Anaximander and the Relation Between Myth
and Philosophy in the Sixth Century B.C.

A thesis submitted to
the faculty of the Institute for Christian Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
Master of Philosophy

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Toronto, Ontario

1979
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Preface

This paper is a study of the pre-Socratic, Milesian philosopher Anaximander, in light of the question concerning the rise of philosophy and its relation to myth in the sixth century B.C. We are restricting our inquiry to Anaximander to make our consideration of the myth/philosophy relation more manageable. Thus we will assume that Anaximander's thought is indicative of the general status of this relationship in his time and milieu. We chose Anaximander also because of the great diversity of interpretations of his thought in current pre-Socratic scholarship. Differences in approach to Anaximander reflect differences concerning the nature of pre-Socratic thought in general. Differences with regard to the pre-Socratics in turn reflect ultimate assumptions as to the nature of philosophy and the historical circumstances in which it arose. Therefore, a considerable part of our study will concern itself with the major Anaximander-interpretations in the literature, their key assumptions and their relationships to existing traditions in pre-Socratic research. This part of the study will be carried out in preparation for our own interpretation of Anaximander and the relation between myth and philosophy visible in his thought. The latter will be conducted in dialogue with the other interpretations and with a conscious awareness of its own hermeneutical assumptions.

The project owes much to the supervision of Dr. Albert Wolters whose help in planning, translation and organization was greatly appreciated.
Part One: Prolegomena

A. Current Status of the Anaximander Question

A useful introduction into contemporary Anaximander scholarship is Cl. Ramnoux's 1954 article entitled "Sur quelques interprétations modernes de la pensée d'Anaximandre." This article summarizes, and to some extent, interprets the history of modern views concerning this sixth century Milesian. Ramnoux examines the exegeses of such notables as Nietzsche, Burnet, Guthrie, Cornford, Jaeger and Heidegger. He demonstrates that each of these interpretations offers a picture of pre-Socratic thought and of Anaximander's place in its dim beginnings. But each interpreter views this chapter in the history of philosophy from a unique vantage point, giving his own judgement as to the significance of Anaximander's work. That being the case, these interpretations conflict at many points, as Ramnoux clearly shows. It is not surprising that an author whose world is nearly lost to us, and whose work survives in a two-sentence fragment and a handful of testimonia, should be the subject of so much scholarly debate. As Ramnoux points out concerning the paucity of evidence, "C'est peu, mais ce peu a déchaîné l'imagination de nos contemporains." That is to say, it is precisely our lack of knowledge that has sparked the interest of philologists, and of historians of religion, science and philosophy. If we possessed an entire text of Anaximander there would be little to argue about. Debates in the historiography of philosophy are most lively when they concern the boundary between knowledge and conjecture. But what we know for sure about Anaximander is so little that debaters cannot agree as to the fundamental questions Anaximander entertained. And the amount of reconstruction necessary for any Anaximander interpretation is
so high that the interpreter must be prepared to exercise his or her philosophical imagination. The combination of this skill with the required philological knowledge is not easy to come by. For that reason, out of the perhaps hundreds of treatments of Anaximander found in modern scholarship in every field from aesthetics to political theory, there are only a handful of interpretations which are convincing. Furthermore, this handful consists of the leading representatives of certain traditions of interpretation, traditions that have had great influence in the development of pre-Socratic criticism. It is clear from Ramnoux's article that by 1954 it had become as interesting to study the developments of Anaximander interpretation as it was to study Anaximander himself. As he says, "tout le travail fait pour cerner l'énigme, ou pour l'exploiter, constitue comme une seconde aventure où se reflète un drame de la pensée contemporaine."  

In the twenty-seven years since the publication of Ramnoux's article, as one would expect from the enormous growth in literature concerning the pre-Socratics since the Second World War, the picture drawn by Ramnoux has become considerably more complex. Seemingly, Anaximander has replaced Thales as the index for questions concerning the emergence of philosophy. If this is true, it is partly because we possess even less information about Thales than we do about Anaximander. But this shift is based as much on qualitative as upon quantitative judgements. G. B. Burch, in his article entitled "Anaximander, The First Metaphysician," calls Thales "one of the most overrated figures in the history of philosophy." In Seligman's opinion, Anaximander was the first Greek to posit a genuinely metaphysical conception of a transcendent reality. Holscher's article, "Anaximander und der Anfang der Philosophie," in which he treats both Hesiod and Thales summarily,
reflects the same tendency. He claims that Anaximander "ist der erste der den Namen eines Philosophen verdient, unabhängig und kühn." Kahn, in his book, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, defends the thesis that Anaximander was largely responsible for the Milesian world-view and that this outlook, in turn, comprises the common background of every pre-Socratic philosopher. Says Kahn,

"That the system of Anaximander"--who, he says, "is far more accessible to a modern historian than are such fabulous figures as Thales and Phytagoras"--"represents for us is nothing less than the advent, in the West at any rate, of a rational outlook on the natural world. This new point of view asserted itself with the total force of a volcanic eruption, and the ensuing flood of speculation soon spread from Melitus across the length and breadth of the lands in which Greek was spoken."

Thus we see the growing importance attached to Anaximander and his conception. In fact, he has become preeminent in a field of intellectual historiography that we may call the "archeology of philosophy."

B. A Basic Polarity in Views Concerning the Genesis of Philosophy

The search for philosophical beginnings has received an impetus from the field of archeology proper. The discoveries earlier in this century of the pre-Hellenic Minoan civilization and the subsequent decipherment of the late Minoan script, has done much to raise our consciousness concerning the problems of the origins of ancient culture. These discoveries and the questions they raise find their analogies in the roughly contemporaneous discoveries at Ugarit. In this case, the decipherment of an ancient language cast a new light on our understanding of Biblical and Hebrew origins. But in both cases, philology, cultural anthropology, history, sociology, as well as theology and philosophy have greatly benefited from the discoveries of archeology. However, both fields of research--Hellenic and Hebraic--have also suffered from the exaggeration that accompanies sudden discovery. Another example is
provided by the phenomenon of Pan-Babylonism in ancient Near Eastern studies. When the importance of Mesopotamian civilization for the history of the ancient Middle East came to light, this philosophy of cultural diffusionism dominated the field. Its advocates saw behind every cultural phenomenon, from Asia Minor to the Arabian Peninsula, and from Egypt to Iran between the middle of the second millennium B.C. to the Macedonian conquest, one and the same altorientalische Weltanschauung: an astral conception of the universe which was at once philosophy, religion and mythology. In the study of Hellenic culture, Nilsson's analysis of Greek religion in terms of its Minoan-Mycenaean origins exemplifies the same tendency. Nilsson proceeds by drawing analogies between two cultural strata and then arguing that these reflect real historical influences. Nilsson is, in fact, willing to speak not only of the Minoan-Mycenaean origins of Greek religion but even of the survival of the former in Greek religion. But it is not clear, for example, that the Orphic cult of Dionysus was "the revival of old Minoan and Mycenaean religious ideas which had for a time fallen into the background" where they "persisted in secret" until, "when the opportunity arose they emerged once more to cause a religious revolution." According to the authoritative inquiry of Lindforth into the historical evidence, there is no basis for the idea of an institutionally organized Orphic Church in pre-Alexandrian Greece, let alone for the supposition that its myth and cult were survivals from a pre-Greek cultural stratum. Thus, in the field of Hellenic studies too, as with ancient Near Eastern studies, modern scholars have occasionally been tempted to overestimate the historical power of a previous tradition brought to light by archeology. Such overestimation serves to emphasize something that has previously been overlooked. But there
is a real danger in overestimating the influence of an earlier tradition
upon a later one: namely, that in historically explaining a phenomenon
such as Orphism in this way, one actually resolves it into its sources.

These considerations pertain to Anaximander inasmuch as all recent
studies of his thought entertain the question of his role in the genesis of
philosophy. The central issue in this discussion is whether Anaximander
is primarily a figure of innovation or one whose philosophy is directed
toward traditional thought-forms. This involves the further question of the
relation between myth and philosophy in the sixth century B.C. In the study
which follows, we will treat Anaximander and the contemporary debates con­
cerning his thought with this latter issue as the leading question. In our
opinion, the genesis of philosophy consisted in the discovery of a certain
(and perhaps original) relationship between thought and the myths, rites
and attitudes of traditional religion. This is not to decide in advance
whether the early Ionian philosophy was necessarily a radical departure
from the traditional religion(s) of Hellas. Many contemporary scholars are
prepared to argue, to the contrary, that Greek philosophy in the sixth
century is little more than a continuation of religious thought in philo­
sophical form. As these scholars argue, early Greek philosophy--far from
being the emergence of a rational science--testifies to the enduring power
of myth and cult over the Greek mind.

The interpretation that the emergence of Greek philosophy is a
radical break with the past is the older of the two views. It thus possesses
something of the power of a tradition itself. The newer interpretation, like
Nilsson's study of Greek religion, represents the impact of new discoveries
by other disciplines, in this case sociology, anthropology, political and
economic history and the comparative study of religion. As in the case of Nilsson's theory concerning the historical origins of Orphism, these discoveries have inspired revolutionary reversals in the traditional reading of the origins of philosophy, which inevitably involve themselves in overstatement and exaggeration. We will seek to avoid this pitfall without relinquishing what insights into our problem are offered by the newer perspectives. In keeping with this, however, we will also take a critical attitude toward the more traditional interpretation of pre-Socratic thought as "le miracle grec"—the sudden birth of rational science, autonomous and therefore independent of historical antecedents.

This traditional approach to the question of the genesis of philosophy tends to regard the myth/philosophy relation in the sixth century exclusively from the point of view of what followed historically. Out of an attitude of appreciation for modern science, this tradition views the pre-Socratics making their greatest contribution in formulating the principles of scientific thought. But when the pre-Socratics were thinking the thoughts of which we possess only fragments, the vast achievements of modern science, as well as the faith in scientific reason which accompanied it, were not even dreamt of. The introduction of western science into a discussion aimed at historically explaining the rise of pre-Socratic thought is anachronistic. In this approach the historicity of the pre-Socratics is sacrificed in order to buttress the modern idea of autonomous science. As we consider the thought of Anaximander, however, we will approach him in his historicity, that is, neither as a repetition of what went before nor as something altogether new. Historicity is a dimension of human life in which we observe human beings take up the past, in the present, for the sake
of the future. By focusing on the dynamic process of human historicity one avoids the pitfalls of either of the interpretations of the genesis of philosophy outlined above.

Of course, it is insufficient, in light of this apparent dilemma in the scholarship, simply to propose a middle course between the two extremes. But a way must be found of incorporating the insights of both. Without announcing a conclusion on this question before actually examining the evidence, we argue that the emergence of philosophy in ancient Greece must be viewed as a rooted departure in and from previous tradition, "à partir de lui en même temps que contre lui." As a rooted departure, the nascent philosophy inevitably grew in the soil of certain historical influences that were making themselves felt in the sixth century milieu. Therefore, the new movement of thought may not be considered entirely unprecedented. We expect to find that the movement departs from tradition, though always in traditional terms. However, as a rooted departure from tradition, Greek philosophy does not permit itself to be resolved into its antecedents. If it has genuine historical character, no phenomenon or event will lack either a relatedness to the past, nor a uniqueness. It is understandable that the uniqueness or departure-character of early Greek philosophy is what first captures our attention, since this is where its historical significance lies. Pre-Socratic thought fascinates us historically because it is such a remarkable anticipation of things to come in the history of philosophy. It is in light of what follows that we sense the boldness of these early thinkers. From our vantage point we can see the monumental impact which this tradition of rational speculation and inquiry has had upon the history of our western society. It is precisely because Greek philosophy
departed in a new direction that it came to constitute a powerful tradition in its own right, in which subsequent "rooted departures" in the history of philosophy are themselves historically rooted. But we do ourselves an immense disservice when, after we have taken stock of what our tradition of western reflection owes to these Hellenic pioneers, we fail to discern the authentic character of these archaic efforts because we ignore their rootedness in a definite historical situation.

With this conception of the historical event as a rooted departure, we wish to work toward the articulation of an historical hermeneutic of Greek philosophy. We speak of hermeneutic because for us history is pre-eminently a human affair in which the theoretical or scientific conception of "explanation"—which arises in the context of the natural sciences—is applicable to the science of history only in an analogical sense. Historical antecedents and consequences, while indeed connected, are not connected as causes and effects. This relation is encountered in the analysis of physical processes. But historical antecedents and consequences are related—to employ a tautology which is nevertheless meaningful—historically. That is to say, the "historical" itself represents a kind of relation, a kind of process or connection which is sui generis and therefore irreducible to other kinds of relationships known in human experience. This insight is substantiated by the fact that once the historical antecedents of, for example, pre-Socratic thought have been outlined to the best of our knowledge (as Cornford attempts to do), we still do not possess anything that would pass for an "explanation", at least according to the criterion for an explanation demanded by natural science. Physics, for example, seeks to explain why, according to universally valid laws, a certain observable process always takes place in a certain way.
But in historical explanation, all we do—and all that Cornford has done—is to render it possible for the reader or modern investigator to understand, in terms of these antecedents and their formative influence, how certain human decisions were made which brought the innovation into being.

Philosophy, like all cultural products of human society, possesses a plastic dimension in accordance with which the question of its historical genesis must be raised. Clearly the phenomenon of genesis is not confined to the specifically historical dimension of things. Indeed, nothing in human experience, including the entire non-human world, is exempt from having come into being, at least according to modern consensus. Conversely, the historical is not exhausted by the genetic. Many things pertain to a proper understanding of history which are not directly related to the problem of origins. But when the question of genesis is raised in the context of the historical, we must be clear that we are talking about origins of a certain kind: namely, origins owing to the influence of historical formation. Therefore, it would be wiser, when faced with the problem of giving historical explanation, to speak in terms of understanding and interpretation. We must use these hermeneutical terms because the objects under view (in this case, the pre-Socratic philosophers) are in fact the subjects of historical acts in a cultural setting. An historical origin is not like a pre-Socratic *arche* out of which all things simply proceed. It is rather a "point of departure" for human thoughts and action. If I take the Biblical tradition as my point of departure in life or thought, it could not be said that my thought emerges out of that tradition. Rather, it is more fitting to say that I have grounded my thought in it. A point of departure is something which is taken, not simply given. Historical influences are felt
in human life because they are appropriated, or succumbed to. But they have no influence until that step is taken. Historical antecedents and traditions in a culture have only that power which human decisions bestow upon them. Therefore, the power of past tradition is entirely a question of the power of present commitment. It follows that our historical hermeneutic is ultimately a religious hermeneutic which seeks to "explain" historical acts and events by way of the historical, human commitments behind them. Therefore, vis-à-vis the question of continuity in the intellectual history of the sixth century B.C., we must reject any analysis which saddles the pre-Socratics with the burden of being the origin--especially in the sense of cause--of all subsequent philosophy. Philosophy has many origins (origin not being the same thing as beginning). On the other hand, we must also reject the views which respectively overemphasize the pre-Socratics' debt to their past or view them as springing full-grown ex nihilo.

Our examination of Anaximander will be carried out in two stages. First, we will examine the views of four contemporary interpreters of his thought (Part Two). I have chosen these four because they illustrate the development in the scholarship since Ramnoux's article and represent its leading movements. A parallel examination of their treatments will be very instructive. Secondly, we will examine Anaximander ourselves on the basis of a hermeneutic to which we will give explicit formulation (Part Three). But before discussing current Anaximander interpretations, we must describe the dynamics of the scholarship, its major debates and traditions at work in it.

C. Four Basic Lines in Pre-Socratic Research

Ramnoux reviews the interpretation of five leading figures. They
are Nietzsche, Burnet, Cornford, Jaeger and Heidegger. Other figures, such as Tannery, Wilamowitz, Eisler and Guthrie, are also mentioned as having their place in proximity to one or other of these major interpretations. A survey of articles and books published both before and after this article reveals the soundness of Ramnoux's intuition about the major interpretations and their influence in the scholarship. I will exploit this arrangement of the scholarship into traditions in order to set the stage for the four Anaximander interpretations in Part Two. The five interpretations laid out by Ramnoux, I believe, actually represent four traditions. Nietzsche and Heidegger belong to different stages in a single line. Ramnoux himself suggests the association. Nietzsche perceived in the fragment of Anaximander an "enigmatic proclamation of a true pessimist, oracular legend over the boundary stone of Greek philosophy." Heidegger, on the other hand (whose interpretation Ramnoux favors), sees in the fragment "the birth of a pure Ontology" and "the revelation of Being" which is "neither pessimistic, nor nihilistic; (though) it remains tragic." This difference rests on, among other things, Heidegger's view that the fragment does not teach the destruction of all individual things back into the origin in payment for the sin of existence. It is clear however, that Heidegger has built upon Nietzsche's break with the traditional interpretation of the pre-Socratics, which we will discuss shortly. Thus, there are actually four traditions: the Positivist, the Classical Humanist, the Neo-Orphic or Existentialist, and the Socio-Structural.

(1) The Positivists are represented by Burnet, Tannery, Gomperz, Heidel, Nestle, Vlastos, Classen and to some extent Guthrie, Kranz and Kurt von Fritz. Their interest is to demonstrate that the pre-Socratics
were fundamentally scientists; that their thought was secular and anti-theological; that their method was empirical and experimental. The origins of their thought, the positivists argue, was only very superficially related to Oriental traditions, and its advent was a sudden and indigenous cultural expression of the innate genius of the Greek race. Though some of these points have been modified or even set aside in the wake of increasing knowledge, it cannot be said that they originally rested on ignorance of actual facts. Burnet's command of the material rivaled that of his predecessor, Zeller. Burnet's arguments still carry weight, and his positivistic tradition of interpretation is still a going concern.

On the question of the relation between myth and philosophy, scholars such as Burnet were adamant concerning the scientific character of the Greek miracle. Accordingly, they emphasize the discontinuity of sixth century intellectual history and the antitheological bent of Ionian thought in particular. As Burnet says,

In all this (Ionian science), there is no trace of theological speculation. We have seen that there had been a complete break with the early Aegean religion, and that the Olympian polytheism never had a firm hold on the Ionian mind. It is therefore wrong to look for the origins of Ionian science in mythological ideas of any kind.

It is interesting to note in Burnet the combination of a high view of Greek science, with the 'nilssonian' judgement that Orphism is a resurrection of Minoan-Mycenaean (Burnet: "early Aegean") myth and cult. This juxtaposition is made more interesting when we find it in Nilsson himself:

The first elements of a scientific explanation of the universe were, among other peoples, just as inseparably united with the mythical as Ouranos and Gaia in the myth of Hesiod. But the Greeks separated them with the keen edge of
thought. Their marvelous qualities of mind, their rationalism, and clarity of thinking could brook no ambiguity or confusion. Hence was born among them that independent searching after truth which is Science, the greatest offspring of the spirit of Greece.26

Thus a clear pattern of interpretation emerges which is shared by Nilsson and Burnet alike. Orphic religion is deemed to be a relic imported into the sixth century from a pre-Greek Aegean society because its ecstatic mysticism and secret revelation constitute the antithesis of rational scientific reflection. The scientific tradition, on the other hand, is attributed to the "marvelous qualities of mind" of the Achaean and Dorian Greeks (who supplanted the previous civilization). The scientific tradition, therefore, was only weak in those parts of Greece which had not come under the rule of the Northerners. This shared pattern of interpretation is the combination of a scienialistic attitude toward Greek Society (apparently inspired by a positivistic view of scientific reason), with a cultural racism which favors the innate qualities of the continental Europeans to those of the Mediterraneans. Again Burnet:

Of course the pioneers of Greek thought had no clear idea of the nature of scientific hypothesis, and supposed themselves to be dealing with ultimate reality, but a sure instinct guided them to the right method. It is to those men we owe the conception of an exact science which should ultimately take in the whole world as its object...The Greeks were the first to follow this method, and that is their title to be regarded as the originators of science.27

The representative of this tradition, whose interpretation of Anaximander we will examine below, is Charles H. Kahn. Kahn's excellent study, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, which appeared in 1960
and was therefore unknown to Ramnoux, stands squarely in line with the positivist belief in the *Miracle grec.* He speaks of the "radical contrast between the physical ideas of Homer and Hesiod on the one hand, and those of Anaximander on the other." He believes with Guthrie that "a surprising number of Greek thinkers of the sixth and fifth centuries shared a common picture of the nature of the universe, of living creatures and of divinity," and that this picture was chiefly a Milesian creation. His book posits the thesis that Anaximander, who stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries philosophically (both Thales and Anaximenes), is the central figure in this break with the mythical tradition. He furthermore states that the pre-Socratic world-picture, as articulated by Anaximander, formed the background against which the other, subsequent pre-Socratics philosophized. The Anaximandrian conception was the common inheritance of early Greek philosophy.

It is ironic that Kahn's outline of this historical development, and of Anaximander's role in it, posits a revolutionary break with the past in the sixth century for which Anaximander was personally responsible, while on the other hand, all subsequent pre-Socratic philosophies are said to show such striking similarity to one another. Thus, while Anaximander succeeded in making a great leap forward, his followers contented themselves with philosophizing on the plane to which Anaximander's efforts had brought them. There is nothing inherently false in Kahn's picture of history moving at such uneven rates of speed. But the kinetics of his historiography should serve to remind us that this interpretation stands in a tradition which habitually makes such assumptions about the movement of history. The accusation has even been made that according to the positivist view this movement has
lost all historical character. This point is made by Vernant, whom we will discuss later, in a caricature of the miracle grec theory.

Aussi serait-il vain de rechercher dans le passé les origines de la pensée rationelle. La pensée vraie ne saurait avoir d'autre origine qu'elle-même. Elle est extérieure à l'histoire, qui ne peut rendre raison, dans le développement de l'esprit, que des obstacles, des erreurs et des illusions successives. Tel est le sens du "miracle" grec: à travers la philosophie des Ioniens, on reconnaît, s'incarnant dans le temps, la Raison intemporelle. L'avènement du logos introduirait donc dans l'histoire une discontinuité radicale. Voyager sans bagages, la philosophie viendrait au monde sans passé, sans parents, sans famille; elle serait un commencement absolu.30

This is not the place to make a critical investigation of Kahn's claims about Anaximander. These points serve to contrast his exegesis with the other traditions of interpretation. Nor do they detract from the value of Kahn's study or his insights. Our appreciation for many details of his work will become obvious later. But we cannot ignore the fact that there are valuable insights and fine scholarship side by side with a working perspective which is not the product of that scholarship, but actually "surrounds and governs" (to quote Anaximander on the function of the Arche) the research activity. It is in terms of this juxtaposition that the determination of a thinker vis-à-vis a certain tradition is to be decided. It is impossible to group together the many Anaximander interpretations that are being offered simply on the basis of agreement or disagreement on certain exegetical details. Such issues constitute the scholarly minutia of Anaximander research:

- does Simplicius say (Diels/Kranz 12A9)31 that Anaximander was the first to coin the term άρχη or simply the first to apply it to the Apeiron?
is ἐπείδου to be understood quantitatively or qualitatively?
-did Anaximander hold to a doctrine of innumerable worlds?
-what are τὰ ὅνου that are mentioned in the fragment?
-what is the actual extent of the fragment itself?

These issues in the scholarship become the objects of our focal awareness. The various answers to these problems may reveal patterns which characterize the tradition we are now identifying. But in reading through the interpretations with these traditions in mind, we will find no clear consistency within any of them on questions of detail. Nevertheless, the reality of the traditions continues to make itself felt. This is because the scholarship has by now exchanged ideas to the extent that these issues no longer represent the real differences between traditions of interpretation. Kahn, for example, makes use of Jaeger's interpretation of ἄρεστος in Anaximander's fragment without accepting Jaeger's view of its significance. Kahn has no special interest in Anaximander's theology. Rather, he follows Jaeger in the idea of a personal Chronos because it squares with his argument for the antiquity of the language in the fragment and for the authenticity of the entire passage. 32 The parallel Jaeger draws between the fragment and a similar statement by Solon 33 serves Kahn's argument for authenticity. But these focal points of argument, in which Kahn and Jaeger ostensibly agree, must be seen in their subsidiary context 34 which concerns such questions as the relation of archaic philosophy to the traditional myths, the sociocultural significance of the rise of Hellenic philosophy, the unity or continuity of pre-Socratic thought and the question of a hermeneutic. In the answers to questions of this order, we begin to see the traditions emerge.

(2) The Classical Humanist tradition of pre-Socratic interpretation begins with Zeller, in whom we find a combination of the Hegelian philosophy
of history and the classicism of Winkelmann and Goethe. Next in this line are Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf and Herman Diels, who both taught at the University of Berlin early in this century. Wilamowitz, the older of the two, was concerned primarily with philological matters; Diels, on the other hand, with the early history of philosophy. In 1872, shortly after receiving his doctorate, Wilamowitz boldly protested the philological tendencies of Nietzsche's *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. However, he did not hold himself apart from philosophical concerns. It is a great testimony to his authority in the area of the history of philosophy that, when he vindicated the authenticity of the seventh and eighth epistles of Plato, within a few years he had convinced a majority of European scholars and reversed the view of the nineteenth century which had deferred to the negative judgement of Zeller on this point. Diels made lasting contributions to the historiography of ancient philosophy in his two great collections of fragments—*Doxographi graeci* (1879) and *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (1903)—and in a number of articles on the pre-Socratics including two studies of Anaximander in which he shows the influence of the Nietzschean interpretation.

In the first and second decades of the twentieth century, Werner Jaeger worked at the University of Berlin under both of these scholars. While he did his doctoral work on Aristotle under Diels, his later work, for example on pre-Socratic theology, shows the influence of Wilamowitz's posthumously published *Glauben der Hellenen*. Jaeger thus entered into the chief battle then engaging classicism: the struggle against a positivistic interpretation of the philosophers of classical Greece. By rendering the early pre-Socratics as natural scientists of a sort, the positivist view
turned them into pale anticipations of what came later in the scientific revolutions of the western world. On the contrary, Jaeger sought to restore something of the traditional respect for the Greeks as paradigms for the present, which had always characterized philological Humanism. Thus seeing the dangers of the positivist approach, Jaeger sought to correct it by pointing out what he called the "theology" of the early Greeks.

The age of positivism, with such representatives as Burnet and Gomperz, stressed the empirical and scientific character of the early thinkers. In their zeal for proving the modernity of the pre-Socratics they often minimized or even neglected that aspect of the first philosophers with which this book is concerned in approaching them in the perspective of the origin of natural theology.36

Jaeger may also be understood as a 'Christian Humanist.' Ramnoux goes so far as to say that he "travaille dans une perspective chrétienne."37 The sense of this comment may be gathered from the last remark in the above quote. Jaeger's expedient for rescuing the pre-Socratics from the fate of being cast as proto-positivists is the classical Christian concept of a theologia naturalis. Nevertheless, this notion is a means to an end, the end being a demonstration of the continuous, organic development of Hellenic civilization. The sudden rise of philosophy in the sixth century is, therefore, but one stage in the unfolding of this Kultur.

It is hard to fix the point when rational thinking begins in Greece. The line should run through the Homeric epic...There is no discontinuity between natural philosophy and the Homeric epics. The history of Greek thought is an organic unity, closed and complete.38

In this last remark we see Jaeger's veneration of the Greeks as exemplars of Humanity (homines classici). A ramification of this view is, that regardless of the extent and power of Oriental influences upon the Greek
arts and sciences, the germ of Greek thought is viewed as the product of indigenous inspiration. And this inspiration, as long as it was present in the Greek mind, guaranteed a continuity in its historical outworking. Nevertheless, however dependent upon myth the thought of Hesiod, for example, had been, Ionian thought "no longer draws its content from the mythic tradition, nor indeed from any other, but takes as its point of departure the given realities of human experience." Thus, although there is an unbroken continuity of organic development which connects the work of the early philosophers to their mythologizing predecessors, there is also a significant break. In fact, the genuine originality of the Greek mind is—for Jaeger—most finely expressed precisely in the autonomous, self-originating, empirical thought born in the sixth century. This thought rejects the myths outright, but without losing (and here is another correction of the Burnetian interpretation) their theological aspect. This theological dimension disappeared from sight in Burnet's analysis because he apparently felt that the interest of positive science left no place for it. Jaeger, however, whose background encouraged a sensitivity to theological concerns, presents us with a more realistic picture. By way of the idea of a "natural theology," Jaeger discounts an attachment of pre-Socratic thought to the myth in any revelational sense. He thereby argues convincingly for his thesis of the 'organic continuity' of Greek thought without sacrificing the Burnetian notion that positive science was born among the Greeks. Thus when compared to certain other, more historisistic interpretations of the relation of Greek philosophy to the myth, Jaeger stands closer to the positivists than one at first suspects.

The final word in Jaeger's analysis of the early Greeks, however, is not science. Scientific progress, in the ancient world, found its proper
place, according to Jaeger, within the context of Humanism. And, in terms of his magnum opus on pre-Alexandrian Hellenic culture, this notion is expressed as paideia: the forming and the self-forming by the ancient Greeks of their own society, character and mind. For Jaeger, this term paideia reaches to the depth of what culture was for the Greeks and should be for us. Though the ancient Greek philosophers had indeed discovered and employed the power of rational thought, this was not done in the interest of dominating nature. Rather, knowledge was sought for phronesis (wisdom) which lies at the root of paideia. The pre-Socratic Ionian in whom this ideal of knowledge comes most powerfully to expression, according to Jaeger, is Heraclitus. But Heraclitus had built directly on the foundation laid by such Milesians as Anaximander himself.

The boldness with which these philosophers applied pure independent logic to the current conceptions of the universe is parallel to the courage of the Ionian poets in voicing their emotions and opinions on human life and their own age. Both ventures are based on the growing power of the individual.40

This power of the individual is one of the characteristic emphases of Jaeger's tradition of interpretation.41 In treating the indigenous cultural setting of nascent Greek philosophy, Jaeger cites in particular the atmosphere of freedom which led Ionian poets and philosophers alike to a high degree of self-consciousness.42 This, then, is the ground in which the autonomous reflection of sixth century philosophy was rooted. In Jaeger's opinion, this insight places pre-Socratic thought in its proper context of an organically developing Greek paideia.
In keeping with his emphasis on the unity of Greek culture and therefore on continuity in Greek intellectual history, Jaeger describes his approach as "the history of problems." In an article in which he offers an overview of the historiography of the history of philosophy in the last century, he speaks of this approach in terms of his belonging to a certain tradition of interpreters.

Durch diese Forschungen ist ein Typus der Philosophiegeschichte hervorgetreten, der in den Arbeiten Baeumkers, Mondolfos, Cassirers, Stenzels und des Verfassers (=Jaegers) seinen Ausdruck gefunden hat: die Geschichte der Probleme. Sie fasst die Geschichte nicht nur, wie das schon Windelband tat, als das allmähliche Auftauchen der grossen philosophischen Grundfragen auf, sondern versucht mehr in die Geschichte der einzelnen Probleme und ihre Kontinuität in der Folge der Generationen und innerhalb der Schulen einzudringen. Es zeigt sich dabei, dass die Probleme ein zähes organisches Eigenleben haben, aber sie lassen daneben in ihren Wandlungen doch auch den engen Zusammenhang mit dem Leben der jeweiligen Epoche und seinem Bedürfnis erkennen.43

We must note that Jaeger became one of the key figures in a movement which, after 1925, was known as the Third Humanism.44 This was in part a battle against scientism in classical education and against a positivistic interpretation of the intellectual achievements of antiquity. On the other side, Jaeger also fought, together with Drerup, de Vries and W. J. Verdenius against "subjectivism" in philology.45 This debate was a continuation of the Wilamowitz-Nietzsche conflict of the nineteenth century,46 and was made increasingly necessary by the appearance of such exegeses as Heidegger's Parmenides interpretation.47 This accords with the fact, as we have already noted, that Jaeger maintained a sort of middle position between the positivist and the Cambridge School
(eg, Cornford), concerning the question of continuity and discontinuity in the rise of ancient philosophy. From beginning to end Jaeger's concerns are those of a pedagogical (neo-) Humanism. And he shared this concern with many who were not connected with the philological studies at Berlin. These include Bruno Snell, Karl Deichgräber, and Olof Gigon.

Gigon's analysis of Anaximander will provide us with a representative treatment from the perspective of a philological Humanism. We will include him in our reviews in Part Two. We chose Gigon for several reasons. In the first place Jaeger's Anaximander interpretation is included in Ramnoux's review and Gigon's was not, even though Gigon's treatment appeared some two years prior to Jaeger's. Secondly, Gigon is more philosophical than Jaeger, Snell or Deichgräber. The danger in this tradition, after all, is that the philologist, while exegeting, may make decisions on behalf of the philosopher. But in the case of Gigon we find a combination of the richness of the classical interpretation (its appreciation for culture, science, art, literature, language, as well as metaphysics) with a genuine concern for philosophical problems. Gigon describes his approach, in fact, as "the history of problems." This squares well with Jaeger. And, like Jaeger, Gigon sees a great deal more continuity between Anaximander and his predecessor, Hesiod, than Kahn would acknowledge. The drawing of this analogy between Hesiod and Anaximander, whether warranted by the evidence or not, is a long standing tradition in the analyses of Wißamowitz and his followers.

Kahn also lays great stress on the unity of pre-Socratic thought--but a unity existing only after Anaximander. In Kahn's case, this unity actually consists of the universal acceptance among the pre-Socratics of Anaximander's world-view. In Gigon's case, the unity of pre-Socratic thought
is really the continuity of reflection upon the same philosophical problems. Therefore, a historiography of their views must be Problemgeschichte.

The principle of unity or of continuity, while it receives different formulations according to the overall view of the course of early Greek philosophy, fulfills a similar function in both the Positivist and the Classicist traditions. This is a use which it does not have, or has to a lesser degree, in the several sociological interpretations where it also plays a role. In response to the poverty of the sources, students of the pre-Socratics appeal to a methodological principle which, they hope, will compensate for the scanty information concerning individual thinkers. The principle is that the exegesis of any pre-Socratic must be carried out within the historiographical guidelines provided by a knowledge of pre-Socratic philosophy as a whole. The exegete of an individual pre-Socratic must be an exegete of pre-Socratic thought. Only through comparison and contrast with other pre-Socratic thinkers can the mysteries of a particular conception be solved. On the basis of this principle, then, the study of the pre-Socratics is made more scientific. The researchers who adhere to this principle cannot hold a nominalistic view of intellectual history, giving the final word to its uniqueness, contingency and discontinuity. On the contrary, modern students of archaic Greek philosophy almost universally confess "the unity of pre-Socratic thought" in one form or another. Whether one acknowledges with Guthrie "a common picture of the nature of the universe... shared by a suprising number of Greek philosophical and religious thinkers of the 6th and early 5th centuries B.C.," or with Kahn "the essential unity of early Greek natural speculation," or with Gigon the notion of "a principle of continuity in pre-Socratic thought," or with Jaeger the history of Greek
thought as "an organic unity, closed and complete," one is following the same Leitmotiv.

This Leitmotiv has functioned largely under the auspices of methodological considerations. It has been perceived as the conditio sine qua non for the possibility of a historiography of ancient thought, a methodological apriori, a transcendental limiting-concept, a regulative idea whose function is to establish the possibility of a totality of conditions. In itself, however, it also represents far-reaching assumptions about the nature of intellectual history. In the words of Kahn:

In virtue of such fundamental similarities as those just mentioned, it should be possible to put some semblance of flesh and blood on the dry skeleton of Milesian philosophy preserved for us by the ancient doxography. The historical method should permit us to reconstruct the lost ancestor, as it were, on the basis of a family resemblance in the surviving descendents.54

We should not be misled by the fact that Kahn makes such strong statements of the unity-idea. His emphasis on this point has to do with the fact that all pre-Socratic philosophy after Anaximander, in his opinion, shared the same rational tenor and motive. But since he actually denies continuity, for example, between Anaximander and his "pre-rational" predecessors, we see that Kahn does not take the principle as seriously, or as far, as Gigon and the Classicist tradition. It is characteristic, both of Gigon's Problemsgeschichtliche approach, and for his tradition's emphasis on the inherent unity and self-sufficiency of the Hellenic genius, to explain Anaximander's view in terms of an antecedent such as the philosophy of Hesiod. This Kahn refuses to do. What Kahn means by unity is the unity of the Milesian world-picture. What it means in the Classicist tradition, however, is the unity of the Hellenic mind or world-view as such. The dominant leitmotiv in Kahn's work
remains the "miracle grec." For the Humanists it is the ἀαθομπνογ, the invulnerability, of the Greek Geist, the impervious, impregnable, indomitable spirit of Hellenic man: 'O Ἀνθρωπος, the exemplar of Humanitas and Homo Classicus.

(3) The third line of pre-Socratic interpretation begins with Nietzsche's deliberate attempt in 1872, with Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, to overthrow the classicism of Winkelmann and to reverse our perception of the earliest Greeks as "Apollinians." Nietzsche viewed them rather as "Dionysians," and his treatment aroused fears in the young Wilamowitz, which the latter expressed in a pamphlet entitled Zukunftsp hilologie! His denunciation of Nietzsche's swashbuckling exegesis of passages which, in Wilamowitz's opinion, deserved exact and scientific dissection, in turn received quick rebuttle from Nietzsche's friend Erwin Rohde.

Ramnoux has amply covered Nietzsche's interpretation of Anaximander. It suffices to say that, for Nietzsche, "philosophy is dangerous wherever it does not exist in its fullest right, and it is only the health of a culture which accords it such fullest right." For Nietzsche, such a happy coincidence of healthy culture and philosophy, existing in their fullest right, is found neither in our present culture nor in the "classical" age of Greek culture. Only among the pre-Platonics do we find the "pure types" of philosophy. The difference between the Platonic and the post-Platonic Nietzsche expressed via his distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The former is the "genius of restraint, harmony and measure"; the latter represents "the cruel longing to exceed all norms." The difference may also be express in terms of the Schopenhauerian distinction.
between Will (Dionysus) and Representation (Apollo) which is made explicit in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

The introduction of the consciousness of a rift in Greek thought which divides Plato from his predecessors was an epoch making contribution to the study of the pre-Socratics. Despite the basic critique which Heidegger has launched against the philosophy of Nietzsche, it is this consciousness of a discontinuity in early Hellenic intellectual history which binds him to the tradition of Nietzsche's pre-Socratic interpretation. In working out this insight, Heidegger takes Nietzsche's own classicism one step further in proposing archaism. "The basic error," he says, "lies in the belief that history begins with the primitive and backward, the clumsy and weak. The opposite is true. The beginning is the uncanniest and mightiest. What comes after is not development but shallowness and diffusion, the failure to hold on to the beginning, rendering it ineffective and harmless and exaggerating it into a caricature."62

For Heidegger, the beginning of philosophy was so momentous that even the "beginning of the end of the great beginning, the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, remains great." Nevertheless, Plato and Aristotle, are the beginning of the end. And that end consists in (or begins with) a separation between *logos* and *phusis* which previously existed in simple unity. The secession of *logos* inevitably entailed the cessation of *legein* and consequently the advent of *ratio*.64 It is in this spirit that Heidegger turns his hermeneutical attention to a new interpretation of the pre-Socratics, and in particular of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides.67

Wesentlich für Heideggers Bezug zu den frühen griechischen Denkern ist, dass er diese Denker aus ihrer Nachbarschaft zu den Dichtern versteht...
Frühes griechisches Denken und Dichtenkommen
nach Heideggers Erfahrung darin überein, dass
beide in ihrem Wesen "dichterisch" sind: sie
stiften und bewahren die geschickhaft geschehende
Wahrheit des Seins (HW 303, 63f).

This does not mean that Heidegger, out of sheer reaction to other
traditions of pre-Socratic interpretation, believes that philosophy arose
and out of poetry and myth.

Philosophy did not arise out of the myth, and conversely the myth and its
world of deities did not disappear because of the advent of philosophy.
The myth fell from its original position because "die Götter sich entzogen"
(withdrew themselves); and original philosophical thinking—the legein of
logos—became dominated by the ratio for the same reason: "What must be
thought about, turns away from man." This ominous "event," this with­
drawal of Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, leaves us to squander ourselves
in Vergessenheit, blissfully ignorant even of our own lostness. When Being
has withdrawn Itself from Mythos and Logos alike, there then arises the
superficial conflict between them—a mere epiphenomenon in the history of
our relationship to Being, but one that marks the beginning of Ontology.

Mythos and logos are not, as our current historians
of philosophy claim, placed into opposition by
philosophers as such; on the contrary, the early
Greek thinkers (Parmenides, fragment 8) are precisely
the ones to use mythos and logos in the same sense.
Mythos and logos become separated and opposed only at the point where neither mythos nor logos can keep to its original nature. In Plato's work, this separation has already taken place. Historians and philologists, by virtue of a prejudice which modern rationalism adopted from Platonism, imagine that mythos was destroyed by logos. But nothing religious is ever destroyed by logic; it is destroyed only by the God's withdrawal.

It is easy to caricature this Heideggerian interpretation, as it is easy to caricature the ideal of the "miracle grec". But this is not the path to real understanding. Of course Heidegger takes great liberties with the Überlieferung—the texts which are our only link with the early Greek thought. His willful disregard for the basic rules of philological procedure has given his opponents ample opportunity to dismiss Heidegger's interpretations as "empty and arrogant nonsense." But once one concurs with Heidegger as to what kind of considerations deserve priority in this matter, the regulae of philology will not stand in the way of his or her appreciation for Heidegger's view, and even for his interpretation of the pre-Socratics. This explains the fact that, despite the widespread recognition of Heidegger's philological weakness, he has nevertheless exerted influence on a whole generation of scholarship, much of which has sought to justify or at least to restate, in terms of a more scientific philology, the Nietzschean/Heideggerian insight into the "great Divide" in Greek philosophical history which separates Plato from the pre-Platonics.

Among Heidegger's own students, the most prominent in this endeavor are Hans-Georg Gadamer and Walter Bröcker. Both of these men have taken innovative steps and argued cogently for new perspectives in the study of Greek philosophy. Another line of influence which remains within this general tradition, runs through Karl Reinhardt and his student Uvo Hölscher. Both Heidegger and Gadamer have expressed their appreciation for the
"bahnbrechende" work of Reinhardt. Though Reinhardt was attracted to Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt, he did not adhere to them in the same manner as the so-called George-Kreise which, via a vitalistic interpretation of Plato, sought to overcome the threat of modern nihilism. The philology of the George-Kreise was "eher wissenschaftsfeindlich". On the other side was the philology of the New or Third Humanism which, in Wilamowitz's words, was essentially "Altermwissenschaft." Hölscher describes Reinhardt as consciously remaining in between these movements, resisting both the "Program-Humanisten" and the anti-Humanistic Classicism of the George-Kreise as well.

Hölscher clearly stands in the line of Reinhardt, and perhaps closer to Gadamer because of his apparent openness for certain concerns of Heidegger. We will have an opportunity to see his hermeneutic at work in our review of his Anaximander interpretation in Part Two.

For our purposes, he represents the third tradition of interpretation which we identify as the line of Nietzsche, Reinhardt, Heidegger, Dirlmeier, Gadamer and Bröcker. The following quote from the preface of Hölscher's *Anfängliches Fragen* will clarify the sense in which we believe he relates to this tradition.

Seit Aristoteles ist die problemgeschichtliche Betrachtung der Philosophiegeschichte vorherrschend, und das Problem, dem er speziell die Vorsokratiker, als die "Physiker", hingegen sah, war die Frage nach dem Stoff und der Ursache der Bewegung. Die Geschichte der philosophischen Systeme stellte sich ihm dar als wechselnde Beantwortungen dieser Frage im Fortschritt des Denkens. Die neuere Forschung hat sich von der aristotelischen Fragestellung mehr und mehr emanzipiert und die eigenen Wege und Formen Frühgriechischen Denkens zu begreifen versucht.

The desire to uncover the authentic pre-Socratic philosophy, if indeed it is philosophy, is the pathos behind the ethos of this tradition of interpretation. Its ethos is the critical destruction of the traditional doxography for the purpose of an Umdeutung, and a re-construction of the earliest Greek philosophies as they were originally formulated. On the polemic side, this means a continuation of the Wilamowitz-Nietzsche controversy, an opposition to the historiographical hermeneutics of the Third Humanism. "Die grossze Arbeit von Uvo Hölscher über 'Anaximander und die Anfänge der ionischen Philosophie' hat folgerichtig die doxographische Überlieferrung einer neuen Analyse unterzogen und dabei Manches aus der neuhumanistischen Epoche stammende Vorurteil abgebaut."  

As with the rationalism of the Positivist view, and with the adoration of the Hellenic Geist on the part of the Classicist tradition, our third line of interpretation, too, possess a key assumption which at the same time is a potential weakness. The attempt to "demolish the prejudice" of traditional interpretation has bred its own kind of higher criticism of the doxographical texts. This critical-scientific enterprise, like its counterpart in Biblical scholarship, has involved itself in many ambiguities and even paradoxes. The most obvious one is that the doxography, the second
hand testimonia to the views of the pre-Socratics, comes exclusively from post-Socratics. To put it another way, the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, which previously were considered our only avenue of access to the thought of the pre-Socratics are now, based on the assumptions of the *neuere Forschung*, transfigured into impassible barriers blocking our approach. This must follow from the assumption of a radical difference between Plato-Aristotle and the pre-Socratics. Any critical destruction of this Aristotelian and Platonic doxography is condemned to chip away at the rock, though not the only rock, on which it stands. Of course, as long as we possess the "fragments," the doxography is not the only basis for a re-construction of pre-Socratic philosophy. But any tampering with the doxography has certain inevitable implications for the fragments as well. This is nowhere clearer than in Dirlmeier's attempt\(^9\) "durch die kritische Einschränkung des als wörtlich anzuerkennenden Textes (d.i. von Anaximanders) für alle weitere Forschung aufs empfindlichste fühlbar gemacht, wie sehr die interpretatio peripatetica unsere Auffassung der Überlieferung beschattet."\(^9\) Numerically, the effect of Dirlmeier's Einschränkung of Anaximander's fragment was to reduce it from the thirty-six word version of Kranz to a mere twelve words. The first attempt critically to reduce the fragment of Anaximander was Burnet's objection to the words *genesis* and *phthora*\(^9\) in the first part of the fragment. Burnet thought these words, which often occur together in the works of Plato, were anachronistically attributed to Anaximander by Simplicius or by Simplicius' source, Theophrastus. But Burnet's opinion on the fragment represented no doxographical crisis such as we find in Dirlmeier. Nevertheless, Dirlmeier took Burnet's comment as a point of departure. Kahn, in his attempt to
restore the Aristotelian doxography to a position of respectability,\textsuperscript{97} defends the Simplician wording of the fragment even against Burnet's rather mild objection. In his own day, Dirlmeier's article touched off a debate between himself and Karl Deichgräber\textsuperscript{98} who represented the interests of classical philology and whose general treatment of the pre-Socratics is close to Jaeger's.\textsuperscript{99} Heidegger made use of Dirlmeier's limitation of the fragment in his Anaximander 'exegesis', as did Gigon(!). But in both cases, there was agreement with the results of Dirlmeier's analysis and limitation of the text but not with the doxographical ethos which lay behind it.\textsuperscript{100} It is Holscher who stands in the tradition of Dirlmeier's treatment of the doxography--the purging of the Aristotelian testimony of its Aristotelian prejudices.

Es kommt mir weniger darauf an, dem einzelnen Placitum sein Recht zu bestreiten, als etwas von der Weise dieses zugänglichen (altertümlichen) Denkens zu erkennen. Es wird dabei zunächst in einer Untersuchung fortgefahren werden, die sich schon ausgewiesen hat: der Kritik der aristotelischen Berichte.\textsuperscript{101}

The same trend appears in English-speaking scholarship, for example, in the work of H.F. Cherniss,\textsuperscript{102} and of his enthusiastic follower, J. B. McDiarmid.\textsuperscript{103} Cherniss' approach to Aristotle as a witness to the views of the pre-Socratics, which McDiarmid applies in turn to Theophrastus, is stated by McDiarmid as follows:

\textbf{Aristotle is not interested in historical facts as such at all. He is constructing his own system of philosophy, and his predecessors are of interest to him only insofar as they furnish material to this end. He believes that his system is final and inclusive and that, therefore, all earlier theories have been groping towards it and can be stated in its terms. Holding this belief, he does not hesitate to modify or distort not only the detailed views but also the fundamental attitudes of his predecessors or to make articulate the implications that doctrines may have for him but could not have had for their
authors. His method of dealing with his predecessors is to set up debates between them. Each debate is resolved in the formulation of one of his own theories, and the grouping and sentiments of the participants vary as the pre-determined solution of each debate requires. Thus, there is no constancy in the historical value of his comments; nor is there even such a thing as the Aristotelian interpretation.

We can readily admit that Aristotle "is not interested in historical facts as such." But it does not follow from this that "he did not hesitate to distort the detailed views and fundamental attitudes" of the pre-Socratics. In fact, this conclusion does not follow from anything known to the modern researcher--whether from other doxographical sources or from the fragments themselves. If we can no longer trust that Aristotle is right, by the same token, we cannot be sure that he is wrong. Without the existence of a doxographer who is what McDiarmid says Aristotle and Theophrastus are not--a reliable source for pre-Socratic philosophy--the Peripatetics cannot be discredited with any finality. This is not to advocate that we wear the spectacles of Aristotle when studying the pre-Socratics. Peripatetic testimonia concerning earlier thinkers must be taken with the appropriate grains of salt. Doxographical statements are a kind of secondary literature. But it is only in the interests of sound scholarship to approach them judiciously.

We thus encounter the fact that fragment and testimonium go hand in hand in conveying the conception of a pre-Socratic thinker. Even when we possess the fragments, the meaning of these bits of ipsissima verba depend upon their context in the doxography. Hölscher remarks: "dasz alle doxographischen Berichte so lange unbistimmt sind, als nicht originalen Wortlaut hinzukommt, gilt in gewissem Sinne auch umgekehrt." That is,
the original wording of any fragment itself is also indefinite as long as doxographical reports are not included with it, giving it context and direction. This point is well illustrated by the debate surrounding the reading of Anaximander's fragment when this text is removed from its doxographical con-text: namely, Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics.

(4) The fourth tradition of pre-Socratic interpretation we will examine appears to lack the same degree of internal and historical unity found in the traditions of Classical Humanism and the Neure Forschung. In the case of the latter two, we have not only traditions but actual schools which can be historically deliniated in terms of nations, generations and universities. In identifying our fourth tradition, however, we must appeal to a feature that is more structural in character. This feature is a hermeneutic shared by those who seek to explain the rise and character of pre-Socratic thought by the social conditions in, or impinging upon, the Asian Greek city-states of the sixth century B.C.

The names in this tradition include F. M. Cornford, George Thomson, a Marxist student of Cornford; M. de Corte, whose perspective is the philosophy of Bergson; and Jean-Pierre Vernant who stands with Cornford and the Durkheimian view of Greek religion which he acquired though Louis Gernet and with the French psycho-historian Ignace Meyerson. We will direct our attention first to Cornford, who gave one of the earliest articulations of this hermeneutic, and then to Vernant, whose Anaximander interpretation we will review in Part Two.

Cornford worked under the combined influence of J. G. Frazer (The Golden Bough) and Emile Durkheim. From Frazer came the idea that all myths
are closely associated with, or even derived from, rituals. The connection, as conceived by the Cambridge School, was that the myth is always offered as an accompaniment or explanation of ritual acts in the cult—ritual having precedence in religious life. Thus, for Cornford, as for Goethe, "Am Anfang war die Tat." Durkheim's theory of religion, which he saw as the matrix of the "collective representations" of science and philosophy, combined with this view to accent the socio-religious setting of all myth. Thus the stage was set for a re-interpretation, not only of Greek mythology as conducted by Frazer, but of early Greek philosophy as well. This is what Cornford set out to do in both From Religion to Philosophy (1912) and Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought (1952). In the context of the debate mentioned earlier concerning the continuity or discontinuity of Greek philosophy with its mythological predecessors, Cornford clearly stands on the side of continuity. In fact, this is, to a large degree, the motivation behind his work.

If we give up the idea that philosophy or science is a motherless Athena, an entirely new discipline breaking in from nowhere upon a culture hitherto dominated by poetical and mystical theologians, we shall see that the process of rationalization had been at work for some time before Thales was born... And when we look more closely at the Milesian scheme, it presents a number of features which cannot be attributed to rational inference based on an open-minded observation.112

Thus, Cornford's strategy for establishing the continuity between philosophy and older forms of thought is not to deny the rational or abstract character of pre-Socratic thought, but simply to undermine the widespread notion that the materials for their thought were provided by the data of experience.
What we claim to have established so far is that the pattern ofIonian cosmogony, for all its appearance of complete rationalism, is not a free construction of the intellect reasoning from direct observation of the existing world. There is nothing in the obvious appearances of Nature to suggest that the sky ever had to be lifted up from the earth, or that the heavenly bodies were formed after the earth, or indeed that the present order of the world has not existed for ever.113

But this is the negative side of Cornford's thesis,114 though it has become the object of much criticism itself.115 His positive thesis is that ancient philosophy was indeed a rationalization, though a rationalization of the myth.

If we take Anaximander's cosmogony with all its archaic features, it can, I believe, be shown to be a rationalization of an ancient Creation myth. The social origin of his philosophy is to be found there, not in the economic conditions of sixth-century Miletus. He inherited from mythical thought a scheme of cosmogony in which the operating factors had originally been conceived as personal gods. Expurgating the factors he could recognize as mythical, he substituted for the gods the operation of powers, such as 'the hot' and 'the cold', which he took to be unquestionably natural. The structure of his system was not the outcome of unbiased reflection on observed phenomena.

This work of rationalizing expurgation was, of course, a very remarkable step towards what we call natural science. But it was, in essence, a dogmatic speculation, with no more claim to have established truth on grounds which any intelligent person must accept than had any other Ionian system which followed.116

A perceptive comment concerning Cornford's theory is made by Jean-Pierre Vernant in his Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs:

Les philosophes n'ont pas eu à inventer un système d'explication du monde; ils l'ont trouvé tout fait. L'œuvre de Cornford marque un tournant dans la façon d'aborder le problème des origines de la pensée rationnelle. Parce qu'il lui fallait combattre la théorie du miracle.
Cornford argued that, like the philosophers of the Medieval period, the early Ionian thinkers were not scientific. They did not seek an observational, or empirical, standard by which to order their thoughts. Their 'systems' were, as a matter of fact, steeped in apriori assumptions which represented the world as they expected to find it, the world as viewed through an archaic Greek mentality. Indeed, these premisses seemed to coincide with 'reason' (logos). But, argues Cornford, "reason itself had inherited its claim to immediate and certain apprehension of truth from the prophetic faculty of the inspired sage." Therefore, whatever claims to innovation this new form of thought (philosophy) may have made for itself, and whatever similar claims moderns may make on its behalf (and this is more often the source of such claims), the rise of Greek philosophy in Ionia was a process which demonstrates the continuity of historical movement. It was not, as modern students of Greek philosophy have pictured it, a revolution which overthrew older forms. Those forms still persisted in the so-called 'scientific' cosmologies of the Ionians. Such structural themes as genesis out of an indistinct arché, strife between primeval contestants, the generation of the world in the midst of this conflict, etc., are the common properties of early Greek philosophy and the pre-philosophical religion(s) of Hellas. Where these themes occur, for example in the cosmogony of Anaximander, Cornford
wishes to make two points: first, that these themes have the character of (inherited) assumptions and are not the products of empirical investigation of nature (phasis); and secondly, that in most cases they betray some sort of dependence upon the myths of traditional religion.

The 'primitive' element in Anaximander's cosmogony, according to Cornford, is particularly conspicuous in its cyclical view of time. Like many interpreters, Cornford equates this cycle with that described by the fragment: the eternal give and take between things which Anaximander sees as a process of mutual offence and recompense. This, Cornford believes, refers to the yearly cycle of the seasons which overtake one another when their times come, and which in their own times of prevalence allow themselves to grow too great, offend their opposite, and thus incur punishment.

The idea of something unlimited surrounding that which is limited is also a very ancient idea according to Cornford. He points out that Homer speaks of the sea forming an 'unlimited' (unbroken) circle around an island. Thus, Anaximander thought of the apeiron as encircling the cosmos, just as an earlier Greek (and Oriental) view pictured the stream of Okeanos encircling the Earth. Cornford compares the Orphic theme of the Cosmic Egg to Anaximander's idea that a great ring of fire grew around the earth (like bark around a tree) at the beginning of the world and split into many rings representing the various circles of the heavens. But one must admit, says Cornford, that the language of (cosmic) sexuality has vanished in Anaximander. This illustrates the philosophical process of rationalization taking place in his cosmogony. But if this archaic form of thought was not inspired by an interest in the facts of experience, what does Cornford mean by 'rationalization'?
In a 1941 article entitled "The Ritual Basis for Hesiod's Theogony," Cornford explained that the seemingly confused structure of the Theogony makes eminent sense when the various episodes are seen in their proper context: namely, that of an ancient Oriental, and ultimately Babylonian, ritual. Obviously, Hesiod's version had been removed from its basis in ritual, which had inevitable implications for the content of the myth. The episode which Cornford has in mind is the celebration of the victory of Zeus in the context of the genealogical story of creation. In the East, where this story originated, the relation between the Creation Myth and the ritual celebration of the Creation (the Festival of the New Year) was explicit. That relation— which always subsists between myth and the activity of the cult, as long as the latter is a going concern—was aetiological. Myth is always given as an 'explanation', not for the cosmic drama of creation (for this is not to be explained, but only participated in), but for the cultic drama which rehearses the original in ritual form.

But when the ritual has fallen into disuse, the myth may survive for many centuries. The action will now appear crude, grotesque, monstrous; and yet a poet may instinctively feel that the story is still charged with significance, however obscure, owing to the intense emotions that went into its making, when it was part of vitally important religious action.

This means—though Cornford does not express it this way—that when the ritual setting is gone, the myth which explained it may itself become the object of explanation. When the ritual is no longer performed, it cannot be clear to the reader or hearer why it is saying what it says. The attempt to tackle this difficulty results in what Cornford calls the rationalizing of the myth. And this is exactly what Hesiod, in a less sophisticated, and Anaximander, in a
more sophisticated manner attempted to do. Cornford thus opens the way
to the archaic Greek cosmologies by an appeal to the social setting of the
myth in cultic ritual.

What excited me was the idea that early philosophic
cosmogony is not only a transcription of mythical
cosmogonies, but finally has its root in ritual,
something tangibly existing, not baseless 'fancies'
and speculation.126

Cornford was interested in analyzing Greek philosophy in terms of its
social setting in two senses. In the first place, he emphasizes the
continuity of historical development. This means that in order to under­
stand the rise of Greek philosophy, it is more important, in Cornford's
opinion, to look at the connections which bind this thought to past forms
than to stress its innovations.127 In the second place, Cornford's 'social'
explanation of Greek philosophy attempts to place every conception in the
context of a prevailing mentality. This prevailing mentality, what may
be called a Zeitgeist, consists of 'innate preconceptions' belonging to the
very nature of the Collective Consciousness of the group at a certain stage
in its development.128 Thus Cornford at the same time emphasizes the unity
of a social mentality and the continuity of its development. Simply put, he
combines psychic unity with historical continuity to produce a social
heremeneutic of early Greek thought.129

Cornford himself was a Fabian socialist,130 though he did not consider
this relevant to his analysis of ancient philosophy. He would not have dared
to forward a "Socialist" interpretation of the pre-Socratics. Perhaps it is
for this reason, and not so much because of ideological differences, that he
denounced the attempts (some he thought more crude than others) among his fol­
lowers to exegete Greek thought by way of Marxism. Nevertheless, some did
move Cornford's ideas in this direction. If we were to judge this fact from the point of view of Cornford's own philosophy of history—the gradual evolution of the collective human consciousness—then we would naturally set about to find what in Cornford could be viewed as anticipatory of Marxism, as well as what in this Marxism betrays Cornfordian roots.

We have already hit upon the answer to this query when we spoke of Cornford's combination of a psychology and a sociology to form a hermeneutic of ancient thought. Such a combination was already present in Durkheim, though not in Marx. Thus, if Durkheim converts, so to speak, to Marxism, it must be a conversion to one or other of the forms of "Western" or "neo-" Marxism in which this combination is often found. And in these revised forms of Marx's doctrine, the messianic fervor must have sufficiently cooled to allow the replacement of revolutionary by evolutionary ideas. Thus the peaceful co-existence of psychology and sociology in both Cornford's Durkheimianism and in Thomson's and Vernant's (non-Marxist) Historical Materialism will have to form the hermeneutical bridge which enables passage over the ideological gulf that separates them. This, I would argue, is clearly the case. I labor this point only to sidestep any objection to placing Cornford in line with Thomson on the grounds that Cornford expressed himself negatively concerning the possibility of a Marxist interpretation of ancient thought,¹³¹ or with Vernant because he denies validity to appeals to material conditions for explaining its genesis. Says Cornford,

If we take Anaximander's cosmogony with all its archaic features, it can, I believe, be shown to be a rationalisation of an ancient Creation myth. The social origin of his philosophy is to be found there, not in the economic conditions of sixth-century Miletus.¹³²
It is not a matter of indifference to the Historical Materialist whether or not material culture is the determinative factor in history. In fact, the Marxist doctrine as such, its interpretation of the history of non-Marxist philosophies, stands or falls on this point. The revisions of the neo-Marxists have indeed tampered with the orthodox (Marx's?) formulation of the base-superstructure relationship. It may even be said that this relationship in Marxist circles has now become ambiguous (though not, perhaps, among practising ideologues). It is not clear, for example, whether for neo-Marxists factors in the economic base are the 'causes' of conditions in the spiritual superstructure, or whether these conditions merely 'reflect' the economic reality of the base. And if there is only some kind of correspondence and not a cause-effect relation between them, what is the proper analysis of this correspondence in its concrete manifestations? But granting that it is no "Marxism," nevertheless Vernant's theory of history is committed to disclosing the social, economic and political factors in culture as that which constitutes the foundation of human thought. And however subtly he may wish to express the relation between base and superstructure, this relation is the key to his hermeneutic of early Greek philosophy.

We must not overlook that which Cornford and Vernant have in common. For in the same sentence in which Cornford dismisses economic conditions as a basis for interpreting Greek thought, he speaks of the 'social origin' of philosophy. On this more embracing issue--more embracing than the place and importance of the economic--Cornford and Vernant speak the same language. It is along these lines that Vernant wishes to carry on the work of Cornford.

Aujourd'hui que la filiation (between myth and philosophy), grâce à Cornford, est reconnue, le problème prend
nécessairement une forme nouvelle. Il ne s'agit plus seulement de retrouver dans la philosophie l'ancien, mais d'en dégager le véritablement nouveau: ce par quoi la philosophie cesse d'être le mythe pour devenir philosophie.134

As Vernant goes on to say, Cornford did not ignore the question of what was new in Ionian philosophy. He simply emphasized the connections of this philosophy with the past because that was his discovery. He suggests that Cornford would have turned to an exposition of its innovations had he had the opportunity. It is this task, therefore, which Vernant feels obliged to pick up. In doing so, he by no means ignores Cornford's demonstration of the rootedness of pre-Socratic thought in its mythical past. For example, Vernant's Les origines de la pensée grecque, though its title suggests that it will be an examination of the views of the earliest pre-Socratics, actually ends with a study of Anaximander. Its greater part concerns the developments, both social and political, which led up to, and made possible, the appearance of these philosophies on the intellectual plane of Hellenic history. Vernant begins with the Mycenaean form of kingship after which, following the Dorian invasions, comes the Polis and a new form of social order. In this way, he actually puts flesh on Cornford's skeletal outline of the historical gap that separates the original Oriental Creation myth in situ ritu from its rationalized form in Hesiod. Vernant shows that kingly sovereignty in the Mycenaean setting was essentially oriental in character. He argues that this ideal cannot be understood apart from the economic conditions which accompanied this form of social life. Its breakdown, too, had a pronounced economic dimension, as had the new social form created by the Greeks to replace it: the Polis. By the time Vernant is ready to explain the relation of early Greek thought to all of this,
Cornford's statement—that the ritual enactment of an ancient creation myth, and not the economic conditions of sixth century Miletus, constituted the social origin of philosophy—no longer makes sense. A disjunction between ritual origins and economic conditions is untenable, according to Vernant's analysis.

D. Summary Remarks

In our examinations of the four traditions of pre-Socratic thought, we have brought to light that feature which, in each case, is the distinguishing mark as well as the potential weakness of its hermeneutic. In the case of the Positivist tradition, the chief characteristic is the analysis of pre-Socratic thought in terms of the birth of Western science. The difficulty of this interpretation, we said, was its view of the rise of philosophy as the 'miracle grec'. The Classicist tradition is characterized by its veneration for the Greek genius, and its chief weakness is its reliance upon a 'unity-idea' according to which the Greek thinkers are analyzed under the rubric of 'the history of problems'—problems to which, it is assumed, all Greeks necessarily addressed themselves. The Dionysian interpretation of the neuere Forschung assumes a breakdown in the Hellenic culture which divides the static theory of Plato and the barren researches of Aristotle from the vigorous rhapsodies of archaic thought. The burden with which this tradition has strapped itself is that of penetrating the Aristotelian doxography to the now almost inaccessible stratum of archaic thought lying beneath it. The fourth tradition, as we have seen, consists of those social explanations of pre-Socratic philosophy. Its chief weakness is neither its emphasis of continuity (which we will see has been corrected by Vernant) nor its theory of the (qualified) dependence of ancient philosophy upon the myth, but the danger
of a hermeneutical reductionism. Philosophical thought, which is analytical-logical in nature, cannot be said to have a social or an economic origin (arché) unless something in the former is theoretically identified with the latter through a reductionistic anthropology, or at least by a reductionistic historiography. As a matter of fact, Vernant must struggle to avoid this danger as we will see in the sequel.
Footnotes

1 Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (1954) 233-252.

2 Ibid., p. 233.

3 Ibid., p. 233.

4 A glance through the indices of L'Année philologique from the early 1930's to the present shows a marked increase, beginning about 1944, in the number of references to works concerning early Greek philosophy in general and Anaximander in particular.


9 Ibid., p. 7.


15 John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (New York: 1930); see pp. 50-71 on Anaximander.

16 F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation* (New York: 1912), see esp. pp. 7-12 on Anaximander; *Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought* (Cambridge: 1952), Chapter 10 on Anaximander.


18 Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfort am Main: 1950), pp. 296-343: "Der Spruch des Anaximanders."

19 *op. cit.,* p. 234.

20 *op. cit.,* pp. 45-46.


op. cit., p. 28.

Kahn confirmed his belief in the miracle grec in a letter to the author.

op. cit. p. XI.


Hereafter we will refer to fragments or testimonia in Diels/Kranz's (*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*) by using simply the number of the author (Anaximander is number 12), the letter designating whether the passage is testimony (A) or actual fragment (B) and the number of the passage in these sections. If the context clearly refers to Anaximander, we will simply use, for example, "A9" to indicate the ninth testimonium.

op. cit., pp. 172ff.

Fragment #24, 1-7.

I am appealing to M. Polanyi's distinction between focal awareness and subsidiary awareness which he makes with reference to the relation of thought to commitment. See his *Personal Knowledge* (University of Chicago Press, 1958), and *The Tacit Dimension* (New York, 1966).


op. cit. p. 241. This is confirmed by Jaeger's own testimony: "I long ago started my work on pre-Socratic philosophy...but I have also spent a whole life on the study of the Christian tradition...I therefore am deeply impressed by the continuity of the fundamental forms of thought and expression which triumphantly bridges the chasm between these antithetic periods of the human mind and integrates them into one universal civilization." Therefore, the Greek and Christian traditions are, if not originally, at least ultimately, parts of a whole. In attributing to the early Greek philosophers a "natural theology," Jaeger is following a classical Christian, even patristic (cf. Clement of Alexandria), conception of the relation between these two traditions.
Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (New York: 1955) pp. 27-30: "In the two centuries which followed Hesiod, however, a process was completed which was of great importance for the rise of philosophy--the emancipation of the individual." This process, says Zeller, which expressed dissatisfaction with traditional religion, found two basic expressions: "that of rational thought and investigation, which the Ionic physicists followed, and that of religious mysticism, to which Orphism pointed the way" (p. 34). Cf. B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind (New York: 1970) Chapter Three: "The Rise of the Individual in Early Greek Lyric" (pp. 43-70). Compare this with Jaeger, Paideia I, chapter seven: "Ionian and Aeolian Poetry: The Individual Shapes his own Personality" (pp. 115-135).

Other representatives include Engelbert Drerup, Der Humanismus, Vier Vorträge (1933) and Max Pohlenz. See also Lothar Hebling, Der Dritte Humanismus (1935).


Heidegger offers an exegesis of Parmenides already in Sein und Zeit (1926) in connection with his doctrine of truth as uncovering (d-λύειν) and again in his Introduction to Metaphysics (1935).

op. cit., Die Entdeckung des Geistes (1948). In Chapter 1, Snell offers his view of Greek "paideia" and of the birth of "Humanism." His section on the rise of philosophy from the myth (Chapters 9 and 10) incorporates Lévy-Bruhlian ideas about pre-logical, mythical thought (See G.S. Kirk, The Nature of Greek Myths pp. 280ff), a kind of thinking which he associates with images and similies (cf. Freud). Concerning the rise of scientific thought Snell points to potentialities latent in the structure of the Greek language itself.
such as the use of the definite article. His emphasis on speech, which "harbors the seeds of the structure of the human intellect" (p. 245), bears comparison with the theories of Ernst Cassirer.

Karl Deichgräber, "Hymnische Elemente in der philosophischen Prosa der Vorsokratiker," Philologus 88 (1933) 347f. Jaeger appeals to this article (Theology, p. 30) as evidence of theological concerns in Anaxagoras, Diogenes and Anaximander; "Anaximander von Milet," Hermes (1940) 10-19, this excellent treatment was directed against the criticisms of Dirlmirer—about whom later—concerning the extent of the actual fragment of Anaximander. Like others in the Classicist tradition, Deichgräber relates Anaximander to the Hesiodic line of thought. He also compares Anaximander's use of "Chronos" to that of Solon (apparently independently of Jaeger) and anticipates Gigon in positing that the distinction between the Unlimited, Eternal Arche and transient, individual things is the chief feature of Anaximander's thought.


See prefaces of Ursprung and Grundprobleme.

See article quoted above at n.43.


op. cit., p. 50.

Wilamowitz had just received his doctorate. For the details of this controversy, see Walter Kaufmann's article on Nietzsche in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rohde was a follower and friend of Nietzsche, later famous for his work. *Psyche: Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen* (Tübingen, 1921) in which he anticipated the belief of O. Kern (*Orphicorum Fragmenta*, 1922) in the existence of an Orphic "Church" in the sixth century B.C. Rohde incorporated a Freudian association of dreams with the unconscious mind (See Kirk, op. cit., p. 70ff) in his interpretation of the Homeric idea of the shade-existence of the post-mortum psyche.


"With Plato something entirely new has its beginning. Or it might be said with equal justice, from Plato on there is something essentially amiss with philosophers when one compares them to that 'republic of creative minds' from Thales to Socrates," Ibid., p. 34.

See Kaufmann, op. cit.


For Nietzsche the Greeks were the "highest authority for what we may term cultural health," *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. p. 28.

*Introduction to Metaphysics* (1953). This book was reworked from a lecture given in the summer of 1935 at the University of Freiburg. But, says Heidegger "I made no changes in the content" (Preface to Eng. trans.), which explains the reference to National Socialism. This last fact sheds some light on Heidegger's attitude reflected in the remark just quoted concerning historical movement from strength to weakness.

Ibid., p. 179.

Ibid., p. 179.

*Holzwege* (Frankfort am Main: 1950), pp. 296-343.

*Introduction*, pp. 126-134.
All of Chapter 4 is devoted to early Greek philosophy, which Heidegger analyzes in terms of the emerging distinctions: Being-Becoming, Being-Appearance, Being-Thought, Being-Ought. His treatment is reviewed by J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York, 1971) esp. pp. 139-155 and by Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Tübingen, 1963), pp. 195-207.

M. Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 325.

O. Pöggeler, op. cit. p. 206.


What is Called Thinking? p. 10.

From a discussion between Marjorie Green and Stuart Hampshire in Encounter April, 1958. See also Green's book, Heidegger (New York, 1957) and her article "Martin Heidegger" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

"Zur Vorgeschichte der Metaphysik," Anteile. Martin Heidegger zum 60. Geburtstag (Frankfurt am Main: 1950). pp. 51-79; "Antike Atomtheorie," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Naturwissenschaft 3 (1935) 81-95; Truth and Method (New York: 1975). In a short section of Truth and Method on "The Classical Example," Gadamer discusses the problematic re-combination of the normative with the historical after WWI by the New Humanism. Gadamer suggests that it is the rise of historisches Bewusstsein and the crisis of Historicism which it precipitated that separates the "second" (Winkelmann) from the "third" (Wilomowitz and Jaeger) Humanism. He speaks of the failure of the New Humanism in this connection (pp. 254f, 257) and is critical of Jaeger in particular (p. 524, n. 190.).

Platons Gespräche (Frankfurt am Main: 1964); Dialektik, Positivismus, Mythologie (on Heidegger); and on our topic, "Heraklit zitiert Anaximander," Hermes 84 (1956) 382-384.

Parmenides und die Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie (Bonn: 1916); Die Ilias und Ihr Dichter (1961); Tradition und Geist (1960); Vermächtnis der Antike (1966). The last title contains Reinhardt's most important articles on Greek philosophy and the history of classical studies.
Untersuchungen zur Form der Odyssee (1939); "Anaximander und die Anfänge der Philosophie," Hermes (1953); Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklos (1965); "Empedokles," Hermes 93 (1965); "Gramatisches zu Parmenides," Hermes 84 (1956); Das Schweigen der Arete (1960); Empedokles und Hölderlin (1965); Die Chance des Unbegagens (Göttingen: 1965); Anfängliches Fragen: Studien zur frühen griechischen Denkens (Göttingen: 1968).

Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 107-108: "Karl Reimhardt's recent interpretation of Sophocles (1933) comes appreciably closer to Greek being-there and being than all previous attempts, because Reimhardt sees and questions the tragic process on the basis of the fundamental relations between being, unconcealment, and appearance."

Um die Begriffswelt der Vorsokratiker (Darmstadt; 1968), a collection of essays by various authors including Gadamer, who edited the volume. According to Gadamer, the collection illustrates that in Germany, "Philologen von bemerkenswerter philosophischer Reflexionskraft und Philosophen von entschlossener Treue zum Text in enge Kooperation getreten sind" (p. vii). In his opinion, Reimhardt's Parmenides (1916) represented the first awakening of this kind of pre-Socratic scholarship in the twentieth century.

Hölscher, who was a frequent guest in the Reimhardt home as a student, relates the deep impression made upon him and fellow students when Martin Heidegger paid a visit to Reimhardt during a Sunday afternoon session, Die Chance (p. 38).

An older contemporary (1818-1897) and colleague of Nietzsche (1844-1900) at the University of Basel and a follower of Schopenhauer. His lectures on the study of history (Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen) were attended by Nietzsche and their influence is seen in the latter's The Use and Abuse of History. A committed classicist, a pessimistic philosopher of history, and an opponent of pure positivism in philology, Burckhardt made his greatest contribution in Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien: Ein Versuch (1860), a classic work on the period.

See Kurt Hildebrandt, Das Werk Stefan Georges (Hamburg: 1960); K. J. Popma, "Humanisme en Antihumanisme," op. cit., p. 31-32; Uvo Hölscher, Die Chance, pp. 43-44; W. Koch, Stefan George, Weltbild, Naturbild, Menschenbild (1933).

Kurt Hildebrandt, Platon, Logos und Mythos (Berlin: 1933).

Uvo Hölscher, Die Chance, p. 43.
As we noted the "problemgeschichtliche" approach—which originated in the Baden school of Neo-Kantianism and especially in the historiography of Windelband (1848-1915)—is the one taken by Jaeger and Gigon. In a broad sense, however, one could say that Aristotle approaches his predecessors in the same way: i.e., by asking how they account for certain realities which are also major themes in his own philosophy. Appealing to "Problemgeschichte" in this broader sense, Höscher is saying that the approach of the Humanistic philologists is not new, but has in fact dominated the history of philosophy. He thereby sets himself over and against the tradition, including the Classicists, in a very radical way.

Here we come upon the central hermeneutical theme and, indeed, problem in the line of interpretation beginning with Nietzsche: if one adopts the notion that the pre-Platonics and pre-Aristotelians differed fundamentally in the character of their thought from the two giants of classical Greek philosophy (Plato and Aristotle), then how do we navigate the narrow passage between this Scylla and Charybdis to reach authentic archaic thinking. For all of our knowledge of the pre-Socratics—except what we possess in the way of primary sources (the fragments)—comes from doxographers of either the Academic or Peripatetic schools.

A reference to the title of Herman Fränkel's Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens (2nd ed, 1960). Höscher implies that Fränkel's work is part of the "neuere Forschung." A similar indication concerning Fränkel's approach to the pre-Socratics is given in the title of another of his works, Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums (New York: 1951).

Anfängliches Fragen, pp. 5-6.

Gadamer, Begriffswelt der Vorsokratiker, p. ix.


Gadamer, op. cit., p. IX.

Early Greek Philosophy, p. 52. n 6.
Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, see the Chapter on the fragment.

Deichgraber's reply to Diirmeier was "Anaximander von Milet," Hermes (1940) 10-19; Dirlmeier replied to Deichgraber in "Nochmals Anaximander von Milet," Hermes (1940) 329-331. The three articles give a clear impression of the issues in dispute between the "Dritte Humanismus" and the "Neuere Forschung" concerning the scientific criticism of the doxography.

See note #49 above.

Says Heidegger, "Der Ausgrenzung des Textes stimme ich zu, nicht aber ihrer Begründung" (Holzwege, p. 345). See also his remarks on pp. 314ff. Gigon, too, concurs with Dirlmeier "gegen Deichgraber" (Ursprung, p. 81 n. 16) but he does not share the Neuere Forschung's attitude toward the witness of Aristotle. In fact, Gigon's unique Anaximander interpretation is based squarely on the text of Aristotle.


Ibid., p. 187.


Anfängliches Fragen, p. 9.

F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (New York, 1912); Principium Sapientiae (Cambridge, 1952).

Journal of Hellenic Studies 73 (1953) 77-83.

M. de Corte, "Mythe et philosophie chez Anaximandre," Leval Théologique et Philosophique 14 (1958) 9-29. De Corte believes that Anaximander's cosmology was "written entirely within the framework of the myth."

We are following Kirk's judgement (Greek Myths, p. 279) and Vernant's appeal to Cornford in his article "Du mythe à la raison: la formation de la pensée positive dans la Grèce archaïque," Annales. E.S.C. (1957) 183-206 and Mythe et pensée, pp. 285-314.

F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae (Cambridge: 1952), p. 188.

Ibid., p. 201

See also his article "Was the Ionian Philosophy Scientific?", Journal of Hellenic Studies 62 (1942) 1-7, for further argumentation along this line.


F. M. Cornford, "The Marxist View of Ancient Philosophy," The Unwritten Philosophy, pp. 121-122.

M. P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée, p. 290.

Principium Sapientiae, p. 159.

Ibid., p. 169 and 171f.

Ibid., p. 177.

Odyssey X, 194:

See Kirk and Ravin, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 44-47. Kirk rejects the connection of Anaximander's cosmogony with this Orphic idea (p. 132).

Principium Sapientiae, pp. 180ff.

In The Unwritten Philosophy, pp. 95-117.

Ibid., p. 112.

Ibid., p. 116.
"This evolutionary view of human thought came to him (Cornford) like a revelation, and to seize the primitive roots of Greek thought seemed to him essential to an understanding of its flower. It was an indispensible means to an end, but the end remained the same, to comprehend the mind of a Plato, an Aeschylus or a Thucydides," W. K. C. Guthrie, from the Preface to The Unwritten Philosophy, p. XIV.

128 Ibid., p. X: "Cornford had been helped, not by the analogies of psycho-analysis but rather by theories of the earliest types of social organization and the mentality which resulted from them. (emph. mine), by accounts of the 'group soul' and 'collective representations' as they were emerging from the researches of French scholars, notably Emil Durkheim and Lévi-Bruhl. The 'collective unconscious' of Jung came later to strengthen and deepen his convictions."

129 Guthrie notes (Ibid., p X, n2) the similarity of Cornford's views to the conception of history held by the late R. G. Collingwood.

130 Ibid., p. XVIII.

131 F. M. Cornford, "The Marxist View of Ancient Philosophy" (1942) in The Unwritten Philosophy, pp. 117ff.

132 Ibid., p. 122.

133 Vernant criticizes Thomson (Mythe et pensée, pp. 308f) for "transposing too mechanically" what Thomson calls the "abstract form of merchandise" (money economy, etc.) from the economic life of the Polis into the abstract concepts of the philosophy of Parmenides.

134 Mythe et pensée, p. 290.
Part Two: Four Interpretations of Anaximander

The order in which we will review the four Anaximander interpretations is chronological, according to the dates of the publications concerned. First Gigon, *Der Ursprung der Griechischen Philosophie* (1945) and "Die Theologie der Vorsokratiker" (1954); next, Hölscher, "Anaximander und die Anfänge der Philosophie" (1953); Charles Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology* (1960); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Les origines de la pensée grecque* (1962) and *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (1971). By rehearsing the order of their appearance, we will be able to make comparisons and cross-references which will reflect actual criticisms, reactions and affirmations among the scholars. Mutual critique is an important factor in the literature. These articles and books were not written in a vacuum; thus we find much in them by way of response to previous literature. For example, the second edition of Hölscher's article (1968) contains numerous references to works which appeared since his article was published. These take the form of footnotes, many of which refer to Kahn's analysis of Anaximander. The vigor of Hölscher's response indicates that, if his article had originally appeared after Kahn's book, the text might read much differently. Therefore it is necessary for understanding the emphases of an author to consider the literature to which he is responding.

The grounds for choosing the four scholars used in this study are: (1) that each works out his Anaximander interpretation along with the lines of a prominent tradition in the scholarship; (2) that, being familiar with each other's work on Anaximander (to different degrees in each case), they illustrate the fact that contemporary pre-Socratic scholarship is a dialogue between these traditions; (3) that these four represent the present
state of the dialogue; and finally (4) that the manner in which these analyses are carried out, vis-a-vis their respective traditions, illustrates the presuppositional character of this contemporary discussion (by which we mean its rootedness in philosophical commitment and hermeneutic aprioris). If, through our analysis of these four interpreters, we succeed in reaching an understanding of this final point, we will then be in a position to enter the dialogue ourselves.

(1) Gigon's interpretation of Anaximander is built primarily on two foundations. The first is his belief in the "principle of continuity" in Greek philosophy. Gigon states this principle as follows:

Die vorhandenen Werke über diesen Gegenstand (die Geschichte der ältesten griechischen Philosophie) leiden öfter daran, dass sie noch zu sehr in Banne der antiken Philosophiegeschichte stehen und sich darauf beschränken, die einzelnen Systeme zu entwickeln, wie sie als geschlossene Welten dem Haupte ihrer Schöpfer entsprungen sein möchten. Dem gegenüber liegt uns vor allem an der geschichtlichen Kontinuität...Das geschichtliche Verständnis der antiken Philosophie gewinnen wir am ehesten dadurch, dass wir immer wieder fragen, was jeder einzelne Denker an schon Bestehendem vorfand, was er daran hat verbessern und überwinden wollen und worin er dann später selbst überwunden worden ist... Aber der Interpretation im Einzelnen bleibt ein ungeheuerer Spielraum. Um aus dem vielen Möglichen das Wahrscheinliche zu gewinnen, bleiben in den meisten Fällen nur jene Indizien, die aus dem Prinzip der Kontinuität sich ergeben. Jede unsichere Stelle muss von ihrem historischen Orte her ihre Deutung empfangen. Wir fragen, wie sie gemessen an den Lehren der unmittelbar vorangehenden und der unmittelbar nachfolgenden Generation zu verstehen sei (1945), 9-10).

On this basis, Gigon argues that the themes and the ethos of Anaximander's thought must be exegeted in terms of the poems of Hesiod. He views Hesiod as the first philosopher and Greek poetry in general as the source of Greek philosophy.
The second foundation is Gigon's belief that the ruling element and constant theme of Anaximander's thought is a distinction between the arché of all things (τὸ ἀπειροῦν = Das Unbegrenzte) on the one hand and everything else (das Begrenzte) on the other. Connected with this is Gigon's unique treatment of several passages in Aristotle which refer to the philosophical conception of an unnamed pre-Socratic. Gigon believes Aristotle has Anaximander in mind and turns this to account in his analysis of the apeiron-doctrine.

The first Hesiodic parallel he finds is in the use of the term arché. Gigon believes that not only Hesiod but also Thales employed it. Thus the statements by Simplicius and Hippolytus which credit Anaximander with the first application (κωμίσα-Αγ) of the term arché merely mean that Anaximander is the oldest author using it whose work Theophrastus had read. Argues Gigon, the term and the idea occur in Hesiod as well--eg, "that which was there in the very beginning" (Theog. 115)--and its meaning in Anaximander is "most probably the same" (1945, 60). Furthermore, the character of Anaximander's arché—the Unlimited—is also reminiscent of Hesiod's Chaos. Both are formless space. But Hesiod's Chaos is the "gap" between Heaven and Earth. Within this space are generated alternately Day and Night (Theog. 123ff). Chaos is limited by boundaries on either side. It is these visible boundaries which Anaximander "thought away" in order to arrive at his conception of the Unlimited—"That which remains after the final abstraction of all form" (1945, 60). Anaximander's use of the generic article with the neuter adjective—τὸ ἀπειροῦν—is the beginning of the language of Greek philosophy, and is itself a "boundary" in its history, both "fulfilling the authentic intention of Hesiod's thought and serving as point of departure for new connections" (1945, 61). Nevertheless, the structure of
Anaximander's cosmogony is Hesiodisch: at the beginning stands "das Leerste, Einfachste, Gestaltloseste", while the generation of the cosmos out of this is "eine Erfüllung, Vervielfachung und Gestaltung".

Gigon sees in Anaximander's ἄνερπος a very sophisticated concept. The concept is "a dialectical unity of Nothing and Everything". By this, Gigon means a concept which signifies everything in potentia without involving the actual existence of any particular thing. It was attained, he says through "the ruthless abstraction from, and even negation of all individuality"(1945, 61). The Unbegrenzte is by no means a visible or sensible presence. It lies somehow beyond the Bright and the Dark. But this concept is dialectical in yet another sense. The Unbegrenzte, despite being "jenseits von Helle and Dunkelheit", is nevertheless related to Night and Light. Gigon appeals to the above mentioned Aristotle texts to elaborate what he believes to have been Anaximander's solution to this conceptual paradox. In these loci, Aristotle refers to a conception according to which the arché of all things lies "between"(μεταξό) water and air or "between" air and fire. The mention of these specific elements in these passages, Gigon believes, is post-Anaximandrian; the μεταξό, however, is authentic. The Unbegrenzte lies between Night and Light and thus is not a material substratum (though Gigon does not hesitate to describe it as a potentiality). "Dieses zwischen markiert eine rein begriffliche Beziehung des transzendenten Ursprungs auf die Welt. Der Ursprung ist wohl jenseitig, aber trotzdem an die Welt bezogen, aber nicht als eine materielle, anschauliche Urform" (1945, 61). Gigon, in relation to a projected philosophical problem--namely, how can one maintain the fundamental difference between the Unlimited and the Limited without sacrificing the relation between them in a dualism?--credits Anaximander with a brilliant
solution. Namely, the arché is conceived dialectically as being something absolutely distinct without being wholly other, as being in union (or at least in relation) without being identical (or at least like in kind). This conceptual balance is achieved through the notion of μεταφορά. The result is that the Unbegrenzte—the invisible origin of the visible—is "jenseits der Alternative von Materialität and Immaterialität" (1945, 61). In contrast to the solid geometry of Thales, with Anaximander we find ourselves "in a sphere of pure intellectuality". This is Gigon's problemgeschichtliche Methode in action. Through his analysis, we see Anaximander advancing upon the conception of his predecessor by introducing and solving a problem which was never broached by Thales.

However, according to Gigon, Anaximander was not always faithful to both sides of the paradox of his apeiron-concept. In some cases he appears to opt for the difference and distance of the apeiron at the expense of the genetic relation between the origin and the originated. For example, nowhere in the testimonia, Gigon points out, do we hear reference to the coming-into-being of the Earth out of the Unbegrenzte. Apparently the "jump from pure formlessness to compact substantiality was still too great" (1945, 62). But this flaw in Anaximander's solution to a philosophiegeschichtliches Problem is itself susceptible of problemgeschichtliche interpretation. As Gigon says, the required conceptual jump was still too great. Thus Anaximander's failure at this point has at least an historical precedence and even a specific antecedent. In the Theogony, too, Earth, while it comes into being after Chaos (=Hesiod's arche, according to Gigon), does not arise out of the origin (Theog. II, 116ff). Again we have a parallel between Anaximander and Hesiod which, precisely because it is a negative parallel (in both thinkers it is
"eine Lücke in der Abstraktion"), indicates just how dependent Anaximander was on the thought of the older theological poet. But above and beyond this, it provides evidence for Gigon's postulate of continuity. "Die Gemeinsamkeit dieser Lücke in der Kosmologie bei Hesiod und Anaximander ist eines der schönsten Beispiele für die Kontinuität des archaischen Denkens" (1945, 62).

The dimension of philosophical-historical continuity in Anaximander's thought is not, however, strictly a matter of its relation to past conceptions. There are also many elements in it which anticipate things to come. With respect to these, Gigon believes that Anaximander was far ahead of his time and that most of these anticipations concern his concept of the Unbegrenzte.

First, says Gigon, is Anaximander's explicit distinction between the Unbegrenzte and the Begrenzte. On this foundation Gigon builds the sophisticated philosophical structure which he attributes to Anaximander and which he believes Anaximander bequeathed to the history of philosophy. The difficulty at this point, which Gigon does not mention, lies in the fact that none of Anaximander's doxographers, nor his fragment, make any mention of τά πέρατα or of τὸ πεπερασμένον, an Aristotelian term. It is true that this theme, in its juxtaposition with τὸ ἀπειρον, is present in early (=5th century) Pythagoreanism, much of which appears to rely upon Anaximander. The contrast πέρατα/ἀπειρον constitutes the first of the Ten Principles (τὰ ἀρχαί ἔκα) of Pythagorean philosophy as related by Aristotle. But there is no textual indication of such a contrast in Anaximander himself. Gigon posits it solely on the basis of an alleged philosophical implication in the apeiron-concept itself. As an alpha-privative form, the ἀ-ἀπειρον substantive etymologically presupposes ἀπειρο. Even on the level of meaning, says Gigon, "fordert das Unbegrenzte als seine Ergänzung das Begrenzte, das aus ihm hervorgeht" (1945, 62). In my
opinion, whether or not Anaximander himself verbalized the contrast between origin and cosmos in this way, some such distinction is clearly implied in the testimonia and fragment(s).

In fact, this distinction is a prerequisite to the correct exegesis of the sentence from Anaximander's book. But it is of no small importance, speaking historically, as to whether Anaximander employed the explicit contrast περάτον/άπειρον, when we are considering the probable impact of his work on later conceptions. Furthermore, the presence of this contrast determines the interpretation of the άπειρον itself by restricting it to a meaning correlate to one of the ordinary uses of περάτον. These uses may be embraced by the three basic meanings of the English word "end": i.e., (1) extremity (spatial), (2) termination (temporal), and (3) goal (purposive). Great differences in interpretation of the apeiron rest on which of these senses of "limit" is perceived in Anaximander's thought. Gigon combines the first two meanings and adds to these more besides. Thus the Unbegrenzte/Begrenzte contrast "unfolds itself into a plurality of antithetical pairs."

The first of these is the distinction between the all-embracing, abstract apeiron and the concrete individual character of the visible cosmos. In Gigon's view, Anaximander's theory of the relation between the visible/finite and the conceptual/infinite held the field in pre-Socratic thought (eg, in Anaximenes and Xenophanes) until Parmenides, who reversed the distinction. The result of this Umkehrung is that, eg. in Plato, definition and delimitation belong to the invisible world of universal forms while the visible is said to be "unlimited" by any stable determinations. Thus, while Parmenides marks the beginning of "reflection of the mind upon itself and mental being," Anaximander remained within the category of appearance (1945, 63). By this Gigon must
mean that Anaximander never attempted to reflect on the nature of any thing beyond the visible, but reserved such transcendence for \( \tau \delta \alpha \gamma \varepsilon \iota \rho \omega \nu \), the general-as-such. Otherwise, he would contradict his earlier assertions of the "pure conceptuality" of Anaximander's apeiron-doctrine.

In the second antithesis, Gigon contrasts the imperishability of the Unbegrenzte with the transitoriness of the Begrenzte. With this Gigon is on solid ground, since the fragment itself speaks of the return of things (\( \tau \alpha \delta \gamma \nu \rho \alpha \) to that from which they came. Gigon connects with this the theory of the innumerable worlds attributed to Anaximander by Theophrastus (12A9). This antithesis is, too, eventually found its way into the philosophy of Plato, (eg, at Tim, 27 D26ff) but without undergoing reversal. In fact, the theme of Time throughout ancient philosophy by and large receives the same out-working, in Gigon's opinion--unlike, eg, the theme of Space (1945, 63).

Parmenides' contribution to the history of this contrast was the application of the terms Being (\( \tau \delta \alpha \omicron \upsilon \) and Becoming (\( \tau \delta \gamma \iota \nu \nu \omicron \epsilon \omicron \nu \nu \)\( \omicron \nu \)). But what is missing in Anaximander's concept of \( \tau \delta \alpha \gamma \varepsilon \iota \rho \omega \nu \), which is present in Parmenides' idea of \( \tau \delta \alpha \omicron \upsilon \), is the idea that the Eternal itself never came into being. In Hesiod, it is clear that not only the eternal gods had an origin, but even the meta-deities, who stand as the \( \delta \gamma \omicron \alpha \iota \) of the two lines of divine descent--\( \chi \alpha \omicron \kappa \iota \kappa \iota \) -- came into being. Anaximander's testimonia nowhere suggest that he conceived of a \( \gamma \nu \nu \omicron \epsilon \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \) of his \( \alpha \omicron \chi \omicron \) of the Unbegrenzte. Yet Gigon believes that he is closer to the thought-world of Hesiod than to that of Parmenides on this point. He claims that both Hesiod and Anaximander lack the concept of the un-generated (das Unentstandene). Therefore, Anaximander's abstract realm of the Unbegrenzte actually represents the epiphany of the gods of Homer who came into existence, but live as Immortals.
From here we move to the third antithesis, which is founded on the Homeric-Hesiodic sense of divine immortality and its contrast, human mortality. Gigon senses in this contrast--beyond the imperishable/transient distinction--a moral gulf which separates the origin from individual things. From the fragment (Bl) we learn that perishable things (including men) are characterized by an Ungerechtigkeit, constantly offending one another and therefore paying each other the requisite penalty. On the basis of this, Gigon conjectures that Anaximander attributed "a comprehensive Perfection and Righteousness to the boundless Origin" (1945, 64). Whether or not indications of the moral holiness of the ἀτελεία warrant this view, Gigon rightly detects an attribution of (quasi-) personality in Aristotle's statement (12A15) that the apeiron "both embraces and steers all things."

Gigon takes issue with Aristotle's remark, just a few lines earlier in this same testimonium, that the apeiron never came into being, but existed from all eternity. As we saw he compares his view to Hesiod on this point. Here, however, he concedes that Aristotle has correctly represented the apeiron-doctrine. In fact, Gigon cites the authority of Deichgräber's judgement of this phrase as "eine charakteristische archaische Allmachtsprädikation." But this awe for a divine personality clashes with the abstract impersonality of the apeiron-concept--the very "negation of mythical personality" (1954, 136). Therefore, Gigon speaks of an unavoidable Antinomie (1954, 138) and theologische Dialektik (1954, 139) which pervades the apeiron-doctrine and indeed dominates the whole outlook of Anaximander. This conflict concerns the competition between appeals to personal, moral and theological categories and appeals to impersonal, neutral, and physical categories. This competition is in evidence at all levels of Anaximander's philosophy. The theory concerning
the visible cosmos shows the dual motive. Anaximander's meteorology, for example, has been denuded of all elements of divine intervention. The weather and the heavenly bodies follow their own processes according to identifiable, natural principles. Yet, says Gigon, the coming and going of Day and Night, or the seasons, or even an eclipse of the sun, are seen by Anaximander as injustices which must be repaid. Even our cosmos, which is one among an innumerable many, is itself a deity. Thus Gigon sees in Anaximander a kind of Schelling, according to whom the same cosmos at once possesses both the natural force of matter and the spiritual freedom of mind. But the kind of tension and duality which Schelling saw in his "Natur" and which Gigon sees in Anaximander, Anaximander himself seems not to have noticed. At any rate, under its "personal aspect" the apeiron reminds Gigon of Hesiod's Zeus who governs the world with justice. And with respect to the theory that it "steers" all things, Gigon notes that Aristotle (and probably Anaximander himself: see 12B5) used the verb κυβερνάω, cognate with our "govern" and commonly used for the pilot or helmsman of a vessel. Gigon suggests (1945, 65 and 1954, 136) that Anaximander thereby alluded to and criticized Thales comparison of the earth to a ship floating on water (11A15). Thales' purpose in this metaphor was presumably to account for earthquakes; while, for this, Anaximander had another explanation (12A27). But it does not appear that Anaximander is actually polemicizing against Thales' seismology by introducing the term "Steer." After all, no pilot can prevent waves from rocking the boat. The only connection between a vessel and steering is the ship's course. And this, we know, was of vital interest to Thales, whom some credited with a Ναυτική ἀστρολογία—a Nautical Star-guide. Anaximander's earth, however, lies at the center of the universe (12A1), stationary (μένουσαν:12A11,3) and without impulse to move up or down or
sideways (12A26)\textsuperscript{14} let alone to sail along by itself. It would appear that when Anaximander predicated "steers all things" of the \textit{apeiron}, he did not have the Earth in mind at all but rather the circles of the heavens which move constantly (though not eternally) in regular patterns. This interpretation would harmonize quite well with Gigon's earlier proposal that when Anaximander predicated "is the \textit{arché} of all things" of the \textit{apeiron}, he also neglected to include the Earth. A better solution might be to associate the \textit{kubernētē} with the fixing and paying of penalties in the cosmos instead of with its physical movement. If this suggestion is sound, then Anaximander intended it metaphorically to mean "govern".\textsuperscript{15} Gigon also acknowledges this possibility (1945, 65).

There are three further antitheses which Gigon attributes to Anaximander. They may be mentioned briefly. The first is that of the One and the Many. Here Gigon has in mind the single, infinite origin and the infinite number of worlds which arise from it (12A17). This distinction, as the previous one, is axiological: ie, a value-distinction between the restless and unstable worlds and their perduring foundation. Anaximander's doctrine of innumerable worlds has a "purely speculative" origin. For naïve thought, our world is the only world. But Anaximander was motivated by considerations of proportionality--over against "dem Einen Unbegrenzten" there must be a "grenzlos viel Begrenztes" (1945, 67). The second antithesis is that between Likeness or Unlikeness of the Homogeneous and the Heterogeneous. Not only does the Origin give rise to an infinite number of worlds, but these worlds differ infinitely among themselves. Gigon infers this idea from a polemical remark in Xenophanes' doxography (21A1) against such a view. He argues that this contrast, which is so important in Parmenides (28B8, 29 7 57f),
was already anticipated by Anaximander. The third contrast is that of visible and invisible. Gigon argues for the invisibility of the apeiron by analogy with Anaximenes' concept of the invisibility of pure, unlimited air (his arché), the invisibility of Anaxagoras' apeiron and of Parmenides' Being. These three contrasts do not shed much light on the interpretation of Anaximander. They are formal, conceptual categories with which Gigon hopes to bolster the philosophical reputation of Anaximander. Later pre-Socratics worked with these categories. Therefore, says Gigon, Anaximander must have included or implied them somehow in his thought.

Gigon is not the first to consider Anaximander as the philosopher to whom Aristotle alludes as having an arché "between" two of the elements. Most of the traditional commentaries on Aristotle have accepted the judgement of Alexander of Aphrodisias (floruit c. A.D. 200) that the philosopher was Anaximander. Two subsequent commentators--Nicolaus of Damascus and the younger Porpherios--contradicted this reading by identifying the unknown as Diogenes of Apollonia (1945, 59). But Gigon follows the tradition of Alexander. He lists nine passages where Aristotle refers to this conception. They are:

1. Physics 187a 14  (6) De Generatione et Corruptione 328b 34
2. Physics 189b 1   (7) De Generatione et Corruptione 332a 20
3. Physics 203a 18  (8) Metaphysics 988a 30
4. Physics 205a 27  (9) Metaphysics 989a 13
5. De Coelo 303b 12

In five of these passages, Gigon admits, the notion of an arché "μεταξύ" air and water or μεταξύ fire and air, cannot refer to Anaximander because there the "between" is interpreted as "thinner than water and thicker than air" or "thinner than air and thicker than fire." Such references to thick
and thin as characteristics of the _arché_, Aristotle sharply distinguishes from the conception of Anaximander. At Physics 187a 14, for example, he divides the _φυσικοί_ according to their theories of generation. The first group posits a qualitative One from which all else is produced through condensation and rarification (πυκνότητι καὶ μακρύνσι). Elsewhere Aristotle refers to this view as generation by "alteration" or "transformation" (αλλοιώσει). The other group begins with a mixture, containing both unity and multiplicity, from which everything is "excreted" (ἐκκρίνεσθαι). Anaximander belongs to the latter group according to this passage.

In four of these passages (nos. 2, 3, 4 and 6), however, there is no mention of "thicker and thinner", but only of a "between". In these passages, there is also no mention of Anaximander—where one expects it—whereas others such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras are explicitly named. These two omissions lead Gigon to a hypothetical exegesis of these loci which he admits is incapable of strict proof (1945, 72-73). He suggests that the term μεταξύ is not a formulaic equivalent to the more detailed expression "thicker than...thinner than". On the contrary, "the fuller expression is a later interpretation of the order, simpler idea of 'between'" (1945, 72). Gigon claims that already with Anaximenes (Anaximander's younger contemporary), μεταξύ was being interpreted in a "material-qualitative" sense. But in Anaximander, who he feels surely originated the idea, the μεταξύ merely indicates "die abstrakt-begriffliche Mitte, in der sich der Ursprung in Verhältnis zu dem von ihm sich absondernden Begrenzten befindet" (1945, 73). This is why, he believes, Theophrastus (who mentions no μεταξύ in relation to Anaximander) characterizes the _apeiron_ simply as "neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other unlimited nature" (12A9). As to why
there is confusion in Aristotle about which element this *arché* lies between, Gigon explains (1945, 73) that Aristotle was not able to find satisfactory equivalents in his own terminology for the primal pair of Anaximander. This is clearly the case with Aristotle's interpretation of the first pair of Parmenides' thought. Parmenides' pair is Fire and Night (28B 8, 53ff). But Aristotle, being confused about the meaning of 'night', translates it into his own terms, sometimes as Air, other times as Earth (1945, 74). Gigon believes the same thing happened in Aristotle's interpretation of Anaximander and that in his case the original pair was the same as that of Parmenides. In other words, the first pair to emerge out of the *apeiron* was Light and Night or Day and Night. The "between", like Hesiod's Chaos-concept, must be understood, not materially-qualitatively, but most likely in a spatial sense. Thus, as Hesiod's *χάος* lies between Heaven and the House of Light above and the Earth and the House of Night in the depths so with Anaximander the focal point of the *Unbegrenzte/Begrenzte* relation lies between Night and Day. But, as with the *apeiron*-doctrine itself, spatiality here is a cipher for genuine conceptuality. Thus the transcendence of the *apeiron* is protected by the concept of *μεταφέ* (1945, 75). Meanwhile this "between" also protects the primal elements themselves. For if either Light or Night were infinite, the other could no longer maintain itself against it. This argument, which is found in Aristotle at *Physics* 204b 15ff and 204b 25ff (12A16), Gigon believes is authentically Anaximanderian.

Looking back on this treatment of the *apeiron*-doctrine, we sense an ambiguity in it which verges on a tension on Gigon's analysis. On the one hand, Gigon sees in Anaximander an extremely sophisticated, and genuinely metaphysical conception. Anaximander had, in Gigon's view, spun out a rather
full ontology of the Origin and its relation to the world. For this he depended upon elaborating the philosophical implications (which in Gigon's view are) inherent in the concept of τὸ ἄπειρον itself. On the other hand, Anaximander is still remarkably bound to the thought-world of Hesiod. He draws, not only upon the formal analogies and metaphors, but upon the "material" concepts of this moralist, poet and theologian. Gigon is also quick to follow Aristotle's lead in penetrating to the reasoning behind the doctrines of Anaximander. But he does not hesitate to depart from the general Aristotelian picture of the ἄπειρον to uncover the theological elements of Anaximander's thought. An example of this is his willingness to replace such terms as "Hot" and "Cold" with the more archaic terms "Light" and "Night". I believe this ambiguity in the picture of Anaximander is to be understood in terms of Gigon's conscious effort to relate Anaximander problemgeschichtlicherweise to his setting, past and future, in the history of philosophy. As he says (1945, 76):

Wenn man dazunimmt, was Aristoteles nicht mehr hat übersehen konnen, dass das Unbegrenzte doch auch den hesiodischen Begriff des Chaos fortführt, so erreicht das Denken Anaximanders eine Spannweite, die von den mythischen Bildern der Theogonie bis zu der reinen Logizität des Parmenides reicht.

There are, of course, many more things in Gigon's Anaximander-interpretation which remain to be said. But they are primarily details. We have seen his overall perspective at work in this exegesis and we have seen his treatment of the issue which is our central concern—the relation of myth and philosophy in Anaximander. A few things may be added about the ethos of Anaximander, as perceived by Gigon, in relation to this problem-historical treatment.
Gigon finds the ethos of Anaximander expressed primarily in his Fragment as it is quoted by Theophrastus (12A9). The latter concludes his quote with the words "thus speaking in rather poetical terms". This indicates that, the key words of the 'fragment' are offered by Theophrastus as the authentic words of Anaximander. But this bare minimum is all that Gigon is willing to accept. We can be certain beyond a shadow of a doubt only of the words κατὰ τὸ χρεών ('according to necessity'), τίγι ('penalty') and δοίκια ('injustice'). In other places Theophrastus paraphrases Anaximander, using only a few terms which appear authentic: namely, the "rather poetical terms". For all we know, argues Gigon, he does the same here in the 'fragment'.

But, in Gigon's opinion, nothing has been lost for interpreting the essence of the phrase which runs:

And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which (their) destruction also happens, according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the order of time (DK12 B1).

Gigon wishes to interpret the source "out of which" all things come and back "into which" they are destroyed both as their "material basis" and as the "conceptual ground and meaning" (1945, 81) of the cycle of existence. The source is not only the pre- and the post-existent state of things, but the cause and ultimate reason behind their coming and going. Thus the "out of which" is also an "on account of which" and the "into which" is also a "for the sake of which." Gigon rejects the possibility that the source spoken of in the fragment is the ἀπειρόν itself. This is because the phrase explicitly connects genesis and destruction with injustice and punishment respectively. Thus, if the "source" is the Unbegrenzte and the genesis of things therefrom is unrighteousness, then individuation is evil in itself. This, says Gigon, is
an un-Hellenic notion, though it could apply to Indian philosophy. What is Hellenic, however, is the idea that existence unavoidably brings error and sin with it. Thus the man who succeeds falls into arrogance and becomes guilty. This guilt is necessary, which is expressed by the phrases κατὰ τὸ χρεών and κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. Thus the latter has nothing to do with the concept of Time (Χρόνος) as the Judge of men and things. This interpretation was offered by W. Jaeger. But for Gigon "such a personification is unthinkable" (1945, 82). Anaximander only wishes to say that the time from the birth of a thing and its passing away is limited, a set period. To everything, arrogance as well as retribution, there is a season. On the other hand, the eternal apeiron which surrounds and directs all things lies, not beyond good and evil, but beyond crime and punishment.

Gigon understands this ethos as "die eigenartige tragische Selbstauf-fassung des archaischen Lebens" which he relates to the thought of two other pre-Socratics. As we might expect, one of these is a predecessor (Hesiod) and the other a successor (Heraclitus) of Anaximander. Again we see Anaximander's relation both to the past and the future. In the Theogony, all three Kings of the Gods—Uranos, Kronos and Zeus—gain power through a misdeed which eventually leads to their downfall (some followers of Hesiod also spoke of Zeus' fall). Here we find the equation of victory and guilt which characterizes the tragic outlook. The offense and penalty which connects Hesiod's three ages correspond in Anaximander to the infinite chain of innumerable worlds. Heraclitus' word for this connection is ἐμαρμένη, "destiny", or "fate" (22B137). Like Anaximander, he expresses the cosmic periods in rather poetical terms. The time of destruction, when all is fire and no world exists is called "Abundance"; the time of the unfolding of the world is called "Need" or "Lack".
One period leads inevitably to the next: "Abundance gives rise to Arrogance, and Arrogance in turn plunges itself into Poverty" (old Ionic elegy). Gigon sees, in one of Heraclitus' fragments (22B36), the same Anaximandrian formula "whence comes...thither goes." Thus, in Gigon's opinion, Heraclitus is Anaximander's closest philosophical relative among the Ionian philosophers.

The ambiguity of Gigon's treatment of Anaximander is its major weakness. This ambiguity shows itself most clearly on the question of Anaximander's relation, on the one hand, to the poetic tradition of the past and, on the other, to the classical Greek philosophical tradition which flourished after him. We have seen, however, that this ambiguity is partially intended, since it is the result of Gigon's problemgeschichtliche approach. We will find a helpful contrast to this approach in Holscher, whose interests are historical origins rather than historiographical analogies. However, Gigon brings a keen philosophical awareness to the investigation which is indispensable. We will have occasion later to draw upon his contribution.

(2) Holscher's article on Anaximander (1953) and its revised and expanded version as chapter one of Anfängliches Fragen (1968) is a complex presentation of material on a number of topics. Holscher found it convenient to subdivide the piece into eighteen sections. This contributes to a sense of unevenness in the text. But it also testifies to a considerable expansion in scope when compared to Gigon's treatment of Anaximander. Holscher's expansion of the horizon of pre-Socratic study is grounded in his conviction that the rise of philosophy in this milieu can no longer be accounted for solely though factors in this milieu alone. "Ich denke, dass es hiernach unmöglich ist, mit Zeller zu sagen,'alles entwickelt sich ganz natürlich aus den Voraussetzungen des griechischen Volkslebens', sofern mit diesem Satz die
Autarkie der griechischen Philosophie behauptet wird" (1968, 43). Thus a
sense of unevenness in Hölscher's material is, in one sense, unavoidable--
in as much as he spends time marshalling evidence against the traditional
notion of the indigenousness of Greek philosophy. This he does by outlining
the possible influences of the oriental tradition(s) upon Greek thought in
the archaic period.

But Hölscher attacks the idea of internal continuity in Hellenic thought
in yet another sense. The thrust of this second attack is aimed at the weak­
est link in the so-called 'great chain' of Hellenic intellectual history:
namely, the evolution of thought from mythos to logos. Whoever attributes
to the Greeks the discovery of the mind has already undermined the continuity
of their history in an important sense. For one must then distinguish
the Greeks before from the Greeks who lived after this discovery was made.
Hölscher's opposition to the traditional continuity idea is grounded in his
adherence to the theory of the 'great divide' which separates the early pre­
Socratics from classical thought. Hölscher is more interested in the character
of this division and the differences involved than in locating the watershed
that divides them, whether this be Parmenides or some movement such as Sophism.
Therefore, the aim of his critique of the Aristotelian doxography, for
example, is "to recognize something of the nature of this rather inaccessible
archaic way of thinking" (1968, 9). In Hölscher's opinion, the chief
characteristic of thought in the early period is its intimacy with mythical
themes. Thus instead of the miraculous birth of an autonomous rational
science, he sees in the early pre-Socratics a dominant, existential concern
for the transcience of life which seeks confirmation in the themes of the
mythical tradition.
Hölscher is critical of the Problemgeschichten of the classical philologists on two levels. He opposes the idea of Greek philosophy as a product of an isolated culture by insisting upon eastern influences. And secondly, he denies that Aristotle and the earliest pre-Socratics shared the same philosophic concerns. These two denials are combined in Hölscher's general thesis: archaic thought, unlike later philosophy, was still closely attached to the myth, but not to any mythology indigenous to Hellenic culture. Put more positively, Hölscher believes the only adequate approach to the problem of the relation of Greek philosophy to myth is to raise it in connection with the question of the relation of Hellenic thought to the Orient. In treating both of these queries Hölscher introduces discontinuity to do justice to historical realities. But the desired effect of these discontinuities, paradoxical as it might seem, is actually to reduce the distance between Anaximander and his predecessors and thereby give evidence of a plausible continuity in the emergence of Greek thought. In this way, Hölscher wishes to provide us with a new understanding of the genesis of philosophy.

Hölscher's treatment of Hesiod is largely a foil to Gigon's view of him as the first philosopher. For example, he takes exception to the interpretation of Hesiod's Chaos as "that which gaps", which Gigon identified with the space between Heaven and Earth. But this spatial interpretation is wholly inadequate to the content of the verb *xaiveiv* from which Jaeger and Gigon derive *Xaofr*. The verb is used by Homer with reference to men, animals and even to the earth, to mean "opening the mouth." Thus *Xaofr* should be taken to mean, not "hollow" or "cavern," but "open throat." This would mean quite a difference for the interpretation of Hesiod's
concept. "A hole encloses, but a chasm devours" (1968, 61). Furthermore, under this interpretation, Gigon's idea that Chaos is the origin of Heaven and Earth becomes problematic. What extraordinary powers of abstraction, asks Hölscher, are we to attribute to Hesiod by which he could posit the existence of the "cavity" before positing that which forms it on either side (1968, 61)? Thus Hölscher dismisses the interpretation of Xaoα as "gap" --which inevitably implies limits-- and argues instead that it signifies the un-limited Deep. This concept recalls the place of "the Waters" in Mesopotamian mythology as well as that of the "primal deep" in Semitic traditions (eg, the Hebraic 'Tehom'). Hölscher believes he has located a possible source of the Hesiodic conception in the cosmogony attributed by Philos of Byblus to Sanchunjaton (or Sankhuniaton), the Phoenician who wrote a cosmogonic poem (quoted in full by Hölscher) of the same genre as the Hebraic Genesis. The Greek mythical tradition prior to Hesiod was extremely lacking in cosmogonic features, and could not provide Hesiod with themes adequate to his conception. His Chaos is the Deepest Deep and thus, not the space immediately above the earth, but the primeval abyss which plummets the infinite depths beneath it (1968, 64). However, although this Hesiodic idea is clearly a cosmogonical item borrowed from the myths of the Orient, Hesiod himself was unable to give it any real cosmogonic function. Unlike the eastern cosmogonies which provide elaborate explanations for the development of the cosmos out of the primal abyss, Hesiod is essentially disinterested in how the world was established (1968, 64). His cosmogony is not only pitifully short, but he fails to make any real genetic or genealogical connection between the world and the origin. He merely says, "First the Abyss came into being, next the Earth."26 Says Hölscher, "Es kann keinen
Hesiod borrowed another key theme in his *Theogony* from oriental myth. This theme—which Hölscher calls the Sukzessionmythos—is the cycle of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus and their successive usurpations and dethronements. This time it is a Hurrian tale (as transmitted in a Hittite version of the middle second millennium B.C.) which was laid under contribution. The Kumarbi Epic does bear resemblance to Hesiod's three generations of gods. There are actually four generations in the Hittite version. But the parallels are, nevertheless, striking. Kumarbi, who corresponds to Hesiod's Kronos, participates in the castration of his father, Anu ('Sky'), whose genitals are then thrown to the Earth where they beget other gods. Then from the Earth is born a storm god (Teshub), corresponding to Zeus, whom Kumarbi proposes to eat until he is given a stone instead. After this the weather-god usurps the rule of Kumarbi. These parallels to Hesiod's story of Chronos need not mean dependence, says Hölscher, but perhaps only an Urverwandtschaft (common ancestry). However, Philo of Byblos knew of a fourth generation of the cycle in the Phoenician version he records. This testifies to his (Philo's) independence of Hesiod as well as to the authenticity of Sankhuniaton's cosmogony. Therefore, argues Hölscher, Sankhuniaton is probably the mediator who passed the Hurrian-Hittite cycle on to Hesiod.

Though Hesiod owes much to the Homeric tradition in terms of language, he differs materially from it in every respect. He wrote not for amusement but for edification. Both he and Homer speak of the muses, but Hesiod speaks through them as well. Hesiod is also removed from the Ionian philosophers. His Wahrheitspathos is not to be compared with their Forscherernst.
He is a prophet and moralist whom we "should remove somewhat from the beginnings of philosophy" (1968, 79). The religious form of this way of thinking is still perceptible in Heraclitus, but the latter grounds his conviction in thought, not in revelation (1968, 80). Though the Milesians did not yet employ argumentation and debate to any great degree, "the appeal to observation (Anschauung) and understanding indicates that, here too, there was a new relationship to truth" (1968, 80).

Thales, though a 'milesian' in his relationship to truth, was also oriented to extra-Hellenic myth. His concept of the Sea, or Water, as origin and of the Earth that floats like a ship upon it, is clearly not derived from Greek tradition. The concept of the Sea was originally alien to the Greeks (1968, 40) and even Okeanos remained a "water of the earth" or, mythologically speaking, the Son of Gaia (1968, 41). Sea as the encircler and origin was known to the river cultures. And when we see that both Mesopotamian and Egyptian myths contained the crux of Thales' doctrine, it becomes much more probable that his thought was inspired by contacts with the South East, than that he developed a cosmogony from the sparse conceptions of Okeanos in Greek thought, eg at Iliad 14, 200 and 214 (1968, 44-45). Many of Thales' doxographers also associate his activity with Egypt. This may also be the case with the character of his thought yet, judging from the testimonia, says Hölscher, Thales can hardly be credited with a "philosophy" (1968, 47-48). Nevertheless, he is responsible for awakening in his home city in interest in cosmogony (1968, 48). This he did by importing a conception rather than creating his own. But contact with the Egyptian notion of the first god began a very fruitful process of Umdeutung. The Egyptian deity, Nun, corresponded to no known god in the Greek Pantheon. It found its closest
analogy in the sea. Thus Thales' reproduction of the Egyptian god in Greek terms entailed an inevitable physicalization of the arché. "Die rationalistische Wendung, die Entmythologisierung, war also schon mit der Übertragung gegeben" (1968, 46-47). Thus Holscher explains the Greeks' break with myth precisely by their being attracted to the myths of barbarians. In turning eastward, early Greek thinkers implicitly turned away (in some sense) from their own traditions. Thus, vis-a-vis their own culture, they took on an attitude of unbelief. Meanwhile, one could not expect them to endorse their new found (eastern) sources of revelation with quite the same reverence which these myths received in their native setting. Inevitably the Greeks saw things in these myths which had only an implicit existence in their respective traditions. And they were free to give these things new significances, as well as to pick and choose according to need. As Holscher expresses it.


Anaximander must also be discussed in the context of these relationships. Anaximander's description of the heavenly globe "stands in the tradition of Eastern pictures of the cosmos" (1968, 84). His sequence of heavenly spheres--fixed stars below, moon in the middle, and sun the highest--is clearly Babylonian, as is the equality of intervals between them (1968, 84). His model of the earth's surface, too, has a Mesopotamian predecessor. He introduced
the gnomon (sundial) and knew of the angle of the celestial ecliptic—both conveyed to Hellas from the east. It is illegitimate, says Hölscher, to separate these discoveries as "practical" and "scientific" from real philosophy (as Zeller and Burnet do), and particularly to attribute them to separate sources, Ionia representing technical science and Hesiod representing speculative theory (as Gigon does). In the East, speculative interests and practical science were "functions of the same priestly spirit" (1968, 86). Thus the Ionians encountered both at once.

It is difficult to find the precise source of Anaximander's conception. Anaximenes' cosmogony, on the other hand, is clearly related to Sankhuniatōn, (1968, Section XVII). However, while Anaximander rejected the idea of water as the origin, he employs this eastern notion as an intra-cosmic arché: all things within the world derive from the primal moisture (1968, 87 and DK 12A 27). Concerning the apeiron-concept, Hölscher argues that it was not achieved by reflection upon the unity or quality of the material cause of things (as it would appear from Aristotle), "sondern in einer gegebenen kosmogonischen Anschauung, die wesentlich räumlicher Natur ist, seine Wurzel hat" (1968, 87). Although Hesiod's Χάος and Anaximander's ἔνεσι ποιόν are Urverwandt—both spring from the same mythical root-conception of the Infinite Depths—"es ist aber unwahrscheinlich, dass Anaximander seinen Begriff aus dem des hesiodischen Chaos entwickelt hat; denn das Unbegrenzte ist das höchste Lenkende und steht an der Stelle des Zeus, das Chaos dagegen ist widergöttlich" (1968, 88). Anaximander is indeed related to traditional concepts of the East, as are Hesiod and Anaximenes. Nevertheless, in Anaximander we have something new. His conception is by far more complex (1968, 88). He was apparently aware of the inherent possibilities of his native Greek language,33 as Theophrastus
intimates in his comment about his poetic terminology. Anaximander's exploitation of these possibilities in prose resulted in a conceptual quality that distinguished him as "der erste der den Namen eines Philosophen verdient, unabhängig und kühn (1968, 84).

As philosophy "grew out of language", the ἄπειρον became a concept--yet not a concept arising through a search for the "primary substance". In fact, mythological thought itself had already prepared for the conceptuality of the Unbegrenzte by personifying it. "Personalität ist die mythische Form des Abstrakten" (1968, 89). Thus while Anaximander's arche had been divested of mythological form, yet "kommt sein eigentümliches Wesen zuletzt aus dem Mythos, nämlich sein Charakter als Macht, seine religiöse Wurde und die Lebendigkeit des Begriffs" (1968, 89).

So much for Anaximander's debt to the Orient. We must now examine him in light of the second discontinuity introduced by Hölscher: namely, the break that separates him from the mentality of his Peripatetic doxographers. This entails a shift of perspective from viewing Anaximander in terms of what preceeded him to an investigation of how he was later understood.

Hölscher's chief attack on the testimonia of the Peripatetic doxographers is leveled at the supposedly Anaxmandrian doctrine of οἱ ἐναντιότητες, the contraries or opposites. According to Simplicius, Anaximander's opposites consisted of "the Hot, the Cold, the Dry, the Moist, and the others" (12A9). This passage from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics does not derive from Aristotle himself. Therefore, its only value as a testimonium depends upon its derivation from Theophrastus. Both Diels and Burnet accept it as Theophrastian. But Simplicins is merely paraphrasing the Physics (I,4) and recollecting his own doxogrammata. Thus there is no trace of Theophrastus
in the statement, which therefore has no place among the testimonia (1968, 10).

The longer section of Simplicius' testimony (A9), which contains the so-called fragment, is considered by some to be entirely a verbatim quote of Theophrastus. This is Deichgräber's opinion. Kranz (in DK) limits the Theophrastian quote to the three sentences preceding the 'fragment'; Diels (Dox. 476) limits it to the words, ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τὴν αἰδίου κίνησιν after the fragment. But, says Hölscher, everything after the fragment is Simplicius' interpretation of it, not a quote from Theophrastus. This is proven by the use of δῆλον ('it is clear that...'), which is Simplicius' customary way of introducing an interpretation (1968, 11). This section of the testimonium is also un-Theophrastian because of its "long lists of abstract qualities in the form of substantive adjectives, permeated by Stoic terminology" (1968, 12). Thus "als Quelle für ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων muss also vorläufig Aristotles und nicht Theophrast gelten" (1968, 12).

According to Hölscher Hippolytus (12A11), in attributing the doctrine of eternal motion to Anaximander, is dependent upon Theophrastus and is therefore correct. Theophrastus associates this notion with the "immanent cause of transformation" (Verwandlung; μεταβολή) in the cosmogony of Anaximenes (apud Simplicius, p. 24, 31). But Simplicius makes further use of the idea in connection with his own scheme—which is a development of Aristotle's (Physics A2)—for categorizing the pre-Socratic ἀρχαί. Aristotle's scheme is:

I. One arche
   a) Unmoved
   b) Moved

II. Several archai
   a) Finite
   b) Infinite
Following a suggestion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius applies the sub-divisions of II (ie, finite and infinite) to the subdivisions of I. The result is:

I. One arche
   a) Unmoved
      1. Finite (Parmenides)
      2. Infinite (Melissos)
   b) Moved
      1. Finite (Thales, Heraclitus)
      2. Infinite (Anaximander, Anaximenes)

According to Simplicius, the function of movement (κίνησις) in the arche (ie, in any conception under I.b.) is to bring about the separation of opposites. But we must remember that this is only an (Simplician) elaboration of the pre-Socratic idea of motion as reported in Aristotle. To Aristotle, κίνησις means little more than changeability (Wandelbarkeit; 1968, 14). Therefore, though we know from Hippolytus that Theophrastus did attribute motion to the arche of Anaximander, we can not be sure that this had anything to do with the separation of opposites.

Aristotle's purpose in Physics A4 is to show "that all earlier philosophies amount to recognition of opposite principles and thus anticipate his own doctrine of form and its privation" (1968, 17). Aristotle attributes a doctrine of opposites to each philosopher. But a comparison of Aristotle's treatment of Empedocles in this section with the actual fragments of that philosopher, warrants our having reservations about his statements concerning Anaximander. Furthermore, Aristotle has Anaxagoras chiefly in mind when he attributes to the entire group (Anaxagoras, Anaximander and Empedocles) the idea that 

εκ τού ἐνος ἐνούσας τὰ ἐναντίοντα ἐκκρίνεσθαι (12A9). When he goes on
to criticize the idea (Physics 187 a32 to end of chapter), he mentions only
Anaxagoras. As for Anaximander, we have no independent evidence that this
sentence applies to him. If Anaximander employed the word \( \ekkrisi \),
this would be enough to satisfy Aristotle that he had held a doctrine of
separation of opposites. "Der Satz stellt also eine Verallgemeinerung des
Aristoteles dar, worin er die Lehre von der Scheidung der Gegensätze von
demjenigen, der sie am reinsten ausgesprochen hat, auf die ganze Gruppe der
Ekkrisis überträgt. Aber das ist eine Interpretation ad hoc, und weit davon
entfernt, den Anaximander zu zitieren" (1968, 15-16).

In the sentences before the fragment in testimonium A9, where we may
be confident of the Theophrastian content of Simplicius' report, we hear of the
arché (\( \alpha_{\text{πειρον}} \)) 
(\( \gamma_{\text{νεσθαι}} \) 
\( \sigma\text{υανου} \) 
\( \alpha_{\text{υοί} \text{γ} } \) 
\( \alpha_{\text{μου}} \)) ('from which all the heavens and the worlds in them come into
being'). This is corroborated by similar statements in Hippolytus and Pseudo-
Plutarch. In the latter, \( \gamma_{\text{νεσθαι}} \) is replaced by \( \alpha_{\text{ποκρισθαι}} \) which was
probably the original Anaximandrian term. Here we see no mention of the opposites.
Hippolytus also speaks in this connection of eternal motion (12A11(2))" in the
course of which the heavens come into being". Here again nothing of the opposites.
Neither apokrisis nor ekkrisis are associated with a doctrine of opposites by
these Theophrastian doxographers. "Simplicius has obviously smuggled in the
separation of opposites" (1968, 19). And he accomplished this simply by combining
the Aristotelian interpretation of the \( \ekkrisi \) of opposites (Physics A4) with
the doxographical reports of \( \alpha_{\text{ποκρισθαι}} \) \( \alpha_{\text{πειρον}} \) in Theophrastus.

The passage from Pseudo-Plutarch, however, has encouraged the association
of the opposites with "separating off" in Anaximander. The passage reads:
\( \phi_{\text{ναί}} \) \( \delta_{\text{ε}} \) \( \text{τι} \) \( \text{ms:το} \) \( \ek \) \( \text{του} \) \( \alpha_{\text{γιοι}} \) \( \gamma_{\text{νιμοι}} \) \( \thetaε\text{ρου} \) \( \text{τε} \) \( \text{kai} \) \( \psi\text{χρου} \) \( \text{kata} \) \( \text{την} \) \( \gamma_{\text{νεσθαι}} \)
τοῦ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκρίθηναι ('he says that something productive of both hot and cold was separated off from the eternal at the genesis of this world'). But in the first place, says Hölscher, the things which separate here are not the contraries, hot and cold, but the γόνιμον (1968, 20). After the γόνιμον separates, a sphere of flame is said to "grow from this around the air which is around the earth as bark around the tree." Hölscher believes that these two phases from Anaximander's cosmogony are also what is meant by the phrase "the heavens and the worlds in them" (1968, 21). The simile of bark and tree may well be Anaximander's own (1968, 22). But if not they doubtless stand for some Anaximandrian original. Gigon suggested Light and Night from the parallels in Hesiod and Parmenides. But Hölscher looks elsewhere.

The oppositions, says Hölscher, between the doctrine of a mechanical εκκρισιά of opposites from a mixture (which Aristotle attributes to Anaxagoras and Empedocles) and the idea of the transformation (ἀλλοίωσιά) of one element into its opposite (which Aristotle attributes to Anaximenes), represents a polemic by the former against the latter (1968, 25). Ekkrisis was intended to contradict the Milesians, "die dem Stoff eine unbeschränkte, aber auch unbefragte Fähigkeit der Verwandlung zuschrieben" (1968, 25). In principle this polemic was a denial of genesis, and as such was only possible after Parmenides, who not only was the first to deny transformation but also introduced the idea of mixture. Thus the distinction between εκκρισιά and ἀλλοίωσιά has not only a systematic meaning, as Aristotle thought, but also an historical significance. As we saw, κίνησιά in Anaximander means Verwandlungskraft (the power of change) which places him, not with those who hold to εκκρισιά but with those who teach transformation. Aristotle, and Simplicius after him, were misled by Anaximander's use of ἀποκρίνεσθαι which in any case had nothing
to do with the doctrine of opposites. For Anaximander himself, the choice between a qualitative transformation of the substrate in Aristotle's sense, and separation out from a mixture in the sense of Anaxagoras, was a non-issue. Clearly, it was both, "just as the growth of bark around a tree is both" (1968, 25).

While Anaximander's cosmogony does not imply the idea of opposite powers coming into being and separating from each other, the testiminia do speak of violent processes which took place in the formation of the world (1968, 26). Pseudo-Plutarch, for example, speaks of a ball of flame "tearing off" or "bursting" (A11); thunder results from the air bursting out of clouds with force (βιασαμενον A23); air penetrates and shakes the earth (A28); the sun "burned off" most of the primal moisture covering the earth (A27). Surely these things are part of what is meant by the injustice perpetuated by things upon one another, of which the fragment speaks (1968, 26-27). The fragment runs: Αναξιμανδρος...αρχὴν...εἰρήκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἀπειρον...ἐξ ὅν δὲ η γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὐσί, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰ, τἀυτά γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρόνον διδόναι γὰρ αυτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῇ ἀδικίᾳ κατὰ τὴν τῶν χρόνου τάξιν (DK 12Β1, from 12A9).

The fragment states the law of "the necessary succession of becoming and decaying," and explains "the rise of the worlds and their kosmoi" (1968, 27). Pseudo-Plutarch reports a similar idea. But after relating the separation of the heavens and worlds from the apeiron, he adds that they undergo this
destruction "since they are all recurring in cycles from infinite ages" (A10). This statement echoes the κατά το χρέων in the fragment. Thus "die Welten werden and vergehen seit Ewigkeit nach dem Gesetz bestimmter Zeitumläufe" (1968, 27).

This parallel is also important for the meaning of the word κόσμος in Anaximander. The verbal form ἀνακυκλουμένων, "recurring in cycles," requires a subject which refers to time. Yet it can refer only to κόσμου. Therefore, the phrase "the kosmoi in the worlds" refers to recurring conditions of the development of the world (1968, 27). It is thus understandable that the kosmoi themselves are ἀπείρου in number (A10). But the alternation of these periods and conditions is not a succession of opposites, "nor is (it) a balance achieved by an equal pull of contraries, but by the fact that each has an allotted span of time" (1968, 29). The fact that injustice is involved indicates that the process is not one of equal periods but entails the temporary dominance of one aspect--as the sea once covered the surface of the earth (A27).

Anaximander seems to have held to similar changes in the history of mankind, since, after coming on to the dry land, the first men "only survived for a short time" (A30). It is noteworthy that here Hölscher postulates a connection with Hesiod. In Hesiod's Silver Generation, men remained children for a century, and then lived very short lives as adults because of their folly and hubris; in the future generations, men will turn grey shortly after birth. Hölscher believes that Anaximander, too, must have commented on the future state of humanity, since men must share in the fate of the earth, which Anaximander said was drying up. Men lived as fish when the sea covered all. But how will they live at the end when everything is dry and, presumably, burned up? This question received no answer from Anaximander as far as we know. But whatever future awaits humanity it is clear that man has passed through the stages...
that brought him to the present via *hubris* and encroachment upon others. After they "set foot on dry land," men "fed themselves" on a diet of fish--their "own parents" (A30). This likeness between Anaximander and Hesiod, offers us a rare opportunity "den Übergang vom Mythos zur Philosophie einmal an einem Beispiel zu beobachten" (1968, 30).


The conceptual scheme of Anaximander's philosophy consists of the contrast between the Finite and the Eternal (1968, 31). But the Finite is not a matter of a conflict and balance of opposities. Rather Anaximander sees it "unter dem Aspekt der Hybris: Übergriff des Endlichen über Endliches" (1968, 31). The lot assigned to each finite thing is its "time"; thus that which assigns fate is not *χρόνος* but τὸ *χρόνῳ*. Hubris belongs to the essence of finitude; by nature, things tend to exceed their bounds. Here we find the idea that everything is war, but Fate allots to each the time of punishment for justice. In Heraclitus, for whom reality is perpetual war (22B53), a similar effect is achieved apart from the idea of a necessary fate. The conflict is seen as internally balanced; the struggle itself is "harmonious." This is possible "because of the idea of opposites" (1968, 31). But the opposites mentioned by the Pseudo-Plutarch, the Hot and the Cold, play no such part in Anaximander's *Weltbild*. Instead of the well-known four elements which are a later development, Anaximander appears to hold to a scale of three world-parts, the same scale which is found in Heraclitus: Earth, Sea and Fire (1968, 32).
Anaximander's sequence is: Sea, Fire and Earth. It is likely that Theophrastus named Sea and Fire as the two primal elements produced by the ὑποίμον; in the process of being passed down through the Peripatetic doxography, this pair evolved into the "opposites" of Cold (Sea) and Hot (Fire) as in A10 (1968, 32). This is the crux of Hölscher's argument by which he intends to retrieve the authentic kernel of archaic thought in Anaximander from the Aristotelizing interpretation of his doxographers. This argument is carried out under the guidance of a Leitmotiv: Pre-Socratic thought is divided into metaphysical and pre-metaphysical periods. This Leitmotiv, though considerably refined in Hölscher's analysis, possesses a structural affinity with the hermeneutical tradition in pre-Socratic research characterized by the theme of "The Great Divide." Both historically and systematically, Hölscher belongs to the tradition of interpretation stemming out of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Reinhardt as opposed to that of the classical Humanists.

A number of points in Hölscher's Anaximander interpretation are aimed at discrediting an interpretation such as Gigon's. The attack on the idea of Hesiod as the first philosopher, the emphasis upon Anaximander's independence from Hesiod, the search for Oriental influences, the critique of the notion of opposites, the critique of the doxography, the refutation of the idea of a "Zwischenelement" in Anaximander (1968, 34-37), the emphasis on the mythical-religious significance of the apeiron as opposed to its conceptuality, all illustrate this tendency. Hölscher's dependence upon Gigon's interpretation of Anaximander is also evident at key points in his analysis. For example, Hölscher affirms a basic contrast in Anaximander's thought between the Infinite and the Finite.44 He understands the ethos of the fragment in terms
mutatis mutandis of the tragic outlook of Hesiod; he denies that the "things" (τὰ ὄντα) of the fragment pass away into the apeiron. He interprets "worlds" as epochs or periods of time. But the chief contrast between the two treatments of Anaximander is that between Gigon's synchronic (Problemgeschichte) interest in a systematic analysis of philosophical problems and comparative study of the results with other conceptions and Hölscher's diachronic interest (Historismus) in the essence of early pre-Socratic thought and its historical genesis. These approaches yield distinct pictures of the shape of early Greek intellectual history and of the place of Anaximander in that history and result in divergent treatments of the relation between myth and philosophy in the sixth century B.C.

(3) In the preface to Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, Kahn tells us that his work on Anaximander grew out of a study of Parmenides' poem. He was led to Anaximander in a search for the origin of Parmenides' world-view. It is instructive to compare his remarks to those of Gigon and Hölscher in this regard. Gigon sees in Parmenides' conception the axiological reversal of Anaximander's distinction between ἀπειρον and περάς; Hölscher views Parmenides' philosophy as a rejection of the (Milesian) idea of genesis. To both, Parmenides represents a break with the past. Kahn, on the other hand, came to the conclusion "that Parmenides' argument was to be understood only against the background of a new rational view of the physical universe, a view which was not his own creation..." (1960, xi). Parmenides does not function as a new point of departure in the history of Greek philosophy, rather he is, in Kahn's opinion, the bearer of a world-view which by his time had become a new tradition, both in Ionia and Magna Graecia. This world-view was Milesian in origin and all of the pre-Socratics were its "heirs and debtors." The exception to this was Anaximander who, though he held to this outlook as
well, did so as its author and was himself heir and debtor to no one (1960, xii).

In its "systematic concern for rational clarity and coherence," this Milesian philosophy distinguished itself from the outlook of the epic poets. It represented a "very different attitude toward Nature." Interpretations such as Cornford's which attempt to assimilate Anaximander to Hesiod, tend to blur the radical difference between the 6th century Milesian world-view and the traditional mytho-poetic world of the epic and of the theologians. Kahn argues:

If these first philosophers had been able to take for granted a coherent, ready-made cosmology, then they would not have been the first after all (1960, xii).

Of course there is no argumentation here, only statement of viewpoint. But the question--when and how did philosophy begin?--plays a determinative role in Kahn's assessment of Anaximander's historical significance, not to mention the actual interpretation of his thought. Yet, he does not attempt critically to justify the assumption that the essence of pre-Socratic thought came into being without historical antecedents through the work of Anaximander.

Kahn's view entails the same ambiguity present in all "Great Man" theories of history. It applies standards to history-making individuals that are very different from the standards of figures who live on the "ordinary plane" of human history. When speaking of the common views of subsequent generations of pre-Socratic philosophers--Alcmaeon of Croton, Parmenides, Heraclitus and Xenophanes--he says "this body of ideas cannot be explained as the personal innovation of any one of them" (1960, 4). He complains that historians of philosophy have recognized the continuity of Greek thought in principle, but in practice have treated the early philosophers "as so many exalted individualists,
whose relationship to one another must be largely a matter of polemic" (1960, 5).

But in Kahn's opinion, these pre-Socratics show a great degree of commonality and even concord in upholding a unitary picture of the world. Upon analysis, argues Kahn, this concurrence turns out to be a dependence upon a "common seed from which the regional types have arisen" (1960, 4). But the individual largely responsible for planting that seed at Miletus--Anaximander--is viewed by Kahn as standing above the norm of historical continuity and dependence upon tradition. Thus Kahn speaks of Anaximander as "the hero of this story" (1960, 8).

The personal features of Anaximander's life and speculation are as completely mutilated for us as is the trunkless remnant of an archaic statue from Miletus which bears his name. But in so far as the earliest coherent view of nature can be deemed the work of any single man, we must truly look upon Anaximander 'as the author of the natural philosophy of Greece, and consequently of the occident',45" (1960, 8).

In this view, Anaximander represents a pronounced discontinuity in the course of Greek intellectual history, while later pre-Socratics represent an overwhelming continuity--a continuity born out of their desire to participate in the revolution led by Anaximander. We may call this an ambiguity in Kahn's approach. But from a hermeneutical point of view, Kahn's "Great Man" view of Anaximander and his postulate of the "unity of pre-Socratic thought" go hand in hand. He is able to turn these two assumptions to his advantage in the exegesis of the remnants of Anaximander's philosophy.

In the case of later pre-Socratics, we possess a great deal of primary source material--albeit fragmentary--which puts us in touch with the actual thought of these philosophers. For Anaximander we are largely at the mercy of secondary sources. But if, as Kahn supposes, behind the known views of
later pre-Socratics there lies a common world-view which derived from a
Milesian source, then we do have an avenue of access to Anaximander's thought.
This way can be opened through analysis of the Anaximandrian doxography, keeping
in mind that Anaximander's philosophy provided a view of the cosmos which was,
in essence, universally shared by later pre-Socratics. Thus the fragments of
later philosophers are the touchstones for determining how the doxography of
Anaximander ought to be read.

The ancient doxography of the Milesians must serve
as the foundation for any study of the origins of
Greek thought. But a foundation it is, and no more.
The stones for the superstructure must be quarried
elsewhere, from the firsthand documents of Greek
thought in the fifth and fourth centuries (1960, 5).

Kahn calls this "the historical method." But in a certain sense it works in
the opposite direction of Hölscher's emphasis on the distance between
Anaximander and his successors—a consideration one might also attribute
to an "historical" approach. Yet, says Kahn,

In virtue of such fundamental similarities as those just
mentioned, it should be possible to put some semblance
of flesh and blood on the dry skeleton of Milesian
philosophy preserved for us by the ancient doxography.
The historical method should permit us to reconstruct the
lost ancestor, as it were, on the basis of a family re-
semblance in the surviving descendants (1960, 5).

We will now move from a consideration of Kahn's method to an
exposition of his application of it to Anaximander. Kahn begins with an
analysis of the doxography. He operates according to the principle—which
he holds in common with Hölscher—that a valid testimony to the views of
Anaximander is one which rests on the authority of Theophrastus; only that
is doxography which derives from Theophrastus' work, The Opinions of the
Naturalists. But Kahn is more liberal than Hölscher in attributing a limited
validity to Aristotle's testimony as well. He points out that Aristotle's classification of the archai of his predecessors is too schematic (1960, 20), and that in general Aristotle's accounts are anachronistic in their attribution of later concepts to the earliest philosophers. Kahn further admits that Theophrastus was dependent upon Aristotle's analysis at many points. But he was also capable of independent judgement based on his own study of the sixth century texts. Therefore, says Kahn, "Theophrastus ranks as a documentary source wherever he tells us more than Aristotle does on the same point" (1960, 22). Kahn also goes further than Hölscher in his optimism about retrieving the Theophrastian elements from the testimonia, which we possess from later doxographers. These hellenistic doxographers are our only access to the fragmentary remains of Theophrastus' book. But Kahn does not share Hölscher's rather skeptical view that the Peripatetic perspective of these later witnesses obscure the reliable (Theophrastian) remnants in them. Kahn believes that the statements of Aëtius, Simplicius, Hippolytus and Pseudo-Plutarch about the views of Anaximander are accurate reflections of the Theophrastian original (1960, 11-17). Even Aëtius--the name of a Hellenistic excerptor, under whom Diels reunited parts of Strobaeus' Eclogae Physicae and Plutarch's Placita, and perhaps the least satisfactory of all ancient doxographers--"must ultimately derive from Theophrastus" (1960, 197). As for Theophrastus himself, says Kahn, his dependability does not rest upon any genuine historical interest in the views of his predecessors. He is as capable as Aristotle of distorting the original forms of the doctrines under consideration and he made no conscious effort to free himself from Aristotelian terminology (1960, 19). His reliability as a witness, therefore, is entirely a matter of the thoroughness of his method. His procedure,
which can be seen in the one long surviving fragment of his De Sensibus (Dox. 499f), consists of: (1) a general statement of the problem and kinds of solutions, (2) the report of individual doctrines and (3) critique and evaluation of these doctrines (1960, 18). According to Kahn, it is Theophrastus' habitual separation of (3) from (2) that makes his witness invaluable: that is, his attempt to let the views of the pre-Socratics stand on their own merit before offering a critique. In Aristotle, exposition and critique are so intertwined that the determination of the pre-Socratic views is at best difficult.

Kahn's method of distilling the common, and therefore Theophrastian, elements from the statements of the doxographers is to group their testimonia topically; he then analyses any parallel phrases to reach a close approximation of the original wording (1960, 25-71). For the order of topics, Kahn follows Simplicius and Hippolytus--"our two best sources"--hoping thereby to "reproduce the order of Theophrastus' own work" (1960, 25). Though Kahn mentions Holscher's treatment of the doxography only three times in passing, this section has the appearance of a defense of the doxographical tradition against higher-critical attack. This defense is a tour de force in synthesizing a great deal of material, and it demonstrates the remarkable correspondence of the testimonia. But, unless one shares Kahn's notion of the fundamental unity and coherence of this body of thought, he will not find the analysis of the doxography sufficient grounds for his subsequent interpretation of Anaximander.

Kahn believes, concerning the reliability of Theophrastus, that his Aristotelian viewpoint and terminology are most evident in those topics involving the δοξή, the explanation of ἐνέπνευσα, and the more fundamental features
of Anaximander's cosmology. Reinterpretation is less likely, and appears less frequently, in the "specific physical theories" such as the shape of the earth and the drying up of the primal sea. For this reason, Kahn begins his exposition of Anaximander's cosmology with an analysis of these physical theories. Anaximander's fragment which is quoted in the course of Theophrastus' account of the arché, does not provide its own context. Though it constitutes the heart of Anaximander's philosophy, it must be read in the light of the "physical" placita whose authenticity is completely reliable.

The first of these concerns the position and form of the earth. The doxographers agree that the earth lies motionless at the center of the cosmos and is cylindrical in shape. According to Kahn, these two doctrines reveal the basic mathematical character of Anaximander's cosmology. Anaximander said that the earth rests at the center of the cosmos because it lies at equal distances from all the extremities. Here Kahn finds a genuinely rational concern for proportionality, because the doctrine is based on the perception of the geometrical principle of the circle (1960, 77). Although the geometric concept did not originate with Anaximander, it was probably "an essential part of Anaximander's formation in the "school" of Thales" (1960, 77). What is crucial, is not Anaximander's grasp of circularity as such, but his association of it with the principle of indifference, or what later became known, with Leibniz, as the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1960, 77). Thus, the earth moves neither up, down or to either side because this "befits that which lies at the center and maintains equidistance from the extremities." This application of the geometric principle was undoubtedly Anaximander's "personal achievement" (1960, 78). And this achievement brought about the "intellectual prestige" of the geometric sphere which "imposed itself with such power on
the ancient scientific imagination that it became the image par excellence of regularity, order, and rational proportion" (1960, 78). Anaximander's theory of the earth's position is of such importance for the history of ideas that...

Even if we knew nothing else concerning its author, this alone would guarantee him a place among the creators of a rational science of the natural world (1960, 77).

Anaximander achieved a victory over the vulgar conception of the Orient about the foundation of the earth, a victory Thales could not win. Many of his successors were unable to maintain the rational consistency of this speculation and surrendered to "the evidence of common sense" that the earth must be supported (κρατούμενον) by something. By virtue of his mathematical spirit, we may see how Anaximander became the father, not only of Ionian speculation, but also of the geometric philosophy, associated with Pythagoras, which arose in the West (1960, 81).54

Anaximander reportedly said that the earth is not only a cylinder, but a cylinder of specific proportions, the width being three times the height. Variations of this ratio play a role at later points when we learn that the circle comprising the sun is twenty-seven times the size of the diameter of the earth. The figure given for the circle of the moon is "nineteen" times the size of the earth (A22). Diels considered this figure a corruption of "eighteen." If he is correct, there is a consistent use of multiples of three in the ratios governing Anaximander's cosmology. Here again, we find the mathematical spirit. The clear intention of these ratios is to render the cosmology suitable for diagram. (1960, 82). We know that Anaximander's interest in geography led him to compose the first world map known in Hellas. And according to later accounts of the cartography of Hicataeus of Miletus, whose
work was reportedly based on Anaximander's, this model of the world was highly symmetrical. It was schematic to a fault, according to Herodotus. It appears, says Kahn, that Anaximander had the same diagrammatic intentions concerning his cosmology and may have included a sketch of the whole cosmos along with his book. Again, this concern is not original with Anaximander. There are extant remains of a neo-Babylonian map, representing the world as a perfect circle, whose date is approximately contemporary with the maps of Anaximander and Hicataeus. The Oriental tradition is no doubt older, and Anaximander certainly borrowed from it (1960, 84). But his application of mathematical proportionality to his geography and cosmography "surpassed his Mesopotamian model in rigor" (1960, 84).

Diels considered Anaximander's mathematical concern to have more poetic and mythical significance than scientific import. Sir Thomas Heath concluded that the ratios of Anaximander's figures of the cosmos meant little more than the Indic notion of the three Vishnu-steps which reach from the earth to heaven. This association had to do with the general importance of the number three as a motif in the history of religions. According to Diels, it represented the idea of plurality and totality. Kahn admits that in the Vedic mythical scheme mentioned by Heath, there are certain rational elements, such as the interest in a "unified vision of the world" (1960, 96). To that extent, this scheme is comparable to the ratio-governed cosmology of Anaximander. But "it is more fitting to speak of a rational element in Vedic thought than of a mythic element in Milesian cosmology" (1960, 96). Anaximander's ratios "cannot have been based upon any kind of accurate observation" such as we find in Aristarchus, the Hellenistic astronomer (c. 270B.C.). But it does not follow that they are poetic in essence and origin. More likely they are the product
of Anaximander's attempt to synthesize the "observational data" which his Babylonian predecessors provided him; his notion of the dimensions of the earth must have been related to known facts (1960, 96-97a). The real inspiration behind Anaximander's cosmic ratios was rational-mathematical.

In this perspective it is legitimate to consider Anaximander as the earliest known type of mathematical physicist, at any rate the earliest outside Babylonia (1960, 97).

There was another aspect to the Anaximandrian world-picture which might be called a 'mythic tendency': the absence of any distinction between rigid geometric form and the vital process of living things (1960, 97-98). This tendency revealed itself in an animism concerning the physical universe, which all Ionians, and Pythagoreans as well, saw as somehow alive. Anaximenes, for example, identified his arché with πνεύμα, a living breath. Anaximander, who was the main influence on Anaximenes, spoke of the heavenly bodies as the exhalations of fire from the celestial rings. The same tendency is at work with his notion of the χορδή, the cosmic seed which gave rise to the heavens. But if this tendency is mythical, "we must remember that the same idea of the world as a living being reappears, stripped of such imagery, in the Timaeus, the De Caelo, and in the cosmological doctrines of the Stoics" (1960, 98). This vitalistic conception did not enslave Anaximander's world-view to the myth but actually led to the science of antiquity.

The Milesian conception of the world as a geometrical organism suffused with life is thus the true archetype of the ancient point of view and, indirectly, the stimulus to all modern endeavors (such as those of Leibniz and A.N. Whitehead) to interpret the total process of nature in terms of organic life (1960, 98).

When we turn to Anaximander's meteorology--the explanation of heavenly phenomena and events--we see a clear break with anthropomorphic explanations of myth.
The numinous personalities such as Zeus, who in the traditional Hellenic outlook controlled the weather, were abruptly replaced with cosmic forces of cold and heat, dampness and drought, darkness and light (1960, 109). This is the main thrust of Anaximander's naturalism. This manner of explanation captured the minds of the leading scientific spirits in subsequent generations and remained substantially unchanged even in the meteorological writings of Aristotle.

Once such a rational theory had been expounded, there was little need for a new one. The goal of a naturalistic explanation had been reached...The attention of later thinkers was thus diverted to new problems...Hence the conservative character of Greek meteorology, and hence the permanent sway of Milesian doctrine throughout antiquity (1960, 109).

Because the theories of the στοιχεῖα and the ἐναντιότητες play a crucial role in Kahn's interpretation of the fragment, and because Hölscher's critique was aimed at removing precisely these notions from the Anaximandrian doxography, Kahn devotes much space to a justification of a sixth century Elementenlehre (1960, 119-165). The basic argument in defense of this idea is that Simplicius explicitly states Anaximander's rationale for positing the άπειρον as αρχή: "he did not think it fitting to make any one of them (the elements) the substrate, but something else besides these," because "he observed the transformation of the four elements into one another" (A9). But the use of the term ὑποκείμενον and the mention of the "the four elements" indicates a certain anachronism (1960, 163). Thus a clarification of the authentic sixth century theory of elements is required.

The fact that "elements" and "opposites" are termini technici in Aristotle's own philosophy should not discourage us, Kahn argues, as to the reliability of attributions of these ideas to Anaximander by Aristotelians. Aristotle did not invent the terms. And his use of them in discussions of
Ionian philosophy undoubtedly reflects the ancient usage. The classical (ie, 5th century) theory (from Empedocles to Aristotle) based the notion of elements upon that of opposites such as Hot and Cold, etc. (1960, 133). But the archaic notion was closer to the Homeric and Hesiodic view of elements (though they did not use that word) as concrete entities such as wind, sea and the earth. A "deep gulf separates the old poetic scheme from the classical theory" (1960, 137) and the Milesian Elementenlehre occupied that gap (1960, 134).

In the time of Anaximander "the four classic elements had not yet assumed a unique position. They figure side by side with stones, clouds and wind among the basic constituents of the universe" (1960, 150). Another distinctive feature of the pre-classical theory is that the elements are seen as subject to a constant process of transformation (1960, 151). The classical theory approaches the elements as unchanging components, like building blocks, from which reality is constructed. The idea of continual self-transformation of the elements which pre-dates the classical theory entered the Ionian purview through the observation of the atmospheric phenomena of condensation and evaporation (1960, 151). For this reason, the central feature of the sixth century Elementenlehre is the element ¿. And this feature clearly was "not derived from Homer" (1960, 153). As components of the world and its transformations "the elements are of Melisian date" (1960, 154), though the idea of the four comes only later.

We now come to the heart of Anaximander's cosmology, and the heart of Kahn's interpretation of it--the doctrine of the fragment. Kahn's method of interpretation is: (1) to argue that Simplicius (in whose commentary the fragment is found) offers a coherent interpretation of the sentence, (2) that Simplicius is quoting, or at least thinking along the same lines as, Theophrastus
and (3) that Theophrastus' interpretation of the fragment in correct. According to Kahn, Simplicius believes that the sentence of Anaximander illustrates one idea and only one: that the source of "all the heavens" is not one of the elements (1960, 167). Below is Kahn's translation of the passage from Simplicius (Phys. 24, 13=DK 12A9; I, 83, 1-10) which he believes has been taken bodily from Theophrastus. The quotation marks indicate Simplicius' (=Theophrastus') indirect citation of Anaximander.

Anaximander...declared the Boundless to be principle and element of existing things, having been the first to introduce the very term of 'principle'; he says that "it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some different, boundless nature from which all the heavens arise and the κόσμοι within them; out of those things whence is the generation for existing things, into these again does their destruction take place according to what must needs be; for they make amends and give reparation to one another for their offence, according to the ordinance of time," speaking of them thus in rather poetical terms. It is clear that, having observed the change of the four elements into one another, he did not think fit to make any one of these the material substratum, but something else besides these.

Kahn believes that this entire passage centers on an Elementenlehre according to which the elements constantly change into one another. Anaximander expresses this "rather poetically" first by stating the general principle "whence things, thither things": ie, the elements pass into those elements from which they came. This is further elucidated by a legal metaphor: they (the elements) pay each other the penalty for their injustice. The "poetic terms" used in speaking of them (αυτά λέγων) refer directly to the elements (1960, 167). Simplicius understood the αυτά in the last phrase of the fragment--"they pay reparation..."---to have the same referent (1960, 167). Likewise, the things "out of which" and "into which" existing things come are also the elements.
Simplicius' whole attention is focused on the notion of the elements, and the poetic phrase which he quotes from Anaximander explains the generation of τὰ ὄντα out of and their destruction into, the elements as a reparation which the latter make to one another for their offense (1960, 167).

It is necessary to comment on Kahn's identification of the αὐτὰ in "they pay" with the referent of ἐκ ὕψος... εἰ Ῥῦτα rather than with the τῶν ὄντων of the previous phrase. His justification is based on the αὐτὰ, both in the second clause of the fragment as well as in the Simplician comment about poetic language, which (in his view) refers to the elements; since the second phrase is an elaboration of the first (γαρ...), the first must also concern the Elementenlehre of Anaximander. When viewed in this way, we immediately see the parallel between Anaximander's statement and the classical Aristotelian definition of an element as "that out of which a thing is composed and into which it can be resolved" (cf, ὅλον φωνή στοιχεῖα ἐκ ὕψους σύγχρηται ἡ φωνὴ καὶ εἰ Ῥῦτα διὰ τῶν ἔργων, Metaph. 1014a 27). Thus the elements are designated by the ἐκ ὕψους and the εἰ Ῥῦτα of this phrase. But this consideration is entirely beside the point. Aristotle's way of defining a στοιχεῖον is irrelevant to the determination of referents for indefinite pronouns in the syntax of Anaximander. If the reverse were the case, if Anaximander's theory of such-and-such were being cited to clarify an obscure remark by Aristotle, this procedure would have validity, at least historically speaking. But to explain the earlier by citing the later is not a legitimate application of the principle.

Kahn's appeal to Aristotle is permitted by his general assumption of the unity of Greek cosmology. However, the question must be determined on philological grounds. In my opinion, the only possible antecedent of αὐτὰ in the second phrase of the fragment is τὰ ὄντα (τῶν ὄντων) in the first. I will argue this point in the final section of the paper.

But, whether or not τὰ ὄντα is the real referent of αὐτὰ--at least
for Anaximander, if not also for Simplicius ("\(\alpha \upsilon \tau \alpha \lambda \varepsilon \gamma \omega \nu\)) -- it remains to be seen whether these "existing things" are identical with \(\tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \). Kahn believes the \(\tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) has this meaning (1960, 180-183). But he is forced to take this position -- otherwise the two parts of the fragment would have no connection. The second clause, stating the transformation of the elements into one another, could not be viewed as an explanation of the first if this phrase simply stated the genesis and dissolution of individual things out of and into their respective elements. Kahn supports the identification of \(\tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) with the elements by citing instances from later pre-Socratic fragments where this meaning is clearly in use (1960, 182). Examples of this usage include Diogenes (B2), De Natura Hominis (ch.7), Anaxagoras (B1 & B8) and Melissus (B8). These citations are more convincing than the citation of Aristotle's definition of an element for a clue to the referent of \(\varepsilon \xi \hat{\omega} \nu \) in the fragment. But grammatically, this interpretation means that the indefinite "things" (\(\varepsilon \xi \hat{\omega} \nu \) and \(\varepsilon \iota \tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \)) are identical in kind with \(\tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) which arise from them. Both are elements, though elements of one kind in the first instance (\(\varepsilon \xi \hat{\omega} \nu \) and \(\varepsilon \iota \tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \)) and of the 'opposite' kind in the other (\(\tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \varepsilon \iota \alpha \)). The Hot arises from the Cold, and in the end goes back into the Cold. Thus the elements pass into one another in a process of coincidentia oppositorum.

This interpretation, which rests entirely on the identity of the referent(s) of \(\varepsilon \xi \hat{\omega} \nu \) with \(\tau \alpha \sigma \tau \sigma \lambda \pi \xi \) \(\sigma \omega \alpha \), has several important advantages. It explains how it is that things necessarily offend one another as well as pay the required penalties in a single process of genesis and destruction. When air comes into being out of the destruction of water (the process of evaporation), air has offended water by usurping its place while water has paid the penalty for a previous offence. The previous offenses of water might then be interpreted
as its having come into being via condensation out of air. This reading saves the relationship of the fragment to the Simplician interpretation which is its context. And lastly, it explains why the fragment expresses the origin and destiny of existing things in the plural (\(\sigma\nu \ldots t\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\)) This point is more important than it first appears. The "neo-Orphic" interpretation of the fragment in terms of a philosophical pessimism (Nietzsche and Diels)--which Kahn wishes to refute (see 1960, 193-196)--rested on ignoring two very important details of the fragment. The first is the presence in the text of the word \(\alpha\lambda\nu\nu\lambda\alpha\upsilon\)\(_\varphi\). By excluding this term, Nietzsche could argue that individual things pay the penalty for existing as such and pay it, not "to each other" but to their source, the Boundless. But this interpretation necessitated, in the second place, reading the referent of \(\varepsilon\xi \ \omega\nu\) and \(\varepsilon\varphi \ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\) as \(\tau\alpha \ \alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu\). The plurals were then simply taken as a grammatical device for indicating the indefiniteness of Anaximander's arché, or as an indication that the apeiron was conceived of as a mixture, as Aristotle claimed. But according to Kahn's interpretation, we would expect the "out of which" to be plural since it refers to the elements in general.

There is, however, also a disadvantage in Kahn's identification of \(\tau\alpha \ \alpha\nu\tau\alpha\) with the referents of \(\varepsilon\xi \ \omega\nu\) and \(\varepsilon\varphi \ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\). This is primarily a disadvantage for Kahn himself. For if the "existing things" of the first part of the fragment turn out to be the elements, then there is no possible connection between this sentence and Aristotle's definition of an element. Aristotle was concerned with the elements as that out of which particular things are composed. But Anaximander's statement, according to Kahn's interpretation, has nothing to do with the generation of individual things. It speaks only of the origination of the elements themselves. Moreover, if both \(\tau\alpha \ \alpha\nu\tau\alpha\)
and \[ \varepsilon \] \( \text{τα} \) \( \text{οντα} \) mean the "elements", the statement cannot be viewed as an elucidation of their source(s). It only states, it does not explain, their origination. It amounts to a statement that elements come from other elements (namely, their opposites)—it describes their "chemical" transformations but not their ultimate genesis. And, as it turns out, since Kahn equates \( \text{τα} \) \( \text{οντα} \) with \( \text{τα} \) \( \text{στοιχεία} \), \( \text{τα} \) \( \text{οντα} \) becomes the real antecedent of \( \delta \_\delta \_\delta \_\delta \_\delta \) after all.

According to Kahn, there is no mention of the \( \text{απειρο̱ν} \) whatsoever in the fragment, nor of the generation of things (even elements) out of it (1960, 185f). Nor is there any association of elemental "atonement" with any final destruction of the cosmos (1960, 186). Other testimonia describe a doctrine of the world's final destruction, but this is never referred to as a reparation. If Anaximander held to an eschatology of any kind, the fragment never aludes to it. Therefore,

...if a cycle of world formation and dissolution is not implied by this brief text, everything else we know about Anaximander's cosmology has its place here: astronomical cycles, the succession of the seasons, the phenomena of the atmosphere, the origin of dry land and living things, all converge in the element doctrine of the fragment (1960, 186).

Even Anaximander's concern for symmetry and proportion appears in the fragment according to Kahn's interpretation. Aristotle comments (A14) that some make the \( \text{απειρο̱ν} \) something apart from the elements because an infinite element would destroy all of the others by absorbing them when they pass into it. In Aristotle this line of reasoning led to the idea of an "equality of power" among the elements. This is essentially a geometric relationship (1960, 187). Thus "the old Ionic theory of the elements is characterized by the same geometric symmetry which prevails in Anaximander's celestial scheme"
It is this internal harmony among the components of the world-system which constitutes the universe as a κόσμος, "an admirably organized whole" (1960, 188). Though we have no evidence that Anaximander himself used the word, κόσμος, the idea as it is known in later thinkers surely derived from him. We do hear of τάξις. The elements pay penalty to one another according to this "order" which is essentially temporal--κατά τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. The proportionality which exists among the elements consists in the prevalence of one element for a time at the expense of its opposite; this is followed by a period of domination by the other. Κόσμος is a τάξις because it is ruled by χρόνος. "Here at the starting-point of Western science and philosophy, we find the Order of Nature clearly conceived as an 'ordinance of Time'." 63

Anaximander was applying these moral and legal concepts to the natural world before the rise of the contrast between φύσις and νόμος (1960, 192-193). He was closer in time and mentality to the ancient civilizations whose mythic formulations habitually conflated the two realms. The tendency of philosophy, however, eventually resulted in their separation (1960, 192). But the concept of the world as κόσμος, while a genuinely philosophical notion, arose in a milieu where it was possible to transfer the terms of civil life to cosmological use. Kahn points out that all philosophical terms begin this way--"from a simpler, concrete usage with a human reference point" (1960, 193). Thus the language of everyday human affairs, which is "older than science", gives it its first form.

The importance of the imagery of cosmic strife in early Greek thought should make it clear that the rational outlook on the world did not arise by mere negation, by the stripping away of some primitive veil of pictures
in order to lay bare the facts. In the historical experience of Greece, Nature became permeable to the human intelligence only when the inscrutable personalities of mythic religion were replaced by well-defined and regular powers. The linguistic stamp of the new mentality is a preference for neuter forms, in place of the "animate" masculines and feminines which are the stuff of myth. The Olympians have given way before το άπειρον, το χρεών, το άντικα, το θερμον, τα οπάτα. The strife of elemental forces is henceforth no unpredictable quarrel between capricious agents, but an orderly scheme in which defeat must follow aggression as inevitably as the night the day (1960, 193).

The catchword for the new philosophy, which Anaximander and his followers brought into being, is φυσις (1960, 201). This signifies an approach which is "nothing less than the science and the natural philosophy of antiquity" (1960, 199). Yet it is the growth aspect of the word φυσις (φυειν: to bring forth) which predominates in the Milesian world-view, rather than the order aspect which prevails in classical thought. The emphasis on becoming is a legacy from Hesiod's genealogy. The use of the word φυσις, rather than, for example, ειδος or ομοιον, indicates that "the early philosophers sought to understand the 'nature' of a thing by discovering from what source and in what way it has come to be what it is" (1960, 202). Hence, their interest in the ἀρχή of all things. Like φυσις, the term ἀρχή lost its genetic sense (ie, "beginning") and took on the meaning of "principle" in classical philosophy. But in Anaximander both meanings are present.

Kahn's emphasis in the interpretation of Anaximander is clearly on his geometric concern for proportionate order which pervades his cosmology. Kahn could be said to differ from Gigon and Holscher precisely in his insistence that Anaximander's thought is genuinely cosmological and not merely cosmogonic. He is aware, as we have seen, that the concern for genesis plays a large role in Anaximander, and actually serves to delineate the early Milesian world-view...
from classical philosophy. But harmony and proportion and, thus order (κόσμος) and structure (σχήμα) are his chief concerns. These became the legacy of Milesian thought.

Kahn places little importance—historically speaking—in Anaximander's arché-doctrine. In contrast to P. Seligman who devotes his entire study of Anaximander to the apeiron theory and this precisely because of its importance in the history of metaphysics, Kahn treats it only briefly in the second Appendix to his book (1960, 231-239). Kahn argues that not only is our information about the apeiron meager, and transmitted in the language of the Aristotelian conceptual scheme, but the whole discussion of first principles "invariably serves to oppose the philosophers to one another" (1960, 231). Anaximander's doctrine of το άπειρον apparently threatens to undermine the case for the unity of pre-Socratic thought. Kahn treats it strictly in terms of the role it plays in Anaximander's cosmology (1960, 231). He argues that the translation "Boundless" does not correspond to its usage in the doxography. Homer and Hesiod apply the adjective to earth and sea. Yet neither element is thought of as devoid of limits. By several examples, Kahn shows the affinity of this word with the verb περάω (to 'traverse', eg, a body of water) and with the adverb περαν ('across'). He concludes that περαπαρ is a limit in the sense of "the point at which the forward movement comes to an end" (1960, 232). Therefore, απειρον means "what cannot be passed over or traversed from end to end." This is why Aristotle contrasts απειρον with διέξοδος and διέξοδος (Physics 204a 2-7). Aristotle's synonym for απειρον is διέξοδο (204a 14). This also explains how the earth, which indeed is limited, can be called απειρον (1960, 232). Anaximander initiated a usage which eventually led to the contrast απειρον/πεπερασμενον (or πέρα).
This resulted in the concept of mathematical infinity and qualitative indeterminancy. But in Anaximander himself it signifies an inexhaustible and endless mass (1960, 233). It is also infinite space. This mass encircles (περιέχον) the heavens. Thus the meaning of ἁπάσις must be spatial as well as temporal (1960, 235). However, the doxographers are mistaken when they speak of the apeiron as τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Anaximander's arché clearly does not function in his thought as Aristotle's ὁ ἄνθρωπος does in his. Unlike the substratum, the apeiron "directs" (κυβερνάν) all things. "It is not only the matter but the motor of the world, the living, divine force of natural change" (1960, 238). The idea of divine government by the very "stuff" from which the world was made serves to clarify the meaning of κόσμοι—the internally harmonious and orderly whole (τὸ φύσις) which owes its order to the divine governance of an arché-principle (ὁ θεός). "Thus it is not only the idea of the well-regulated cosmos which Greece owes to Anaximander, but also that of its regulator, the Cosmic God" (1960, 238).

I have stressed the role of Kahn's hermeneutical assumptions in his analysis. These include the theme of the unity of pre-Socratic thought (cosmology), the Great-Man theory, a stress on scientific revolution as the vanguard of archaic philosophy, and on discontinuity between this science and the mythical-religious tradition. These assumptions indicate Kahn's relationship to a tradition of interpretation which we have labelled as "Positivist." This label concerns the author's view of what is significant about Anaximander, not his own method of research. Kahn is not skeptical concerning the reliability of the texts. He is cognizant of the role of assumptions in his treatment of Anaximander to the point of admitting circularity in his argument. However, he retains a firm conviction in the "miracle grec."
Some such historical assumptions—let us say paradigms—about the course of Greek philosophy appear to be hermeneutically necessary to the interpretation of any individual pre-Socratic. It is clear, at least, that Gigon, Holscher and Kahn do employ a morphology and philosophy of history as a guide to the history of philosophy. Kahn's argument works properly and convincingly when his idea of the Greek miracle is viewed, not as a conclusion stemming from it, but as a foundation upon which it rests. Only in this light can his detailed arguments be integrated and his conclusions evaluated.

(4) Jean-Pierre Verant - The analysis of Vernant's interpretation of Anaximander offers a surprising contrast to that of Kahn's. Vernant explicitly departs from the 'miracle grec' view of a scientific—metaphysical revolution out of the creative intelligence of the pre-Socratic philosophers. He proposes instead to explain the sudden rise of speculation in the sixth century by mutations in the forms of social life. Archaic philosophy is thus more of an effect than a cause in the history of this era. The early philosophers "ont projeté sur le monde de la nature l'image même de la société humaine dans la forme que la polis lui avait conférée" (1971, 158). This is not only the case with the events of archaic Greece. It is rather an instance of the general relation which holds between the intellectual and non-intellectual spheres in human history and society. Vernant is an adherent of a sort of Historical Materialism though he rejects the label "Marxist." At any rate he certainly departs from Kahn's view of the genesis of Greek philosophy out of a scientific revolution led by one outstanding personality. But we are surprised to find agreement with Kahn in Vernant's analysis of the character of the transformation: "...nous saisisons donc le
passage d'une image mythique à une notion géométrique" (1971, 158). The philosophical thought whose origin Vernant seeks to explain by a social history of the centuries leading up to its emergence is seen by him as rational, geometric, and scientifically positive (1962, 101). The new philosophical thought—fully visible only with Parmenides—is characterized by two traits. They are: (1) "le rejet, dans l'explication des phénomènes, du surnaturel et du merveilleux" and (2) "la rupture avec la logique de l'ambivalence, la recherche, dans le discours, d'une cohérence interne, par une définition rigoureuse des concepts, une nette délimitation des plans du réel, une stricte observance du principe d'identité" (1971, 312-312). Again, these innovations were no miracles.

Il n'y a pas d'immaculée conception de la Raison. L'avènement de la philosophie, Conford l'a montré, est un fait d'histoire, enracinée dans le passé, se formant à partir de lui en même temps que contre lui (1971, 313).

The innovations were due, rather to "natural causes": important but thoroughly mundane developments in Greek society. But the connection or relation between the intellectual transformations and transformations in the social, economic and political realms is treated with considerable subtlety in this analysis. Vernant opposes the notion of any direct line between the Parmenidean concept of Being and the abstract form of exchange embodied in money. He dismisses such an explanation as vulgar Marxism. Nor is the concept Being a 'reflection' of monetary practice. The problematics behind Parmenides' τὸ οὐ are not essentially, or even originally, economic. They are genuinely philosophical. Thus, on the one hand,

cette mutation mentale apparaît solidaire des transformations qui se produisent, entre le VIII et le VI siècle, à tous les niveaux des sociétés grecque: dans les institutions politiques de la Cité, dans le droit, dans la vie économique, dans la monnaie (1971, 313).
But, on the other hand, "solidarité ne signifie pas simple reflet".

But what role, in this "mutation mentale", does the thought of Anaximander play? He is, after all, pre-Parmenidean, both chronologically and developmentally. Vernant admits, along with Kahn, that the Ionians' concern for genesis, the union and conflict of opposites, etc., which they "inherited from religion" (1971, 312), places their thought close to the myth. Nevertheless, Vernant insists that Anaximander is the one in whom we first find the essential elements of Greek philosophy. But more importantly, unlike Parmenides' concept of Being, the key ideas of Anaximander are almost transparent in their relation to the social conditions which explain their origin and significance.

In order to elucidate these relationships, Vernant journeys a considerable distance into the pre-Hellenic past. Contrary to what one expects from the title, Les origines de la pensée grecque is not a discussion of the early pre-Socratics. 'Origins' here mean not the coming into being of Greek thought, but that from which it took its rise. Hence, the book traces relevant historical developments beginning with the Minoan and Mycenaean periods and culminates in a discussion of Anaximander. Its purpose is to explain the beginnings of Greek philosophy through an understanding of its origins.

Despite the fact that, as M.P. Nilsson has shown, the religion and mythology of classical Greece is rooted in Mycenaean traditions, on other
levels there was almost a complete break with the past. Vernant argues that the Dorian invasions of the 12th century B.C. destroyed a type of palace-centered government which was personified in a divine king. This type of royalty was thoroughly oriental, as was the culture it represented. Thus the relation to the East is a key factor in the Mycenaean tradition. After the cultural isolation of the Hellenic "middle ages" (c.1100-900 B.C.), the Greeks found themselves turning eastward again, this time in search of their own identity. It was contact with their own past that the Orient offered them. Unlike the Mycenaeans, who were orientals by imitation and assimilation, the Greeks appropriated this influence in a highly original way (1962, 7). It was during this period that the monarchical form of social life was replaced by the Polis—a genuinely public forum governed by démos and debate rather than by royal personality and palace secrecy. Along with the city we also find the birth of a rational thought, which offered itself in place of the ancient cosmogonies associated with the rituals and myths of sovereignty. The new thought assumed the task of ordering the world, as the Polis had ordered the common affairs of men, according to the principles of symmetry and equality among the diverse elements within it (1962, 7).

Under the ancient form of government, the monarch ruled all aspects of social and economic life. This rule was carried out through the intermediary of a class of scribes, who regulated these affairs according to a massive body of tradition which existed in the form of archives. Writing was an integral and exclusive part of royal bureaucratic privilege. If there was genuine private commerce, there is no record of it in the Linear B tablets we possess. Nor is there a trace of payment in gold or of an established value-equivalence for trade. Apparently the scribes regulated distribution
as well as the production of goods (1962, 18-19). In addition to the scribes we find a class of priests who reflect the immense religious significance of the king. The king was a divine personality.

But this society differed in almost every way from that of the Greek Middle Ages (1962, 33). The Greeks of the 10th and 9th centuries were not unmindful of these differences, though they appear at times (for example, in Homer) to wish to forget them. In Hesiod, the differences are explicitly thematized. Hesiod, who lives in the "age of Iron", recalls the superior ages of "Gold" and "Bronze." In other ways too, the differences between the past and present are felt. In the political vocabulary, the Mycenaean term for king, αναξ, is now replaced by βασιλεύ/ (1962, 31). The change in name represents a change in nature. The supremacy of the basileus is that of a primus inter pares whose authority is limited to such things as leading war campaigns comprised of armies drawn from several cities (1962, 35ff). The limited power of the basileus is further attested by the appearance of the archon. As the domain of the basileus becomes limited to that of certain religious priesthoods, the archon gains power over the realm of politics in the proper sense of the word (1962, 37). Furthermore, the archon is installed by election, not through heredity. His office presupposes a new conception of power; ie, delegation "par une décision humaine, par un choix qui suppose confrontation et discussion" (1962, 37). This necessitated a new attitude toward struggle in social life. For if the Polis is under the direction of individuals chosen by means of debate and persuasion, then the power-struggle among parties of individuals of like standing no longer poses the threat of social breakdown, as it did in the Mycenaean period, but has become the fount of law and right. This new attitude toward social conflict is reflected in Hesiod's statement--Works and Days, 11ff--
that there is not one Eris but two, an evil 'conflict' and a good 'rivalry' (1962, 42). The latter is the new element, and with it Hesiod takes distance from the world presented by Homer. Rivalry represents a kind of struggle which is necessary, good and which improves the contestants. It is Eris in this sense which was seized upon by the founders of the Polis and elevated to a principle of political life (1962, 41).

This concept and the way of political practice it represents was called forth by the collapse of the Mycenaean order. In Homer's portrait of Odysseus' kingdom, we see the remnants of the Mycenaean order which played a positive role in the early struggles of the nascent Hellenic society.

Mais précisément la disparition de l'anax semble avoir laissé subsister côte à côte les deux forces sociales avec lesquelles son pouvoir avait dû composer: d'une part les communautés villageoises, de l'autre une aristocratie guerrière dont les plus hautes familles détiennent également, comme privilège de genos, certains monopoles religieux. Entre ces forces opposées que libére l'écroulement du système palatial et qui vont s'affronter parfois avec violence, la recherche d'un équilibre, d'un accord, fera naître, dans une période de trouble, une réflexion morale et des spéculations politiques qui vont définir une première forme de 'sagesse' humaine (1962, 34-35).

Vernant is refering to the Seven Sages who, though not quite comparable to the natural philosophers of the next period--"Elles n'a pas pour objet l'univers de la phusis mais le monde des hommes"--mark the beginning of political thought in Hellas. It is this tradition of political reflection, Vernant argues, which the philosophers of the sixth century took as their point of departure.

Lorsqu'elle prend naissance, à Milet, la philosophie est enracinée dans cette pensée politique dont elle traduit les préoccupations fondamentales et à laquelle elle emprunte une partie de son vocabulaire (1962, 132).
Among the changes introduced by the Polis, perhaps the chief one was
the extraordinary preeminence given to speech above all other instruments of
power (1962, 44). The power of speech was considered divine by the Greeks.
In this form—Πείθω: persuasion—it resembles the belief in the efficacious
words and formulae of religious ritual, or of the 'words' of the king when
he spoke the law (themis). But the power of speech as it was known in the
Polis, was a secularized institution (1962, 45). Speech was authoritative
only if it survived the public test of debate and argument. It was not believed
because of an innate authority; it derived its authority from the public to
whom it is addressed. The Vox Dei had become the Vox Populi. "C'est ce
choix purement humain qui mesure la force de persuasion respective des
deux discours, assurant la victoire d'un des orateurs sur son adversaire"
(1962, 45). Thus, there was an intimate relationship between politics and
thought (λόγος). Thought became aware of itself, its rules and its power
precisely by means of its political application.

A second element introduced by the Polis was the full "publicity"
(pleine publicité) which it brought to the structures of social life. If
debate and persuasion were to function effectively, all factors relevant
to political decisions had to be known. This demand for publicity was
antithetical to the palace secrecy upon which the Mycenaean monarchy had
been based. Such secrecy, a form of privatization necessary to royal govern-
ment, had no place in the new organization of the Polis. This does not mean
that the details of the lives of private citizens were brought to the attention
of the public. The Greeks recognized a legitimately private sphere. It does
mean that the Polis brought a fully public arena into existence for the first
time: a forum (Greek:Εστία) in which all facts pertaining to the commonwealth
were known to all. Thus the Polis sought the permanent elimination of that
privileged information which had been restricted to secret familial or
sacerdotal circles in the bureaucracy of the ancien régime. This in turn
had crucial implications for the development of logos in Greek society.

Not only did thought become motivated by a scientific drive for universal
knowledge of everything (Phusis) (1962, 101), but it would no longer pay
homage to any authority, personal or religious, in its pursuit of truth.

If we view these two characteristics of the Polis—the preëminence of
speech and the elimination of the covert from public life—in their historical
unity, we will understand what is unique about the emergence of writing in
Hellas. Through written language, speech could effectively divulge those
things which otherwise would become powerful secrets in the hands of certain
segments of society (1962, 47). According to Vernant, we must not overlook
an analogy here between political and intellectual history. No sooner does
logos—which was nurtured in a political environment—begin to argue about
things philosophical, than it turns to the written word as a means of expression.
This fact is particularly relevant to Anaximander, who is believed to
have written one of the first prose treatises in Hellas (1962, 48). The
analogy which Vernant draws is that of a lawgiver publishing his laws, not to
be accepted as the divine word of an αναξ, but to be passed into legislation
by vote.

Lorsqu'à leur tour des indivis décideront de rendre
publique leur savoir par le moyen de l'écriture, soit sous
forme de livre comme ceux qu'Anaximandre et Phérécyde,
les premiers, auraient écrits...leur ambition ne sera
pas de faire connaître à d'autres une découverte ou
une opinion personnelles; ils voudront, en déposant
leur message ἀπὸ τὸ ἴδιον, en faire le bien commun
de la cité, une norme susceptible, comme la loi, de
s'imposer à tous (1962, 48-49).
On the intellectual plane the new thought of the Sages and Philosophers was a substitute for the secret revelations of the mystery cults such as Orphism. These sects represented a momentary revolt against the process of "divulgation" and de-privatization of social life (1962, 52f). As philosophy waged this battle for the new order against certain reactionary forces, it "found itself in an ambiguous position at its inception." It occupied the middle ground, being the mediator, between the publicity of the agora and the secretive spirit of the sect (1962, 55). This ambiguity is clearly seen in early Pythagoreanism, but it remained a lasting trait of Greek philosophy. In the thought of Plato, we see a basic ambivalence between the philosopher in the role of reformer of social life and director of the Polis, and the philosopher as an otherworldly teacher who gathers disciples to himself in order to set up another Polis to live a life of knowledge and contemplation (1962, 55-56).

This ambiguity is visible in Anaximander as well. His philosophical vocabulary contains many expressions deriving from the religious language of the sects. He speaks of the arché (as Hesiod did) as an indistinct state preceeding all existing things; he says the apeiron secreted (ἀποκρίνεσθαι) a seed (γόνιον) which, being cold in the center and hot on the circumference, was able to generate air and fire in the world; he says the heavens were formed when the shell of this cosmic egg cracked and broke off. However, we must remember the true spirit of this new thought—"Il n'y a pas entre le mythe et la philosophie rééllement continuité" (1962, 105). These terms do not exhaust the vocabulary of Anaximander. In other respects his language is quite profane and even his mythical language is not used in its proper religious sense.

Avec les Milésiens, pour la première fois, l'origine et l'ordre du monde prennent la forme d'un problème
explicitement posé, auquel il faut apporter une réponse sans mystère, à la mesure de l'intelligence humaine, susceptible d'être exposée et débattue publiquement, devant l'ensemble des citoyens, comme les autres questions de la vie courante. Ainsi s'affirme une fonction de connaissance dégagée de toute préoccupation d'ordre rituel. Les 'physiciens', délibérément, ignorent le monde de la religion (1962, 105-106).

Cornford overestimated the significance of the orphic vocabulary of Anaximander. He was mistaken in his belief that early pre-Socratic thought simply "appropriated and prolonged the essential themes of the cosmogonic myths" (1962, 102-103). On the other hand, though Burnet's picture of the birth of rational thought as a virtual creatio ex nihilo is false historically speaking, he did understand something of the character of this thinking and of the radical change which it entailed for the Greek mind (1962, 100-102).

The genesis and rise of rational thought must entail the decline and dissolution of mythical thought. "L'expérience quotidienne" which in the mythical outlook is religiously devalued as profane in favor of the exemplary acts of the gods "à l'origine" is now elevated to a revelatory status.

Ce n'est plus l'originel qui illumine et transfigure le quotidien; c'est le quotidien qui rend l'originel intelligible en fournissant des modèles pour comprendre comment le monde s'est formé et ordonné (1962, 101).

The process of "laïcisation de la vie sociale" necessarily produces the "désacralisation du savoir" (1971, 152-153). This connection, which is conceived by Vernant more in terms of analogy than in terms of causality, concerns even the content of philosophy.

Pour construire les cosmologies nouvelles, ils (les Milésiens) ont utilisé les notions que la pensée morale et politique avait élaborées, ils ont projeté sur le monde de la nature cette conception de l'ordre de la loi qui, triomphant dans la cité, avait fait du monde humain un cosmos (1962, 106).
What really interests Vernant in the thought of Anaximander is not its orphic language but the concepts of l'isonomia, l'équilibre, réciprocité, harmonie, symétrie, cosmonomie: ie, expressions of geometric centrality and spatial proportionality. These expressions are characteristics of the Polis as it was designed and administrated by such men as Hippodamos and Cleisthenes. As the above remark shows, Vernant sees in Anaximander's cosmology the Polis itself writ large.

For this reason, though he lays aside the 'miracle grec', Vernant speaks appreciatively of Kahn's interpretation of Anaximander (eg, 1962, 122 and 1971, 185 and 196). They agree essentially in this: the key feature of Anaximander's thought is the geometrical scheme of his cosmos. This explains why Vernant, like Kahn, shows little interest in Anaximander's apeiron. He occasionally refers to it, in a way reminiscent of Gigon's interpretation, as an analogue to Hesiod's Chaos (1962, 104f). But as for the role it plays in Anaximander, Vernant understands the apeiron, like Kahn, strictly in its relation to his cosmology. The point of the apeiron-doctrine, he says, is to ensure a reciprocal power-relation between the elements of the cosmos (1962, 123). And, again like Kahn, he sees the elements in Anaximander's cosmology as opposites defined by their mutual struggle.

In Vernant's opinion, these elements were the Milesian substitute for the primordial deities of the myth. The elements, like the gods, are imperishable, possess great power and have wide extension. They are not abstractions which may be found anywhere and everywhere in the cosmos. They have their proper places, as the divinities were assigned their own lots (μοίραι). The limits (πείρατα) on an element are spatial; they are imposed by another element which surrounds it and thus defines it (1971, 194-5). Around all of the elements is something which itself is not surrounded and which therefore is unlimited.
What is unlimited has no beginning (arché)—since, according to Aristotle, this would constitute a limit. Thus the ἀπειρον is the ἀρχή of everything else. Vernant cites the same reasoning in Melissos of Samos and Anaxagoras (1971, 195), a point also made by Kahn. The apeiron is ruled by none save by itself (αὐτοκρατήρ) (1971, 196). Vernant accepts Aristotle's explanation for Anaximander's making the apeiron something apart from the elements: namely, if any element were unlimited, the others would be destroyed by it. He concludes that the concept of the apeiron is employed by Anaximander to preserve a balanced order among the elemental opposites of the world.

The elements are τὰ ὄντα which pay reparation to each other for their injustice. They are equivalences subject to the "une règle de justice compensatoire." This equilibrium of powers—which is "nothing less than static" (1962, 123)—constitutes the harmonious order (κόσμος) of the universe.

Sous le joug de cette dike égale pour tous, les puissances élémentaires s'associent, se coordonnent suivant un équilibre régulier, pour composer, en dépit de leur multiplicité et de leur diversité, un cosmos unique (1962, 124).

But it is the structure of the visible cosmos—its geometric scheme—rather than the abstract balance of opposite elements which constitutes the essence of Anaximander's world picture, according to Vernant. He lays stress on the diagrammatic motive behind this conception; Anaximander sought to render the cosmos "à voir", a spectacle (τὸ θέατρον) (1962, 120 and 127f). The priority of the geometric-schematic aspect of Anaximander's conception attests to the "profonde analogie de structure entre l'espace institutionnel dans lequel s'exprime le cosmos humain et l'espace physique dans lequel les Miléiens projettent le cosmos naturel" (1962, 126). This parallel becomes a constant refrain in Vernant's interpretation of Anaximander: "...des interférences qui ont
pu se produire entre les valeurs politiques, géométriques et physiques
du centre... dans la société et dans la nature"; "...ces correspondances
entre la structure du cosmos naturel et l'organisation du cosmos social";
"les liens...entre des deux ordres de phénomènes"; "...la parenté entre
la conception géométrique de l'univers...et l'organisation, dans le cadre
de la cité", etc.

Vernant has worked out this correspondence in great detail. We have
seen his conception of the development of the Polis and its spirit of
isonomia. We must elucidate a further element in this socio-political
structure so its analogy with Anaximander's philosophy may be properly
drawn. That element is a new geometric conception of political space.

According to Vernant, in a detailed line of argumentation which he derives
from Louis Gernet, the revolutionary political outlook underlying the
Polis expressed itself in a radical reorganization of civic space culminat-
ing in the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes of Athens and Hippodamus of
Melitus (1962, 125 and 1971, 154f). This movement of reform began in
the colonies where the development of cities could be thoroughly planned.
It consisted in a shift from the centrality of the acropolis to the cen-
trality of the agora. This shift is consonant with that from monarchy to
Polis democracy, insofar as it involved a "dévalorisation" of the sacred
space associated with the old order. In the Polis, no group was allowed
the privilege of rule over another. Thus no physical space could be valued
above any other space. This is clearly expressed by the city designs
created by Hippodamos. Likewise Cleisthenes effected the radical realign-
ment of power groups via the rotation of office-holding in the Athenian
Council of Five Hundred, between the ten tribes who occupied ten separate
living quarters in the city. The agora, far from being a sacred space, was
the center: privileged only in the sense that it signified the equality of all sectors of the ἄστυ (physical town) and therefore expressed the equality of all members of the πόλις (political community) (1962, 151f).

The Greek agora, as described by Gernet, was understood as "le Foyer commun", the common hearth and thus derived from (or at least replacing) the older concept of Ἑστία. The hestia was the domestic hearth and center of the private domain of the family. There the family lit the fire, sacrificed to the gods and established a link between heaven and earth (1971, 157).

But the advent of the Polis created a new kind of man--le citoyen--who did not orient his life about the familial hearth, but around the agora. Located in the center of the town, the agora nurtured the new ideal of public equality. The fact that the hearth is now ἐν μέσω of the Polis means that political power is now held ἐν κοινῷ by all citizens (1971, 154).

As the old belief in a religiously heterogeneous space found its expression on the intellectual plane in the myths of sovereignty, so the new belief in a secular and politically homogeneous space found expression in the Milesian philosophies. The most transparent of these is the cosmology of Anaximander. His picture (πίναξ) of the cosmos, with its strict proportionality, possesses a fixed center in the earth (unlike Thales, whose earth floats about on the water). The earth remains in place because it is equidistant from the extremities of the cosmos (unlike Anaximenes, whose central earth must be supported by Air). In Anaximander's cosmology, as in the Polis, stability depends upon equality and equality is expressed as spatial centrality. Thus Hippolytus, describing Anaximander's view, says, "the earth is aloft, not dominated by anything." As the agora is the place of public justice and equality so the earth remains inviolate in the center, ὑπὸ ἁλωτὸν κρατούμεναι. But the idea of an undominated earth appears to
conflict with idea of the apeiron as a governing arche.

To resolve this tension, some have argued that the phrase υττο μηΰενο/κρατουμενην is not Anaximander's own, but Hippolytus' interpretation of him, and that κρατειν, in the Hellenistic period, meant 'support' and no longer referred to 'domination'. This is a plausible reading since Hippolytus elsewhere (13A7) tells us that Anaximenes, unlike Anaximander, taught that the earth stayed in place because it was επ'αεροί οχουμενην: "borne (up) on Air." In these terms, it is natural to think of Anaximander's earth as remaining in place even though it is "not supported by anything."

But Vernant cites several parallels in the fragments and testimonia of other pre-Socratics showing that κρατουμενην indicates violation by a superior power. κρατουμενην means to be "dominée par ce qui s'étend au delà d'elle, l'entoure, l'enveloppe, c'est à dire fixe ses limites, ses peirata" (1971, 194-195). Thus Anaximenes' earth is supported by the Air which περιεχει the cosmos. κρατουμενην is understood by Hippolytus (and Anaximander) as identical to περιεχουμενην. "Περιεχειν, envelopper, (avec les valeurs spatiales que ce terme implique), κυβερναν, gouverner (avec ses résonances politique), tel sont les deux aspects désormais solidaires du pouvoir de cratein" (1971, 193-194). But is Anaximander's doctrine of geocentricity simply an exception to the general rule that the arche (το άπειρον) "surrounds and governs all things?" The solution to this difficulty lies in the fact that Anaximander's conception of the earth is an appeal to the notion of το κοινον μέσον which represents political, and now cosmic, isonomia. Isonomia means restraint upon monopoly and usurpation through a balance of power. Vernant argues that it is not a doxographical inconsistency that the earth is 'unsupported' or 'undominated' while at the same time the apeiron surrounds
and directs it along with everything else. These two placita are not incompatible, because the apeiron is not like Hesiod's Zeus or the Divine King of the myths of sovereignty who rule by holding κράτος over subordinates. Rather, "L'apeiron est souverain à la façon d'une loi commune imposant à tous les particuliers une même dikê" (1971, 204). The concept of the apeiron "vise à garantir la permanence d'un ordre égalitaire où les puissances opposées s'égale à réciproquement." The apeiron itself is not one of the elements. It is nothing in particular (ι'διον), but rather the common fount of all reality (το κοινον) (1971, 203). This explains why Aristotle and Simplicius understood the apeiron as "le médiateur, l'intermédiaire entre les éléments, το μεταξύ τουτων." 78

Though the earth, like all the elements, must have its 'times' of ἀδίκια and τίσι, it seems to enjoy special provision in Anaximander's cosmology. Vernant explains this by positing a kind of rapprochement between the apeiron-concept as the governor of the cosmic powers and the doctrine of geocentricity as the intra-cosmic embodiment of this principle (αρχη).

En dehors de l'apeiron qui demeure immuable et éternel, tout dans le cosmos est mouvement, changement, transformation; tout se déplace, avance et recule. Au contraire la terre demeure immobile à sa place. Pourquoi? Parce que, sous la domination de l'apeiron, le monde apparaît désormais centré et que la terre occupe précisément ce centre (1971, 205).

...le centre traduit le commun et symbolise, en solidarité étroite avec l'apeiron, le non-dominé, l'autocratès. (1971, 206)

Seul l'apeiron, que rien ne limite ni ne domine, n'est en rien non plus particu- larise. Cependant la terre n'est pas une partie comme les autres. Parce qu'elle est
centrale, elle n'est pas particulière mais commune et, en ce sens, homologue au tout (1971, 206).

Anaximander's earth, in the political analogy, represents every central hearth. The hearth in turn points to the common motive and arché behind all of the institutions and all levels of culture in Hellenic society.

Édifié au centre de la cité, en ce méson où le cratos a été déposé pour que nul ne puisse se l'approprier, le Foyer porte le nom de Hestia koine parce qu'il symbolise le tout d'une communauté politique où chaque élément particulier, sous le règne de l'isonomia, est désormais l'homoios de tous les autres (1971, 206).

Vernant's Anaximander interpretation, while less detailed than Kahn's because of his attention to historical matters, nevertheless is extremely instructive. With Hölscher, he endeavors to uncover the historical origins of pre-Socratic thought. Yet, with Kahn, he strives to preserve the authenticity of Greek scientific rationality. He accomplishes these ends by seeking these origins, with Cornford, in social conditions. Thus he puts the question of the relation between Anaximander's thought and that of his predecessors in a new light. In so doing, he offers a surprising contrast to Kahn. He rejects the "miracle grec" by grounding Anaximander's cosmology in political life and thought; yet he emphasizes (somewhat in reaction to Cornford: cf. 1971, 290) what is new in Anaximander's philosophy vis-à-vis the religious myth. Anaximander's thought, while rooted in the material history of political life, is nevertheless (for this very reason) motivated by a passion for rational and geometric proportionality in Nature. But Vernant's conception of the relation between the material-historical base and the intellectual plane of culture is subtle. He rejects any causal line of attachment. He reserves a measure of autonomy for both niveaux: each is seen to develop in terms of its own character, without
undergoing the direct influence of factors originating on another level. Vernant wishes to analyze the relation of thought and material culture in ancient Greece in terms of parallel causalities operating intra-, but not inter- regionally. Yet development in the political, economic and intellectual planes is motivated by the same aspiration and even worked out *mutatis mutandis* according to the same principle. This fact gives the various institutions of Greek society their coherence and constitutes the condition for the possibility of an integral analysis of their history. In Anaximander's philosophy, the parallel which reveals its relation to political life is its conception of natural space, which reflects the political space of the City-State.

Ce remarquable parallélisme dans le vocabulaire, les concepts, la structure de la pensée, semble bien confirmer notre hypothèse que la nouvelle image sphérique du monde a été rendue possible par l'élaboration d'une nouvelle image de la société humaine dans la cadre des institutions de la polis (1971, 156).

In the final analysis, Anaximander's view "was rendered possible" by historical developments in material culture. This represents a tension in Vernant's hermeneutic. On the one hand, he wishes to demonstrate the rootedness of the Anaximandrian conception in political life; on the other hand, he resists the antinomies which result from this reduction. But this interpretation of Anaximander, while it offers a provocative demonstration of correspondences between his cosmology and the Polis-structure, is itself rendered possible by a parallelistic Historical Materialism. This *Leitmotiv* informs Vernant's study of Greek thought in much the same way as Kahn's belief in the unity of pre-Socratic cosmology informs his. In both cases, the author's perspective must be recognized, if not accepted, in order for the argument to bear its intended weight.
Summary Comparisons and Transitional Remarks

We have already contrasted Hölscher's diachronic interest in the origins of Anaximander's philosophy with Gigon's synchronic interest in its structural affinities with earlier and later conceptions. We spoke, in this connection, of Hölscher's Historicism and Gigon's Problemgeschichte. Kahn and Vernant may be contrasted in a similar way. Kahn's interest in the systematics (eg, the doctrine of elements) comprising Anaximander's world-view, which he believes had no antecedents as such, differs from Vernant's attempt to illustrate its social origins as Gigon's interpretation differs from Hölscher's. Gigon and Kahn share a interest in the structural features of Anaximander's conception; Hölscher and Vernant have a greater interest in the genetic questions surrounding the same phenomenon. This does not mean that Hölscher and Vernant agree as to the relation between Anaximander's philosophy and the myth. On this question the four divide along different lines. On the one side, we have the view that Anaximander's thought is closely bound to mythical conceptions, whether that be Hesiod (Gigon) or some oriental antecedent (Hölscher). On the other side is the view that Anaximander gave rise to an unprecedented philosophical rationality, whether this was a product of scientific curiosity (Kahn) or a reflection of the political ideal of equality (Vernant). If we depict these two issues as two perpendicular axes, we can illustrate the major differences and similarities thus:

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  structural/systematic analysis

  Gigon  
  close to myth  
  Hölscher  
  genetic/historical analysis  

  Kahn  
  break with myth  
  Vernant  
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Kahn and Gigon both emphasize the relative constancy of themes in pre-Socratic thought. This is reflected in their respective notions of "unity" and "continuity." But these two terms clearly indicate different things. The difference emerges in that "unity" for Kahn applies to philosophy after Anaximander, while Gigon's "continuity" holds for pre-Socratic thought before and after Anaximander. Gigon speaks of Hesiod's 'philosophy'. For Kahn there is too much distance between Hesiod and Anaximander to permit this view.

For Gigon and Hölscher, who find in Anaximander a close relation to the myth, the apeiron-doctrine is of central importance. In Kahn's and Vernant's interpretation it has faded into the background. For Vernant, the apeiron as arché requires an intra-cosmic analogue (the central Earth-Hearth) to express its full meaning. For Kahn, the question concerning the arché introduces differences among philosophers. What Anaximander has in common with later thinkers lies outside the apeiron-doctrine. Because of this, he must exclude the subject of the apeiron from the doctrine of the fragment. For Gigon, however, it is through the conception of the Unbegrenzte that Anaximander made his contributions to the history of philosophy. The arché-doctrine also connects Anaximander to Hesiod. For Hölscher, Anaximander's apeiron is that which most clearly reveals his debt to the myth; while a doctrine of elements (upon which, for Kahn, Anaximander's philosophy rests) has no place in his conception.

Kahn and Vernant emphasize the spatial element in Anaximander's cosmology and apeiron-concept. This is another reason the latter receives such cursory treatment in their analyses. If the apeiron is principally spatial, then its meaning is "that which has no dimensions" or, as Kahn
gives it, "that which cannot be traversed from end to end" (1960, 232).
The emphasis on spatiality in Anaximander's thought apparently draws one's attention away from his theory of the arché to his theory of the generated cosmos with its proportionate dimensions, rational harmony (Kahn), universal justice and equality (Vernant).

Hölscher lays great stress on Anaximander's cosmogony. He recognizes the genetic and temporal character of both arché and archomenon. (With Gigon, Hölscher, accepts the implicit contrast in Anaximander between das Unbegrenzte and das Begrenzte.) For this reason, his interpretation of the apeiron is more developed than Kahn's or Vernant's. Even here, however, the spatial receives priority since the apeiron derives from the idea of an Infinite Deep in oriental myth and arché is that which "surrounds" and "bounds" all things. Gigon also combines the temporal with the spatial: "Der Begriff des Unbegrenzte ist (was archaischen Denken natürlich ist) sowohl räumlich wie auch zeitlich zu verstehen" (1945, 63). Gigon's way seems safe, but he burdens the apeiron with too many meanings. In my view, the temporal deserves the accent in Anaximander's thought, which has not yet received an adequate exposition in this light. With respect to the emphasis on the spatial, however, it is interesting to note that for Kahn this represents a fundamental shift in consciousness in the sixth century B.C. from the interests of religious cosmogony to those of rational cosmology. On the other hand, for Hölscher the dominance of the spatial is due precisely to the influence of the graphic character of the mythical Weltbild. Thus an emphasis on spatiality does not necessarily undercut Anaximander's attachment to the myth.

With these reflections, we are anticipating our own interpretation of
Anaximander in Part Three. Much of that interpretation stems from dialogue with the four interpretations outlined above. In general our interpretation will be sympathetic, on the one hand, to the genetic historical approach and, on the other hand, to the idea of a close relationship between Anaximander and myth. Superficially, this places us in the neighborhood of Holscher's Anaximander interpretation. But our hermeneutical grounds are not the same as those underlying Holscher's view. Therefore, we must elaborate these grounds to clarify our interpretation in advance.
Footnotes

1 Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique (Geneve, 1954), pp. 127-155. We will refer to two other titles: Grundprobleme der Antiken Philosophie (München, 1959) and the chapter "Die Vorsokratiker" in Gigon's Studien zur antiken Philosophie (Berlin, 1972), pp. 1-7.


3 The first edition appeared in 1965; the second in 1966. We will use the third edition since the earlier editions do not contain the article, "Structure géométrique et notions politiques dans la cosmologie d'Anaximandre," which first appeared in Eirene VII (1968) 5-23.

Hereafter, we will refer to the works of all four reviewers, not in the footnotes, but in the text by placing in parentheses the date of their publication underlined, followed by the page number.

4 "Der Erste, den wir einen Philosophen nennen dürfen, ist denn auch selbst ein Dichter, Hesiod von Askra in Boötien, der Dichter der Theogonie... Darum ist sein Buch von der Geschichte der Götter in einem unvergleichlich viel tieferen sinne der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie als die Schrift des Thales von Milet, die die Philosophiehistorie seit Aristoteles und Theophrast an den Anfang gestellt hat" (1945, 13).

5 "In der Dichtung hat sich der hellenische Geist zuerst dargestellt... Er wäre beinahe erstaunlich, wenn nicht auch die Philosophie aus der Dichtung hervorgegangen wäre" (1945, 13).

6 K. J. Popma (Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, p. 142f) rejects the idea that Hesiod used the word arché in any philosophical sense. He is critical of Gigon's philosophical exegesis of Hesiod and of Vollenhoven's similar treatment of an earlier passage in the Theogony (45) in his article, "Ennoëtisme en Ahoristos Dvas in het Praeplatonische Denken," Philosophia Reformata (1954) 65, n. 45. Vollenhoven's treatment of Anaximander, both in this article and in Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte (1951), resembles Gigon's at several points.
Gigon accepts Jaeger's etymology of Hesiod's χάος as a derivative of χάσκω (to gape, to yawn), root χό-, hence χαώ (1945, 28). Jaeger relates this stem to the Nordic gap-, and the Nordic word ginungagap, a mythological term "expressing the same notion of the gaping abyss that existed at the beginning of the world" (Theology, p. 13). Gigon translates χάος as Spalt or Hohlung (1945, 28).

This recalls B. Snell's point on "The Origin of Scientific Thought" (The Discovery of the Mind, pp. 227ff) where he argues for the rise of abstract thought among the Greeks out of the very structure of the Greek language. He says, for example, "we could scarcely imagine the existence of Greek science or Greek philosophy if there had been no definite article."


Metaphysics, A5, 986a 23ff.

Liddell-Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, "πέραφος."

The usage of πέραφος as "goal" is Hellenistic at the earliest (Liddell-Scott). No one has attempted to interpret Anaximander's αρχή along these lines. It is not likely that Anaximander would have called the arché of all things "the Aimless" and then the "Divine" (12B3) which "steers" (12B5) them.


Aristotle explains (12A26) that the earth stays put because of its equidistance from the extremities of the universe. Here again, as with Anaximander's concept of the unbegun beginning, Aristotle reports the doctrine but offers an explanation of the reasoning behind it which may actually be his own. We know from De Caelo that he shared Anaximander's view of a stationary earth and that he polemized against the Pythagoreans who rejected the centrality of the earth (293a 15ff) and against Plato who believed that it rotates in space (293b 16ff). Vernant attributes supreme importance to Anaximander's doctrine of geocentricity. In his view, its significance lies in the fact that it is a revolutionary conception of space. But this conception in turn depends entirely upon Aristotle's inference of inertia from equidistance. Fortunately, Hippolytus repeats this reasoning (12A 11) which argues for its authenticity since his source is Theophrastus.
The otherwise earliest attested metaphorical use of κυβερνάω is by Pindar, Pythia 5, written in 462 B.C., Liddell-Scott, "κυβερνάω."


In a footnote (1945, 81, n. 16), Gigon allies himself with F. Dirlmeier (Rh. Mus. (87) 376ff and Hermes (75) 329ff) and against Deichgräber (Hermes (75) 10ff).

Vollenhoven also attributes a causal meaning to the εξ ων and the επί ταὐτα. His translation runs: "de factoren ("εξ ων"), die het ontstann der zijnden verklaren, zijn noodzakelijkerwijs dezelfde als die, welke met hun vergaan gemoeid zijn, want zij--de zijnden--betalen elkander straf en boete voor hun ongerechtigheid naar de ardening van de tijd" ("The factors that explain the origin (-ation) of things are necessarily the same as those which are involved in their distruction, because they--the things--pay each other penalty and reparation for their unrighteousness according to the arrangement of time").

Is this necessarily so? I think not. A close reading of the fragment shows that the only implied connection is that between punishment and destruction. Ie, the penalty spoken of in the sentence is strictly the "death penalty." The common association of genesis and injustice, however, is not strictly implied by the fragment--though it is capable of this interpretation.

Gigon cites Theognis 327f, as an example. This theme is also present in Greek literature in the terms κόροι, ὑβρίς and άτη (satisfaction-reckless excess-destruction). Cf. A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. IV pp. 258-261.

Paideia I, p. 159ff and Theology, p. 34ff.

Gigon remarks (1945, p 83) that Hesiod's ages could, therefore, in a sense be called three "worlds." Vollenhoven (1954) makes the same connection but reverses its import. He claims that Anaximander's "κόσμοι" must be understood in Hesiodic terms as "ages" or "periods" through which the universe passes.

Later Walter Bröcker argued that Anaximander is actually quoted by Heraclitus at 22B 126 and, on the basis of this, offered a reconstruction of Anaximander's fragment (12A9 § 12B1). "Heraklit zitiert Anaximander," Hermes 84 (1956) 382-384.
24  
apud Eusebius, Preparatio Evangelica I, 10.

25  This squares with the opinion (held by Chadwick, Murray, Toynbee, et alii) that the essence of Greek legend and myth is contained in the traditional Heroic literature. In Kirk's typology of the Greek myths (Chapters 6-8 in The Nature of Greek Myths), the examples he cites under the category "cosmogonical" are derived exclusively from Hesiod. This begs the question concerning the presence of cosmogonic elements in earlier Hellenic myth. But Kirk is quite willing to recognize borrowed Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Hittite elements—or at least parallels with these which point to a common ancestry—in Hesiod as well as in other facets of Greek mythology (p 117f and Chapter 11 on "The Influence of Western Asia in Greek Myths").

26  Gigon too points out that in Hesiod, and in Anaximander for that matter, the genesis of the earth seems to occur quite independently of the Origin (arché).

27  Of course, in the Theogony, Chaos is the progenetor of an entire line of deities which play no small part in Hesiod's scheme and some of which may be interpreted as cosmic in character. Such offspring include Night and Day. Night and her children, however, represent a catalogue of ills—some natural, some man-made—which plague human existence. The truly cosmic deities, on the other hand—Sky, Ocean, Time and the gods of weather—are children of Gaia and Ouranos, who (if Hölscher and Gigon are right) have no connection with ἀρχή, the Origin. Personally, I do not feel that these are sufficient grounds for saying that Hesiod is a stranger to cosmogony, though it must be clear that this was not his central interest. I believe, as Popma suggests, that Hesiod deliberately posited a dual arché: Earth and Chaos. (Popma does not discuss the role of Eros—but then neither does Hesiod—which also comes into being ex nihilo). Popma however accepts the Jaeger/Gigon interpretation of Chaos as the Gap between Heaven and Earth, which I believe Hölscher effectively refutes. If we accept Popma's notion of a dual arché in Hesiod, meanwhile reading Chaos with Hölscher as Infinite Deep, a conception emerges which actually consists of two cosmogonies or better of a cosmogony (of Earth, Sky and children) in conjunction with an anti-cosmogony (of Chaos and children). This seems to "save the appearances" of the Theogony without dismissing its logical lacunae, as Hölscher does (1968, 79ff), as byproducts of Hesiod's prophetic moralism.

28  This is also Kirk's view (Greek Myths p 117) of the relation of Hesiod to the Hurrian myth.

Michael H. Jameson, "Mythology of Ancient Greece" in Mythologies of the Ancient World, p 265f, suggests that Hesiod's Theogony was occasioned by the roughly simultaneous impact of the Hurrian—Hittite cycle and the Phoenician cycle upon the Hellenic tradition. He points out that the Hittite tale squared with the existing Greek cult because it taught the complete overthrow of Anu (=Kronos, who had no cult in Greece) by Kumarbi (=Zeus, the chief cultic figure in Hellas). But in the Phoenician version El (=Kronos) had not been completely displaced by Baal (=Zeus) and continued to be called "the father of men and gods," a title the Greeks reserved for Zeus alone. Thus Hesiod was faced with the alarming fact of a conflict between two ancient, and therefore authoritative, traditions. He was forced to reconcile these myths, not only with each other, but above all with Hellenic religion. This he did in the Theogony which he begins by speaking of the muses who "know how to tell many falsehoods that seem real" as well as the truth.

This judgement is shared by Kirk and Raven (pp 90-91).

It is precisely because of this difference between the functions of Chaos and apeiron that Walter Burkert ("Iranisches bei Anaximander," Rhein. Mus. (106) 97-134) discounts any relation of Anaximander to the Levantine or Mesopotamian tradition. The Infinite Deep in these mythologies represents the threat of bane for the demiurgic dieties. Only when Apsu and Tiamat have been slain and their huge bodies dismembered, can the cosmos come into being (Burkert, p. 119). Hölscher deemphasizes the difference between this conception and Anaximander's by positing a genetic relation between them. Burkert has built his argument on Hölscher's foundation. He accepts the eastward orientation of early Greek thought and attempts to pinpoint a source for Anaximander's cosmology in Iranian myth. Burkert is followed in this endeavor by M. L. West, Early Greek Philosophy. In correspondence with the author, Hölscher stated that he was not enlightened by Burkert's investigation of Anaximander's source.

Cf. Bruno Snell's comments about the debt of Greek philosophy to the Greek language. See footnote #8 in the present section above.

Here again Hölscher is following Snell. See Discovery of the Mind, pp 229ff. Also note Hölscher's use of the term "mythogical thinking," an idea Snell (following Cassirer) takes with the utmost seriousness (cf. Chapter nine of Discovery) but which Kirk (Gr. Myths, pp 280ff) finds nonsensical.

Diels, Doxographia, p. 134 and 476n; Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, section 13.

Simplicius, p. 24, 15.

See also Kahn's Anaximander, pp 210f.

Kirk and Raven concur that, in this section of the testimonium Simplicius is no longer quoting from Theophrastus. However, Hölscher does not prove that Simplicius could not have had Theophrastus in mind (Krik and Raven, pp 124-131).

Hölscher refers here to Reinhardt's Parmenides, p.74.

This was Reinhardt's explanation of the term (Parmenides, p. 174).

Compare this to Gigon's development of the contrasting pairs in Anaximander's thought at Ursprung, p. 62f.

Against Jaeger, Paideia I, p. 159f and Theology, p. 35f.


Kahn is quoting T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (London: 1901), I, p. 49.


Including 12A9, A9a, and A19.

Including all of 12A11.

Including all of 12A10.
To this extent Kahn agrees with the "harsh judgement of J. B. McDiarmid" ("Theophrastus on the Pre-Socratic Causes" Harv. Stud., 61 (1953) 85-156) on the philosophical--as opposed to the historical--interests of Theophrastus (1960, 19, nl). He refuses, however, to accept McDiarmid's condemnation of Theophrastus as "thoroughly biased and even less trustworthy than Aristotle."

An exception is the statement of Theon Smyrnagus (12A26) that the earth is μετεωρόφ καὶ κινείται περὶ τοῦ κόσμου μέσου. But this attribution of movement to the earth is "not credible," in Kahn's opinion, despite the authority of Eudemus on which it rests. Concerning the use of κινείται here, the critical apparatus of Diels-Kranz notes, "Stelle missverstanden oder verderbt; Montucla" (I 88, 38-39). All other doxographers have ἅρμακον (Aristotle, A26; Simplicius, De Caelo 532.14), ἅρμακον (Hipp., Al) or κεῖσθαι (Diog. Laert. A1; Suidas, A2).

An exception is Diogenes Laertius who calls Anaximander's earth ἑθαμοσίαν (12A1). But this, says Kahn, is "Hellenistic confusion" (1960, 56). Diels-Kranz calls the whole section an "oberflächliches Excerpt aus Theophrastus' Phys. Opin. (vgl. A9-11)."

Aristotle, 12A26. Hippolytus gives the same rational for Anaximander's doctrine of geocentricity: "on account of its like distance from all things."

Kahn relativizes one of the oldest distinctions in pre-Socratic scholarship: between the materialistic and naturalistic thinkers of the East and the idealistic and spiritualistic thinkers of the West; between Ionians and Italians; Milesians and Eliatics. A.H. Armstrong speaks of the two beginnings of philosophy (An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, p. 1). But Kahn's view is related to his principle of the unity of pre-Socratic cosmology. If the philosophy of Pythagoras (an Italian) is not organically related to the world-view of Anaximander, then neither is that of Parmenides (1960, 81). But Kahn's project is rooted in his belief that Parmenides' world-view is derived from Anaximander.

Aëtius, at 12A21, gives the figure as twenty-eight times the earth's size but in a later passage (also A21) says twenty-seven, confirming Hippolytus' figure.

Book IV, 36.

As Diogenes Laërtius reports (DK 12A1: I, 81, 15-16) "He first drew an outline of earth and sea, but he also constructed a (celestial?) globe."
58 "Über Anaximanders Kosmos," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 10 (1897) 228-237.

59 Aristarchos, p. 38. More recently Walter Burkert has argued that the celestial levels in Anaximander to which he carefully applied his ratios based on multiples of three, are the result of Iranian influence. This influence extends as far as the specific order ascribed to the rings by Anaximander: the lowest is the ring of the stars, next the moon, and the highest is the sun. In its original context in Persian mythology, says Burkert, this scheme represented a "Jenseitslehre": a theory of the hereafter and the destiny of the human soul as it journeys upward from earth to the throne of Ahura Mazda.

60 We recall that it is precisely this segment of Simplicius' testimony—the comments following the quotation of the fragment—where Hölscher claims Simplicius is speaking for himself and no longer quoting Theophrastus. There is in fact a perceptible change of tone in the testimony. Initially we read a report of Anaximander's doctrines, culminating in the actual quote. But following the reference to Anaximander's "rather poetical language," the remarks become interpretive and more candidly Aristotelian. For example, it is clear that Simplicius (and possibly Theophrastus as well) is thinking of the ἀπειρον-archē in terms of the idea of the ὑποκείμενον.

61 Plato appears to be the first to make technical use of στοιχεία (Timaeus 48b-c). This was the opinion of Simplicius (Phys. 7, 13) on the authority of Eudemus (fr. 31, Wehrli).

62 ισοτητ τῆς δυναμεως: Meteorologica, 340a 1ff.

63 Kahn reads "χρόνοσ" in the fragment, with Jaeger, as a personification of cosmic power. Like Jaeger, he points to similar usages in Solon and Pindar. In the latter two, Chronos is described primarily as a power in relation to human life, while in Anaximander the application is cosmic. Kahn argues that the genitive in κατὰ τὴν χρόνου τάξιν is subjective; thus the phrase speaks of an ordinance "by time." In Kahn's view κατὰ τὴν χρόνου τάξιν = κατὰ τὴν τάξιν ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον τάττει (1960, 170, n3). This is supported by the fact that the full sense of τάξιν is said to be "an arrangement prescribed with authority; an order which is morally binding. And in this case, the authority is exercised by Time" (1960, 170). But it is possible to accept this definition and yet to read the genitive, τοῦ χρόνου, objectively, resulting in χρόνος being subject to a moral authority. We will return to this point in Part Three.

Like most nouns in -σις, περιγράμμα indicates a process, at least in earlier usage. The form in -μα indicates the result of this process: growth. But, as Kahn points out, περιγράμμα soon acquired a substantive sense, often close in meaning to περιγράμμα, which means "stature" or "nature."


It is not clear why Kahn would raise this objection here (1960, 231) after arguing against it in the case of the element-doctrine of the fragment where the orientation and the vocabulary, especially in the surrounding material from Simplicius' commentary, is also Aristotelian.

In a letter to the author, Kahn clarified what he means by "the unity of pre-Socratic thought." He said he argues only for a unified tradition of pre-Socratic cosmology and would not attempt to unify, for example, the philosophies of Parmenides and Heraclitus.

Kahn here follows Burnet's conception of the ἀπειρον as infinite space. He de-modernizes Burnet's concept by calling it infinite mass at the same time. "This space is not as yet thought of in abstraction from the material which fills it. Place and body are here combined in a single idea" (1960, 233).

Through correspondence.

Through correspondence.

Through correspondence.

Vernant refers specifically to the theories of George Thomson (The First Philosophers, pp. 297, 300 and 315) who says of Parmenides that, "Just as his universe of pure being, stripped of everything qualitative, is a mental reflex of the abstract labour embodied in commodities, so his pure reason which rejects everything qualitative is a fetish concept reflecting the money form of value." Vernant refutes this by showing that while οὐσία φανερά on the economic plane signified "real estate" (ie, visible and tangible property) which was superior to the illusory οὐσία ἄφαντα (liquid assets, specifically money), on the philosophical plane, reality, permanence stability belonged to the invisible realm of οὐσία and it was the visible which became the merely apparent (1971, 309-310). In Vernant's opinion,
73 (Continued)
Thomson has yielded to the "tentation de transposer trop mécaniquement les notions d'un plan de pensée à un autre" (p.308).

74 Says Popma: "Eris vertalen we met Twist; volgens de boerenkalender is er niet alleen de boze Twist, maar ook de goede Wedijver. Jaeger ziet hierin een zelfcorrectie van de dichter. Beter lijkt het hier de critiek van Hesiodus op te merken" (Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie) p. 21.

75 This is not inconsistent with Vernant's positive assessment of Cornford's work in "La formation de la pensée positive dans le Grece archaique" (Mythe et pensée, pp. 285-314) nor with their overall affinity with respect to a common interpretative tradition. Both seek to explain Greek philosophy by way of Greek society. As a Durkheimian, Cornford believes that the mother of thought is religion. He therefore looks to the cult, the institutionalized form of religion in society, for the origins of Greek thought. This entailed sacrificing the traditional view of a pre-Socratic "Scientific Revolution." For Vernant whose historicism is more 'materialistic' in character, Greek thought is to be explained by the economic and political structures of society. By means of this, he is able to salvage the traditional view of the scientific character of Greek rationality.

76 Louis Gernet, Anthropologie de la Grèce antique (Paris, Maspero: 1968), especially the chapters "Le Foyer commun" and "Les origines de la philosophie."

77 Jan Janda, Eirènè, V, p. 205, claims that in the Hellenistic period, and especially in Christian times, the verb κοπάειν acquired a new, customary meaning of "support." Thus Kirk and Raven translate the phrase with "held up by nothing."

78 Vernant agrees with Kahn, who agrees with Gigon, that Anaximander's archè was something "between" fire and air, or air and water, though he gives this a very different significance.

79 Vernant cites textual parallels between Anaximander's philosophical vocabulary and the political vocabulary used by Herodotus (3, 142) to describe the abolition of tyranny on Samos by Maiandrios (successor of Polycrates). Maiandrios claimed that he had never approved of the royal despotism and that he would "establish the archè en méson (in the center) and proclaim isonomia" for all.

80 Vernant stated in a letter to the author, that his chapter on Anaximander in Mythe et pensée (1971) was somewhat one-sided in overestimating this aspect of his thought.
Part Three: Myth and Philosophy in Anaximander

A. Underlying Hermeneutical Assumptions

The questions we will address by way of introduction to our investigation of Anaximander include "what is philosophy?," "what is myth?" and "what is their relation?"

(1) To answer the question concerning philosophy in a way suitable to an examination of the pre-Socratics, we must be rather dogmatic. When the ancients are included in the discussion, one feels the definition would be so broad that it would lack meaning. The question of defining philosophy is itself a vexing philosophical question. Our answer to it must be grounded in our own philosophy. Is it better, then, to seek a functional definition, for which 'philosophy is as philosophy does' rather than look for the structural boundaries within which philosophy takes place? We could define it in terms of the questions it entertains: philosophy is that discipline which concerns the extent and validity of human knowledge, or the character and meaning of Being, or the linguistic form of significant statements. These definitions are attractive because, despite the debate over its boundaries, most students of philosophy are prepared to discuss roughly the same topics. This is not due merely to practical considerations in conducting philosophical discussions. Nor does it simply reflect similar philosophical training or method. Rather it testifies to the connection between the study of philosophy and the study of its history, and to the influence of the latter upon the former. The general awareness of the problems appropriate to philosophical discussion, despite disagreements over the very nature of philosophy, is due to our relation to the same philosophical tradition. It has been suggested that this history of philosophical activity
itself should function as the concrete criterion for what is and what is not philosophy.

If we take this as a criterion in our examination of Anaximander, however, we cannot question his role in the genesis of philosophy. If philosophy is defined as the western intellectual heritage, and this movement is said to begin with the Milesians, then Anaximander becomes the touchstone for an understanding of philosophy. And the possibility that a definition of philosophy could provide a touchstone for an understanding of Anaximander is lost. For our purposes we must identify structural features for a useful definition of philosophy. It will not help to argue that there is one discipline called philosophy which stands apart from the so-called special sciences, as these stand nicely delimited from one another, by virtue of subject-matter.

We define philosophy not in terms of its subject matter but in terms of the kind of thinking involved. Philosophy does not consist in simply any kind of thought; it is analysis. More specifically, it involves that analysis which is associated with examination, hypothesis, argumentation, refutation, and investigation. That is, philosophical thought is theoretical thinking. It is not necessarily the epitome or encyclopedia of the sciences, but it is theoretical reflection. Philosophy is a dimension of all human theorizing, found to a greater or lesser degree in all of the sciences. Instead of philosophy, it may be helpful, therefore, to speak of the philosophical direction of thought.

In the analytical identification of an object in thought, we at once abstract it from its given, concrete setting and relate it to a known kind. Analysis may not only consider this object by comparing it to other objects
of the same kind which it has also identified, but it may consider the relation of its kind to other kinds. In the latter, thought moves in the direction of a conceptual totality, toward a synthetic view (synopsis) of the conceptual whole which constitutes the abstracted object's ultimate conceptual context. This transcendental direction, which is a possibility for all theoretical thought, is what we understand as philosophical thinking.

We have stressed the activity of thought in our definition. But we are not suggesting that activity is all that is involved, nor that it is the most important thing. Wherever the activity of theoretical analysis occurs, there will also be its results: ideas, notions and concepts. Where the human possibility of philosophical theorizing is realized, we find ideas which point reflection in a direction transcendental to the context at hand. Philosophical reflection and its result are anthropic possibilities which we find being realized even in traditional societies, as contemporary structural anthropology has demonstrated. But if theoretical activity in its philosophical direction takes place in cultures who "have no history," then philosophy per se is not the product of cultural evolution. There is no question of philosophical thought having "come into being" in the historical sense of the word. Even if one were to suppose that philosophy, qua dimension and direction of thought, was a product of historical genesis, nevertheless sixth century Ionia is too recent an historical setting to have been the matrix of such a fundamental aspect of the human mind.

But an anthropic possibility is one thing; its realization is another. If the realization of philosophical thinking cannot be reduced to a result of historical differentiation, nevertheless actual philosophizing is always given in an historical setting. The importance of historical factors is
still more pronounced when we move beyond the results of philosophical thinking and consider their organization into a philosophical view (θεωρία). Such organization of thought requires thematizing. Only through the articulation of philosophical thinking, along the lines of guiding themes, can philosophical thought-results acquire the interrelatedness which constitutes a composite whole, or system of thought. The thematic employment of the human capacity to theorize philosophically really involves the inner, structural articulation of the analytical aspect of experience. Systematization is necessitated by the exigencies of thought when the latter reaches a certain level of complication. But the inner articulation of human thought, which first gives rise to the need to thematize, must be seen against the backdrop of the differentiation of thought itself from other aspects of human culture. Thought becomes articulated structurally to the degree that it is institutionalized, receiving its own differentiated cultural space.

With respect to what is generally considered philosophy—a thematically consistent, theoretical view—the historical factor is crucial. All attempts to explain the thematizing motive and phenomenon by appealing to the nature of thought alone have failed because they remain within the horizon of this sphere. Such attempts collapse under the weight of a reductionistic cultural rationalism. These attempts rest on assumptions which attribute too much to thought as a power in human culture and ignore the influence of the historical upon thought. The systematizing of any human activity is a question of cultural institutionalization. It concerns the motives and influences by which man organizes and differentiates his activities into culture. Therefore, the advent of systematic philosophical theorizing must be considered in the context of the phenomenon of the institutionalization of thinking in
human society. Philosophical thought did not come into existence once and
for all, but came and went in accordance with the historical careers of the
societies who articulated it. Philosophy in this sense may well have "come
into being" first in sixth century Hellas B.C., but we leave this to further
investigation. What cultural-historical laws constitute the conditions for the
emergence of systematic philosophical thinking, we do not know—though we
are apt to gain some clues in our investigation of Anaximander.

(2) Here again, as with the previous question, there is endless
debate. But the debate has had a much shorter history. Systematic reflection
on the character and structure of myth began in the nineteenth century. During
that time each monolithic theory which dominated the discipline in
its day was dismissed by the next, often through the exposure of western
scholars to another traditional society. Malinowski's theory that myths consist of social charters for customs, institution of beliefs was largely
inspired by his study of the Trobriand islanders in the south-west Pacific.
The structuralist theory of Claude Lévi-Strauss is supported by evidence
drawn from the Amerindian societies of Brazil. Malinowski's theories had
deposed a previous tradition in the scholarship whose primary representative
was Andrew Lang. In Lang's view, all myths were aetiological in function.
Thus, he tended to view mythology as a "proto-science." Lang's theory of myth
had in turn replaced the theory of Max Müller, that all myth is nature myth:
a symbolic representation of natural events and forces. Behind Müller's theory
lay the idea that the religions of traditional societies are animistic. The
latter plays a role in the interpretations offered by H. and H.A. Frankfort,
according to which myth addresses the world in terms of "Thou." There are
also the striking theories of Marcel Eliade, which were worked out through a
development of the charter-theory of the Malinowski school. According to this view myth consists of the recollection of the creative era, a rehearsal of the deeds performed by the ancestors, or by the gods, in illo tempore. In the structure of myth, Eliade sees an existential drive to "overcome time" and history. The deeds performed in the creative era are paradigmatic for personal and social behavior in "profane time." The Cambridge School, which we already mentioned in connection with the theories of Cornford, assumes that myth is rooted in ritual, where it finds its raison d'être. To this list we must add the 'psychological' explanations, including the theories of Sigmund Freud, Karl Jung and Ernst Cassirer. Like Freud and Jung, Cassirer was an opponent of the idea of myth as proto-science. The human spirit, he believed, expresses itself culturally under certain "symbolic forms" including language, myth and science. By calling it symbolic, Cassirer did not mean, with Freud, that myths symbolize something, as if it could be interpreted allegorically. Rather, myth is a pure expression of reality directly perceived, which "overcomes a man in sheer immediacy." But Cassirer, like Jung, remained faithful to the Freudian idea that there is a fixed correlation between certain symbols and certain feelings. Here we find an anticipation of the structural theory of Lévi-Strauss. The issue here concerns the (structural) similarity of the human mind (L'esprit) in every period and social context in history. In this respect, the structuralist theory is related to the psychological theories of Freud, Jung and Cassirer. There are other social explanations of myth, related to the Cambridge or Malinowski schools which reflect the hermeneutics of Marxism. According to this approach the meaning of the myth must be sought in the social, and economic, class conditions.
of a given society. This treatment of Greek religion and myth is exemplified in the English speaking community by George Thomson.

These theories evidence a dialectic, according to which myth is analyzed either as the product of mythopoiesis (myth-making) or of mythopistis (myth-believing). Thus Freud analyzes myth as the product of spontaneous psychic fantasy; Jung sees it as a profound surrender by religious man to the Numinosum. Cassirer defines mythical consciousness in terms of a single impression which drives the self to lose itself in it; Lévi-Strauss sees it as an amateurish "science of the concrete" in which the fictive energies of lingual man are directed toward the formation of a meaningful syntax. Müller saw myth arising from man's encounter with a natural "Other"; Malinowski attributed to it the function of maintaining order in human society.

Kirk feels that the antinomies in the scholarship are due to the mistaken belief that the word myth has a single referent. In fact, says Kirk, there are only 'myths', which are traditional stories. He finds a limited validity in all of these theories, but a universal application of any of them is out of the question. Kirk's statement of his view is perhaps too nominalistic. But there is a basic insight here. The dialectic in the scholarship reflects something of the structural features of myth. But far from discouraging definition, it actually helps us discover the two modalities of myth which constitute its structural delineation: namely, its poetic (or fictive) aspect and its pistic (or confessional) aspect. The antinomies arise as myth is based upon one of these features either to the exclusion of the other or as the foundation of the other.

The most notorious antinomy arising from this habitual reduction is
the idea of "mythical thinking." Kirk is very critical of this notion, which he sees as "the natural offspring of a psychological anachronism, an epistemological confusion and a historical red herring." He objects to this idea because, he says, myths are the products, not of analysis, but of story-telling. There is no pre-logical, primitive mentality which produces myths. Myths are, says Kirk following Lévi-Strauss, quite logical in their own way. But Kirk himself is forced to appeal to what he calls "poetical thinking," a sort of combination of metaphor and reason, in order to define the logic of myth.

Kirk's ambivalence as to where to place myth is like the difficulties underlying the definitions of Cassirer who (unlike Kirk) consigns myth to the realm of the non-rational. This is inspired by Cassirer's attachment to the idea that human thought takes its point of departure (arché) in its own immanent (apriori) laws; thought is "autonomous" (=Reason). This view is called by Dooyeweerd the "Immanence-standpoint," and on its basis, he argues, one cannot attain a satisfactory criterion, as Cassirer tries to do, for distinguishing between mythical and non-mythical consciousness. When thought is understood and defined in relation to itself, the relation between thought and the non-rational (in this case, the mythical) becomes problematic at the outset. Dooyeweerd argues, in opposition to the tradition of Immanence Philosophy, that thought is not autonomous. Maintaining the idea that theoretical (or practical) thought functions according to logical laws which are irreducible to any other law-sphere, Dooyeweerd insists that thought is intertwined in a coherent relation with all other facets of human experience. And, in the first place, it is related to and guided by the aspect of faith: the pistical or confessional sphere. Thought, of course, has many relationships, such as a relation to the economic and to the historical. Upon these
relationships the reductionistic philosophies of historicism and marxism are grounded. But by relating analytical thinking to the confessional aspect, Dooyeweerd does not wish to say that thinking is really confession in disguise. What enables their connection without necessitating a mutual reduction is the insight that both analysis and human certitude (as well as economic and historical experience) are functions of an integral human nature whose root is a dynamic religious selfhood. From out of this central religious selfhood, man responds to different kinds of conditions (logical, historical, etc.). This root, which Dooyeweerd calls the heart, is the locus of religion which he carefully distinguishes from faith. Kirk clearly rejects the identification of myth and religion, or the identification of myth with a kind of thought and any "wild oppositions" between rational and irrational thinking. But his definition of the kind of thinking that underlies myth (poetical thinking) is still lost in the wilderness between the rational and the non- or ir-rational.

Dooyeweerd understands myth as the product of pistical imagination; it is fashioned in an attitude of faith and is addressed to "those who have ears." Myth possesses marked features of a social, historical, lingual and aesthetic kind, but it is, in the first place, a "cultic" matter (cult ≠ religion) and therefore at home with liturgy, sacrament (rite) and prayer (incantation). Since the myth is addressed to faith it bears a certain authority structure.

Every real myth has the (not necessarily deliberate) tendency to reveal a religious truth which is essentially related to the modal function of pistis. In this respect it is sharply to be distinguished from a tale and a legend.

The other feature of myth which we identified in terms of "mythopoiësis" (μυθοποιεσις) indicates that the myth, while it has authority as a revelation,
nevertheless is always the product of a certain human activity. The myth is a revelation about the gods; but it has not been handed down to men from the gods. Religions which produce myths, evidence a paradoxical state of affairs. For example, Hesiod receives the inspiration for his revelatory poem from the Muses of Helicon, the daughters of Zeus who, says Hesiod, "breathed into me their divine voice so that I might tell of things to come and things past." But Hesiod relates the coming-into-being of all the gods, including Muses themselves. The Muses were born of Mnemosyne (memory). This is, at least, a compromise between the contribution of the Muses and of the poet. And if the reference to Mnemosyne is as baldly metaphorical as it appears, then the maker of the myth himself is the source of the revelation. Dooyeweerd speaks in this connection of "autonomous pistical fancy." As Vollenhoven expresses it.

As a product of human activity (myth) is religiously conditioned. Here it ought to be observed that a religion which produces myths is always paganistic: where pistical phantasy pretends to be able to express an opinion about the genesis of the world of gods just as well as about the genesis of the cosmos, the boundary between God and cosmos has been utterly lost sight of. 

There is a certain paradox in the idea of myth-as-revelation because it is received as divine truth while at the same time acknowledged as the work of human hands. Its divinity is an attributed divinity; it possesses the character of an Idol. This feature which is viewed negatively by the Christian scholar has not been ignored by others who do not see it in a negative light. The dimension of creativity which is a necessary and essential feature of myth consists, according to Cassirer, in a spontaneous transfer of the subjective onto or into the objective.
The focusing of all forces on a single point is the prerequisite for all mythical thinking and mythical formulation. When, on the one hand, the entire self is given up to a single impression, is 'possessed' by it and, on the other hand, there is the utmost tension between the subject and its object, the outer world; when external reality is not merely viewed and contemplated, but overcomes a man in sheer immediacy, with emotions of fear or hope, terror or wish fulfillment: then the spark jumps somehow across, the tension finds release as the subjective excitement becomes objectified, and confronts the mind as a god or a daemon.²⁴

Myth is a humanly fabricated authority for faith. Nevertheless it retains a genuine pistical character and function in the cult.

(3) It is necessary to add "in the cultic setting" when we point out the pistical character of the myth, because many myths which are known to us, including almost all of the Hellenic myths, have been removed from their cultic context. In antiquity such myths existed apart from ritual and the practise of the religion which produced them. And this development provided the historical conditions for a possible relation between myth and philosophy. Such distance between myth and cult is clearly the case with the Olympian tradition employed by Homer, who had little or no use for the cults of these gods. It is open to question whether the Olympian deities ever possessed cults.²⁵ But it is probably the case that these cults disappeared very early when Hellas emerged from the social chaos of the "heroic Age"²⁶ which the poems of Homer describe. This period of migration (Völkerwanderung: 1400 to 1150 B.C.) experienced the submergence of an entire civilization under a human flood of European backwoodsmen including Achaeans and Dorians. In light of the discovery of this lost Atlantis by twentieth-century archaeologists, it is possible to detect in Hellenic literature faint memories of the pre-heroic (Minoan) "Golden Age." In the pessimistic poetry of Hesiod, there is a genuine sense of loss regarding the Golden Age and a
sense of the tragedy and atrocity of the deeds committed by the "men of
bronze." But the experience of the Völkerwanderung provided an environ-
ment for the creation of a new religion by the invading peoples. This
religion consisted of a pantheon of bellicose deities who were of one mind
with their human votaries in waging constant warfare. This pantheon was
a projection of the life of these barbarian war lords into objects of worship
(or veneration). But it also represented the overthrow of the primitive
religion which was its precursor when the Greeks lived a relatively peace-
ful life as a traditional society in the European hinterlands. The new
religion, qua cult and ritual, was only a going concern as long as there
was a vital "heroic" ethos in its social environs. When the manic energy
of the heroic age gradually dissipated and finally, with the advent of the
polis (c. 850-750 B.C.), disappeared, all that remained were the magnificent
creations of the oral tradition that had grown up with the new religion,
but which had lost its association with the cult. Then began the long
process, described by Kirk, of a re-working of the oral remains of this
religious and aesthetic tradition.

These myths and religious views were still in circulation in the
seventh and eighth centuries B.C. although under a modified form. The myths
as found in Homer have a paradigmatic function: they serve as educational
exemplars, which Kirk considers "an extension of the functional use of myths
as charters." There seems to be what Jaeger calls "an ethical design"
to the Iliad, which transcends the values of the "heroic age" by virtue
of Homer's (?) reflection upon this tradition, and which in turn laid the
foundation for Greek tragedy. This paradigmatic or exemplary use, not only
of the legends about the Heroes, but of the divine myths concerning the gods,
provides the earliest example of a modified use of Hellenic myth. Vollenhoven sees in Homer an abandonment of a confessional attachment to the myth. Jaeger believes the epics of Homer contain "the germ of all Greek philosophy." In terms of our structural considerations, a strict antithesis between myth and philosophy is out of the question. An antithesis here would ultimately entail an antithesis between pistis and analysis. Despite the modern enthusiasm for neutral science--human analysis denuded of 'religious' beliefs--the thinking man does not stop believing when he thinks. If one cannot be certain of anything or attempts somehow to doubt everything (Descartes) then he cannot take even rudimentary steps in thought. Thinking is not automotive; like everything else it requires an impetus and point of departure. This point of departure provides thought with an αὐτόν· Myth is quite capable, in its capacity as revelation, of providing thought with the required principle and beginning.

The historical relationship between myth and philosophy should be expressed in terms of philosophy's attachment to, or detachment from, the myth. The antithesis should be put between mythologizing and non-mythologizing philosophy and not between myth and philosophy. We must also reject the notion of a gradual evolution of consciousness from one to the other. This is excluded on the ground that myth and philosophy are things of different kinds--not both forms of thought so that one may arise out of the other.

When we speak of philosophy's attachment to the myth, we understand a real pistical connection: a confessional bond between the myth and a philosophical conception owing to a certitudinal relation of the thinker to the myth. The philosopher maintains a faith in the myth as a revelation pertinent to his philosophizing. In such a case, then, the myth plays the
role of ἄναπτυχ. This means among other things that the most transcendental (philosophical) ideas in our thinking—what Vollenhoven calls the Hoofdonderscheidingen (chief distinctions) which guide philosophical thinking in reflecting on other concepts—find their source in the myth. Thus pistic attachment to the myth means for philosophy both a confessional arché as well as a source of themes. It may be possible for philosophy to have a non-pistical attachment to the myth—a borrowing of themes without an attitude of faith in the myth-as-revelation. But in any case this is not what we mean by mythologizing philosophy. The appearance in thought of real mythological themes (eg, Heidegger's "Geviert"—Erde, Himmel, Gottlichen and Sterblichen) which in themselves are products of a pistical imagination, indicates that the myth is functioning in thought as an authority—unless of course the use of these themes is only metaphorical. It is generally agreed upon that such a non-mythologizing use of the myth is just what we find in Homer—a dependence upon the myth for themes, but no dependence upon the myth-as-revelation. The "myth" to which a given philosopher has attached himself as revelation, need not necessarily be a traditional (primitive), or even a classical myth. Heidegger's attachment to the poetry of Hölderlin is genuinely mythologizing. The important thing is that the myth is a product of pistical fantasy and that the relationship is certitudinal. The fact that the myths to which Hesiod or the Orphics attached themselves had been cut off from their cultic environment is no hinderance, but rather an invitation and opportunity for a different kind of pistic use of the myth. Mythologizing thought, while it is pistically bound to the myth, involves a certain Umdeutung, making myth relevant to its theoretical requirements. It is (incorrectly) assumed by the mythologyzing thinker that the terms or themes
of the myth really have the character of the hoofdonderscheidingen of philosophical thought. This is a violation of their confessional character. This violation becomes apparent when the need for greater philosophical precision renders these mythological terms obsolete. The scientific (theoretical) character of philosophy cannot receive satisfactory treatment when thought is confined to the themes of the myth. (Note: I am not now suggesting that in fact an antithesis does exist between the myth and philosophical thought.) For these reasons there is a certain instability, even incoherency, involved in a mythologizing relationship between philosophy and myth. This does not make it problematic as an historical phenomenon. And it does not justify the view that the rejection of the myth is the essence of philosophy. The non-mythologizing traditions of philosophy are no less guilty of inconsistency in their attempt to reject all revelation and in their own mythical faith in the Chimaera of autonomous theoretical thought.

Another dimension of myth must be pointed out to illuminate its relation to philosophy. We have determined that myth is pisto-poietic in character. In every pistical act or state of mind, man commits himself to a belief in something (e.g., a religious tenet or a personal God) and therefore also to a determined rejection of that which opposes it. In seeking the order he desires for his life, man clings to the former and shuns the latter. Faith involves an element of repression or suppression. This has long been held by representatives of the Freudian and Jungian theories of religion. But suppression, as understood by these schools, refers primarily to belief in a deity and represents repression of sexuality (Freud) or escape from the unconscious self (Jung). Freud and Jung are surely correct about repression in certain kinds of religious experience. But we doubt whether these categories are broad enough for an understanding of pistic repression. The point at issue
at issue concerns the significance of the religious category of falsehood or the profane. Determination of this must be grounded in the realization that pistical suppression is sui generis, irreducible to psychological categories. In the attitude of faith, man suppresses what his convictions tell him is false. Such conviction cannot be reduced to psychological expediencies, though the pistical emotion of awe (Scheu) functions psychically in confessional life. Nevertheless, as many things in and concerning human experience may be doubted and suppressed as may be believed. Dispite the variety of possible objects of suppression in confessional experience, contemporary students of traditional (myth-making) societies agree that myth generally involves the suppression of time.

Mircea Eliade stresses the importance of archetypes in the myths of traditional societies. By this he means the "exemplary model" to which traditional man orients himself. Says Eliade, the first characteristic of primitive ontology is its Platonic structure. The paradigm is provided by the exemplary deeds of the gods and heroes who lived during the creative era, in illo tempore. He speaks of "the abolition of time through the imitation of archetypes and the repetition of paradigmatic gestures."

A sacrifice not only exactly reproduces the initial sacrifice by a god ab origine, at the beginning of time, it also takes place at that same primordial mythical moment; in other words, every sacrifice repeats the initial sacrifice and coincides with it. All sacrifices are performed at the same mythical instant of the beginning; through the paradox of rite, profane time and duration are suspended...Thus we perceive a second aspect of primitive ontology: insofar as an act (or an object) acquires a certain reality through the repetition of certain paradigmatic gestures, and acquires it through that alone, there is an implicit abolition of profane time, of duration, of "history"; and he who reproduces the exemplary gesture thus finds himself transported into the mythical epoch in which its revelation took place.
For Eliade the only satisfactory substitute for this traditional ontology is a theistic philosophy of freedom such as that offered by the Judaeo Christian tradition.\textsuperscript{41} "Only such freedom is able to defend modern man from the terror of history—a freedom, that is, which has its source and finds its guarantee and support in God."\textsuperscript{42} Every other modern freedom, however, is "powerless to justify history," because modern man has taken refuge in the secular philosophy of Historicism. What is required by the religious needs of modern and primitive man alike is, so to speak, a historiodicy. This is what myth on the one hand and theism on the other supplies by giving the assurance that "historical tragedies have a transcendental meaning."

From a very different point of view Claude Lévi-Strauss posits a similar relation between myth and time. The pertinence of time to myth-making consciousness for Lévi-Strauss, however, does not concern its presence in the thematic content, but rather in the structural form of myth. In the introduction to \textit{The Raw and the Cooked},\textsuperscript{43} Lévi-Strauss attempts to delineate this structural form by positing an affinity between myth and music. He takes this likeness quite seriously and to give the book itself a mythical form\textsuperscript{44} he divides it, not into chapters, but into "movements," "rondos," "solos," "themes and variations," etc. The introduction he calls an "overture." But what is the source of this supposed affinity between myth and music? It lies, he says, in their common relation to time.

The true answer is to be found in the characteristic that myth and music share of both being languages which, in their different ways, transcend articulate expression, while at the same time requiring a temporal dimension in which to unfold. But this relation to time is of a rather special nature: it is as if music and mythology needed time only in order to deny it. Both, indeed, are instruments for the obliteration of time. Below the level of sounds and rhythms, music acts upon a primitive terrain, which is the physiological time of the listener; this time is irreversible and therefore
irredeemably diachronic, yet music transmutes the segment devoted to listening to it into a synchronic totality, enclosed within itself. Because of the internal organization of the musical work, the act of listening to it immobilizes passing time; it catches and enfolds it as one catches and enfolds a cloth flapping in the wind. It follows that by listening to music, and while we are listening to it, we enter into a kind of immortality. It can now be seen how music resembles myth, since the latter too overcomes the contradiction between historical, enacted time and a permanent constant.

In the theories of Roland Barthes, the same features are visible. As literary and film critic working in the line of Saussure, Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss, Barthes articulates a structuralist science (semiology) of myth. Accordingly, he emphasizes its fictive aspect. He holds neither the positivist view of myth as falsehood, nor the History-of-Religions view of myth as revelation. This disjunction, he calls a "false dilemma." "Myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflection." This again is due to his emphasis upon the fictive in myth: "Men do not have with myth a relationship based on truth but on use." Nevertheless, Barthes recognizes the theodicy function of mythical discourse. Myth (specifically the myth of the Bourgeoisie) is an inoculation "which consists in admitting the accidental evil of a class-bound institution the better to conceal its principle evil. One immunizes the contents of the collective imagination by means of a small inoculation of acknowledged evil; one thus protects it against the risk of a generalized subversion." But the instructive point in this analysis is that, in inoculating the myth-reader, myth "deprives the object of which it speaks of all History." The myth is "innocent speech," not because its historical intentions are hidden, but because they are naturalized.
is a system of signs and values (semiological), but it is read as a system of facts. History enters language "as a dialectical relation between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of essences." Thus myth appears to have "come from eternity," having existed "since the beginning of time." Here is the familiar relation between myth and human temporality which we understand in terms of suppression, motivated by the desire to justify evil.

For the very end of myths is to immobilize the world: they must suggest and mimic a universal order which has fixated once and for all the hierarchy of possessions. Thus, every day and everywhere, man is stopped by myths, referred by them to this motionless prototype which lives in his place, stifles him in the manner of a huge internal parasite and assigns to his activity the narrow limits within which he is allowed to suffer without upsetting the world.

Eliade is closer than Lévi-Strauss or Barthes to viewing the suppression of time in myth in its pistical aspect. Lévi-Strauss is interested in what occurs in myths at the unconscious level of form. But both authors attribute to and share with the mythical perspective a rather negative assessment of time. Barthes' philosophical sarcasm is directed toward exposing the pseudo-physics of myth, which supplants the dialectical anarchy of history with a vision of Eternal Man. Thus all three allow us to see the religious dynamic operating in the myth's devaluation of temporality.

The devaluation of time is an attitude adopted by religious consciousness in myth, because time--the very character of our creatureliness--presents itself as a cipher for human weakness and vulnerability. Time like man is finite and transient. This fleeting character of human life is thought by mythopoietic consciousness to be the source of its malady and suffering. If it were it not for the sting of death and risks of contingency, man would live
in bliss. This is the happiness *homo religiosus* dreams of in the myth. According to Eliade, traditional man is inherently archaistic in his philosophy of history: he instinctively invents a story of paradise. Whether by content or form, consciously or unconsciously, the myth offers comfort by providing time in the form of "profane time" as a scapegoat for the ills of life.

The theme of time as an evil power is of the greatest antiquity. We may attribute its recurring use to its serviceability to the theodicy-thinking of the myth: its need to explain the origin or to justify the reality of evil. Ricoeur describes the myth's concern with evil in terms of a threat to "the bond between man and what he considers sacred."

Evil--defilement or sin--is the sensitive point and, as it were, the "crisis" of this bond which myth makes explicit in its own way....It is because evil is supremely the crucial experience of the sacred that the threat of the dissolution of the bond between man and the sacred makes us most intensely aware of man's dependence upon the powers of the sacred. Therefore, the myth of the "crisis" is at the same time the myth of "totality": in recounting how these things began and how they will end, the myth places the experience of man in a whole that receives orientation and meaning from the narration. Thus, an understanding of human reality as a whole operates through the myth by means of a reminiscence and an expectation. 57

Ricoeur speaks of the understanding which is conveyed through the myth. He does not intend this as theoretical Verständlichkeit. The myth is revelation, but not essentially epistemic. The myth offers orientation, not gnosis. Its orientation is offered to those who acquiesce in it. Myth is "not an explanation but an opening up and a disclosure." 58 Here the pistical character of the myth is clearly evident. From the point of view of the problem of evil, however, it is possible to regard the myth as a kind of...
explanation, at least under certain of its forms. To conclude from this that it is a "proto-science" is to presuppose a scientistic view of explanation. The myth "explains" evil by confessing it. Such confession must be contrasted with explanations by analytical thought, including the kind of thinking we have designated as philosophy. When the confession of evil is no longer needed because it has been preempted by rational explanation, there is no longer faith in myth. But in relation to the problem of evil, this contrast between "faith and reason" is superficial, and certainly no antithesis. Myth and philosophy alike aim at a totality view which seeks to explain the reality of evil.

As Holscher's work on the early pre-Socratics shows, sixth century philosophical thought was dominated by questions of finitude, transience and injustice. As dispassionate as pre-Socratic thought sounds as it discusses what substance underlies all things, this thinking had an unmistakable convergence with the themes, as well as the concerns, of the myth. Such a convergence is not readily visible if we insist on comparing the nascent philosophy with its precursors in Hellenic myth. Greek myth is above all the myth of the Hero, whose cosmogonic and theodicy-minded serviceability to Hellenic thought was negligible. But when archaic thought is compared to myths of the Near East, whether of the primitive cults or of the rudimentary higher religions, the rapprochement between myth and philosophy becomes clearer. The likeness is structural, thematic and functional. Structurally oriental myth and Ionic philosophy share an interest in the genesis of the cosmos. Thus there is a formal analogy between the Milesian idea of the arche and the equivalent element in the various eastern myths (eg, Tiamat). Thematically, there are such things in Ionian thought as 'seed', 'shell', 'heaven and earth', 'gods', 'ageless', 'divine', etc. which evoke
comparison with the themes of oriental myth. And functionally—as we will
demonstrate in the case of Anaximander—philosophy offered itself as a
nomination of the locus, and therefore a justification of the reality, of evil.
From its inception, philosophy addressed the problem of evil which had first
been raised (and answered) by the myth. But, whereas myth offered a narration
describing "how it began", philosophy chose the speculative path to gnosis
by thematizing the question τὸθεύ τὰ κακά; \(^{59}\)

In relating myth to philosophy vis-a-vis the question of the reality
and origin of evil, I am drawing the connection in the closest possible way.
I do not wish to suggest, however, that philosophy is essentially myth in
another form. Although we have called the religious difference between them
"superficial", the structural difference is real, and the historical shift
from one to the other has had profound implications. In the first place,
the fact that the problem of evil was transferred from confessional to
analytical discourse indicates a shift from a concern for stating the cause
of man's suffering in narrative to that of identifying it in his experience.
In doing this, the bounds of thought as we recognize them were virtually
ignored. This deeply speculative motive in pre-Socratic philosophy's treat-
ment of evil—which, in my opinion, it inherited from the myth and bequeathed
to the history of philosophy—Ricoeur calls gnosis.

Gnosis is what seizes upon and develops the
etiological element in myths...It is true
that the myth is in itself an invitation to
gnosis...One might say that the problem
of evil offers at the same time the most
considerable challenge to think and the
most deceptive invitation to talk nonsense,
as if evil were an always premature problem
where the ends of reason always exceeds it means. \(^{60}\)

Therefore, philosophy from the outset yoked itself with the task of
making explicit in and to thought what the myth had attempted to state in
narative for faith. There was, of course, rejection of the myth among the
pre-Socratics. This occurred in various degrees of intensity. The violence
of this revolution must be measured in each case by the extent to which the
myth was felt to fall short of its task of theodicy. In Xenophanes, for
example, such rejection was quite vehement and his disappointment in the myth
is explicit (DK, 21B11-16). It is clear from these fragments that Xenophanes
does not oppose the concept of the divine as such. His complaint is precisely
that the character of the divine was betrayed by the traditional Hellenic
tales of the activities of the gods as reported by Homer and Hesiod.

Xenophanes' critique is a defense of a certain conception of divinity
which he goes on to develop (B23-26). Moreover, the issue which Xenophanes
takes up with Homer and Hesiod concerns their representation of the moral
qualities of the lives of the gods: "Both Homer and Hesiod have attributed
to the gods all things that are shameful and a reproach among mankind: theft,
adultery, and mutual deception" (B11). Thus, Xenophanes, the monotheist,
wishes to rescue the idea of the divine from the wickedness imposed upon it
by the myth. If the righteous integrity of the divine is not safe-guarded
by seeking the truth—ie, by philosophy: "the gods have not revealed to
mortals all things from the beginning; but mortals by long seeking discover
what is better" (see also Fr. #2)—then the wellbeing of civil (21B2) and
moral (21B1) life is undermined. In Anaximander—as we will argue—a negative
attitude toward myth, if present at all, is only implicit. In fact, though
one could make a case (against Gigon) that Anaximander was not dependent but
actually critical of Hesiod and the Hellenic mythical tradition, this says
nothing about a negative attitude toward myth per se (if there is such a
ting as myth per se). If we follow the lead of Cornford, Hölscher, Burkert,
and West in extending the horizon of sixth century intellectual culture to
include the entire Levant, we must re-evaluate an apparent rejection of the myth in Ionian thought. And when we see, as we shall, the dominance of theodicy in Anaximander himself, we will realize his positive relation to myth and the significance of myth in general for the genesis of philosophy.

Now we must move on to the examination of Anaximander and the demonstration of these points in the final sections of our study. One of the most interesting results of this examination will prove to be the fact that in recapitulating a mythical theodicy in thought, and thereby giving rise for the first time to "philosophy" in the West, Anaximander gave decisive centrality to the category of time, again following the myth, as the explanans of malady, suffering and evil. Thus Anaximander is significant, not only as the "first philosopher", but also as the father of a tradition within the history of philosophy which Popma has characterized as "kwaad spreken van de tijd"--the maligning of time. 61

B. Anaximander

The final section of our inquiry will consist of two parts. The first is an analysis of Anaximander's fragment. The second will raise the question concerning the relation of the doctrine of this fragment to the myth in general.

1. Exegesis of the Fragment

The following is an exegesis of the thought of Anaximander as it is given in the fragment contained in the report of Simplicius (A9) and originally quoted from Anaximander's book by Theophrastus. Of course the fragment cannot be interpreted without drawing upon hints given for its interpretation in the doxography. But I will not rehearse the contents of this doxography, as Kahn does, as a prelude to the interpretation of the fragment. This may seem to presuprose two things which I am not entitled to assume. The first
would be the possibility of coming fresh to the text of Anaximander, bracketing out the difficult (and perhaps misleading) considerations presented in the doxography or in the contemporary literature, in order to allow the horizon and structure of Anaximander's thought to disclose themselves. I reject this possibility, not because I doubt the value of phenomenological interpretation, but simply because of the impossibility of attempting it with such fragmentary remains of texts. The second assumption would be that the fragment necessarily represents the most important thoughts, or the core ideas of Anaximander. This could be supported by pointing out that the fragment was the only thing deemed worthy of quotation by later authors. The fact that Theophrastus quoted this particular passage and not another speaks well of its significance. It would be cynical to doubt Theophrastus' sensitivity to the relative significance or weightiness of statements in Anaximander's book simply on the basis of his Aristotelian prejudices. But it would be naive simply to assume that if Anaximander had bequeathed only one statement from his book to his philosophical posterity, if he had been able to pick one sentence for which he would be known and remembered, that that sentence would be the one which we posses. Kahn has clearly shown that the fragment serves a specific purpose in the commentary of Simplicius. Therefore we must proceed with caution. But apart from either of these presuppositions I would defend the priority and centrality of the fragment in the exegesis of Anaximander's thought. My grounds are the fact—which I hope the following treatment will illustrate—that, whether it was the kernel of his book or not, the fragment reveals something important about the philosophy of Anaximander in its relation to the myth.

Kahn's exegesis and interpretation of the fragment is based on his parallel exegesis and interpretation of the Simplician testimonium in which
it is found (12A9). He does this because he believes that Simplicius' view of the fragment, together with Theophrastus' commentary, also quoted by Simplicius, accurately reflects the intention and content of Anaximander's thought. On this matter, I agree with Holscher that Simplicius does not merit our uncritical trust as interpreter of Anaximander. Kahn argues that Anaximander's central concern in the fragment is with the elements and their mutual interaction. He grounds this entirely upon the authority of Simplicius, supposing here that Simplicius is either quoting or following Theophrastus. The Simplician phrase in question, which follows immediately upon the quotation of the fragment, runs as follows:

"...thus speaking of them in rather poetical terms. It is clear that, seeing the transformation of the four elements into one another, he did not think it fit to make any one of them the substrate, but something else besides these..."

Holscher's tactic for removing this sentence from the bonafide doxographia, is to argue that the form of the phrase (δηλαν δὲ ὅτι: "it is clear that") is characteristically Simplician, and therefore that the content belongs to Simplicius, not Theophrastus. If the sentence were Theophrastian, however, it would have to be taken at face value in Holscher's opinion. In contrast to this critique, I feel that the separation of Simplicius from Theophrastus, while it may or may not be correct, is impossible to verify and unnecessary besides. One need only recognize the fact that Simplicius (or Theophrastus) believes that Anaximander's doctrine concerns the "four elements" to realize the inherent anachronism of his commentary. The idea of the four elements dates from the mid- or late-fifth century. This is a fact which Kahn was forced to face in his justification of the reliability of this statement. But the use of the Aristotelian ὄντοκείμενον discloses the critical, and even polemical, purpose of its author. These factors serve as warnings
that this commentary does not grow out of a 'phenomenological' attitude toward the original statement, whatever it may have been, but already represents an interpretation. It could be argued that the confusion of the Empedoclean idea of the 'four elements' with the pre-Socratic Elementenlehre is more likely a mistake of Simplicius than of Theophrastus. Simplicius was, after all, almost as far removed from Anaximander (1075 years) as he is from us (1450 years). But the use of 'substrate' to describe the apeiron could be ascribed to anyone after Aristotle.

Our justification for bracketing out the Simplician context of the fragment as a guide to interpreting the fragment, is that this interpretation forces us to take an allegorical approach to the images which, though present only in bits and pieces, were clearly a part of Anaximander's view of the world. Simplicius, or Theophrastus himself, calls our attention to Anaximander's use of these "rather poetical terms." But the very way in which he does this in turn calls attention to the fact that the commentator has missed the force of these images. This misleading interpretation on the part of Simplicius (Theophrastus) has been criticized by Jaeger.

Simplicius describes the diction (in, the fragment) as 'somewhat poetic' and suggests that it veils a quite dispassionate observation of the intertransformations of the four elements. This interpretation is unhistorical not only in that it reads into Anaximander a much later philosophical theory, but also in that it misses the force of his language by explaining its picturesqueness as mere metaphor. In these very images there lies a philosophical interpretation of the rationale of the world. Simplicius' attitude leads to the substitution of philosophical equivalences for the images used in the fragment. By means of this allegorization, Simplicius apparently wishes to uncover the philosophical meanings which he believes the images signify. Simplicius, and those who follow him
read the fragment as allegorically expressed philosophy, which makes it impossible for it to speak for itself. This interpretation and the assumptions it makes concerning the nature of philosophical thought and language is one we do not share—and one we believe in this case actually distorts the facts. Once such an attitude is taken toward the nature of Anaximander's language, the path is clear for the eisegesis of one's own systematic distinctions. This is precisely what the doxographers appear to have done. In the final analysis the fragment itself militates against the Simplician-Theophrastian interpretation of it. We will now examine the fragment in terms of its own syntax and imagery. The text of the fragment runs:

1) \( \varepsilon \xi \sigma \nu \ \delta \varepsilon \n \gamma \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \iota \epsilon \upsilon \ \tau \partial \gamma \ \omicron \sigma \iota \) 
2) \( \kappa \alpha \iota \ \tau \eta \nu \ \phi \theta \omega \rho \alpha \nu \ \omicron \eta \ \tau \omega \upsilon \alpha \ \gamma \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \sigma \theta \alpha \iota \) 
3) \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \ \tau \omicron \ \chi \rho \nu \upsilon \upsilon \) 
4) \( \delta \iota \delta \omega \nu \alpha \varsigma \ \gamma \alpha \rho \ \alpha \upsilon \tau \alpha \ \delta \iota \kappa \nu \) 
5) \( \kappa \alpha \iota \ \tau \iota \sigma \iota \nu \ \alpha \lambda \mu \nu \lambda \nu \nu \ \tau \upsilon \ \alpha \delta \iota \kappa \iota \alpha \iota \) 
6) \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \ \tau \eta \nu \ \tau \omicron \ \chi \rho \nu \upsilon \upsilon \ \tau \alpha \xi \iota \nu \) 

Burnet already questioned the authenticity of the words \( \gamma \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \iota \) and \( \phi \theta \omega \rho \alpha \nu \) in the first two lines, which he considered too late (Platonic) to have been used by Anaximander. He also thought the \( \tau \partial \gamma \ \omicron \sigma \iota \) unlikely. Dirlmeier followed this criticism and eliminated the first two lines from the fragment altogether. Dirlmeier further stated that the word \( \tau \alpha \xi \iota \nu \) in line six is predominantly Peripatetic and more than likely accrued to the fragment through its Überlieferung by the Aristotelian tradition. Thus he eliminated the last part of the second phrase as well, so that all that remained of the fragment were the words in lines three, four and five. This tradition of criticism does not reflect our attitude toward the fragment. We refer the reader to the defense of the authenticity of the phrases in question by Deichgraber and Kahn. We accept Kranz's full text as represented in the above quote.
The fragment divides easily into two sections both ending with adverbial phrases introduced by κατὰ + the accusative. This parallelism suggests that the two clauses of the fragment were intended to say the same thing. However, this possibility is excluded by the presence of the ὅτι in the second phrase, which indicates that it contains an explanation or rationale for what is stated in the first. As we recall in Kahn's analysis of the fragment, a difficulty presents itself in the attempt to relate the two clauses. The difficulty could be put in this way: What in the first clause was intended to be explained by the second clause? Or, in terms of the syntax of the second clause, what is the antecedent of ἀυτὰ in line four? Kahn looks to the Simplician context of the fragment for the answer, and argues that it must refer to the elements. He argues that τὰ ὁτιθέντα is the only neuter plural mentioned by Simplicius before the fragment is quoted. Thus ἀυτὰ could only refer to this. Kahn believes this interpretation is vouchsafed by the Simplician comments which follow the fragment. After the quotation, Simplicius (Theophrastus) adds: 'speaking of them (ἀυτὰ) in rather poetic terms'. Simplicius then reveals that the 'them' can be no other than the elements themselves: 'seeing the transformation of the four elements into one another...', etc. In this interpretation the ἀυτὰ, meaning the elements, must refer back to the neuter plurals ἀ...τὰ ἀυτὰ in the first clause. Kahn likens this clause to the classical Aristotelian definition of an element.

There are many examples in Aristotle of the kind of syntax found in the first clause of Anaximander's fragment, some of which are explicitly connected with statements concerning the elements. But, as we argued above, it is a questionable procedure to apply an Aristotelian definition to problems in the syntax of a sixth-century pre-Socratic. But even if the ἐκ ὧν...
and εἰς ταῦτα refer to the elements, it seems clear from the syntax of the fragment that the 
αὐτά in the second clause cannot refer to these relative pronouns. These pronouns are part of a grammatical structure—relative clause with indefinite antecedent—which renders the knowledge of their precise referents unnecessary to the meaning of the sentence. For example, in the phrase "ἐλαβεν ἃ ἐθυμᾶτο" ('he took what he wanted'), the meaning is clear regardless of the identity of the objects taken. Such a phrase may be turned around, expressing the same thing by reversing the order of the words. In such a case, however, the syntactic rules for such constructions often require the use of demonstrative pronoun in conjunction with the relative. In other words, when the clause containing the indefinite relative preceeds the main clause, the latter employs a demonstrative for emphasis. Thus: ἃ ἐθυμᾶτο, ταῦτα ἐλαβεν ('what he wanted, that he took'). The first clause of Anaximander's fragment has precisely this structure: ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἔγενσι διὸ τοῖς οὐσί, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ('but from what things beings arise, into these they also pass away'). It is interesting to notice that this clause, which exemplifies the 'inverted order' of a relative clause with omitted antecedent, could not be expressed if we reverse it again, putting the main clause first and using the same words. In the example, ἐλαβεν ἃ ἐθυμᾶτο, a single pronoun stands for the omitted object of both verbs. When we reverse the order of clauses—ἀ ἐθυμᾶτο, ταῦτα ἐλαβεν—we require two pronouns. But when we reverse the latter sentence—ταῦτα ἐλαβεν, ἃ ἐθυμᾶτο—the result is a different meaning. In such a case the relative is preceeded by a demonstrative which implies some previously mentioned antecedent. Thus a reversal of the first clause of the fragment could not be translated with the same indefinite sense. It would not be: "destruction occurs into those things from which is the genesis of things." Rather it would read: "destruction
occurs into these things (i.e., some previously mentioned things), which are the origin of beings." But in the case of a relative by itself, neither ταύτα nor ἐκείνοι are implied as its antecedents. 70

The syntax of the first clause of the fragment allows the referents of its pronouns to remain indefinite because such referents are unnecessary to the meaning of the sentence. Therefore the thrust of the phrase concerns something else, something which is not indefinite, at least not grammatically indefinite: namely, τὰ ὦτα. The point of the phrase is the necessity (κατὰ τὸ θέρμαν) of their destruction into that from which they arose. It is only of secondary importance that their source and their end are the same. This is taken for granted. The necessity of this is what draws our attention, and it is this necessity which—in the mind of the author—requires explanation. What the second phrase purports to explain is not the fact that that from which things come is identical with that into which they are destroyed again, but rather why they must be destroyed into their source(s). The answer is that they are thereby paying for their crimes against each other. Thus the antecedent of αὐτὰ ἔσχατα is τὸν ὀσῶν. It is here and only here that we find the neuter plural needed to connect the second clause of the fragment with the first.

Ultimately, Kahn admitted the identity of the ἐκ(ων)...ταύτα with τὰ ὦτα. Both, he said, refer to the elements. Thus it was quite easy for him to explain why the relative pronouns were plural. But we must find a solution elsewhere. The τὰ ὦτα may refer to the elements, though I believe it would be wrong (because anachronistic) to restrict its referents to the elements alone. However, as the syntax of this clause reveals, the relative pronouns need not refer to anything at all, thus certainly not to the elements. It
makes little difference then that they are in the plural, except that this is what one might expect as long as τοις ουσιοις is plural. However, I believe the real reason for the plurals in the relative pronouns is to highlight the axiomatic character of the phrase. The plurals have the effect of emphasizing the generality of the statement. They make it more abstract—"Things pass into those from which they arose." Through the plurals, the statement acquires a kind of universality. It bears the character of a rule, of an axiom. The axiomatic effect is heightened again by the addition of the phrase κατά τὸ χρεών which, I believe applies to the phrase as a whole. Again the point is not the necessary identity of source and destiny, as if the phrase should read: "the things from which beings arise are necessarily the same as those into which they are also destroyed." Rather the point is the necessary destruction of things: "it is necessarily so that from what things beings arise, into these they also pass away."

The phrase κατά τὸ χρεών, whose authenticity no one contests, contains the substantive τὸ χρεών. This must be added to the list of substantives which occur in the doxography but which are attributed by Kranz to Anaximander himself. These include τὸ γονιμον and τὸ απεχρον. The ideas of τὸ βερυόν and τὸ ψυχρόν and the other "contraries" which may be inferred from the doxography could be added to this list. But the τὸ χρεών points to some conception of Necessity as a force operating in or over things. Therefore this substantive ought to be reflected in our translation of the first clause of the fragment. Kahn's "according to what must needs be" is not adequate. Τὸ χρεών is close in meaning to the word μοίρα: 'lot', 'portion', 'fate' or 'doom'. I translate the first phrase thus:

But it is the fate of the things that are,
To pass into those from which they arose;
Like μοίρα, the idea χρεών combines the notion of an inevitability with that of a just desert. Therefore more than the necessity of annihilation is stated in this phrase; the necessity is an inescapable due as well.

Already in the first part of the fragment Anaximander is making use of his so-called 'poetical terminology'. Therefore, there is no basis for supposing that the second clause is offered as a metaphorical explanation of some "natural process" expressed in the first. There is nothing in the fragment which is not already 'metaphorically expressed'. But, while Anaximander states in the first part of the fragment that things are assigned their lots—which anticipates the legal language of the second clause—he has not thereby revealed in advance the justification for why this should be so. The first clause raises the question "why are things assigned a lot and subjected to fate?" The second clause answers, "because they have incurred this punishment by their injustice."

The other substantive in this clause of the fragment, which we have mentioned already, is contained in the τοι Ὀντα. It is necessary at this point to take notice of the fact that the actual spelling of the words of the fragment is not old Ionian, but Aristotelian or post-Aristotelian Attic. M. L. West has offered what he believes may have been the original reading. According to him, the original form of τοι Ὀντα was τοι Ὀντα, meaning that Anaximander's τα Ὀντα was originally written τα Ὀντα. Jaeger has shown the significance of this older form for the meaning of the Anaximandrian expression.

The term τα Ὀντα in the so-called fragment of Anaximander in all probability reflects the true language of this early thinker. He and the other Ionian philosophers of nature simply followed Homer and the usage of epic language, Homer and Hesiod speak of Ta Ὀντα as that which exists at present and contrast it with Ta Ὀσσουεσα and Ta Ὄπο Ὀντα things as they will be in the future and as they were in the past. This very opposition proves that the word originally pointed to the immediate and tangible presence of things. Homer's Ὀντα.
did not exist in the past and will not exist in the future. They did not yet exclude γένεσις and φθορά, as Parmenides taught they did. In this regard the oldest thinkers were quite Homeric.\textsuperscript{74}

What is impressive about this comment is not only that τὰ υόντα are said to be subject to genesis and destruction as the fragment declares, but it illustrates the fact that the expression originally had a temporal significance. Therefore, it would be misleading to translate τὰ υόντα as 'beings', risking an anachronistic confusion of this idea with that of Parmenides and miss the force of the expression. Thus, I translate τοῖς υούλοις as "of the things that are."

Jaeger's insight at this point is valuable. When this expression is properly understood—as in the case with κατὰ τὰ χρέων, which we have understood in terms of 'fate' or 'due'—it provides another link in the chain connecting the two clauses of the fragment. To say that the things that presently exist are subject to a doom which they deserve is an anticipation of the idea that they pay penalties κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. But what are τὰ υόντα? Is it possible to determine the specific identity of these so-called "things that are"? Kahn identifies them with the ἐναντιότητες, i.e., the mutually opposed qualities; Hölscber believer they are the οὐράνους καὶ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους ἀπείρους; Gigon says they are Tag und Nacht; Jaeger, individual things; Vannant agrees with Kahn; Vollenhoven agrees with Hölscber, (though he believes the divinities called kosmimoi represent periods in world history (cf. Hesiod)).\textsuperscript{75}

One way out of this puzzle is to conclude that τὰ υόντα has no specific referent at all, but simply indicates any identifiable thing which presently exists.\textsuperscript{76}

But all of these answers are premature at this point.

With these considerations in mind, we can see that the first clause of Anaximander's fragment expresses something which is already familiar to us—
not in content, at least in form—from the literature of antiquity. From a formal point of view, the clause exemplifies what one might call a "whence things...thither things" structure. Some of the more readily available examples of homologous statements occur in the Biblical tradition. In the New Testament, for example, we may cite the statement of Christ to Peter at Gethsemane, "those who live by the sword, die by the sword." But here, the language is more prescriptive than nomothetic. Indeed, it states a 'rule' that is necessary as far as it goes, but this rule is not a universally valid condition—that is, the proverb applies only to those who live by the sword. Pacifists, who perish innocently are not subject to its condemnation. By contrast, Anaximander's fragment is—in Kantian terms—a categorical, not a hypothetical judgement. But the Hebraic tradition is not without such categorical pronouncements: eg, "the Lord giveth, and the Lord taketh away." Perhaps the most striking Judaic parallel to the Anaximandrian fragment in form and content is the provocative complaint of Koheleth that:

The fate of the sons of men and the fate of beasts is the same. As one dies so dies the other; indeed, they all have the same breath and there is no advantage for man over the beast, for all is vanity. All go to the same place. All come from dust and all return to the dust (Eclesiastes 3:19-20).

It would be easy to get sidetracked in comparing the fragment to this verse which poses so many interesting historicial questions, for example, concerning the possible parallels between ις χρεών and Anaximander's το χρεών. The point to notice, however, is the structural analogy—a structure we have designated as "whence things, thither things." The presence of this structure, and its commonality in other literatures, serves to verify our view that the fragment possesses a proverbial character. It observes a general state of affairs, and acknowledges a nomos which Anaximander clearly accepts as a point
of departure. But this structural analogy with other literature, and with the statement of Koheleth in particular, also illustrates the remarkable difference in Anaximander's attitude toward this basic truth. The statement expresses Anaximander's point of departure and reflects what in his mind was perhaps the ultimate fact about life with which man had to reckon. To this extent, one might say that the fragment goes no further than the language and structure of myth insofar as it manifests a confessional character. And, in fact, it is extremely important to notice that, precisely at this juncture in his reflection, Anaximander is speaking the language of myth (which is however is not to be equated with the process of mythopoesis). But in another sense, Anaximander is altogether 'beyond' the myth in terms of his attitude toward the basic truth he confesses. The new attitude is expressed less in the structure of the first clause than by the presence of the second. As we noted, the second phrase is offered as an explanation of the first. Its character as an explanation is textually indicated by the word yap. By virtue of his explanatory attitude, we believe Anaximander transcended the myth (however consciously) in his attitude toward his own most basic assumption. The myth may be said to 'explain' things. But in terms of its pistical character, it is accepted as an explanation in an attitude which acknowledges its authority per confessionem. Thus, faith is the substance of things which are not seen. The kind of explanation the fragment offers, however, is the result of a searching (speculatio). And for Anaximander, the truth expressed in the first clause must be supported by a sufficient ground. The structure of the fragment itself suggests a rather dispassionate examination of the reason behind the comings and goings of things in life, while leaving no hint of a lament over this tragedy. Without giving the yap more weight than it will bear, I would like to express this attitude by hypothetically inserting a line into the
fragment representing the response of a listener, voicing the question which the first clause of the fragment may have raised in the mind of Anaximander himself.

It is the fate of the things that are,  
To pass into those from which they arose;  

Why is that?  
Because, in so doing, they satisfy  
And repay each other at the appointed time  
For their injustice.

Therefore, far from the pessimism which we may hear in the lines of Koheleth, or which Nietzsche attributed to Anaximander, we hear in the fragment what is almost a satisfaction in observing the regularity and appropriateness (perhaps even the harmony, as Kahn suggests) of the process of life and death. There is at any rate very little, in this Anaximandrian view of evil, of what Ricoeur calls the existential confession of uncleanness, sin or guilt which belongs to the rudimentary language of the symbolism of evil. Is there then actually something of the victorious attainment of a gnosis--a speculative grasp upon the final reason behind the reality of evil--which is being announced in this statement? This question must be postponed until we have examined the actual content of the second clause of the text.

The two predicates of the second clauses--διδοναι δίκην and διδοναι τίςχν, which refer to τὰ οὐνα of the first clause--are synonymous. There is no apparent reason other than poetic or stylistic for the duplication. With the use of two terms, however, one might expect in this context to hear Anaximander say "things pay penalty and exact punishment." Especially because of the presence of the ἀλληλοῦν, which indicates the idea of a mutuality in the process of justice, it would be convenient to say things both distribute justice to and receive justice from other things. But this reading is impossible.
Many interpreters wish to read some doctrine of revenge into the fragment. But as the text reads, things do not give justice, they only suffer justice. Even διδοναι δίκην, which literally reads 'they give justice', means "they give satisfaction." This expression is equivalent to the Latin, poenas dare. To express revenge and punishment with δικην, one must use δικαρ λαμβάνειν (poenas sumere). Occasionally, δικαρ λαμβάνειν means 'take justice' in the sense of accepting (suffering) a just punishment for some misdeed, instead to 'exact justice' from some one else. In this case the expressions δικαρ λαμβάνειν and δικαρ διδοναι are synonymous. But while δικαρ λαμβάνειν can mean "give satisfaction," δικαρ διδοναι can never mean "to exact penalty." As for the expression, τισιν διδοναι, it is precisely equivalent to δίκην διδοναι: ie, poenas dare. Therefore, punishment in the sense of avenging by the offended party has no place in the fragment.

We must bear in mind that these synonymous predicates apply to the auta mentioned in line four, which, as we argued above, refers to the τοι ουσι in the first clause. Τα ουτα are the things which pay penalty and give satisfaction "to each other." This is extremely important because it is not true that the second clause describes the relationship or the process which takes place between things and their origin (το απειρον) or origins (α...εξ ων). Whether one interprets the relative pronoun, α, to refer in the plural to the origin (the apeiron) or to the elements from which things come, or to former Weltperioden from which the present era emerged, nevertheless, the syntax of the fragment discourages the view that things together with their origins pay reparation to each other. Instead, the things that are pay mutual satisfaction among themselves. Many plausible interpretations of this fragment have been made on the assumption that the αλληλοι in the second clause refers to the α (εξ ων) and τα ουτα respectively. In fact not one of the four interpretations we reviewed in Part Two are free
from this assumption. They have all assumed that the penalty ascribed to things is paid by them either to things which were (from which they arose) or to the things which will be. According to Gigon the fragment is describing the natural process of the alteration of day and night (among other such alternations). The advent of Day means the death of Night—which is an injustice committed by Day. The demise of Night at dawn is also its just reward for having asserted itself so exclusively, at the expense of Day, during its floruit. However, Night reasserts itself when Day has had its time and avenges itself. In Hölscher's interpretation, the fragment describes "the necessary succession of becoming and decaying" of the κόσμοι. When one of these world epochs has run its course, it must suffer the punishment of coming to an end because of its hubris. It pays this penalty to the following κόσμος by making way for it. For Kahn, "the things which are" are the elements and they pass back into the origins from which they emerged—which, according to this interpretation, are also elements, though other and opposite elements. Thus when fire emerges from air, it is paying a penalty to the element from which it had previously exacted penalty. But if the ἀληθέωτα refers exclusively to τὰ ὕπτα, all of these interpretations—on this point—go further than the text of the fragment permits. According to Anaximander's words themselves, "things-that-are" pay penalty and satisfaction to other "things-that-are," not to things that are not (either because they were or will be). The punitive process of the second clause of the fragment, and the offense (ἀδίκα) which called it into being, can only be understood synchronically, and loses its explanatory raison d'etre in a diachronic interpretation. Why are things doomed to pass into those from which they arose? Not because of the relationship of a thing to its origin. This relationship—which consists precisely in ἄνεσι and ἀορά—explains nothing; it is just this which must be explained.
Therefore, the things to which penalty is payed by τὰ ὄντα (ἄλληλοι) are not identical with those into which (ἐν τοῖς ὄντα) they are fated to be destroyed. This is another way of saying that αὐτὰ...ἄλληλοι in the second clause refers exclusively to the τὰ ὄντα in the first. But when we express this relation in this way we see that there is no basis in the fragment for equating δίκια with the γένεσι of things. It is true that the fragment equates δίκη/τίσι with φθορά. In fact, the point of the second clause is to explain the latter by appealing to the former. But the identification of injustice and genesis—as if things are guilty for the sin of having come into being, as Diels thought—has no basis in the text. As plausible as this view sounds, it is a misinterpretation. The "things that are," though they pass into those from which they arose, do not pay penalty to their origin(s) for any offense against their origin(s). And, conversely, though they must pay penalty "to each other," they do not do so by passing into each other, but by passing into their origin(s).

The interpretation which equates injustice and genesis, however, discloses an important feature of Anaximander's thought as it is presented in the fragment—however misleadingly it expresses it. That feature is the clear attribution of evil to things (τὰ ὄντα) themselves. Unfortunately, the Nietzschean/Diels interpretation puts this much too strongly. It equates evil with existence per se. Rather, the doctrine of the fragment attributes evil to the universal and necessary structure of the relationship between things that exist at the same time. The fragment implies that things inherently tend to conflict, and thus inevitably encroach upon the jurisdiction of another—assuming, for the moment, that this is the meaning of a-dikia. Why do things necessarily pass away? Because they deserve to on account of their mutual hostility to one another, says Anaximander. Therefore, injustice, maliciousness—evil—is an essential characteristic of existing things.
This mutual hostility, however, does not result in the destruction of things. Destruction is the result of fate. Things do not eliminate each other, they are doomed to annihilation. And the annihilation to which they are doomed is annihilation into their source(s). They are subject to this doom on account of their guilt. But nowhere in the fragment do we read of things suffering extinction at the hands of one another. Therefore, the process described by the fragment implies or presupposes the involvement of a third party who looks after the interests of justice, seeing to it that things pay each other the required penalties, ordaining the ends of things. This is the role which Kahn, following Jaeger, ascribes to chronos in the phrase κατά τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. According to this interpretation, Time in the fragment is a quasi-mythical personification of the divine arbiter of justice who ordains the penalties paid by finite things for their injustice. This reading is convenient in as much as a comparable conception is to be found in the poems of Solon, who also lived in the sixth century. But it is worthy of note that Gigon and Holscher, who disagree on so much concerning Anaximander, agree in rejecting this interpretation. The point hinges on the nature of the genitive of τοῦ χρόνου — whether it is objective or subjective. That is, does the phrase κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν speak of an ordination "by" Time or of an ordination "of" time. Jaeger's point that τάξιν here is used in its legal sense and not simply in its chronological or successive sense can hardly be questioned. He is apparently correct, therefore, that this particular "metaphor" suggests something like the juridical process of a legal suit such as those which were commonly carried out in the agoras of ancient Greek city-states. Does this necessarily mean, however, that Anaximander considered Time to be this judge? Holscher believes that the judge, or at least that which decrees destruction is not χρόνος but τὸ χρεών. But this is hardly a satisfactory solution since
syntactically the phrases κατά τὴν τοῦ χρόνου ταξιν and κατά τὸ χρεών are parallel expressions. They are not absolutely synonymous, but they echo one another. Both elucidate how things meet their destruction—"by necessity" and "by the order of time." But what speaks most tellingly against Holscher's solution is the fact that τὸ χρεών in the first clause of the fragment is precisely that which has been ordained.

The customary usage of χρεών is as "that which an oracle declares," or "that which must be."86 The expression χρεών ἐστί, like χρὴ, means "it is necessary" or "it must be."87 In our view, ὁ χρόνος, like τὸ χρεών, is that which is ordained, not that which ordains. The limits of all things are fixed, their time is set. This must be the explanation of Hippolytus' statement that Anaximander "speaks of time as though coming-to-be and existence and destruction were determined (or limited: ἐπισταμένη)" (All). The genitive of χρόνου must be objective. Therefore, we translate the phrase, not "according to the ordinance of Time," but simply "at the appointed time."

The most important element in the second clause and in the whole fragment, however, is τῆς δικαίας. It is in this phrase that the speculatio which underlies the text finds its fulfillment. The predominant concern of the fragment is the question of evil. But, as we have argued, Anaximander is far from the pessimistic spirit attributed to him by the neo-orphic interpretation. Thus the motivating power of the fragment is an aspiration to theodicy.88 Anaximander seeks a justification of evil in the world and a vindication of the government of it by its ruler. According to the fragment, justice is always done in the world, though at the price of death to the offenders. Nevertheless, Anaximander does not appear to have a cynical attitude toward this state of affairs. The fragment does not sound like the description of the
government of a βασιλεύ—whether in the spirit of the Great King of the Persians as Herodotus depicts it, or in the spirit of the legendary kings of the Helladic or Mycenaean past. Things are not destroyed by one another for offences given previously to a sovereign third party. Τὰ ὀντα are not cast in the role of Gladiator-criminals fighting one another in a contest in which the victor carries out the punishment decreed by the Emperor upon another, weaker man who is no more guilty than himself. On the contrary, things are destroyed by a sovereign third party on account of offenses given to each other. The judge who presides over this situation rules, according to the fragment, in the interests of justice. This interest is implemented by the ordaining of death penalties against guilty parties. But the offenses in question are not understood by Anaximander as offenses against an impersonal law which reigns supreme in some Empire or Universal State. The situation described is considerably more primitive than this and more than likely reflects the level of juridical development attained by the Hellenic Polis itself by the middle of the sixth century B.C.

According to Kahn, the doctrine of the fragment concerns the elements, and only the elements. Thus he finds no reference to the apeiron in it.89 This is due to the fact that he believes Chronos to be the moral arbiter implied in the legal process depicted in the fragment. But since this reading is impossible, τὸ άπειρου may easily and naturally be supplied at this point in the discussion. And since the character of the judge in the fragment is not that of a basileus, but more closely resembles that of the archon—as Vernant describes it90—the apeiron appears to be the most likely candidate for the office: especially because Anaximander called it ὁ ἀρχή, being the first to use the term in this way. But even more significant are the implications of this
for the doctrine of the *apeiron* itself. We have seen that the purpose behind
the fragment is theodicy, and that--although we have not yet interpreted
the fact--this theodicy is worked out according to a certain view of temporality
(it is the fate of things to be destroyed at the appointed time). If the
fragment presupposes the doctrine of the *apeiron*, we can use its view of time
as a point of departure for an exposition of the meaning of "the Boundless."

Gigon seems to be correct in maintaining that there is a contrast in
Anaximander's philosophy between the *apeiron* and everything else. Gigon's
interpretation of this contrast becomes philosophically overloaded with the
metaphysical content which he attaches to the distinction. But he is followed
in his sound, basic assumption by Hölscher. Both understand the contrast--which
is more implicit than explicit in the doxography--in terms of the Infinite
on the one hand, and of the Finite on the other. However, if we take this
terminology as a clue for recovering the original terminology of Anaximander
himself, we come up with something like an *ἀπείρον/περαρ* (*πέρα*) distinction
or an *ἀπείρον/πεπερασμένον* contrast. The first, which is known to us from
Pythagorean philosophy, dates from the fifth century at the earliest, while
the latter originates with Plato and Aristotle. The difficulty is somewhat
abated if we think of τὸ ἀπείρον, not as the Infinite, but as the Endless. The
difference may be slight, but the term "endless" allows us to hear the temporal
aspect of the root, *πέρα*,--an aspect which is clearly part of its original
signification. If we allow for this shift in meaning, then we can easily
find this missing contrast of τὸ ἀπείρον, certainly not in any omitted terminology
such as *πέρα* or *πεπερασμένον*, but in the fragment. If we interpret τὸ ἀπείρον
as the Endless, we will find in the doctrine of the fragment the polar contrast
which is implied in the very form ἀπείρον. The axis along which these polar-
ities lie is that of time. And time, we recall, is the central category in
Anaximander's theodicy.
In my view, following Popma, the temporal deserves the accent in Anaximander's thought, or at least a greater emphasis, because of its importance for understanding the central motive of his thought and for an insight into the connection between the apeiron concept and the doctrine of the fragment. Despite its inherent anachronisms, Aristotle's comment at Phys. 4.203b6 (DK 12A15) reveals the temporality of Anaximander's concepts of both το ἀπέιρον and ἡ ἀρχή. According to Aristotle, το ἀπέιρον is the ἀρχή because the apeiron itself has no arché. He bases this conclusion on the reasoning: "for everything either is a beginning (principle) or has a beginning (principle)." But there is no beginning for the undetermined, because if there were it would be determined and limited by it. On the other hand, whatever has a beginning has genesis and therefore must undergo destruction: τὸ τε γὰρ γενόμενον ἀνάγκη τέλος λαβεῖν, καὶ τελευτὴν πᾶση ἔστι φθορὰ (203b 9-10). The latter phrase is almost a verbatim restatement of the first clause of the fragment: εξ ων δε η γένεσι το οΰσαι και την φθοράν ειτε ταυτα γένεσαι κατα το χρεων. After his statement of the necessary destruction of all things which come into being, Aristotle says that the apeiron by contrast has no beginning and therefore is the beginning of everything else. He then mentions Anaximander by name and says that the apeiron "encompasses and steers all things." These comments confirm that Anaximander posited a contrast between his arché (the apeiron) and the transient things of the world. But Aristotle suggests that Anaximander arrived at this basic truth by means of rational consideration of the principle, "everything is an arché, or has one." We must remember that it is this kind of thinking which in Aristotle's mind is first philosophy: i.e., the articulation of metaphysical truths by means of logical necessities.
It is clear, therefore, just how Aristotle considered Anaximander to have differed from those "theologians" who went before him.

Jaeger has pointed out that for Hesiod, everything had a beginning, including that which was the very first, Chaos. Jaeger attributes this view to Hesiod's failure to transcend the category of genealogy. In effect, Hesiod never acknowledges a true αρχή, a beginning of becoming. "To do such a thing would have required a degree of consistency that is still quite foreign to his thought." Гigon on the other hand does not hesitate to attribute a genuine αρχή-concept to Hesiod, and partially by virtue of this elevates him to the status of the first philosopher before Socrates. Both agree, however, in regarding the αρχή-concept as a criterion for the beginning of philosophy. Jaeger believes that Anaximander philosophized according to the principle ex nihilo, nihil fit. Thus Anaximander reasoned: "if in the beginning there had been nothing, there would be nothing still; for out of nothing, comes nothing." Apparently this principle was considered the sine qua non of philosophy by Aristotle and the Aristotelian doxographical tradition. At Physics 187a 27f, Aristotle speaks of τὴν κοινὴν δοξαν τῶν φυσικῶν, οὐ γενομένου οὐδένος ἐκ τοῦ οὐ, "the dogma common to all the physicists that 'nothing comes out of what does not exist'."

In this passage, Aristotle does not explicitly attribute such philosophical (metaphysical) reasoning to Anaximander himself. The way Aristotle expresses it is reminiscent of argumentation elsewhere in his own thought. But he could hardly be more clear in attributing a doctrine of an "unbegun beginning" to Anaximander. Judging from other passages (such as Phys 187a 27, quoted above), Aristotle did believe that some such rational argument underlay Anaximander's doctrine of the apeiron. We can not accept or reject Aristotle's
interpretation without implicitly passing sentence on his value as a historian of pre-Socratic philosophy. According to Jaeger,

The question is whether Aristotle is really giving us a kind of historical report or is merely trying to fathom the philosophical motives of the older thinkers from his own point of view... Aristotle rightly singles out Anaximander who applied the epithets \textit{immortal} and \textit{indestructible} to the Boundless... But is Anaximander also responsible for the deduction in which the dialectic of the peras and apeiron is used to prove that the Boundless has no beginning?[^95]

In the final analysis, Jaeger decided that Aristotle rightly discerned the motive as well as the line of reasoning behind Anaximander's \textit{apeiron} doctrine. In Jaeger's view, Anaximander is a philosopher in the sense of possessing a \textit{theologia naturalis}. "Taking the natural world as their starting point, they (the pre-Socratics) develop the idea of some highest principle and then proceed to assert of it that 'this must be the Divine'."[^96]

Pre-Socratic philosophy is really a natural theology, and in this sense we may speak of a theology of the early Greeks. Gigon, however, denies that Aristotle has correctly understood the doctrine of Anaximander, which Gigon believes is much closer to that of Hesiod. That is, as with Hesiod so with Anaximander the \textit{arche}, like everything else, comes into existence at some time. In this way, Gigon seeks to preserve a sense of the archaic in his interpretation of Anaximander's thought. I believe it is safer—both with respect to Aristotle's trustworthiness and for the interpretation of Anaximander's \textit{apeiron}—to concur with Jaeger that Anaximander's Boundless was ungenerated and that this is why he applied (κόμισα/ρχτ) to it the term \textit{άρχη}. The idea of the 'unbegun beginning' is precisely the significance of the \textit{arche}-concept, and Anaximander (according to Simplicius: 12A9) is responsible for its introduction in this sense. I do not, however, agree with Jaeger in making this \textit{arche} idea into the principle \textit{ex nihilo}, nihil \textit{fit}, and in turn making
this into the condition for genuine philosophy. This interpretation overloads the evidence—as if with Anaximander, thought suddenly came to maturity concerning the concept of "necessary being." Jaeger exploits the traditional Christian notion of *theologia naturalis* to explain the philosophical theology of the early pre-Socratics. It is an extension of this way of thinking to credit Anaximander with a virtual proof for the existence of God. Hesiod, and the Hellenic mythological tradition in general, lacked the idea of the unbegun beginning; but that is not to say that the idea is unknown to myth—it is simply unknown to Greek myth. It is not inconceivable (following the suggestion by Holscher of Anaximander's dependence upon an oriental religious tradition) that the *arché* theme in Anaximander—which we recognize as his distinguishing mark and the key to his thought in general—is due to his positive relation to some myth. At any rate, I cannot agree with Kahn who says that Aristotle's argument as to why Anaximander's *apeiron* is an unbegun beginning "has the ring of great antiquity." Aristotle may not be wrong that Anaximander understood his *arché* as ungenerated, but it seems unlikely that this idea arose from the principle "everything either is a beginning or has a beginning." If Anaximander's *apeiron*-doctrine must have a source, it is interesting to consider Burkert's suggestion that the implicit notion of the Anarch (*ο άναρχος*)--the Unbegun and Unruled--in Anaximander's *τὸ ἀπεὶρον* is historically related to Medo-Persian cosmology and its ultimate principle of "das Unendliche Licht" which "stand an Anfang (als) das Licht als Reich Gottes, ungeschaffen und unendlich."99

Our conclusion is that despite the metaphysical character of his interpretation, Aristotle is correct in his depiction of the contrast between the Boundless and everything else. From his depiction, we see that the contrast
pertains in the first place to temporality. The Boundless is the Arche. It is the beginning of everything, though it was itself never begun. The Boundless, however, is also the Endless and is removed from the realm of perishable things subject to temporal limits (περαι). As Aristotle says, "this Unlimited, then, would be the divinity itself, being 'immortal and undestructible' (αθανατον και ανωλεθρον) as Anaximander and most of the physicists declared it to be."100 This then is the contrast we have been looking for—a contrast in terms of time which confirms the importance of the temporalistic theodicy we discovered in Anaximander's fragment.

The contrast between the doctrine of the apeiron and the temporalism espoused in the fragment may be expressed schematically if we arrange the various epithets of the Endless in one column and match these with corresponding expressions connoting the finite in another. The results would be something like the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctrine of the Arche</th>
<th>Theodicy of the fragment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>το ἀπειρον</td>
<td>τὰ ἕντα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸ αἰδιον (12A11)</td>
<td>ὁ χρόνος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸ ἀθάνατον (12A15)</td>
<td>τὸ χρεών</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸ θεῖον (12A15)</td>
<td>ἡ ἀδικία</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸ ἀνωλεθρόν (12A15)</td>
<td>τὴν φθορὰν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἡ ἀρχὴ (τὸ ἀναρχομένον)</td>
<td>ἡ γενεσία (τὰ ἀρχομένα)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸ πάντα περιεχόν</td>
<td>τὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καὶ κὐβερνάν (12A15)</td>
<td>διδόντα</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This schema illustrates the relation of the apeiron-doctrine to the ideas of the fragment. But several things remain to be said about Anaximander's
understanding of time. We are not suggesting that Anaximander thought of
time as one realm over and against another realm, eternity, occupied by
the Endless. We find no trace of "dualism" in Anaximander's thought.
There is a duality corresponding to temporal necessity and eternity respectively. In addition, the former (the temporal) is devalued ontologically--
judging by Anaximander's description of the process of life and death and
especially by his explanation of this state of affairs by the inherent tendency
toward conflict and injustice among temporal things in contrast to the divine
apeiron. But Anaximander draws no hard and fast line to separate temporal
things from their eternal governor. As we discovered in exegeting the
fragment, the temporal process of genesis and destruction is stated by
Anaximander in such a way that it can not be understood apart from the
involvement of some sovereign third party--το άπειρον. The one piece of
information we are given (by Aristotle: 12A15) about the activity of το άπειρον
is precisely that it "surrounds and steers all things." If we add to this
the consideration that the apeiron is the arché--and therefore the origin--of
all things ἔε νὸ ἀπανταφ γίνεσθαι τοῦ ὄρασας καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ
κόσμου, we see that there is no ultimate independence of τὰ οὐτα from το άπειρον.
In the second place, while the apeiron is not subject to a fate which determines
its 'time', it is not for that reason supratemporal in the Parmenidean sense
of a static timelessness. The apeiron is the dynamic φύσι which generates
the heavens through its eternal motion. Anaximander's Endless is intimately
involved with the temporal process: ruling and directing it.

If Jaeger is correct about the personification of time in the phrase
κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνον τὰς, then this can only be reconciled with the apeiron
doctrine by identifying ο χρόνος with το άπειρον. Only the boundless could play
the role of the cosmic judge. The only thing which would appear to stand in
the way of this are the epithets αἰόιον and αγηρω by means of which Anaximander distinguishes the arché from those things which 'are' only in the present tense. However, the word αἰόιον actually indicates an "ever-lasting perduration in time," in contrast to the term αιώνιον—in its customary pre-Socratic use after Parmenides (eg, fr. 8,5)—which means "eternal" in the sense of "not belonging to the order of time." The thrust of αἰόιον is a contrast with the notion of corruption (φθορα). 

There is no reason that το απειρον, as χρονον, cannot be the time-god without being temporal in the sense of subject to the limits of duration. He would presumably be the one who fixes such limits. At any rate, we know from several sources that expressions such as χρονον αἰόιον and χρονον αγηραον were not unfamiliar figures in both Orphic cosmogonies and dedicatory inscriptions. We must grant the possibility that Anaximander referred to το απειρον as the deity Chronos (whatever may have been the relation between this personification of time and the old Hellenic god, Kronos). However, the χρονον in the fragment, we believe, cannot have this meaning. There is nothing in the doxography to suggest this usage of χρονον. The important point is that the Endless—the arché that is also without end—is χρονοκρατωρ without being αχρον. Everything "has its time" except the apeiron. But the apeiron is not above time. Rather, it is "unlimited" with respect to any conceivable date of expiration. The apeiron is ageless because it never shows the ravages of time, eternal because it is never fated—ie, subjected κατα το χρονον—to pass away. In addition to not passing away, the apeiron (because of that very reason) is not guilty of δικία. On the contrary, it is το θειον. Therefore, if the apeiron is αἰόιον we must realize that this is intended in the sense of 'everlasting time'. This explains why and in what sense the Endless is called the arché of all things. Because this certain
boundless nature (τίνα φύσιν ἀπειροῦ) is given the role of ἀρχή by Anaximander, it may be considered to have unlimited capacities for generating heavens and worlds and elements and individual things. One of Aristotle’s conjectural reconstructions of the reasoning behind the ἀπειρον-doctrine was "the idea that from the unfailing persistence of genesis and its opposite it follows that the things which come into being are drawn from an unlimited store" (12A15). If the ἀρχή is endless then genesis must also be endless. For this reason, as Pseudo Plutarch reports, Anaximander declared that destruction as well as generation "happen from infinite ages (εξ ἀπειροῦ αἰῶνος), all of them occuring in cycles" (12A10). Thus in the fulness of Anaximander's conception of the ἀρχή— which he was the first to introduce—to ἀπειροῦ is:

1) ἡ φύσις (in the sense of natura naturans) or ἡ γένεσις
   ἐξ ἡ πάντα γίνεσθαι (ie, natura naturata),
2) ὁ τέλος (in the sense of destiny) εἴρν ὁ πάντα φθείρεσθαι,
3) ὁ χρονοκρατωρ, ὁ κυβερνᾶ πάντα, and
4) ὁ νόμος (ἡ τὸ πέρα), ὁ περιεχόν πάντα καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ πεπερασμένο.

Conversly, in the fulness of Anaximander's use of the idea of ἀπειροῦ, his ἀρχή is

1) A Source of Boundless bounty (12A15),
2) The Ruler over an Infinite succession of worlds and things and their eternal return (12A10),
3) Temporally Endless (12A10), and
4) An Unlimited (τίνα φύσιν ἀπειροῦ) or undetermined (φύσις ἀόριστον) nature (12A9 and 12A9a).
There is yet another meaning of apeiron in connection with that of arche which comes to light in a curious remark by Augustine to the effect that Anaximander:

"did not hold that all things spring from one principle—as Thales did, who held that principle to be water—but thought that each thing springs from its own proper principle (principium); these principles of things he believed to be infinite (infinita) in number and thought that they generated innumerable worlds and all the things which arise in them." (12A17).108

If this testimonium is accepted as valid, we are forced to raise the question as to what relation exists between these principia infinita—which, if genuine, must be a translation of ἀποξαί ἀπείροι109—and the ἁρχή ἀπείροι.110

If we accept this Augustinian reading, Anaximander will have to be classed with the so-called "pluralists"—such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras—who held to the existence of more than one arche. Pluralism is Aristotle's category, which he used in contrast to "monism" meaning that there was but one arche.111 Among the pluralists, the conception most closely resembling that which Augustine attributes to Anaximander, is that of Anaxagoras.

In his fragment 1 we read,

All things were together, infinite in respect to both number and smallness; for the small too was infinite. And while all things were together none of them were plain because of the smallness; for air and aither covered all things, both of them being infinite; for these are the greatest ingredients in the mixture of all things, both in number and in size.

We should notice that the idea of infinite things (NB: not ἀποξαί) is connected with that of mixture. There is considerable discussion in the literature about Anaximander as to whether his apeiron should be interpreted as a μίγμα.112 This interpretation is closely related to the view that Anaximander's apeiron was in some way 'between' two of the elements. In fact, both of these interpretations are derived from certain obscure remarks by
Aristotle concerning Anaximander and the debate over the generation of the world by an \( \alpha\lambda\omega\iota\omega\alpha\iota \) of the root element or by an \( \varepsilon\kappa\rho\alpha\iota\alpha\iota \) of opposites out of a mixture. However, there are conflicting passages in Aristotle as to whether Anaximander belongs to the former group or to the latter. Aristotle was apparently confused by the fact that Anaximander's \( \alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron \) was not an element, and hence—reasoned Aristotle—must be either an intermediate or a mixture. This confusion which is inspired by Aristotle's categories more than by the philosophers' views is the source of Aristotle's continued attempts to connect the conceptions of Anaximander and Anaxagoras.

According to Simplicius, this was also Theophrastus' modus explicandi:

Theophrastus forces Anaxagoras together with Anaximander and thus takes what is said by Anaxagoras as (if it were) capable of meaning that the substrate is one nature; and he writes thus in the Researches of the Physicists: "thus someone of those who understand (him) might say that he makes the material principles infinite and the cause of motion and genesis one, just as it is said. But if someone were to understand the mixture of all things to be one nature indeterminate both in form and magnitude, just as he appears to mean, it ammounts to his saying that there are two principles—the nature of the apeiron and the mind—so that he clearly conceives the bodily elements in a manner analogous to that of Anaximander.

The "he" throughout the quote from Theophrastus is, of course, Anaxagoras. The mistake Simplicius is attributing to Theophrastus is treating Anaxagoras' "infinite things," like Anaximander's \( \alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron \), as one nature. Thus Simplicius is affirming the "monism" of Anaximander. Furthermore, in the error of Theophrastus, we can discern a tradition of Anaxagoras-interpretation in antiquity by means of which his infinite mixture was interpreted through Anaximander's \( \alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron \), thus at the same time (indeed on the basis of)
interpreting the latter's **apeiron** in terms of the former's mixture. In the passage quoted above, Simplicius is concerned about the confusion of these two thinkers as far as it regards the interpretation of Anaxagoras. We, on the other hand, are interested in the mistake as it relates to the interpretation of Anaximander. For it is this side of the error that is revealing itself again in Augustine's **testimonium** concerning Anaximander's **principia infinita** or \( \text{ἀρχαι αἰπείροι} \). Thus, we believe, Augustine's idea of innumerable arches is a mistaken interpretation; Anaximander was no "pluralist."

But as an index of the persistence, not to mention the extension (ie, also in the Latin commentators), of this error, this testimony is interesting in itself. It could be that this misinterpretation had a basis in the very words of Anaximander himself, and therefore repeatedly forced itself upon the Aristotelian sensitivities for strictness in philosophical categories. Anaximander need only have referred to his arché—the **apeiron**—in the plural to cause pandemonium among his philosophical successors and interpreters. If Anaximander had referred to the **apeiron** in the plural—perhaps with a form such as \( \text{τὰ ἀπείρα} \) --it would not have been the first time the divine principle and origin of the world was expressed in such language: witness the Hebraic plural of respect, Elohim. But is it at all likely—aside from being merely possible—that Anaximander employed such a usage? Augustine's **testimonium** is the only indication of the use of \( \text{αἰπείροι} \) in the plural with reference to the origin. The plural is used to describe the Innumerable worlds—\( \text{ἀπείροι κόσμου} \)—but no other such usage is known from the doxography. There is, however, the rather mysterious plural reference to the origins of things in the fragment. Could this clause with a plural pronoun of indefinite referent in fact be a clause with a plural pronoun
refering to the Indefinite? This may well be the case. But we prefer the former possibility because we believe the clause states a sort of axiom which is explained by the second clause. Thus, we accept Kranz's translation of the επι ὑψ...τάυτα as "Woraus...hinein." Just as τά ὑπότα refers in general to all things which presently exist, so the ἀ...τάυτα refer to whatever it is into which these existing things are passing away. Whether it refers to things passing into their constituent elements, or to the opposites passing into the "productive seed" from which they were "excreted," or to the heavens and worlds passing into the Endless—all these kinds of φθορά are included by the proverbial language of the fragment. Certainly, the meaning cannot be artificially restricted to one of these alternatives.

We have seen the central thrust of the fragment and have made this insight serviceable to the interpretation of the apeiron-doctrine. We discovered, despite Kahn's objection, that the fragment implies the apeiron-doctrine. But we will not continue the exposition of Anaximander's philosophy here. We cannot hope to cover all of the issues presented in the doxographia. It is necessary only that we disclose his key conception(s) in relation to the question concerning myth and philosophy in his thought. We turn now to this question.

B. Anaximander's Relation to the Myth

The rationalization or secularization of archaic Greek culture is undeniable. That it has undergone a great many interpretations and reinterpretations as to historical significance—not to mention its cultural value—cannot detract from its factuality. Historians are not agreed on the essential characteristic of this movement. But it may be said that its distinguishing mark had something to do with a new attitude toward traditional Hellenic religion.
The leading centers of this movement geographically were the Ionian city states. This would appear to violate the historical 'law' that those who participate in the colonizing efforts of a society eventually become a conservative element within it. But the colonizers who fled the mainland during the last Dorian invasion seem to have been purged of traditional loyalties by their journey. Confronted with the new situation, they soon had laid the basis of a new social order in the form of the Polis, replacing the older form of Kingship. These Ionian Greeks refute the truism cælum, non aminum, mutant qui trans mare currunt. For, despite an ostensible preoccupation with the heroic past in the Homeric epics, the ethos of this poetry breathes a new spirit and exemplifies the shift in religious outlook. Particularly in the Odyssey we see that the gods have paled into all but decorative figures who signify little more than the bon vivants who were their human paradigms. Testifying to the decay of traditional religious sentiment among the Greeks, Arnold Toynbee remarks,

As early as the sixth century B.C. Superstition has been so effectively sterilized by Rationalism in the more progressive states of Hellas that the native supply of medicine-men and diviners gave out—if we may legitimately draw this inference from a number of cases, recorded by Herodotus, in which the government of one or other of these states in the heart of the Hellenic world of that age employed the services of a diviner who had been born and bred in one of the backward cantons in the North West.

More important than the decline in number of active shamans is the eruption onto the scene in the sixth century of a number of new forms which attempted to fill the newly opened gap. By means of these movements, a young but intellectually precocious, Hellenic society—expressing itself in epic, lyric and cosmogonic poetry, as well as gnomic, scientific and
philosophical prose—sought consolation for what it lacked in the way of a profound religious tradition. But what Hellas lacked in this department, the societies which surrounded her on three sides possessed in abundance. All of these societies represented a common levantine background. They included: the Phrygian, Neo-Babylonian and Medo-Persian to the east; the Syrian and Egyptian to the south east; and the Phoenician to the south and west. Speaking culturally, not geographically, Hellas was situated such that three out of four points of the compass pointed to the East.

It is widely admitted that the scientific interests of the Ionians in astronomy, geography, mathematics, etc. were largely inspired by contact with the achievements of Egyptians and Babylonians in this field. It is also recognized that there was no real separation between 'science' and 'philosophy' in Ionian intellectual culture. It is likely, therefore, that these two foci of the Asian Greek mind both derived from a dynamic and fruitful contact with the non-Greek societies of the Levant. Thus, we follow Hölscher in looking to the East for an answer to the question concerning the origins of and influences upon pre-Socratic thought.

When the half-secularized Greek colonists in Ionia began absorbing other traditions, either as they encountered them in the course of their trade, or as these traditions filtered westward via the routes of social exchange among the peoples of Anatolia, the Greeks saw in them something corresponding to their needs and situation. They combined a critical attitude toward their own religious tradition—which for them had lost validity and appropriateness—with a somewhat secularized and speculative (hence disinterested) reinterpretation of the cosmogonic myths which they encountered. As Aristotle read and reported the views of the pre-Socratics out of his own perspective,
so the pre-Socratics themselves understood the theogonic-cosmogonic
tales of the orient in their own terms as members of a vital though re-
ligiously blighted Hellenic society. The anti-mythologyzing attitude of much
of early Hellenic philosophy is not "Enlightenment," but, on the contrary,
consists in an orientation to non-Hellenic myth. Thus the general
relationship between philosophy and myth in sixth century Hellas was not that
of rising rationality to waning faith. Rather, it was a matter of the re-
jection of one tradition of revelation in favor of another. The latter was
prefered because it was perceived as older, more venerable and more suited
to Hellenic needs.

However, the disaffection of the pre-Socratic philosophical mind
from its own religious tradition precluded the possibility of any fully
successful rapprochement with oriental myth in terms of the myth's
indigenous meaning and function. The Ionian Greeks had to accept the
traditional tales of the cultures which entered their ken with a grain
of salt--pistically speaking--on account of their (by now habitual) attitude
of unbelief toward their own myths. Thus philosophy experienced itself
as something other than the myth, both the myth which it implicitly rejected
and the myth whose impact upon Greek thinking called philosophy itself into
being. As Holscher remarks,

Die Griechen waren mit einem von haus aus
naiven und fabulosen Mythos herangekommen,
der Ansprüche auf Tiefsinn wenig erfüllen
konnte, der sakrale Mythos war ihnen fast
dem fremd. Darum waren sie der orientalischen
Spekulation so zugänglich. Es wurde ihnen
immer unbehaglicher bei ihren Geschichten,
an die sie nicht mehr glauben konnten. Da
liess sich doch eher an die luft glauben.
Aber nur wo eine starke Geisteskraft dies-
em Druck des Orients begegnete, wurde das
Fremde als philosophie bewältigt.123
In the thought of Anaximander himself, I believe it is possible to detect the bare bones of some myth or mythical tradition. What his attitude toward this tradition may have been must remain obscure. It may be that Anaximander was somewhat eclectic as he sought revelational roots for his reflection. He may have taken a polemical stance against part of the tradition that attracted him. At any rate, this tradition differs from that drawn upon by Hesiod. This is not because Hesiod is especially Greek, or oriented to the heroic ethos of the epic. The similarity between the Theogony and certain Hittite and Hurrian analogues proves that the poem was not a wholly indigenous product of Hellenic imagination. But what distinguishes Hesiod from Anaximander--granting that some form of myth lies behind the latter's conception--is that for Hesiod the genealogical unfolding of the deities culminates in the birth of the world ruler. For Anaximander, on the other hand, genesis begins with a world ruler who was himself never born. Among the gods and goddesses whose births are recorded in the Theogony are included the various parts of the cosmos: eg, Earth, Heaven and Sea. For Anaximander, the 'heavens and kosmoi' which are generated out of the apeiron are also understood as divinities (12A17). But Anaximander's cosmic gods come and go according to the requirements of justice. For Hesiod, one god succeeds another through injustice; justice is instituted only in the reign of the ultimate successor of all gods and goddesses, Zeus. Furthermore, if chronos in Anaximander is the name of a deity, it is more likely a personification of time than a reference to Kronos. Kronos in the Theogony is the enemy of justice who must be overthrown by his son. As Hölscher has pointed out, Hesiod's first god, Chaos, generates the children of night; he thus represents a power of disorder over and against
the rule of Zeus. Therefore, the *apeiron* of Anaximander, though it appears to be an undifferentiated *archē*, is not analogous in structure and function to Chaos because it is and remains the sovereign power who "surrounds and steers all things." Nevertheless, Anaximander's picture of the generation of the world is rather genealogical than demiurgic. Although the *apeiron* is a reigning sovereign, he does not build so much as beget the cosmos; he is not a creator. Unlike the Babylonian Marduk who slays the primeval water-goddess, Tiamat, and thereby establishes the portions of the cosmos, the Endless excretes a seed from which are generated the Hot and the Cold.

As Pseudo Plutarch says:

> When this cosmos came into being a seed capable of producing both hot and cold was separated (excreted) from the Eternal and a sphere of flame grew out of this (seed) around the air around the earth like bark on a tree; when this (flame) broke off and was shut off into circles the sun, moon and stars were formed (12A10).

It is not clear whether in the phrase, *τὸν Κόσμον*, Pseudo Plutarch is using *kosmos* in his own sense, or—as we might expect—using it in the Anaximandrian sense. The point is of some significance since, if *κόσμος* means one of the infinitely numerous worlds attributed to Anaximander, it is used here to include what we would otherwise consider the heavens: namely, the sun, moon and the stars. If these 'bodies' (Anaximander thought of them as holes in the great cosmic wheels of fire and air) belong to the "*kosmos,*" what is meant by the term "*ou̱pāvōi"? It is interesting to notice that, while several statements in the doxography speak of the 'generation' or 'separation' of the heavens and worlds from the *apeiron*, in the statements referring to the destruction of that which has come into being, the doxographers are curiously consistent in not mentioning the heavens, speaking only of the destruction of "all things" or of the worlds. Both the heavens and worlds are
said to come into being, but only the kosmoi are explicitly associated with
dissolution. In the three extant, second hand versions of Theophrastus'
account of Anaximander--by Simplicius, Ps. Plutarch and Hippolytus--the
apeiron is variously described as the "element," "nature" or "cause" of
the generation as well as the destruction of τὰ ὄυτα (9, A11 + A14), ἡντα
(A14) and τὸ πᾶν (10 & A14). It is not clear whether these latter expressions
were intended to include both worlds and heavens. If the heavens are not subject
to the universal destruction declared in the fragment and elsewhere what
status do they possess? If we may reach for an explanation--supposing for
a moment that Anaximander posited the existence of perduring heavens--we
might compare this conception to the Semitic דב (shamaiim) which expresses
a single entity or divine abode with a plural noun and which, in Hebrew
thought at least, is quite distinct from the stars and other heavenly
bodies. The only alternative is to assume that Pseudo Plutarch is using
kosmos--in the expression κατὰ τὴν γενεσίν του δυνατον του δυναι του κόσμου--in his own
sense, a sense which included both the kosmoi and the heavens of Anaximander.

But, despite its ambiguities, this passage clearly illustrates the
genealogical and organic model in Anaximander's thought which closely resembles
the mythical theogonies of the Orphics. This bespeaks the influence of myth.
As Kirk says,

> Probably the most crucial effect of myths on
> the early Presocratics was...the provision of
> an anthropomorphic model for their view of how
> the world maintains its unity. The Milesian think-
> ers are essentially cosmogonists, and their idea
> of cosmogony is plainly based on the theological
> model provided by the divine myths.129

Furthermore, this passage contains what appears to be a authentic account of
the birth process of the kosmos, and it is one of the passages which speaks
strongly for a doctrine of opposites in Anaximander. As Kirk and Raven point out, even Hölscher has not succeeded in destorying this bit of evidence. Hölscher's justification for excluding the idea of opposites from the authentic placita of Anaximander was his belief that such a view came only later—with Heraclitus—presumably because the idea itself was too philosophically sophisticated to have been simply invented by Anaximander. However, this is quite an assumption to make. What is particularly philosophical about the idea of opposites? Granted, such a concept could only be predicated through a some kind of logical activity; i.e., distinguishing and analyzing. The researches of Cl. Lévi-Strauss have shown that there is no lack of oppositions of a logical kind (though certainly not scientific) in the societal structures and mythologies of even the most primitive peoples. Far from an index of the philosophical sophistication of a thinker, the idea of the opposites may in fact indicate the influence of myth upon his thought. Anaximander believed that

the world arose out of an 'Indefinite' substance, which modern scholars have been tempted to relate to Hesiod's Chaos. He also envisaged the natural world as dominated by the opposed powers of the different materials, such as fire and water, that emerged from the Indefinite. This idea of basic opposites in nature had a more certainly mythical precedent than the Indefinite/Chaos equation. Another 'mythical' feature of Anaximander's conception is the idea of the eternal return of generated things to their origins. His ἄνακτουμένα ἐξ ἀμείβου ἀληθο (12A10) is the expression of a wide-spread mythical theme. Kirk and Raven discredit the authenticity of this placita which they rightly associate with the doctrine of innumerable worlds. Both of these they attribute to a stoicizing trend among Anaximander's doxographers. But if such a view of the final return of the cosmos to the source from which it came is not out
of place in Heraclitus,\textsuperscript{135} then certainly it is not inconceivable in Anaximander.\textsuperscript{136}

Besides these themes, there are several images in the doxography which suggest that Anaximander relied upon images provided by the myth. There is, for example, the image of the earth as a tree around which a fiery atmosphere grows like bark. Gigon argued that this image was clearly of mythical origin, indicating Anaximander's debt to a very archaic way of thought.\textsuperscript{137} The figure of the tree also occurs in Pherycedes;\textsuperscript{138} Xenophanes appeals to it by stating that the earth stretches its roots beneath our feet to infinity.\textsuperscript{139} But there is no reason that these figures, \textit{qua} images, should indicate any particular attachment to the myth on the part of Anaximander. From all indications, his picture of the world-structure appealed to several images. These include his comparison of the shape of the earth with a section of stone column (All), the comparison of the sun's orbit with the wheel of a chariot (A21) and the rim of this wheel with a flute which emits air from its blowholes (All). It could be argued that the tree image was also used in this spirit. On the surface, they are little more than metaphor. Even so, the language of the fragment is not metaphorical in this sense. Here something more profound is being said about the ways of the world through the concepts of $δικη$, $τιτικεία$, etc. And it is here, in the fragment, that we find a deeper, inner connection between the thought of Anaximander and myth in general.

All of the instances of image or metaphor cited witness only to a superficial link with the myth. None of the themes discussed—the genealogical pattern, the idea of the seed and perhaps of a world egg (as Cornford interpreted the sphere of flame which grew out of the seed around the earth and whose 'shell' when it cracked gave birth to the heavens), an eternal return, etc.—reveal a pistical attachment to the myth. We described pistis as one
of the qualifying features of myth. Thus, thought that is genuinely
mythologizing attaches itself in faith to the myth as revelation. As we also
said, though we believe we can see the bare bones of some mythical tradition
in Anaximander, we are in the dark as to his attitude toward this tradition--
that is, if we remain on the level of his mythical images. But what under­
lies his use of mythical imagery are the remnants of a confessional approach
to the problem of evil. We have called this impetus behind myth-making and
myth-believing "theodicy." Theodicy lies at the heart of Anaximander's
fragment. The history of human attempts at theodicy is the history of the
attempt to find a structural scapegoat, a feature of reality, upon which
to pin the blame for the evil and malady experienced in life. In so
describing the motive behind theodicy, we have passed judgement upon it as
a vain attempt. In so far as theodicy would explain the essence and origin
of evil, the reality of evil itself is falsified. The most common scapegoat
used in myth, we found, was temporality. And this indeed is the scapegoat
named by Anaximander in the fragment. It belongs to the very nature of
the 'things that are'--because they are limited in their time of existence,
not eternal and therefore susceptible to φθοράν--to conflict with each other
and commit mutual injustices. For this reason, says Anaximander, they deserve
the destruction which comes upon them.

In this line of reasoning, which we believe is the fragment's own,
there is a clear circularity. The first clause states the problem: finite
things are doomed to destruction into their origins. The second clause explains
and justifies this state of affairs. It declares that things deserve necessary
destruction on account of their injustice. But why, to take it a step further,
are things necessarily unjust in their interaction? The fragment of course
does not answer this question, but it does indeed suggest it. If we, as
Anaximander's interpreters, raise the question on his behalf, we are drawn back into the problem presented in the first clause. The only conceivable basis for the injustice of things is their finitude. We come full circle: why do things suffer the limitations of time? Because they thereby pay penalty for their mutual crimes. And why are they unjust? Because this is their nature as finite, temporal things. This we believe is the ultimate assumption at work in the philosophy of Anaximander--unspoken, but clearly implied in the fragment. The clearest expression of this assumption comes through the idea of the ἐξωτικότητα. Here we see that reality, as it emerges from its ἀρχή, is articulated into basic polarities. These polarizations do not arise because conflict breaks out among the constituent parts of τὸ πᾶν. Rather, conflicts break out because reality has been articulated in polarity ab origine.

Anaximander's philosophy, therefore, has an inner connection with myth which goes beyond the mere repetition of mythical themes. In all respects the connection is essential and, above all, pistical. His thought is the product of one who was impressed by the kind of question entertained by the myth--perhaps a certain myth--and who sought to rehearse its task of theodicy in thought. By the nature of the case, however, Anaximander was condemned to rehearsal through reflection. He shared with his milieu a dissatisfaction with the fabulous and legendary elements in Hellenic mythology, regarding it as primitive and superficial. But he was forced to be a spectator and never fully a participant in the religious traditions of the East which were holding his attention. This is the reason behind the aura of distance in the fragment. By virtue of this, it views disinterestedly what the myth confesses in faith. In Anaximander, philosophy is mythologyizing thought: a thought which is inspired by the themes and concerns of the myth it accepts as
revelation. But, in this case, myth is a revelation for philosophy: an analytic which moves transcendentally in the direction of context, relation, origin and destination. Thus, while the relation of myth and philosophy here is pistical, in Anaximander we see only a philosophical reflection on the myth and not the myth itself. In this way, myth was rendered serviceable to the genesis of philosophy in the sixth century B.C. and was by no means its antithesis.
Conclusion

In the foregoing analysis, we raised a structural question in an historical setting. The structural question concerns the relation of philosophical thought to the product of religious imagination we call myth; the historical element is the interpretation of Anaximander. Thematically the study has two foci. By moving around these foci our research has taken the shape of an ellipse. When the discussion revolves around one point, the other appears within its ambit but eccentric to it, and vice versa. Thus Anaximander becomes an example of the myth/philosophy relation, or conversely the latter becomes a guide to the data of his doxography. We are fully interested in both questions, though either one in itself could be discussed ad infinitum. In the interests of limiting this "apeiron," we have risked conflict between the two issues, which come together in our examination in order to restrict one another. If there is inherent injustice in this procedure it is a necessary evil--and therefore justified, as Anaximander would say.

A third issue resulted from the synthesis of the above two concerns. The relation of myth and philosophy in Anaximander raised the question of the genesis of philosophy itself. This question was involved at every stage of our study. In Part One we discovered that each tradition of pre-Socratic interpretation is characterized by a certain approach to this issue. In Part Two we showed that paradigmatic assumptions about the rise of philosophy govern the treatment of myth in Anaximander in four contemporary views. From
the outset we tried to balance the polarity of this debate—continuity vs. innovation—by describing philosophy as a rooted departure in and from tradition. Clearly in any historical situation there are forces working in both directions—not forward and backward, but to the left and to the right, progressive and conservative. Without the one, there is no movement to history; without the other, no history to movement. But the genesis of philosophy, insofar as this is an historical matter, is a discontinuity of a peculiar kind. It is not a scientific revolution involving a shift in theoretical paradigms, a change occurring within the history of scientific activity. It involves rather crossing the very "threshold of scientificity." However, scientificity (specifically its philosophical direction) is a structural possibility which has no historical origin as such. Therefore, historically we can only speak of crossing this threshold in terms of thematizing the results of theoretical thinking into a theoretical view (ἐπιστήμη). The latter is what is usually called philosophy, and it is this which apparently first arose in the sixth century B.C.

As we argued, the thematization of philosophy in the sixth century B.C. has a correlate in the contemporaneous institutionalization of thought in Greek society (III A1). Time was too short to permit a thorough examination of Anaximander's view in light of these cultural considerations. These are broadly suggested in our analysis of the theodicy-character of his philosophy; they are raised explicitly by Vernant's interpretation. In our opinion the
socio-cultural aspects of a philosophical view are more than accidental qualities. We do not believe that these cultural factors are always determinant, as Vernant implies. But his illustration of this principle in the case of Anaximander sheds invaluable light on the obscurities of his fragmentary text, so often read in abstraction from other cultural products of the sixth century. There is nothing tendentious in pointing out these connections and in making them serviceable to an Anaximander interpretation. Besides this, such an analysis raises the question concerning the historical conditions under which "philosophy" as we know it came into being. This issue is pertinent to discussions in the various schools of Metascience and the Sociology of Knowledge. There is a growing awareness of theoretical thought as an institution in society and of the philosophy of science as belonging not so much to epistemology as to the philosophy of culture.142 Anaximander should prove an interesting test-case for such researches in the future.

In our study we treated the genesis of philosophy as a function of the myth/philosophy relation. We acknowledged that myth is a recurrent factor in the history of philosophy; it was influential in many stages of its development and is often useful in explaining its transformations (eg, Heidegger's "reversal"). But in Anaximander, myth is useful in explaining philosophy's coming-into-being. We distinguished between origin (source) and beginning (genesis). Myth is certainly not the origin of philosophy (III A2), but it is intimately involved in its rise (III A3). Myth relates to philosophy, not as its source, but as the source of its inspiration.
Therefore myth bears on the genesis of philosophy wherever thought attached itself to myth in order to produce a philosophical view. We found support for the general view that myth is concerned with giving an account of evil (theodicy) by way of a negative view of time (III A3). This may not characterize all myth, but Anaximander clearly articulates this view in his so-called fragment (III B1) and appears to owe it precisely to the inspiration of a non-Hellenic myth (III B2). Therefore, whatever other elements are found in myth as such, its time-oriented theodicy predominates in its relation to philosophy, at least in its relation to the genesis of philosophy.

By establishing the relation between myth and philosophy in Anaximander and showing the relevance of this for the origin of his conception, have we really shown the importance of myth for the genesis of pre-Socratic thought in general? In the preface we stated that we would approach Anaximander as an index of the myth/philosophy relation in the sixth century B.C. But he is representative of this relationship only in a limited sense. We cannot assume that the motive for theodicy, which is the link connecting myth and philosophy in his thought, is operative in the same sense and to the same degree in all archaic philosophies. Theodicy is also found, under other forms, in thinkers as diverse as Heraclitus and Xenophanes. But in these thinkers we do not find the same relation between myth and philosophy as in Anaximander (though they share his view of the finite individual as a derivative existence). This requires two observations: In the first place, the
value of the myth for philosophy was an issue which forced itself upon the pre-Socratics as a common problem. As such it constituted a certain thematic unity in their Geschichte. They of course greatly differed among themselves as to the solution of this problem, though these were differences over the same issue. In the second place, the issue of myth was not the only issue, and certainly not always the decisive issue, for pre-Socratic thought. In any conception, it constituted but one theme out of several. In light of these considerations—that the pre-Socratics differed widely as to the value of myth and that many other issues occupied their attention—we can see the limitations upon taking Anaximander as an index of pre-Socratic thought even on the question of the myth/philosophy relation. Nevertheless, this relation is the decisive issue in Anaximander's temporalistic theodicy. And the character of his θεωρία has a more than accidental relationship to the fact that he was first in the line of Hellenic philosophers, "unabhängig and kühn." In Anaximander, myth is the impetus for generating philosophy as speculative theodicy and philosophical theology of time. Coming as it does at the beginning of philosophy, his view has immense significance for subsequent intellectual history. Though Aristotle regards Anaximander as a φυσικός, and thereby obscures his view, the influence of Anaximander's theological motive is seen in Aristotle's own conception of theology as the highest and most honorable of the speculative sciences (τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν). Therefore, in spite of its limitations, the discovery of the importance of myth in Anaximander promises us an entrée into an important dimension of the whole of pre-Socratic thought and even into the philosophy of the classical period.
1 A "Science of Mythology" was first spoken of by K. O. Müller in 1825, and more recently by C. G. Jung and C. Kerényi in their Essays on a Science of Mythology (New York, 1949).


3 Andrew Lang Custom and Myth, (1884) Myth, Ritual and Religion, (1857); Modern Mythology (1877).

4 See their important study Before Philosophy: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (Pelican, 1973). For our purposes see especially the concluding chapter entitled "The Emancipation of Thought from Myth."

5 See especially his The Myth of the Eternal Return (1954); Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (1961); The Sacred and the Profane (1959) and Myth and Reality (1963).

6 Freud was preceded in his treatment of myth—which was marked by, among other things, a close association of myth with dreams—by E. B. Taylor who, like Lucien Lévi-Bruhl (La Pensée Sauvage, Paris: 1962 and La mentalité primitive, Paris: 1922), held to a theory of "primitivism", that there was a "pre-logical" primitive mentality, inscrutable to modern man, which lay behind the products of traditional societies. Freud's master work in this area was his The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) on which he laid the foundation for the interpretation of mythical (as well as dream) symbols according to his theory of the unconscious mind. According to Freud's followers, Karl Abraham (Dreams and Myths 1909) and Otto Rank, dreams are the myths of the individual while myths are the dreams of the race expressing "wish-fulfilment fantasies" derived from the infancy of the race.

7 In Man and his Symbols (1964), Jung rejects the Freudian preoccupation with the idea of racial infancy which he then modified into his conception of the "Collective Unconscious." The latter is the source of myth as well as all human symbols which reveal unconscious urges and phobias of society. For Jung, this function of myth held for all societies, modern, ancient or primitive. And no theory of the "infinitile" character of myth could conceal the fact that moderns too possess myth which reflects hidden collective realities.

9 Language and Myth, p. 33.

10 G. S. Kirk, The Nature of Greek Myths p. 81. Part One of this excellent and lucid book contains a discussion of these "monolithic theories" concerning myths developed since the nineteenth century. My summary above of some of these traditions is based on Kirk's digest of the historical material.

11 Ibid., p. 81f.

12 C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion (Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 5ff.


16 Ibid., p. 282.


18 Like M. Polanyi (Personal Knowledge, New York: 1958), Dooyeweerd believes that far from precluding faith and belief, theoretical thought is structurally dependent upon human commitment.

19 Kirk, op. cit., p. 80.

20 Ibid., pp. 280ff.


22 op.cit., p. 326.


24 Language and Myth, p. 33.

See Chadwick _The Heroic Age_ and Toynbee _Ibid._, Vol. VIII.

Hesiod, perhaps paradoxically, feels a certain (Homeric) admiration for the "Heroes," who follow the Bronze men in the _Theogony_ but who are, in Toynbee's opinion (Vol. VIII, pp. 664ff), in reality the same performers on the historical stage, portrayed as both protagonists and antagonists. In Toynbee's view, the "hero" is by necessity a Janus-faced persona (See Vol. VIII, pp. 1-87).

This is seen in the fact that Homer's Olympians are universally subject to the impersonal ordinance of Destiny (Moira, Fortuna), as are all mortals from the greatest to the least. This fact is pointed out by Cornford (From _Religion to Philosophy_, p. 12) as a problem to which he proposes a sociological explanation (Ch. #2).

On the pacificity of "primitive" religion and society see Toynbee, _op. cit._, Vol. V, p230f.

A parallel to this period of Hellenic history is provided by the Scandinavian "Völkerwanderung" which took advantage of a collapsing Carolingian Empire in Western Europe and of the Khazar Kingdom in the east (Russia). Like the Greeks, the Vikings produced a pantheon of war-gods and an elaborate epic tradition. And like the Achaean Thalassocracy described by Homer, the Vikings were known and feared as masters of the sea. ("Russian" from Old Norse "Rothsmenn"="sea-farers").

_Greek Myths_ p. 279f and 291f. He observes: "Literacy entered the scene uniquely late in Greece in relation to the development of other cultural institutions. Pre-Homeric Greece was not a traditional society just because it was preliterate; it had lost many aspects of traditionality not only long before Homer, but long before the Mycenaean age with its highly sophisticated political, social and economic organization" (p. 279). The Mycenaean Age, I believe, belongs to another sphere of culture (Kulturkreise) than the Hellenic: namely, to the latter end of Minoan history. The Heroic Age itself should then be considered the final period of that society, during which it essentially vanished.

Plato speaks of Homer's reputation, among his "eulogists", as "The educator of Hellas." (Rep. 606E.). Plato's severe critique of the employment of the work of poets, and above all of Homer, as examples of conduct indicates that this approach to Homer was ancient tradition, ie, going back to Homer himself. See Chapter three of Jaeger's _Paideia_ Vol. I, "Homer the Educator."
34 Though Aristotle carefully distinguished epic and tragedy (perhaps because of considerations of literary "Form"), Plato considered Homer the greatest of the tragic poets. In his Tragedy and Philosophy (1968), Walter Kaufman argues (Ch. V) that "the birth of tragedy" is indeed Homer himself.

35 Admittedly it is the first real glimpse we get of their use at all, whether under modified forms and conditions or in their indigenous setting. Our argument is that this glimpse clearly reveals that the myths have already been subjected to a reworking by Homer (?) because their exemplary use has become their sole function, whereas in the original cultic setting we would expect to find this existing alongside other uses.

36 Geschiedenis, p. 44 of Runner's translation: "In the course of his many travels having come in contact with a large number of local cults, he pictures the world of gods—in his epic poems Iliad and Odyssey—as a family of active and brave gods living on Olympus, a mountain in the north of Greece. In this family Zeus, Athena and Apollon are in the foreground. But Homeros, even in the Iliad no longer takes the gods, as the myth does, to be awe-inspiring, superhuman powers, but rather, when compared with the Greek heroes, as "comfortably living" people, people who, in the Odyssey with its idealization of daring (pluck) and power of endurance by both man (Odysseus) and wife (Penelope), pale into all but decorative figures. In this way Homeros became the prophet of an attitude toward life which may be called "non-mythologizing", ie, not built upon faith in the myth" (p. 40).

37 Paideia I, p. 53: "In them we can clearly see the anthropocentric tendency of Greek thought, that tendency which contrasts so strongly with the theomorphic philosophy of the Oriental who sees God as the sole actor and man as merely the instrument or object of that divine activity. Homer definitely places man and his fate in the foreground, although he sees them sub specie aeternitatis, in the perspective of the loftiest general ideas and problems."


40 Ibid., p. 35.
41 Ibid., p. 160.
42 Ibid., p. 161.
44 Ibid., p. 6.
47 Ibid., p. 144.
48 Ibid., p. 150.
49 Ibid., p. 151.
50 Ibid., p. 131.
51 Ibid., p. 131.
52 Ibid., p. 142.
53 Ibid., p. 151.
54 Ibid., p. 155.
55 Ibid., p. 12, 157.
56 Ibid., p. 140.
58 Ibid., p. 165.
59 The Title of Plotinus' fifty-first treatise (Enneads I. 8.) on the question, "Whence Evils?"
62. Theology, p. 34.
63. John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 52, n. 6.
64. F. Dirlmeier, Rhein. Mus. 87 (1938) 376-382.
65. Dirlmeier was followed in this by J. B. McDiarmid in his "Theophrastus on the Pre-Socratic Causes," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 61 (1953) 85-150.
67. Charles Kahn, op. cit., final chapter.
68. Eg, Physics 5, 204b 33.

...ἀπαντα γαρ ἐξ οὐ ἐστι, καὶ
dιαλύεται εἰς τὸ ὄντο...

Metaphysics A3, 983b 8.

...ἐξ οὗ γαρ ἐστι ἀπαντα τὰ ὄντα,
καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρῶτος καὶ εἰς
ὁ θεὸς εἰρέται τελευταῖον...

Metaphysics 3, 1014a 28-29.

ὅλον φωνὴ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὃν σύγκειται
ἡ φωνὴ καὶ εἰς ὁ διαίρεται ἐσχατα.

Metaphysics 3, 1000b 25.

πάντα γαρ θεϊρέται εἰς ταύτ' ἐξ ὧν ἐστι.

De Generatione 325b 18-19.

ἐξ ὧν πρῶτων σύγκειται καὶ εἰς
ὁ ἐσχατα διαλύεται.

Metaphysics 10, 1066b 38.

ἀπαν γαρ ἐξ οὗ ἐστὶ καὶ διαλύεται εἰς τὸ ὄντο (ορ ταὐτα).

Nichomachean Ethics 1173b 5-6.

ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, εἰς τὸ ὄντο διαλύεσθαι.
καὶ οὓς Γενέσις ἡ ἡλικία τούτων ἡ ἐλπὶ δίκαιων.
See Wm. W. Goodman, Greek Grammar (MacMillan, 1974) pp. 219-220, articles 1026-1030: "relative pronouns with omission of the antecedent."

Ibid., article 1027, p. 219.


All of the forms are Attic except γίγνεσθαι which is the Ionian variant. However, after Aristotle this Ionian form became predominant, replacing the earlier γίγνεσθαι, which nevertheless remained proper Attic (see Liddell-Scott: γίγνομαι). Thus we find γίγνεσθαι because it is the Hellenistic spelling, not because it was the Anaximandrian original--although the two would be identical. The Attic forms in the fragment are not a threat to the authenticity of its vocabulary. It is likely that Theophrastus, when quoting Anaximander in the late fourth or early third centuries B.C., used the Aristotelian Attic forms instead of the originals. Aëtius (De plac. I 3, 3) gives us a phrase resembling this part of the fragment in which the form γίγνεσθαι is used: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ τούτου (ἱ, τοῦ ἄπειρου)πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τούτο πάντα θελεσθαι. This is no quote however, and probably indicates only that Aëtius was a more rigorous Atticist than Simplicius or Hippolytus whose testimonia contain very similar phrases about genesis out of the ἀπειρον but which use γίγνεσθαι.

Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, pp. 81-82, West's reconstruction of the fragment is as follows:

ἐκ τῶν ὄν ἡ γενεσθαι ἐστι τοῖς ἔσοσιν,
καὶ ἡ φθορὰ ἐστὶ τάυτα γίνεται
κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν.
διδῶν γὰρ ἀπίκην καὶ τίσαν
ἀλλήλοιοι τὴν ἀπίκην
κατὰ τὰν χρόνου τάξιν.

There are three points of interest here: (1) In restoring the Ionic -ν to the ending of (Attic) φθοράν, West eliminates the accusative case. He changes τὴν φθοράν to τὴν φθορή. This raises the question, why do we find the accusative form in the fragment? We know no reason for it. But as the more difficult reading, it must be preferred. West should have suggested τὴν φθορήν. (2) West replaces the relative ἐκ τῶν with the article ἐκ τῶν. But this sacrifices the structure of the clause as we described it above. The use of the article means that a definite antecedent is pre-supposed; this, in turn, would render the ἐκ/ἐκ ταύτα in the second line unnecessary. (3) The use of the article with χρόνου in the fragment does not exclude the personification of Time (an interpretation West shares with Jaeger and Kahn), but West's elimination of the article excludes any interpretation besides this.


76 See West's helpful comments on this point, op. cit., p. 83.


78 Liddell-Scott, "δικῆ".

79 Ibid.

80 Liddell-Scott, "τίσιλ".

81 With Popma and Diels.

82 With Kahn and Vernant.

83 With Hölscher.

84 Gigon also reads an avengence theme into the fragment.

85 *Paideia* I, p. 159ff, and p. 455 n50; *Theology*, p. 35 and p. 207 n54.

86 See Liddell-Scott, "χρεων".

87 Ibid.

88 Jaeger, *Theology*, p. 34, 36.

89 (1960, 185f).

90 (1962, 37).

91 See Liddell-Scott, "πέρα", definition II: the use of πέρα as opposed in meaning to ἀρχή.


94 See eg. Aristotle's argument for an unmoved arché of all movement at *Metaphysics* A.

95 *Theology*, p. 24, 25.

96 Ibid., p. 31.

97 See Kahn's appendix II on the apeiron of Anaximander, op. cit., esp. pp. 235f.


99 Ibid., p. 133.

100 *Physics* 203b 14-15; Loeb translation by Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford.

101 For τὸ ἀπειρον as φύσις see Diels-Kranz 12A9, 12A11.

102 For the eternal motion of τὸ ἀπειρόν, see 12A10.

103 Popma, who attributes the personification of time to Anaximander, locates this mythical personage in his ontology between the apeiron on the one hand and finite things on the other. See, op. cit., pp. 69-70.


105 Ibid.

106 On the Orphic cosmogonies, see Damascius, *De principiis* 123 (DK 1B13) describing the cosmogony of Hieronymous and Hellanicus:

εἶχεν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄμων πτερὰ, ἀνωγάθα δὲ

Χρόνου ἀγήραον καὶ Ἡρακλῆα τὸν αὐτόν

On the Orphic Rhapsodies, fr. 66, Kern (from Proclus):

Αἰθέρα μὲν Χρόνος σύντορο ἄγηραος ἀνθιτόμητι γείνατε


βεβαίον τὸ Ἐνθ θεοῦ τῶν αἰώνον χρόνων, συμβεβαιῶν

ḍὲ τὸ τῆς ἑποίηκος τῶν θεῶν τοῦ αἰεὶ ὀντας καὶ
See also Pherycedes, DK 7B1: Ζαρ και Χρόνος ήσαρ αει...

107 See Kirk & Raven, pp. 55-58, esp p. 56 n1.

108 Civitas Dei VIII, 2.


110 Vollenhoven's solution is to understand the principia infinita as individual analogues of the universal elements and thus "not as the environment, but as constituent parts of living things" (p. 3). But this distinction is excluded by the fact that Augustine refers explicitly to these principia as the source(s) of the innumerables mundos (απειρου κόσμου) as well as of the individual things in them.


112 See, eg. Gigon, 1945, 68f.

113 See esp. de gen. et corr., B5, 332a 19 and Physics A4, 187a 12.

114 See Kirk & Raven, pp. 112-114.

115 For example, at Physics 4, 203b 6 (DK 12A15).

116 Physics 154, 14 (DK 12A9a).


118 DK 12A10.


120 Horace, Epistles Bk I, ep. xi, 1. 27.

Hölscher, "Anaximander and the Beginnings of Greek Philosophy," Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 321: "It is improbable that Anaximander developed his conception from that of Hesiod's Chaos; for the Boundless is the highest Director and stands in place of Zeus, whereas Chaos is against the gods."

See Kirk, Greek Myths, p. 119.

op. cit., p. 321f.

A9, A10, A11.

A10, A14.

Kirk, Greek Myths, p. 296.

Kirk and Raven, pp. 129-130.


Kirk, op. cit., p. 296.


op. cit., p. 121-126.

DK 22A5, 22A10.

Kirk and Raven also oppose the stoicizing interpretation of Heraclitus.


DK 7A11 and 7B2.

According to Gigon, this is his meaning at B28.


144 Hölscher, 1968, 84.

145 *Metaphysics* E1, 1026a 19; K7, 1064b 3.


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