must still say "the more radically they differ from our own values, . . . the more difficult it is for us to make them understandable by imaginatively participating in them."279

The requirements of a rigorous science: objectivity and remoteness of the subject from the object, possibility of experiment, verifiability, accuracy, the possibility of duplication: all of these existed in Weber's Verstehen.

Weber talks of direct (aktuell) and explanatory (erklärendes) observation. In the former, one has a clear unobstructed, immediate relation with the object. One understands what he observes in a naive, superficial way. In the latter of these two types, the investigator searches for the precise but not obvious reason for the observed action.

This duality is an evidence of the subjective and personal character of this new theoretical device. Since Weber maintains that each person (including the scientist) operates under the canopy of some set of values, how does one suspend such values when he completely understands another's motives, especially in the erklärendes manner? Is he like the proverbial muzzled ox, only in this case unable to warn when he is convinced of inevitable failure? The investigator is powerless to do more than clarify the position of those who request his assistance. While seeking to remove the blinders of bias, he applies
the gag of value freedom. Of what good is the ability to see precisely what is the problem of an individual, a group, or a society, when there is no power to suggest an alternate course?

Thus, Verstehen exquisitely presents the ultimate failure of Weber's entire systems: there is no absolute standard from which to judge the rightness or wrongness of any other system. In Weber's theory, all values are equal in all respects. As a result, there may be technical understanding of a given situation, but a deep knowledge or wisdom about the real reason for the existence of the situation may be totally lacking. Weber's laudable attempt to understand -- even comprehend -- social realities has resulted in nothing but a clearer description of the problem areas. In an indirect way, this approach may also contribute a solution to a problem, but it does not presume to suggest alternatives because it possesses none.

C. Wertfreiheit in Weber's Dialectics

Through Wertfreiheit Weber wants to establish that the social scientist must not distort the data that he researches by approaching them with preconceived ideas and conclusions, thereby trying to fit the data to prove the correctness of these conclusions. Such theoretical acrobatics is precisely what he observed when he saw men like the historian Trietschke promote Bismark's policies before his university students. In a more personal way, Weber grew up hearing his own father justify all of his demands by appeals to the knowledge which he possessed. Being against such distortions, he calls for a separation of fact and opinion.

He insists, however, on recognition of the limitations
of analysis. Meaning, he says, is never found through analysis, but it is created by the individual, the investigator, or the epoch in which it occurs. And, as the individual is allowed to choose and decide freely for himself, without the dictates of custom or nature, he can operate on the basis of his values. Through action, these values are transformed into goals and purposes. In addition, according to his wife, Weber held that "spiritual freedom" and "conscience" were the highest ideals which man possesses and they were the criteria by which he judged the soundness and legitimacy of political systems.

On the other hand, Weber says:

All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once it is oriented towards a given subject matter through particular settings of problems and has established its methodological principles, will consider the analysis of data as an end in itself. It will discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general. And it is well that should be so.

This quotation summarizes Weber's other side, i.e. his value freedom in its highest degree. In such a declaration, one is encouraged to isolate the facts of a situation from their relations to the values which give them meaning and which provide a context for their existence. It is this theme which is picked up in the modern insistence that the social scientist should make no pronouncements about everyday affairs. In such situations, only comments about the logicality or illogicality of a situation are allowed.

But the opposite tendency in Weber is always close at hand: "An attitude of moral indifference has no connections with
scientific 'objectivity." What he says in this quotation is that one cannot claim to be scientifically objective merely by simultaneously claiming that he is indifferent to all values. This is due to the fact that all action must be meaningful (by definition). In order for this meaningful action to be understood, an equally meaningful interpretation must be offered. For social science to be worthwhile, the possibility must exist to express the consequences of a particular course of action. It is humanly impossible to do this without forming some kind of opinion about its value or validity, measured according to the investigator's own standards. Some value judging inevitably occurs. What Weber wishes to accomplish is to accept these values as real, and to prevent them from obscuring an accurate analysis of reality.

The reader of Weber's methodological works is thus confronted with a perplexing oscillation: from a denial of value judgments to a guarded recognition of their existence. This tension was never resolved. Max Weber, himself so much an individualist, wants to preserve both freedom and dignity for humanity. This means that he cannot devise a system which is rigid or deterministic. He obviously feels, however, that individualism is misplaced when it biases social science. "But this required him to perform a dangerous balancing feat." One always has the lingering suspicion that "objectivity" could never allow one to come up with a social scientific proof for the existence of bureaucracy, for example. There is the unmistakeable impression that Weber's own personal feelings about issues are the only interpretations possible if one uses the "value free scientific
method." Such a situation, of course, makes a sham of the entire attempt at Wertfreiheit.

D. The Implications of Weber's Dialectics

People do not act except on the basis of some set of commitments around which they order their activities. To deny this, is to deny the social aspect of societal reality. Weber wants to acknowledge this, but he refuses to admit the absolute impossibility of a completely value free science. This would be a surrender to all of the subjective forces which are a great part of his personality, his academic milieu, his colleagues, and his nation's political leaders. Such would be what he once called an "intellectual sacrifice."287

When the scientist decides to take a stand on a particular issue, he does so outside of his role as a scientist. There are no principles to guide him; this stance is an irrational acceptance of what the person feels to be right. He can get no direct guidance (nor directive) from social science.

Most commentators allow Weber to commit this error, only reminding their readers that he is inconsistent. Some seek to redeem the good features and say that at least he asks the "right questions."288

Such is not the extent or content of the critique of this paper. It needs to be said here that Weber's refusal to acknowledge his starting point and to wrestle with its dialectical nature is his most serious omission. Deviously, he acknowledges so-called values but wishes to eliminate the real power that they exert. Yet, Weber does not deny the values of "intellectual integrity," the validity of science, and the universality of logic. Despite his protests, the acceptance of such propositions
is the way in which his system exhibits an admission of values similar to the values of any other world view. Weber's system then must be displayed in the marketplace of values to be tested with all of the other antagonistic, irreconcilable views of reality. The delusive angle of Weber's Wertfreiheit, which many theorists and social scientists since him have accepted unquestioningly, is the statement that anyone can use this method without compromising his own position. The deception occurs in the subtle manner in which a specific point of view -- to some, a very common and appealing one -- is proclaimed as the only one which is free from subjective, specific, and personal points of view.

The lack of explication of a specific starting point admittedly means that Weber's Verstehende Soziologie, with its principle of Wertfreiheit can be construed as compatible with many world views. What the users fail to realize is that the very use of Wertfreiheit may basically oppose the meaning system in which they root themselves.
A. Irrationalism Established

When most writers comment on Weber's faults, they somewhat disdainfully mention that Weber ultimately breaks his pattern of reasoned objectivity and vaults into an insufficiently proved argument for the ultimacy of values -- and specific ones, at that! They refer to his irrationalism as a regrettable mistake in his system. However, the thesis of this paper is that this irrationalism is an essential and integral part of his theory. It is not an inconsistency.

Weber deliberately avoids absolutizing rationality. Instead, he advocates acts of individual, autonomous choice which transcend the realm of reason. His irrationalism is a way of putting reason in what he considers to be its correct place. Precisely this awareness of the supra-rational character of reality lends special pathos to his attempts to establish a value free sociology nonetheless.

Weber's irrationalism is the primary cause of the deep split between science and values. Within a system which suggests meaning, choice, freedom, and values as the most pervasive characteristics of human existence, science will necessarily have to play a different role than in rationalism.

. . . recognition of the fundamental irrationality in the world in which we are living is an indispensable and often neglected link in the explanation of Weber's thought. 289

The climax of this irrationality is Weber's emphasis on the absolute conflict among the various ultimate value systems. Since there is no hope of rapprochement among these systems,
those holding dissimilar positions can only act accordingly, despite the inevitable clashes which follow. For this reason, Weber proposes the value free science so that agreement may be reached on the consistency within each system, if not among them. The obvious failure of this proposal is that one who holds a particular set of values need not necessarily accept science's statement concerning the internal consistency of an opposing system.

Another way of phrasing the problem of the alienation between science and values is to say that the latter have "been relegated to the limbo or the irrational, where they have remained by and large ever since." 290

At this point, a schematic presentation of the polar tension, which exists in Weber's irrational philosophy and sociology, may be beneficial toward increasing clarity.

ON THE ONE HAND. . .  

1. Science must be value free to be objective (and to avoid the excesses of idealism).
2. To be a science, sociology must be value free.
3. Wertfreiheit declares value decisions beyond the competence of science (to avoid naturalism).
4. The choice of a view of life (value system) is facilitated by science, which is a form of rationalization.
5. The freedom of individual choice is guaranteed by making science value free, preventing the legimation of one system and the exclusion of others.

ON THE OTHER. . .

1. Science must deal with matters of value (to avoid naturalism and positivism).
2. Sociology is a special science of understanding.
3. Wertfreiheit declares that all values have equal status (to avoid rationalism).
4. The choice itself (of a view of life) is beyond reason.
5. The individual is burdened with the necessity of making a choice, and making it alone.
Given the ambivalent status and legitimacy of values in Weber, his wife's testimony is not surprising.

He judged political events by a criterion which he followed consistently throughout his life; spiritual freedom was the highest good for him. Even to political power interests it was not to be sacrificed; . . . conscience to him was supreme. . . .

Having grown up in the tradition of liberal politics, and having surpassed the narrow definition of earlier liberalism, Weber had a lofty ideal of freedom. One would expect him to transport this ideal into the applications of his social policies. The "irrationalism" label is appropriate insofar as there is no provision for an ideal such as freedom within Weber's methodology. This freedom motif is prominent in Weber, especially in connection with the individual person coming to "self-realization and the constant attunement of his inner being to certain ultimate values and life meanings. . . ." Freedom is not simply an incidental concept for him, but operates throughout his theory. Therefore, neither is this element of his theory a mistake. Rather, it is an intended inclusion, calculated to vouchsafe "human dignity" in his social science.

Nowhere does one see more of the pathos and deep complexity of life as Weber saw it than in the passage about the antagonism of values in "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality.'" Here we are forcefully told that one chooses his own fate by the decisions he makes in regard to the values before him. But, as Salomon notices, "The question of why man proves true to himself, why these decisions between conflicting values are so important, remain obscure, and Weber veils the question in silence."
Weber faced a great dilemma from within his own experience; from his childhood and through maturity, he realized the importance for concrete action of convictions, starting points, allegiances -- i.e., values. At the same time, he wanted to understand people's actions by analysis, verstehen, careful observation, taking all factors into account -- i.e., science. Anticipating the possibility of simple human values losing their significance before the onslaught of science and rationality, Weber reacted. He wished "'to preserve the dignity of individual choice in a world of conflicting values.'"\(^\text{295}\) Therefore, in order to maintain what he believed to be true humanity, Weber created this abstract and separate world of values. This realm was necessary, because the real world does not correspond to Weber's methodological picture of it. Although the addition of a second realm did not eliminate this problem, it made it less jarring and its effects more palatable.

B. Irrationalism's Consequences in Weberian Sociology

"Werde der Du bist -- Become that which you are," declared Weber as he critiqued historian Roscher.\(^\text{296}\) This is the way that Weber looked upon his role as a leader to the students in his classroom and to others who questioned him for scientific pronouncements. This is the position at which Weber or the Weberian scholar must eventually arrive. Certainly he can acknowledge the existence of a multitude of values but the world of science is a disenchanted one and from it can come no enchanting or enchanted directives. Each person is alone with his values, standing before the blankness of his future.\(^\text{297}\)

Weber's "dangerous balancing feat" between spiritual freedom
and an objective science was transferred to contemporaries and future generations of social scientists. The result for the preponderance of social theorists has been an avoidance of practical social issues. Although the very existence of human beings may be threatened, these descendants of Weber, the scientist, will not take positive action. Suspended judgments are the farthest point which these men reach. The result is the endless perfection of methods of testing, sampling, polling, and computing. Little societal amelioration has occurred. The realm of value judgments and suggestions remains off limits -- irrational -- to such a scientist.

Weberian sociology has been accepted and misunderstood by many social scientists since his time. They have failed to notice the struggle which he underwent to maintain the integrity of both science and values. Despite his valiance, the balance which Weber achieved was disturbed by developments which derived from within his own system.

C. The "Polytheism of Values": Weber's Demon

Universal or general laws which are binding on all individuals in society are denied by Weber. In his historical works, notably in the various sections of his Religionssoziologie, Weber engages in a great deal of discussion about the immediate factors which explain beliefs and societal action. However, no explanation is given for the ultimate regularity in reality to which all of these religious systems refer in their unique ways. Emphasis always falls on the differences of these systems, rather than on their overwhelming similarities. Weber points out that there is
an infinite amount of data available to all people, but they only select what appeals to them on the basis of their values. "Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest, and it alone is significant to us," Weber comments.299

Society is what society has come to be, as far as Weber is concerned. Weber proves that there are historical reasons for the various forms of society, but he acknowledges no conditions for existence beyond the historical ones.

Although there is no universal law order in Weber's view of reality, values are still upheld since they are the only factors which lend dignity to human existence. No questions are asked about the legitimacy of such values because all values are equal. In reference to this individual character of the values which function as "laws" for specific actions, Weber writes:

As far back as we may go into the grey mist of the far-off past, the reality to which the laws apply always remains equally individual and equally undeducible from laws.300

Values are necessary in Weber's system to provide meaning and to compensate for a more ultimate order which offers a framework within which actions make sense. One sees here the operation of Weber's dialectic: no universally valid law, but values which function in the position of law; yet the values are law only for the individual who adopts them as his own.

In his observations on the place of value in modern theorizing, James H. Olthuis writes:

Value has a ring of normativity and at the same time it echoes all sorts of subjective associations.301

This comment helps to explain the ambivalence and dialectic which
is part of Weber's use of values: an attempt to acknowledge and appreciate the existence of extra-rational reality without surrendering his ambition of a Wertfrei, objective science.

Anticipating the accusation of relativism in his system, Weber claims that anyone who interprets him to imply that values are relative, is guilty of the "crudest misunderstanding." However, the relativity which he protests refers to a wavering from or compromise of one's position in the event of a difficult situation or choice. Weber wants to encourage the individual to retain and defend his own set of values. He does not condone aimless floating among various ultimate values, choosing the best of each absolute world. As noted earlier in this study, Weber is indeed anti-relativistic and anti-historicistic in this sense.

However, our concern is that Weber emphatically denies the existence of an ultimate law-word by which each individual can test his values. Weber endorses a "polytheism of values" which enthrones every individual human subject as the autonomous ultimate lawgiver. Weber's irrational individualism provides him with no ultimate criterion to judge among a variety of values: each set of values is equally as prominent as all others. Nevertheless, he sincerely wants to be in "the service of moral forces," so that humanity need not live in the ignorance of inconsistent and incarcerating systems of value. His system provides him with the wrenching tension of holding to certain personal opinions, while fearing to suggest their implementation to other people, who may hold alternate beliefs. Since he can appeal to no higher authority than the course of historical development to justify his own set of values, he is properly
hesitant to impose them on another person or a divergent system.

Both the segment of Max Weber's system devised before his mental collapse and that portion revised after this experience comprise a desire to preserve the human responsibility and dignity which result from freedom. In short, he engaged in a quest for meaning.

If Weber had been able to search out and find that non-arbitrary meaning of reality which gives order and stability to life, he would not have had to bear the impossible burden of creating meaning. If this had been the case, it would not have been necessary for him to live between two ultimately and irresolvably opposite poles: a passion for individual meaning and a value free, objective science. Then he would have been delivered from the threatening anarchy of a "polytheism of values." In principle he would have been free to develop a sociology of understanding which is neither dogmatic nor "value free."
I. BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION


2 Unless otherwise noted, the historical references are substantiated in the well documented survey in Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, 1958), pp. 3-74. (Hereafter indicated as Essays.)


5 Ibid.

6 Mitzman, Iron Cage, pp. 51-53.

7 Ibid.


9 Mitzman, Iron Cage, p. 291.

10 Ibid., p. 136.

11 Ibid., p. 140.

12 Ibid., p. 152.

13 Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," Methodology, p. 50. (Hereafter referred to as "'Objectivity,'" Methodology.)
16 Ibid. About Stefan George, Ernst Troeltsch wrote: "The value system which he embodies is modeled in large on Plato, Dante and Nietzsche, is based on modern historicism and not . . . on nationalism. Rather he excises everything liberal, democratic, socialist, nationalist and individualist with merciless severity." (Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Revolution in der Wissenschaft," Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. XLV, 1921, No. 4, p. 72, quoted in Mitzman, Iron Cage, pp. 263-264.)


II. WEBER'S SOCIOLOGY

Raymond Aron notes this tendency toward the analysis of values in Max Weber when he remarks, "Weberian science is defined, therefore, by an effort to understand and explain the values men have believed in, to explain and understand the works produced by men." (Aron, Main Currents, p. 228). Salomon adds that science searches the ideals and ultimate norms which one holds so that he can live in "more conscious attunement with them." (Salomon, "Max Weber's Methodology," Social Research, p. 167.)


Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 72.

Ibid., p. 74.

Ibid., p. 111.

Ibid., p. 110.

Ibid., p. 54.


In line with Salomon's summary of the Weberian position of science, compare what Weber himself said in his famous speech of 1918, "Science as a Vocation." (I will summarize his comments.) Science can contribute to the practical life in three ways: First it can aid in calculating external objects as well as men's own activities. Secondly, it can offer methods of thinking and training for thought. In the third and most unique way, science can offer clarity to one who is faced with a multitude of values from which to choose. In short, one can be confronted with the means necessary to obtain a given end. (Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," Gerth and Mills, eds., Essays, pp. 151-152.)


Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 54.

Ibid., p. 51.


Gerth and Mills, eds. Essays, p. 55.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid.


Max Weber was born the very year in which the International Working Men's Association -- the "First International" was formed.


Ibid., p. 93.


Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" *Methodology*, p. 76.

Ibid.


Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" *Methodology*, p. 52. (underlining mine.)
Closely allied with the concept of "meaning" (Sinn) is "significance" (bedeutung). In fact, the two terms are used synonymously in many cases (e.g. pp. 55, 80, 81 in Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology which are pp. 152, 180, 181 in Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen, 1922).

However, it is used in a more specific sense, and could possibly be referred to as selective meaning. That which is important on the basis of one's values, that which has meaning, that which points to the value-conditioned zone, is significant. Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to their connection with our values. (Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 76; Max Weber, Wissenschaftslehre, p. 175.)


Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 53.


Ibid., p. 20.


Abel, "Operation," p. 211.

Ibid., p. 212.

Weber resumed his studies at the University of Berlin in 1884, two years after Dilthey began his twenty three year professorship there. Weber also taught for three years at the University of Berlin (1891-1894) during Dilthey's tenure there. Previous to that, of course, Dilthey had been the guest at Weber's parent's home in Berlin. (cf. Mitzman, Iron Cage, p. 20.)
This distinction, derives from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, in which nature and culture are separated; see Parsons, ed. "Introduction," Theory, p. 8.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 96.

Ibid., p. 90; Max Weber, Wissenschaftslehre, p. 504.


Ibid., p. 91.

Ibid., p. 93.

Ibid., p. 90.

Ibid., p. 95.

Ibid., p. 101.

Ibid., pp. 103-104; Max Weber, Wissenschaftslehre, p. 516.


Ibid., p. 98.


Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 99 and 109.


Nefzger, "The Ideal Type," p. 169.

Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 90.

Ibid.; emphases in the original.

Ibid., p. 93.

Ibid., p. 101.

Ibid., p. 102.

Examples of ideal type are found throughout Weber's writings. Selecting from one which has had the greatest impact in North America, one could find such examples in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, by Max Weber. On page 71 of this work, Weber mentions "The ideal type of capitalistic entrepreneur . . . ." In a footnote to this (p. 200), Weber warns his readers that he is not referring to the "empirical average type," but to "the type of entrepreneur (businessman) whom we are making the object of our study."

The second example from this work is taken from a section in which Weber is discussing the "psychological sanctions" of the beliefs and practices of certain religions. About this he comments, "We can of course only proceed by presenting these religious ideas in the artificial simplicity of ideal types, as they could at best but seldom be found in history." (pp. 97-98.)
III. WERTFREIHEIT


130 Ibid., p. 11.

131 Ibid.


133Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, p. 3.

134 Ibid., p. 12.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.


139 Ibid., p. 13.

140 Ibid., p. 14.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.
He compares the choice between absolutes to that between God and the Devil. Further in the discussion, he speaks of the "fruit of the tree of knowledge" when he talks about the relevance of the choices for one's daily existence. In this regard he says, "The fruit of the tree of knowledge... consists in the insight that every single important activity and indirectly life as a whole... is a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul... chooses its own fate, that is the meaning of its activity and existence." (Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, p. 18.) Strong language like this is reserved for what seems to be closest to Weber's own heart.


Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, p. 18.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 20.


Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, p. 20.

Ibid., pp. 20-21.

Ibid., p. 22.


Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, pp. 24-25.

Ibid., p. 24.

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid., p. 47.

IV. THE VALUE-SCIENCE POLARITY


163 Ibid.
164 Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 76.
165 Ibid., p. 81.
166 Ibid., p. 82.
167 Ibid., p. 78.
168 Ibid.
170 Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 55.
171 Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, p. 25.
172 Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 110.
173 Ibid., p. 111.
174 Ibid., p. 55.
175 Ibid., p. 53.
176 Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, p. 17.
177 Raymond Aron, Main Currents, pp. 220 and 233.
180 Ibid., p. 165.
181 Max Weber, "'Ethical Neutrality,'" Methodology, p. 18; Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 57.
183 Ibid., p. 136.
184 Ibid., pp. 147 and 152.
185 Ibid., p. 155.
186 Ibid., p. 156.
188 ibid.
189 ibid., p. 52.
190 ibid.
191 ibid.
192 ibid., p. 85.
193 ibid.

195 ibid., p. 86.
197 Aron, Main Currents, p. 223.

199 The list of areas in which modern science with its rationalism has excelled includes: mathematics, geometry, physics, natural science, chemistry, historical studies, political thought, jurisprudence, music, architecture, the rise of the academic institution, the emergence of the modern state and economic systems, the appearance of capitalism. (Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic, pp. 13-24.) In the course of this discussion, Weber writes,

It is hence our first concern to work out and explain genetically the special peculiarity of Occidental rationalism and within this field that of the modern Occidental form. (Ibid., p. 26.)

200 Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 54.
201 ibid.
202 ibid.
204 ibid., p. 151.
Salomon has a similar synopsis:

first, the appropriateness of the means in relation to a given end; second the adequacy of the ends in relation to a given concatenation of working interrelationships; and finally, the unintended consequences and by-products of every human action. (Salomon, "Max Weber's Methodology," Social Research, p. 167.)


Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 111.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., pp. 72-73.

Ibid., p. 74.

Ibid.

Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 74.

Ibid., p. 101.


Aron, Main Currents, p. 232.

Ibid.


After characterizing the spirit of Calvinistic Protestantism (or religious asceticism) as confined to an iron cage, he claims that capitalism eventually emerges from it as a product. Although Calvinism escapes from the cage, capitalism lingers. He wonders who or what force will inhabit the cage next. At this point he begins to introduce some of his own feelings into the analysis. He obviously casts himself in favor of the "new prophets" rather than "mechanized petrification." Above all, his epitaph for this age of capitalists could hardly be called neutral: "'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of culture never before achieved.'" (Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic, pp. 181 and 182.)
V. POLITICAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND PERSONAL INFLUENCES ON WEBER'S SYSTEM

Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 112.

Ibid.


Ibid.: Weber's dislike for Wilhelm and his policies was not restricted to this single instance. He was convinced that strong opposition was needed to keep Germany strong and her people free. For this reason, Weber advocated the freedom of science from imposition. (q.v. Fred H. Blum, "Max Weber: The Man of Politics and the Man Dedicated to Objectivity and Rationality," Ethics, Vol. 70, No. 1, Oct., 1959, pp. 6-7.)

Blum, "Postulate," p. 51; Blum obtains this phrase from an essay written against the economist Roscher, published in Wissenschaftslehre, p. 38.

Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 51.

Blum, "Max Weber: The Man of Politics," passim; This paper frequently has mentioned the political situation at the time of Weber. However a brief sketch of some additional particularities will assist one in seeing the necessity for some of Weber's concrete suggestions.

Germany at the time of Weber's birth in 1864 was composed of a number of small kingdoms with their own separate autonomies. They were loosely consolidated in a Zollverein for trade purposes, but there was little political unity. After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, however, the German states became federated under the leadership of Prussia, the most powerful of the states.

In this new situation, there were three distinct classes: the Prussian aristocracy (Junkers), the bourgeoisie (the rising middle class formed largely on the basis of industrial ownership), and the working class (formed as more and more people came into the cities to work in industry).

Each of these segments, divided from the others by privilege and economic status, formed its own political affiliations. The aristocratic Junkers formed the Conservative and Free-Conservative Parties and supported Bismark heavily. Since they also retained their land ownership, they forced policies protecting German food production from cheaper products elsewhere. They maintained their position by supporting an unjust voting system, calculated at giving them an unfair representation advantage.

The bourgeois class was relatively new to the German scene since the industrial revolution was late in coming. As in the rest of Europe and in England, this middle class held to liberal ideals. This class supported the Progressive Party as its left wing and the National-Liberal Party as its right. The
Center Party also was formed from this class, but its membership was predominantly Catholic. Before Max Weber became politically active himself, the National-Liberal Party suffered a split between right and left factions. Part of the Party's membership supported the Junker's and Bismark's policies against both the workers' Social Democratic Party and the Catholics. Another segment opposed this attempt to cast the party into this negative direction. Still a third group within the party failed to become involved in this issue to a great extent; this group remained loyal to the party and maintained it despite the weakening which occurred. The right faction joined the Free Conservatives, while the left group united with the Progressive Party. Amidst all of this controversy, Max Weber's father -- Max Weber Sr. -- maintained his position as deputy in the National-Liberal Party. He refused to jeopardize this position by taking a stand on the issues. This spineless attitude, chosen to retain a functionary position within the party's bureaucracy, despite harmful consequences, greatly angered Weber.

The working class, meanwhile, also constructed a political extension. In 1875, the Social Democratic Party was formed as a way to give political expression to the numerous workers, who were crowding into the manufacturing districts as part of the new surge of industrialization in Germany. In 1878, the group was outlawed by the Junker-controlled government, and supported by opportunistic members of the bourgeoisie. By 1889, this group had become decidedly Marxist and joined with the "Second International" movement, which sought to consolidate the position of workers throughout the world. The ban against the Social Democrats was repealed in 1891 when the aristocracy was losing political power and realized that it could no longer realistically control the working classes in this way. (The entire summary of the political activity of the time is taken from Blum, "Max Weber: Man of Politics," pp. 1-3.)

Gross disparities among the various classes disturbed Weber immensely. At one time, he considered joining the proletariat in its struggle against the combined political arrangement of bourgeois, capitalist ownership of industry and the aristocrats' control of the land. (Gerth and Mills, eds. Essays, p. 41.)

There was political collusion and cooperation to prevent cheaper imports from abroad by levying tariffs and forcing the peasants from their lands by hiring in cheap Polish laborers. In the middle of this, politicians called upon the newly emerging social sciences for justification and pardon for their nefarious activities. (References to Weber's dislike of science being called in by the State are found in Marianne Weber, Max Weber, ein Lebensbild, p. 330 and Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, p. 407 quoted in Blum, "Postulate," p. 51.) In response, Weber called for objectivity. The scientist must not choose sides, but must "keep a cool head" to offer professional counsel, whether or not it is solicited. By way of stressing the limitations of what the social scientist is able to offer the practical politician, although Weber himself had many political ideals, he says:
We know no ideals which can be demonstrated in scientific terms. To be sure, it is only the more arduous a task to draw than from one's own breast in a period of culture which is so subjective. But we have no fool's paradise and no streets of gold to offer, either in this world or the next, either in thought or in action; and it is a stigma of our dignity as men that the peace of our souls shall never be as great as the place of him who dreams of such a paradise. (Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, Tübingen, 1924), p. 420 quoted in Salomon, "Max Weber's Methodology," p. 165.)

Weber wishes, therefore, to stress the distance between political zealotry and the scientific attitude which the analyst must assume if he wishes to remain true to his calling. Again, the observation must be made that the position which Weber takes is extremely tainted by the immediate historical situation which he faced. Any attempt to universalize from this experience must be ready to face the accusation of using an anachronism in the assessment of the problems of another era.


232Max Weber, "'Objectivity, Methodology, p. 47.

233Ibid.

234Blum, "Max Weber: The Man of Politics," p. 15

235A significant distinction can be mentioned here. Weber's call for values to be separated from national politics, for example, was an attempt to keep values out of one's pursuit of science. The discussion about rationalization, while also tending toward an endorsement of Wertfreiheit, is more oriented toward the freedom of one's own values from the encroachment of science. This is an important distinction to keep in mind throughout the discussion.


237Ibid., p. 139.


240Ibid., pp. 155-156.

241Ibid., p. 142.

242Ibid.

Blum, "Postulate," p. 49.


Blum, "Postulate," p. 50.

Ibid., p. 52.

Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 50

Ibid., pp. 51-52, sic.

Ibid., p. 52.


Blum, "Postulate," p. 52.


Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Ibid., p. 11.


Ibid., p. 51.


Ibid., p. 15.

Ibid., p. 17.


VI. THE DIALECTICS OF WEBER'S SYSTEM


277 Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 98.


280 Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 57.


283 Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 112.

284 Ibid., p. 60.
Weber himself suggests that:

Every meaningful value-judgment about someone else's aspirations must be a criticism from the standpoint of one's own Weltanschauung; it must be a struggle against another's ideals from the standpoint of one's own. (Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 60).

The point which is most difficult to prove is whether or not value judging is indeed occurring in a given situation. Weber insists that one can give direction without giving advice. This is not as unambiguous as it initially appears. For even Weber admits to the universal existence of values.


e.g. Simey, "Theory of Value," p. 55.

VII. WEBER'S IRRATIONALISM

Blum, "Postulate," p. 48; underlining mine.


Max Weber, Methodology, pp. 18-19.


Raymond Aron refers to this as "a philosophy which at the time was not yet known as existential or existentialist, but which in fact is so." (Main Currents, p. 220). Albert Salomon also calls the philosophy, which spawned Weber's sociology, existential (Max Weber's Methodology," p. 153).


Max Weber, "'Objectivity,'" Methodology, p. 76.

Ibid., p. 73.
In fact, a philosophy has been and continues to be developed which promises the establishment of such a sociology. It is based on the confession that the Lord God, as revealed in the Old and New Testament Scriptures of the Bible, is the Creator and Maintainer of all that exists.

Fundamental to this Philosophy of the Law Idea, as it is called, is the recognition that all reality is coherently created according to the Word of God. All of reality functions according to lawful regularities which are as dependable as the non-arbitrary Word which is given to order and maintain them. There is no arbitrariness, then, in the ordering of reality because all aspects thereof are answerable to and held in place by the Word of God which is ultimate and unalterable.


Works of more immediate benefit include:

Elaine Botha, Sosio-Kulturele Metavrae (Amsterdam, 1971);
B.G. Breems, "The Modality of Intercourse in Distinction from Societal Structures," Systematic Philosophy Paper (Toronto, 1975);
This paper is my attempt to expound the sociology of the Philosophy of the Law Idea. It contains a survey of Dooyeweerd's theory of the law spheres, and theory of the structures of individuality. Further, the complementary pair of social philosophy and positive sociology are investigated and endorsed as a departure from traditional sociology. The main thesis of the paper is a suggestion to elaborate a science of the social aspect of human behavior.


The most recent and complete summary of this philosophy is:
L. Kalsbeek, Contours of a Christian Philosophy, Bernard and Josina Zylstra, eds. (Toronto, 1975); with complete bibliography on the Philosophy of the Law Idea.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


