METAPHOR, AN AESTHETIC FIGURE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT'S THEORY

A Thesis by
Michael J. Ophardt

Submitted to the Institute for Christian Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Philosophical Foundations
in Aesthetics

Institute for Christian Studies
Toronto, Ontario

May 30, 1983
METAPHOR, AN AESTHETIC FIGURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT'S THEORY

A Master's Thesis
Presented by
Michael J. Ophardt

Approved as to Content and Style:

Dr. Calvin G. Seerveld

Dr. Hendrik Hart

Dr. James Sheridan
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give my warmest thanks to my wife Edith and my friend Anya Dejager-Seerveld without whose help I could not have completed this task in the time allotted me.

I also thank Dr. Seerveld for helping me formulate and improve my arguments.
I dedicate this thesis to the financial supporters of the Institute for Christian Studies for making my Christian education possible.
Statement about the Language

Academia is trying to judge whether proper English is dominated by male sexism, and if so, whether it is right or wrong to do so. I do not accept the current solutions of making our language neuter. And the inclusion of both genders is cumbersome. As a solution, I am suggesting that we not use "man" and "he" as the form to include both sexes, but rather use an exemplary form, "a man" or "a woman" to symbolize both sexes. Male writers should be allowed to use "a man", and female writers, "a woman", exclusively. This paper will use the male exemplary form.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## FOOTNOTE SYMBOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) Philip Wheelwright</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## A) Philip Wheelwright

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B) The Development of Wheelwright's Thought</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Reality</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) People</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Language</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## C) Wheelwright's Theory of Metaphor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D) My Working Assumptions</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## I HOW IS METAPHOR POSSIBLE?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) Three Dimensions of Human Awareness</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## A) Three Dimensions of Human Awareness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B) Three Dimensions of Human Knowledge</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## B) Three Dimensions of Human Knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C) Metaphor as Meaningful Communication</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) The nature of language</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Metaphor: an element of tensive language</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II METAPHOR: "THE MOST REVEALING ELEMENT OF TENSIVE LANGUAGE"

A) Introduction

B) Wheelwright's Analysis of Language
1) Block language and human perspective
2) Tensive language and human perspective

C) The Two Most Tensifying Factors of Language
1) The mimetic factor of tensive language
2) The methexic factor of tensive language

D) Summary of Tensive Language

III WHEELWRIGHT'S ANALYSIS OF METAPHOR

A) Overview of the Components in Metaphor
1) The lingual tensions in metaphor
2) Relating metaphor to reality
3) Why concentrate on Metaphor and Reality rather than The Burning Fountain

B) Metaphoric Imagining
1) The elements of epiphor
2) The elements of diaphor
3) The merging of epiphor and diaphor
## IV Metaphor's Purpose Critically Evaluated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A)</td>
<td>Is Metaphor's Purpose Clarification or Mimetic Expression?</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>Mimesis Communicates Meaning Aesthetically, Not Lingually</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C)</td>
<td>Wheelwright Fails to Recognize the Irreducibility of Aesthetic Expressions</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D)</td>
<td>Metaphor As Aesthetic in Nature</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## V Towards a Theory of Metaphor as Aesthetic Figure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A)</td>
<td>Aesthetic Expression and Reality</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>Five Theses on Conditions for Aesthetic Expression</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C)</td>
<td>Metaphor, an Aesthetic Figure</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D)</td>
<td>Metaphor and Its Literal Meaning</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) Simile</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Metaphor</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Simile and metaphor</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E)</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Postscript: About Wheelwright as a Philosopher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Postscript: About Wheelwright as a Philosopher</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO 138

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE 140

ENDNOTES FOR THE POSTSCRIPT 141

BIBLIOGRAPHY 142
### Footnote Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Footnote Symbols</th>
<th>Works by Wheelwright</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TM</td>
<td>&quot;Toward a Metaphysic of Literary Criticism&quot; (1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>&quot;Poetry and Logic&quot; (1930)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>&quot;Notes on Meaning&quot; (1930)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>&quot;A Defence of Orthodoxy&quot; (1932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSP</td>
<td>&quot;On the Semantics of Poetry&quot; (1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>&quot;A Preface to Phenosemantics&quot; (1942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM</td>
<td>&quot;Symbol, Metaphor, and Myth&quot; (1950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAM</td>
<td>&quot;Hinduism, Ancient and Modern&quot; (1951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>&quot;Notes on Mythopoeia&quot; (1951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKS</td>
<td>&quot;On Being, Knowing, Saying&quot; (1952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>&quot;Mimesis and Katharsis: An Archetypal Consideration&quot; (1952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAW</td>
<td>&quot;The Philosophy of Alan Watts&quot; (1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>&quot;Philosophy of the Threshold&quot; (1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>&quot;Art as Language&quot; (1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF</td>
<td>The Burning Fountain (1954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>&quot;Aesthetic Surface and Mythic Depth&quot; (1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>&quot;The Intellectual Light&quot; (1958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>A Critical Introduction to Ethics (1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>&quot;Semantics and Ontology&quot; (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>&quot;The Essential Role of Metaphor&quot; (1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Metaphor and Reality (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>&quot;Semantics and Poetry&quot; (1974)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other Works Cited

- The Poetics by Aristotle
- "Metaphor" by Beardsley
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flint</td>
<td>&quot;Dedication&quot; by Flint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The King's Indian</td>
<td>The King's Indian by Gardner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene</td>
<td>&quot;The Arts as Revelation and Communication: A Perspective on Metaphor and Reality&quot; by Greene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holman</td>
<td>A Handbook to Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Poetics</td>
<td>On Poetics from Aristotle II ed. by Hutchins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPOM</td>
<td>Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor by Johnson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray</td>
<td>Modern Critical Theory: A Phenomenological Introduction by Murray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OM</td>
<td>On Metaphor edited by Sacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaper</td>
<td>&quot;The 'As-If' Element in Aesthetic Thought&quot; by Schaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>A Christian Critique of Art and Literature by Seerveld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Rainbows for the Fallen World by Seerveld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>&quot;Towards a Cartographic Methodology for Art Historiography&quot; by Seerveld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watts</td>
<td>OM: Creative Meditations from Alan Watts ed. by Johnstone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Manuscript: this paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recent philosophical definitions of metaphor are frustrated by constrictive problematics. Ted Cohen articulates the problem that most definitions of metaphor are unable to fully answer:

The central, fundamental question concerns meaning. Does a metaphorical statement possess, in addition to its literal meaning (with respect to which the statement will be, typically, absurd or false or pointless), another metaphorical) meaning wherein resides its capacity to be true as well as to provide the twist of insight we derive from some good metaphors? Or is the magic of metaphors not a matter of the meaning of their words, but a feature of the contexts of their use, of their "pragmatics"?

Philosophers who orient their definitions toward answering this question about metaphor's meaning have underlying assumptions. Many analytic philosophers of this century approach this question of meaning with assumptions similar to those of seventeenth century empiricism, and specifically, of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), whose main tenets are summarized by Mark Johnson:

the conceptual system is essentially literal -- literal language ("words proper") is the only adequate vehicle for (a) expressing one's
meaning precisely, (b) making truth claims, which
together make possible correct reasoning by the
philosopher. (PPOM, 12)

Positivists and other analytic philosophers, tracing
many of their roots to the tradition of Hobbes (and
also Locke), (PPOM, 11, 17) continue to assume that
only literal language could be used to express meaning
and make truth claims. With their philosophy based on
this assumption, positivists and analytic philosophers
could then assume that the most critical question to
be asked of metaphor would be, "is it meaningful?" For
the first half of the twentieth century, Johnson tells
us, positivists considered metaphor:

\[
\text{a deviance from literal (cognitive) discourse, such that, if metaphor has any cognitive im-
port at all, it is expressible by literal statements of comparison. (PPOM, 17)}
\]

According to Johnson and Cohen, the answer to the
question of whether or not metaphor is meaningful changed
when Max Black, himself an analytic philosopher "pos-
sessing impeccable credentials," (PPOM, 20) published
his essay, "Metaphor" in 1954. Black's essay asked the
analytic philosophers of his day to re-evaluate their
assumptions about metaphor and language in general. (PPOM, 19) Since that date positivists no longer treat metaphor
as "frivolous and inessential." (OM, 3) Cohen says:

it is becoming common -- almost customary -- to credit metaphor with ... three virtues: ... (1) [the] capacity to contain or transmit knowledge; (2) ... direct connection with facts; (3) ... genuine knowledge. (OM, 3)

Now that analytic philosophers are willing to say that metaphor is meaningful, they face the problem of defining what metaphorical meaning is in terms of their philosophy. Cohen says that analytic philosophy's definitions of metaphorical meaning are frustrated continually, because they are not sure if metaphor can be adequately paraphrased. Perhaps the frustration analytic philosophers feel is best stated by the man responsible for giving new leadership within his own school of thought, Max Black. The following passage is taken from the concluding paragraph of his critical evaluation of an essay by Donald Davidson (1978).

In my opinion, the chief weakness of the "interaction" theory, which I still regard as better than its alternatives, is lack of clarification of what it means to say that in a metaphor one thing is thought of (or viewed) as another thing. Here, if I am not mistaken, is to be found a prime reason why unregenerate users of appropriate metaphors may properly reject any view that seeks to reduce metaphors to literal statements of the comparisons or the structural analogies which ground the metaphorical insight. To think of God as love and to take the further step of identifying the
two is emphatically to do something more than to compare them as merely being alike in certain respects. But what that "something more" is remains tantalizingly elusive: we lack an adequate account of metaphorical thought. (OM, 192)

The problematics of assuming that meaning is communicable only through literal (or logical) language is the implicit assumption which continues to confound Black's analysis. His theory suffers at the point of his greatest insight: to identify God with love metaphorically, is, indeed, "to do something more than to compare them...." His philosophy keeps him in a vicious circle, for he must ask if it is even meaningful to identify one thing as another; and since he has affirmed this metaphorical process as being meaningful, he must try to analyze the metaphor in relation to its literal meaning. As long as Black's philosophy continues to treat meaning as something which only literal language possesses, he will never be able to define this "something more" quality of metaphor.

A) Philip Wheelwright

The same year that Black's essay "Metaphor" appeared, Philip Wheelwright published his book The Burning Fountain,
which defines metaphor in the larger context of what he
calls symbolic language. Wheelwright does not work with
the problematics of the analytic school. He does not
consider their question fundamental. He believes that
their assumption of literal language as being the only
valid sort of language, is a mistaken, or at least, a one
sided view of reality. Empirical observation is not
the only nor the best way to know reality. In The
Burning Fountain, Wheelwright argues:

There can be no science of man. You can study
a man scientifically to just the extent that
you can grasp and systematize his thinglike
characteristics, which form an ontological
substructure of every one of us; but the man
in his wholeness, which is to say in his dis­tinctively human character, eludes every net­work of rational concepts that is thrown out
over him. In our technosophic age it is es­pecially important to remember and reaffirm this
inalienable first principle of the human con­dition. (8-9; see also, 274)

What a man knows about himself -- his ethics, his meta­
physics (BF, 17), his religion (BF, 9, 15), his compre­
hension of time and change and his comprehension of
social and environmental relationships (BF, 9-14) -- is
his own view of himself, that is, his perspective of him­
self, and the parameters of his perspective of reality.
"Rational concepts" cannot grasp the spirit of a man,
nor can they grasp all of his way of viewing reality.
Wheelwright does not ask if metaphor is meaningful. He assumes that metaphor, like poetry, intends to be a form of meaningful communication. Therefore Wheelwright asks a deeper question: what is the relationship between language and reality? A second part of this question is: what are the referential objects of metaphor and poetry? (BF, 268-274, 296-302)

Wheelwright's article, "Semantics and Ontology" (1960), argues that a man can only think about or reflect on his experience through the use of language. Wheelwright suspects that metaphor may be the form of language in which language is most purely related to a man's experiential knowledge. (SO, 4) He elaborates on this suspicion two years later in his book, Metaphor and Reality.

The Burning Fountain, "Semantics and Ontology," and Metaphor and Reality, are three works on metaphor and unique among much of the recent discussions of metaphor because they contextualize the theory of metaphor in a broad, critically articulated philosophical system. Mark Johnson, and Ted Cohen seem to assume the analytic philosophical tradition to be the only major tradition working on defining metaphor. Johnson argues that after Max Black's essay in 1954, only a systematic focus on key questions about metaphor is necessary. Those questions are:
I prefer Wheelwright's approach over that of the analytic philosopher, because Wheelwright asks more fundamental questions. Wheelwright is one of the earliest critics of logical and semantic positivism. (Murray, 195, footnote, 42; see BF, ch. 3 &13; OSP, 265; NM, 375-6; SMM, 681-3) He is careful in his philosophical system not to subjectivize, objectivize or linguallize the human knowing process; instead, he holds each category (subject, object, and language) to be equal and integral. (SO, 3; MR, 26) Wheelwright recognizes that each man and woman is unique in his or her individuality; Wheelwright's theories of perspective and presence recognize this specifically. Perhaps the most significant presupposition of Wheelwright's theory is that he regards men and women as spiritual creatures, not only rational and emotional. (BF, 9-16) All these factors influence his approach to defining metaphor. He does not ask if
a metaphor's meaning is meaningful. He assumes it is and instead asks what kind of meaning metaphor communicates. (MR, 45-55)

B) The Development of Wheelwright's Thought

Wheelwright's earliest writings show that one of his main philosophical concerns is to analyze the relation of language to reality. (See TM, 234) His analysis focuses on two human initiated relationships: 1) a subject → object knowing relationship, and 2) a subject translating knowledge (attained from the first relationship) into a language relationship. Analysis of these relationships requires that he designate precisely what he believes to be fundamental about reality, people and language in each relationship. His early writings provide a sense of how his theories developed.

1) Reality

Wheelwright makes certain assumptions about reality which set the parameters of the subject → object knowing relationship. He assumes that he and other people, and
other things like rocks, trees and squirrels exist. Wheelwright calls this the "mundane dimension" (BF, 9; see also PT, 56-8; EKS, 349) Wheelwright assumes that reality is temporal and that everything undergoes change. (BF, 9; PT, 56-8) Wheelwright also believes there is a religious dimension that is as fundamental to reality as are things and time. (BF, 9; PT; EKS, 349) This philosophical assumption is not accepted as an ontological dimension of reality by many people in the 1980's. Wheelwright realizes that many people believe religious expressions are attempts at super-natural escapism. So he directs himself to respond to those who argue out of an anti-religious spirit. (NM, 375-6) In "Poetry and Logic" (a 1930 article), Wheelwright writes:

Doubtless not all philosophers suppose that their abstract language reflects every facet of reality, but being professionally committed to such a language the best they can usually do is give their doctrines a mystical polish by paying respects to an inexpressible something that, though it eludes analysis, yet somehow ineluctably is. (PL, 451)

Wheelwright's "inexpressible something" may have come from his reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (6.522) which he quotes, "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical." (PL, 451)
2) People

Wheelwright first outlines man's relation to reality in his article, "On Being, Knowing, Saying" (1952).
He writes:

... man's existence is not that of pure subject set over against a world of objects. Man is interpenetrative with that world.... Secondly, man's existence is radically social. ... Thirdly the vertical dimension. Man has glimpses of a bright perfection which he can never wholly attain.... Fourthly, there is the historical. The tensions and unconditional exigencies that mark man's human situation at all times.... Finally, there is an acceptance of mystery and paradox.... as inexpungeable characteristics of the very nature of things. (349)

Wheelwright is careful to make everything in reality interdependent. In his article "Mimesis and Katharsis," published the same year as "Being, Knowing, Saying," Wheelwright argues for the reality of the "presences" of things. (MR, 12) Each man knows himself to be a presence. If he is true to his relationship with other things or other men, he will realize that they are presences as well. (PT, 60; see also NM, 381-2) By giving equal status to subjects and objects Wheelwright escapes a radical subjectivist (or objectivist) problematic.
This insight that subjects and objects are equal, leads him to conclude that, "Man's existence is radically social."
This thesis has important implications for Wheelwright's postulates explaining the validity of belief.

The first of these postulates might be called the Postulate of Personhood. It affirms that the most valid explanation of the universe is in terms of a living person or persons, rather than in terms of inert material particles, electrical charges, ectoplasm, blind will, mind-stuff, or metaphysical abstractions. The belief in God's existence is more important than any demonstration of it and can stand valid even while the validity of demonstration is being inquired into. (DO, 17)

The thrust of Wheelwright's argument is that the divine is not an object which a man perceives, but an objective presence which, unlike other objective presences, reveals itself to men. A man cannot experience the divine whenever he desires. Wheelwright adopted this from Alan W. Watts' article "Mystical union cannot be willed." (PAW, 497-8) Since the divine cannot readily be experienced, rational argument offered as proof of it, is inadequate. Wheelwright again approvingly refers to Watts on this point in his (Wheelwright's) article: "The Philosophy of Alan Watts."

Argument is unsuited to discourse about the Ultimate Divine. It is both superfluous ('only doubtful things need defense') and futile — like trying to put legs on a snake, as the Chinese proverb says. Experience and faith, not reasoned belief, provide the way;
and that way lies directly through, and in full confrontation of, all the insecurities and paradoxes of daily human living. (PAW, 296)

Perhaps what a man is most insecure about in his relation to the divine are his own limitations. The divine may never clearly reveal itself to a man. A man is one being among many, occupying only a small space of reality when compared to the size of the earth. Furthermore, a man's ability to experience and think about reality is compromised and shaped by history and culture. Wheelwright summarizes a man's state of being in his 1953 article, "Philosophy of the Threshold."

The distinction between subjective and objective is relative, not absolute. The line of demarcation fluctuates according to the intention and assumptions which predispose a given occasion. We all reach out toward objectivity in one way or another, but as our vision of the object is shaped and colored to some degree by our needs and preoccupations, whether privately obtruded or publicly agreed on, it appears that every conception of the objective is dependent upon a pre-chosen or pre-accepted context. (66)

A man cannot transcend his limitations given with his own being. He needs to realize this, and he needs to realize that the outside reality which limits him, also reaches out to him. Reality reaches out, not as a subjective act, but as divine revelation through reality.
Divinity partially reveals itself in all of reality. That is why it is fundamental to the dimensions of things and time. (PT, 62-64) The religious dimension is not something that can be sensed or proven to exist by rational argument. Both activities, sensing and thinking, only focus on a limited part of reality. Characteristics of things are distinguished by sensation or thought. But seeing a thing as a whole is not the same as knowing its presence or becoming aware of its divine "something more" dimension. A man only becomes aware of presence and dimensional realities through his highest faculty, "intuition." (HAM, 174)

Wheelwright takes his theory of intuition from Sri Aurobindo Ghose's book, The Life Divine. From it he quotes the following:

"But intuition is rarely if ever pure," says Wheelwright, (HAM, 175) at once commenting on Sri Aurobindo's theory and stating what he would write in The Burning Fountain three years later. Intuition is as compromised and
limited as the rest of a man's faculties. Intuition cannot clarify what the body is not sensitive to, what reason does not distinguish, or what a man's faith cannot accept. However intuition gives a man the ability to interpenetrate presential and dimensional realities. A man's reasoning can be guided by suggestions of ontological order, and his poetry can point out presential, religious and other dimensional significances. (See BF, 13, 15) In The Burning Fountain he writes: "to intuit thus means to be directly aware of more, in any experience, than the immediate sensuous content." (BF, 15)

3) Language

A man's knowledge consists of a sensuous and rational content and an intuitive awareness of dimensional reality. Language must accommodate all three if it is to be an adequate vehicle for communication. Wheelwright, in his second published article "Metaphysic of Literary Criticism" (1929), distinguishes scientific and philosophical languages from literature according to the "types of reality" (TM, 239) on which each concentrates. Philosophy and science concentrate on abstracted characteristics and use words of conceptual significance. Literature
concentrates on individual wholes and connotative knowledge which is done through "tonal quality, metaphor, delicate allusions, and such other devices as may contribute to the emotional and intellectual significance of a given work." (TM, 239)

Wheelwright directs his attention in his article "Notes on Meaning" (1930) to the question, "what does meaning mean." (NM, 373) He begins by criticizing philosophies which reduce the meanings of reality to a kind of meaning a philosopher acquires "an aptitude for handling." (NM, 375) The kind of meaning Wheelwright is talking about is usually lingual propositional meaning. He concludes this article with a discussion of "aesthetic meaning," which is at the opposite end of the lingual spectrum from words of conceptual content. Language can accommodate both conceptual and aesthetic meanings because of the nature of lingual symbols. A symbol of conceptual content and literal use is "of a generically different character from the symbols" with those "meanings whose affinity with the symbols is so close that the symbols are an aspect of, or even tend to become identified with, the meanings." (NM, 381) Symbols which have aesthetic significance can take on "several sorts of meaning," and in this way, are able to communicate more meanings of reality than the purely conceptual. (NM, 386; see also PP, 516)
Having established a theory of symbol which also accounts for meaning which is different from conceptual meaning, Wheelwright, that same year, directs himself to "the important problem of how far poetic appreciation depends on the acceptance of particular [religious] beliefs." (PL, 440) In "Poetry and Logic," he writes:

> What poetry is to *imitate* or express is not as with Aristotle, a world whose human and structural qualities are a common possession, but a predominantly private world -- a world so private and so ephemeral and so dependent for its evocation on the 'hallucination of the word' that only by grace of metaphor is it a world at all. (422-3)

Poetry imitates a private world because its subject matter is that of subject (person) to whole object, and because a poet does not distinguish characteristics of a thing but instead, intuits a thing's presence, its relationship as a thing to the rest of reality. Intuition is necessarily private and resists proof. (See PL, 443-3)

By around 1940, the positivist philosophy which holds that only logical discourse is valid became widespread. Positivist thinkers deny poetry any meaning other than literal. Wheelwright believes they are "wrong, dead wrong." In his essay, "On the Semantics of Poetry" (1940), he writes, "What I am proposing in this essay is a sort of Copernican Revolution in semantics." (OSP, 264)
Wheelwright's theory of semantics is founded on three levels of meaning: the atomic, the molecular and the organic. The atomic level of meaning consists of distinguishing two kinds of symbols: the monosign and the plurisign. He writes: "The meaning of the monosign is invariant, the meaning of the plurisign is partly contextual." (OSP, 266) This theory is a direct improvement upon his theory of invariant symbols and their poetic contextualization in his article, "Poetry and Logic" (1930). A monosign obeys the "Law of Identity;" its meaning is designated by a definition and does not change in different instances. Plurisign is a term used by William Empson in his book, Seven Types of Ambiguity. Wheelwright uses plurisign to stand for "the atomic ingredient of poetic language." He defines it as "controlled variation and plurality of reference in language that deliberately transcends the literal." (OSP, 266) A plurisign can become entirely an aesthetic symbol devoid of all denotative meaning, like music, for example. But to remain a symbol, a plurisign must retain both an aesthetic (mimetic, in the sense of imitating for communicative purposes (MK, 11-13)) and a referential significance. (OSP, 269)

The molecular level of meaning distinguishes the semantic combinations of monosign from those of plurisign.
Wheelwright calls semantic combinations of monosigns, propositions, and those of plurisigns, poetic statements. He defines a proposition as "an assertible relation between monosigns." A proposition is any statement that "can be asserted as true or false, or as partly one and partly the other." He defines a poetic statement as "a quasi-assertible relation between plurisigns." Wheelwright says that a poetic statement differs from a proposition "in their manner of asserting."

A literal statement asserts heavily: it can do so because its terms are solid. A poetic statement ... consisting as it does in a conjunction or association of plurisigns, has no solid foundation, and affirms with varying degrees of lightness. (OSP, 274)

The organic level is the level of discourse. Propositional (or literal) discourse, Wheelwright explains, can be used to argue from premises to conclusions by way of "therefore"-types of connections; it can be used to explain, using "because"-types of connections; it can be used to explain by examples; it can be used simply to enumerate, using "and"-types of connections; "and others." However, poetic discourse, Wheelwright says, "is more subtle, and its possibilities are as unlimited as the genius of the poet." (OSP, 278) However, what is more important for understanding poetic
discourse is not "the techniques of patterning but to what and how the patterns connote." (OSP, 279)

Wheelwright argues that a poetic statement can never be adequately "translated or summarized into literal language." However, he believes that literal language can often "approximate the poetic original ... and that light can be thrown upon the nature of the poetic statement by comparing such approximations." (OSP, 279)

Wheelwright then defines poetic discourse with respect to: 1) its position between the two poles of full assertion (didactic poetry) and non-assertion (surrealist and dadaist poetry); 2) its "degree of organization," "from the simplest component statement" (possibly a metaphor) "up to the total statement which is the poem itself;" and 3) "the number of quasi-assertions of varying weight with which a single statement is simultaneously making" (which might be called the degree of "plurisignative fullness"). (OSP, 282-3) Two years later, Wheelwright relates this idea of plurisignation to the non-logical types of meaning which make up reality in his article, "A Preface to Phenosemantics."

Together, his two articles, "A Preface to Phenosemantics" (1942) and "Symbol, Metaphor and Myth" (1950), tie together his theory of semantics with his theory of reality and people. He continues to maintain that poetic
language is necessary for communication of the divine, ontological truth. Wheelwright holds that "apprehension of truth" always "comprises irreducible semantic and logical surds." For Wheelwright, paradox may seem "self-contradictory or opposed to common sense," but it is "nevertheless true." (CE, 451; see also PP, 518) In fact, paradox signifies to Wheelwright that the divine reveals itself, however dimly, in reality. It is paradox that points beyond reality in a semantic role, and towards "the enveloping mystery of the divine." (PP, 518-19)

C) Wheelwright's Theory of Metaphor

Wheelwright develops his theories throughout his life. He finds in metaphor the essence of all poetic language, and posits that metaphor may be the most authentic semantic formulation of an intuition which we have to analyze. I became interested in his definition of metaphor because of the broad philosophical parameters he establishes for defining it.

What follows is an analysis of Wheelwright's final theory of metaphor. I concentrate my analysis on three of his works: The Burning Fountain (1954, reprinted in
1968), "Semantics and Ontology" (1960, the first place he makes his focus on metaphor explicit), and Metaphor and Reality (1962, which works out the implications of his new focus). I shall demonstrate that Wheelwright's theory argues for defining metaphor as an aesthetic figure, but that he errs when he subordinates the aesthetic nature of metaphor to its semantic medium.

D) My Working Assumptions

Throughout this paper I will work with four assumptions about metaphor. Like Wheelwright I assume metaphor to be meaningful. For the purpose of simplifying analysis, I will assume a language model of metaphor, meaning precisely the English language, as opposed to Wheelwright's broader definition in which a painting can be considered language. My third assumption follows from the second. I have adopted Monroe Beardsley's theory that metaphor can be divided into its grammatical divisions of subject and modifier. (Beardsley, 285) The usual grammatical division, at least of declarative sentences, is that of subject and predicate. Metaphor, however, is not always presented in sentence form. Some metaphors consist of a compound word, such as "egghead," which does
not have an obvious predicate. However, all metaphors do contain a subject and a modifier of the subject. This is the case with simple metaphors such as "airhead," where "head" is the subject and "air," the modifier, describes the contents of the subject. This is also the case with sentence metaphors where the predicate modifies the subject. My fourth assumption is that metaphor and simile are both metaphorical structures. By making this assumption, I do not intend to formulate a stand as to whether metaphor is an elliptical simile (having dropped "like" or "as,") or simile is a metaphor which uses the words "like" or "as." Making this assumption I do mean to assume that the laws defining the nature of metaphor generally apply to the lingual structures of both metaphor and simile (perhaps needing some modification, depending on the specific definition of each).
I HOW IS METAPHOR POSSIBLE?

Every critical analysis must begin with some assumptions, that is, some appeal to the state of affairs in question which are held to be self-evident. In Wheelwright's theory of metaphor, he assumes that metaphors are 1) communicated by and for people, 2) about something in reality ("something" refers to characteristics, aspects and dimensions of things as well as things as wholes), and 3) meaningful communication. In this chapter I will explain what Wheelwright means by each assumption and why each assumption is significant to his theory of metaphor.

A) Three Dimensions of Human Awareness

Wheelwright's first assumption that people communicate metaphors assumes that people share, at the very least, certain general awarenesses about themselves and reality. Wheelwright opens The Burning Fountain defining man as a conscious creature who is aware that reality consists of more than his mind is able to grasp. Wheelwright says that a man is driven by this "sense of a beyond and the urge to wonder about it." (BF, 8) He writes:
Man lives always on the verge, always on the borderland of a something more. He is the only animal, apparently, who has built restlessness into a metaphysical principle. ... Human desires, winged by imagination, fly beyond the scope of natural instinct and mock at our efforts to satisfy them.... When ... we succeed in allaying the grosser forms of uneasiness, the sense of a beyond and the urge to wonder about it remain.

Indeed, the intimation of a something more, a beyond the horizon, belongs to the very nature of consciousness. To be conscious is not simply a fact or event like those determinate facts and events which make up our physical world.... To be conscious is not just to be; it is to mean, to intend, to point beyond oneself, to testify that some kind of beyond exists, and to be ever on the verge of entering into it. (BF, 8)

Wheelwright explains that a man should begin with some (apparently undeniable) assumptions about human awareness, in order to define or satisfy his wonderings about the intimations of a "something more." Only by defining his own conscious awareness can a man come to understand "the radically threshold situation that is our birthright --" says Wheelwright, "at once the glory and tragic finitude of being human." (BF, 9)

In The Burning Fountain, Wheelwright distinguishes three dimensions (independent variables) of human awareness. These three dimensions are so fundamental to human existence that they define the parameters for all human knowledge. They are inescapable -- they define humanity's place and purpose in the world. "To exist humanly,"
says Wheelwright, is to exist more or less consciously aware of each of the three dimensions. (BF, 9; see also 15-16) To deny or not to give some conscious attention to each of these three dimensions is to deny or ignore some part of one's own humanity.

One of the three fundamental dimensions of human awareness is "the time dimension": the awareness that everything "is in process of change." Another is "the mundane dimension: we are aware of, and by sound instinct we accept the independent existence of, other persons and things as realities constituting our potential (never fully realized) world." The third is "the religious dimension": the awareness of one's own consciousness, and the awareness of "something more" to reality than what is visible. This religious dimension never reveals itself to a man's consciousness in a more substantial form than that of direct though dim and possibly faulty, personal intuitions. (BF, 16) The directness of those intuitions assures a man that reality consists of something more than is visible. However, the intuitions are so dim and ambivalent that a man cannot be sure if that something more reveals "Heaven or the Abyss (they are symbols, of course, and not place names)." (BF, 15)
Wheelwright describes consciousness as a quest for truth. A man gathers up intuitions from reality and reflects upon them, wondering if they intimate a life beyond, or the end of existence. (BF, 8, 16) Wheelwright describes conscious existence as a man's realization that the object before him is as real as himself (the mundane dimension), that its present form is just that (the temporal dimension), and that the object presents to his conscious mind knowledge that exceeds the description of its present form (the religious dimension). (BF, 8-16) Therefore, any metaphor that a man uses to describe something, must implicitly be formed within the parameters of these dimensions.

B) Three Dimensions of Human Knowledge

Wheelwright's second assumption that metaphors are about something in reality requires an assumption about human knowledge. If communication is possible then human knowledge of reality must not be solipsistic. There must be certain general ordering dimensions of human knowledge which all humans share. Wheelwright distinguishes three dimensions of human knowledge in his book *Metaphor and Reality*. 
Unlike Immanuel Kant, Wheelwright does not base the three fundamental dimensions which order human knowledge on a theory of mental categories. Instead Wheelwright bases the dimensions of human knowledge on his three dimensions of awareness. He assumes: 1) in terms of his time dimension the world is changing and interactive, 2) in terms of his mundane dimension other things are as real and as important as conscious human beings, and 3) that in terms of the religious dimension man is conscious, not only of himself, but of the dim revelatory reference of all reality towards its own nature and towards the "something more" quality of its existence. He writes:

The principal characteristics of living reality appear to be three: it is presential and tensive; it is coalescent and interpenetrative; and it is perspectival and hence latent, revealing itself only partially, and ambiguously. (MR, 154)

The first characteristic of reality, which is also a shaping dimension of human knowledge (see MR, 156, 168-9), is that reality presents itself tensively. (see 156-61, and 164) "Strife is the common condition," Heraclitus remarks, "and if strife were to vanish from amongst gods and men, then their very existence would cease." (MR, 45-6) Reality, says Wheelwright, is ridden with
tensions: the "struggles between opposite forces" (MR, 45) -- the forces of all individualities tending towards their own ends. Tension exists wherever relations exist. A man realizes that the object he is conscious of (religious dimension), right now (temporal dimension), is so wholly other (mundane dimension) than himself that his mind is unable to enter into the object's being. Yet, the man wants to know the object. He then realizes that all things have individual existent presences created by each thing tending towards its own peculiar end. (BF, 183) As a consequence, any relationship between things is tensively polar. The more similar the ends, the lesser the tension. So, if a man wants to know a rock, tension results between his mental aim to know, and the rock's physical aim to exist. (MR, 45-6, 161, 164)

The second shaping dimension of human knowledge is the awareness that the object of which a man is conscious, is existing simultaneously with himself (temporal dimension). The man will then have some notion of coalescence between himself and the object's relation to reality (mundane dimension). He will realize that the strife of reality composes a coalescent unity. The mere appearance of coalescence within reality intimates to a man's consciousness that the ultimate order of reality's tensions is beyond his possibility to know it (religious dimension). Intimations of such order come to him only
partially, within particular examples. (BF, 8-11; MR, 45-6, 164-70)

The third shaping dimension of human knowledge is that a man's own conscious awareness (religious dimension) is delimited to the (ever) present moment of time (temporal dimension), to his concentration on the things and people around him, and to his own spatial position (mundane dimension) -- the fact that he is always 'here' and never 'there'. In short, he has a perspective on the world. Intuitions of the "something more" of an object come to him. The intuitions are his own, and therefore are as unique as his own individuality. The man's perspective changes and develops along with his experiences. His perspective may be similar to a woman's down the street, or to his best friend's, or to his wife's; but his perspective will be uniquely his own. (BF, 9-16, ch. 8; MR, 15-16, 169-73) The man may have as many perspectives as he has dimensions of his being. (MR, 16) If these perspectives are to become unified and complementary to each other, they become so through his religious perspective. He can choose to believe in a heaven, or an abyss, and he intuitively apprehends his populated environment as carrying intimations of the origin's ordering hold ("origin" as heaven or as abyss -- whichever he believes) over reality. Such a perspective is not philosophical or scientific, although these may
order and support the perspective. Instead, his reli-
gious perspective of "something more" is mythic. (BF,
ch. 8; MR, ch. 7, 169-73) Wheelwright explains:

Thus there is a stage of human awareness
before the explicit formulation of a myth,
which strongly disposes the persons who share
it to formulate and rationalize various ex­
périences in descriptive and narrative accounts.
(MR, 136)

Myth, then, is not in the first instance
a fiction imposed on one's already given world,
but is a matter of perspective first, inven­
tion second. This radically cognitive func­
tion of myth ... is stressed particularly by
Ernst Cassirer in his study of "Mythic Think­
ing," which forms the second part of his three
volume work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.
Cassirer starts out from the Kantian principle
that all knowledge involves a synthesizing
activity of the mind; that in the very act of
knowing an object the mind contributes those
lines of connection whereby the particulars
of sense are combined into an intelligible
unity.... (BF, 159)

Any meaningful knowledge which metaphor carries,
according to Wheelwright, must be radically related to
the dimensions of human awareness and interpreted by the
dimensions of human knowledge. A man's sense perception
and reason can only analyze characteristics of reality.
Knowledge of his threshold awareness can only be intuited.
"To intuit," Wheelwright explains, "means to be directly
aware of more, in any experience, than the sensuous con­
tent" of the experience. (BF, 15) Therefore, to whatever
degree a metaphor communicates dimensionally-related knowledge, the metaphor is guided by intuition. Wheelwright writes:

Consciousness then in its religious ... temporal and mundane dimensions, stands on a threshold....
The Threshold, in each of its three aspects, is a primordial situation from which no human creature ever entirely withdraws. But a threshold implies a mansion beyond, and ... the fact ... is that we can and do have direct intuitions of that beyond -- intuitions which can err in details but can never be proved to err in the major assurances of a Something More which they yield. (BF, 15)

Although intuition allows metaphor the possibility of great insight, metaphor also has the limitation of human knowledge. The highest purpose a metaphor can have is to share the insight of its author with other men. Wheelwright writes:

As man gropes to express his complex nature and his sense of the complex world, he seeks or creates representational and expressive forms... which shall give some hint, always finally insufficient, of the turbulent moods within and the turbulent world of qualities and forces, promises and threats, outside him. His life oscillates between contrary pulls, and out of his Dionysian condition he seeks, and sometimes for lingering moments attains, an Apollonian vision /of coalescence/. But if the vision is not to be escapist and a merely stubborn refusal to face things as they are, it will bear traces of the tensions and problematic character of the experience that gave it birth. (MR, 46)
C) Metaphor as Meaningful Communication

1) The nature of language

Wheelwright's third assumption that metaphor is meaningful communication assumes that Wheelwright works with a theory of lingual communication, that is, language. Language, Wheelwright says, is the means by which all human knowledge is thought about or communicated. The insight which inspires the composition of a metaphor must be represented in some form of language. (MR, 30)

Language, Wheelwright defines broadly:

is any element in human experience which is not merely contemplated for its own sake alone, but is employed to mean, to intend, to stand proxy for, something beyond itself. (MR, 29)

Language, Wheelwright would argue, is not a material form of mental telepathy. A man does not know, for example, the true feelings of his frustrated friend just by listening to his friend's ramblings and cursings. Language makes it possible for his friend to communicate some of what he feels, but his friend also has feelings of frustration for which there are no
adequate words. In fact, (nonpoetic) language may only allow cultural formulations of his friend's feelings. If the man's friend is a Hindu from India, speaking English, the Hindu may not be able to find the appropriate words in English to express the Hindu formulation of his feelings.

The linguistic instruments that he uses, which are part of his social heritage, at once make possible and set limits to the kinds of questions he can ask, the kinds of reality he can conceive, and the ways in which he can conceive it. A person says, "I mean..." and what he wants to do thereby is define some aspect of O /the object/, and in the more important cases to establish his own place in the S → O /subject-object knowing/ relation. But his ontological intention is always partly frustrated by the fact that he is obliged to use language, and to conceive what he means in terms of language. (MR, 30-1)

Wheelwright gives language a role of equal, and appropriate status with that of the subject and the object in the communication of human knowledge (both experiential and reflective). In fact, Wheelwright holds that the epistemological problem of explaining how subjects are able to know objects must include language as a necessary ingredient of the subject-object relation if a solution is to be found. (MR, 25-6) He explains:
The traditional Cartesian dualism of mind vs. matter, or in its later forms subjective vs. objective ... has begun to yield in many quarters to a threefold thought-structure, in which subject, object, and linguistic medium play irreducible and inter causative roles in the formations of what, for want of a better name, we may call reality. The older epistemological dyad is becoming replaced, in much contemporary philosophy, by an epistemological triad. Letting $S$ stand for the knowing subject, $L$ for the language (in the broadest possible sense) by which $S$ undertakes symbolic expression, and $0$ for the meant or sought-for object, then the basic structure of any situation, so far as human beings can be aware of it or inquire about it, might be schematically represented thus:

```
  L
 /\  
S  O
```

The point to be stressed is that neither $S$, $L$, nor $0$ can be conceived as existing alone, apart from interplay with both of the other two factors. (MR, 26)

Wheelwright's theory of language is ordered in accord with this epistemological triad. In order for a man to communicate anything about his $S \to 0$ relationship to anyone else, he must do it in accord with the $S \to L \to 0$ relationship. Wheelwright argues that language can be used in two distinct ways: emphasizing either the $S \to L$ half or the $L \to 0$ half of the $S \to L \to 0$ relationship. The $L \to 0$ half designates language's referential (elements standing proxy for) relationship to reality. When the $L \to 0$ half of the $S \to L \to 0$ relationship is emphasized,
language is being used according to its established rules and its communicative purpose to (literally) state or tell. The $S \rightarrow L$ half designates the use that language has been put to by a subject. (MR, 29) When the $S \rightarrow L$ half is emphasized (in terms of the diagram) in the $S \rightarrow L \rightarrow O$ relationship, the subject uses language (and all of its rules) in an imaginative and expressive manner (rather than in a literal or straight forward manner), and its communicative purpose is to suggest, emote, persuade or poetically represent an object. (MR, 29, 39, 43-4) Wheelwright calls language emphasizing the $L \rightarrow O$ relation "block," "steno," or "literal" language. (MR, 16, 33; SO, 4) He calls language emphasizing the $S \rightarrow L$ relation "open," "tensive," "expressive" or "poetic" language. (MR, 16, 45; BF, 49)

A man stands in the world amid changes, tensions and presences which he can never fully know. That is why, when he looks at the world from his unique and limited perspective, he senses not only a coalescence which seems too large or universal for his limited perspective, but he also senses "something more" to reality than any of his senses or his reason are able to grasp. When a man intuits an insight into any of the three dimensions of reality, he intuits something too "vague," "problematic" or "elusive" to be identified and described by block
Because block language is inadequate, he must use expressive language which will reflect the type of tensive coalescence he intuits. (MR, 17, 45-7)

Expressive (tensive) language is difficult to define, says Wheelwright. It "can only be defined negatively" in its relation to block language. (SO, 4)

For it is block language that conforms to rules and hence admits of exact definition. Fluid /tensive/ language has an indefinite number of possibilities in an indefinite number of respects. (SO, 4)

Tensive language "reflects those qualities" which block language cannot adequately identify. (MR, 43) Wheelwright wants to know what it means to say that the tensions in reality are reflected in tensive language. In his book, Metaphor and Reality, he investigates the problem of relating real tensions to their reflections in language. Wheelwright focuses his investigation on metaphor because, "we cannot always be dealing with tensive language as a whole." Therefore, "it is desirable to look for a unit ... of such language ... that /is/ ... sufficiently representative." (MR, 66) Wheelwright chooses metaphor to be this exemplary unit for tensive language, because as he says, quoting John Middleton Murry, "Metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself, and speech as ultimate as
37

thought." (MR, 69) Having chosen metaphor as the representative element of tensive language, Wheelwright must define metaphor as reflecting the object's tensions and the object's coalescent unity, as the subject (the author of the metaphor) perceives them.

2) Metaphor: an element of tensive language

Wheelwright defines metaphor as follows:

Metaphor in its radical, which is to say its semantic sense, is much more than a rhetorical stratagem. The essence of metaphor consists in the nature of the tension which is maintained among the heterogeneous elements brought together in one commanding image or expression. ... The point might be summarized by saying that poetic [tensive] language becomes alive and vibrant largely by reason of its semantic multiplicity-in-unity; or less technically, because of the precarious balance among various suggested lines of association which it invites the imagination to contemplate. (BF, 101; see also MR, 71)

The heterogeneous elements to which Wheelwright refers are more than the denotative or connotative meanings of the metaphor's subject and modifier. As an element of tensive language, metaphor has the potential to express a man's vaguest intuitions of any dimension of reality, or the "something more" character of reality. The virtue
of metaphor is its ability to represent expressively some knowledge or intuition of reality in such a way that the author's audience can know the author's personal knowledge of the object.

It is therefore vital to Wheelwright's theory that metaphor be understood as ordered by the dimensions that order conscious awareness and by the epistemological triad. When a man, S, is consciously aware of an object, then that man has entered an S → O relationship. A man's conscious awareness (as well as the object) will be governed by the temporal, mundane, and religious dimensions. These dimensions will make a man aware of three dimensions of being: 1) that the object is composed of certain tensions, or certain tensive relationships with other things in its environment; 2) that the object and all its relationships, for all their contradictory tensions, nevertheless constitute a coalescence which holds reality together; and 3) that whatever specifics a man perceives, he perceives them only as he can, out of his perspective -- in this place, at this time, in his mood, with his interest, with his religious belief.

However, if his knowledge is to be shared with other people, it must be translated into language through the S → L → O process. Assuming that a man wants to express some personal knowledge about an object or experience, he will want to emphasize the S → L half of the
S \rightarrow L \rightarrow O relationship, that is, he will want to use language imaginatively. He will try to communicate his personal intuitions by reflecting in words and their syntactical relationships the types of tensive-coalescence he has intuited concerning the object. (This will be explained in the following chapter.)

When a man communicates his intuitions through a metaphor, Wheelwright says that he is employing what may be the most authentic element of tensive or expressive (the imaginative use of) language. Metaphor tensifies the normal (social) meaning of the subject and the modifier, and places them in a tensive syntactical relationship that creates "one commanding" and coalescent "image" which "is employed to stand proxy for" a man's unique, perspectival knowledge of an object.
II METAPHOR: "THE MOST REVEALING ELEMENT OF TENSIVE LANGUAGE"

A) Introduction

Philip Wheelwright does not define metaphor for the sake of defining it. He hopes that by defining metaphor he will find the relationship which unites language to reality. Language is obviously related to reality in the mind of a subject. Wheelwright wants to know how.

The problem, as he sees it, of relating language to reality, lies in the fact that the two are essentially different. Language, Wheelwright says, "must be understood in the broadest possible sense, as applying to any semantic vehicle whatever." (SO, 2) Wheelwright means by "semantic vehicle" any thing which carries meaning. (SP, 558) Reality, as he defines it, consists of at least six dimensions, that I discussed in chapter I, none of which include a semantic dimension. The question of relating language to reality, Wheelwright suggests, must be answered from the way a man (S) uses language (L) to think or speak about reality (O). (MR, 26-7)

To define this relationship, we must know how a man relates language to nonlingual reality. Wheelwright distinguishes three dimensions of human awareness: the
temporal dimension (change), the mundane dimension (real things), and the religious dimension ("something more" than is visible), of reality. He also distinguishes three dimensions of human knowledge: the dimensions of tension, coalescence, and perspective. Wheelwright then explains that a man communicates his knowledge of reality through a medium of language. He explains that the only way a man can communicate his perspective on the tensions and/or coalescence of reality is to fill language with similar tensions and/or a similar coalescence. (MR, 38-43) The relation of language to reality is located in the nature of the similarities between the tensions and coalescence of reality (as a man perspectivally intuits them) and those with which he modifies language. In order to locate and define the nature of similarities between reality and language, Wheelwright analyzes the smallest (complete) element of tensive language: the metaphor.

The following chapter will analyze Wheelwright's notion of language in a way that illuminates his definition of metaphor.
B) Wheelwright's Analysis of Language

Language is the critical factor in Wheelwright's epistemological triad. As a public system of semantic vehicles, language (L → O) implicitly carries nothing more than a cultural perspective. If a man wishes to communicate something which in any way deviates from the cultural perspective, he must use language in a more or less expressive manner, that is, one which complements his interpretation of reality's tensions and coalescence. Wheelwright's concern is to discover how adequately expressive language is able to communicate a man's private perceptions and apprehensions. (See MR, 15-17)

Wheelwright begins his analysis of language by distinguishing "block" language from "tensive" language. He writes:

By block language, I mean language that ideally consists of terms defined and employed according to the law of identity, such terms being combined in such a way as to produce propositions obeying the law of noncontradiction. . . . Fluid, or tensive (MR, 16-17)语言 by contrast, stands for such language as has not become rigorized into block language." (SO, 3-4)

Wheelwright also writes that block language and tensive language should be "viewed as differing not so much in kind as in degree." (MR, 16) While this is true, it may
also be gleaned from his works that block language obeys the law of identity, whereas tensive language obeys the law of clarity.¹

"Clarity" is not a term Wheelwright uses, but it is conceptually accurate to his meaning. Wheelwright uses many words to get at the nature of tensive language. He calls tensive language living language because it reflects, or approximates the problematic nature of reality, as perspectivally known and interpreted by a man. (MR, 46-7) In Metaphor and Reality, Wheelwright calls this tensive language: open (16), fluid (16), vibrant, living (17-18), adequate (43), and poetic (50). Each of these words are adjectives which describe language in relation to reality or to human perspective and interpretation.

The language a man uses to describe his unique perspective on reality must be true both to the language as people understand and use it, and to his own perspective. Both purposes can be satisfied by using the semantic vehicles of language in ways similar and complementary to the tensions ordering a man's perspective. When this happens the semantic vehicles are said to be tensified. Tensified semantic vehicles can express as many meanings as there are perspectives. For this reason Wheelwright says that tensive language:
has an indefinite number of possibilities in an indefinite number of respects: for instance, its terms can be plurisignative, they can undergo semantic variation according to context, the meanings can be presented in soft focus and can be suggested by indirection, there can be varieties of interplay between meaning and song, the sentences can work by irony and paradox, a sentence can hover between the roles of statement and question, or between statement and exclamation, and so on. (SO, 4)

Therefore, tensive language must tensify denotative and connotative meanings of semantic vehicles, but only to the degree that their meanings remain clearly understood. Tensive language is not block language, but it still obeys the lingual law for semantic vehicles "to stand proxy for, something beyond itself." (MR, 29)

Therefore, if tensive language expresses certain tensive realities "adequately," then the language must clearly indicate this meaning of reality, although it may not precisely identify or name the tensions which compose that meaning.

For this reason tensive language is distinguished from block language in terms of laws which define the kind of meaning each provides. Block language can be understood as language that uses semantic vehicles as blocks, one set after the other, in order to create sentences. Tensive language, which takes its import from intuitions (of wholes, implying only apparently
necessary details)\(^2\) emphasizes meaning at the level of sentence or discourse. By obeying the law of clarity, tensive language can be understood as language which uses semantic vehicles in a "fluid," "open," "vibrant," or "poetic" manner to construct meaning on the level of the sentence or discourse which is not reducible to the grammatical sum of the semantic units. This happens because a man modifies block language by putting those semantic vehicles into tensive relationships that are essentially similar to those he intuits to be in reality.

1) Block language and human perspective

The purpose of block language is to establish a set and exact meaning for each semantic vehicle. Block language stabilizes the language \(\rightarrow\) object (vehicle-referent) relationship. Wheelwright explains that block language, which "can also be designated as 'literal language,'" (SO, 4) consists of words which have simple and universal identities. Many of these words are easily translatable into other languages because their referents are common to all cultures. Wheelwright offers examples of English vehicles whose referents can be found all over the world: "child, parent, dog, tree, and sky." (MR, 33)
With these examples, identity is established through a correspondent relationship between the object and its vehicle (or sign). (MR, 34) Wheelwright calls this type of meaning "steno-meaning." (MR, 34) "Steno-meanings, or meanings which can be publicly and exactly shared," (MR, 33) may be objects, groups of objects, and sharable abstractions: e.g. geometrical concepts, justice, natural law, evil, divine providence, reality, etc. Such terms are, in responsible discussion, made as precise as possible by definition and careful contextualization. When the discussion is carried on logically, an effort is made by all participants in the discussion, to use every such word in a single and understood sense. (MR, 36)

At the extreme end of block language lies scientific language. Scientific language is logical communication. Each word must have an exact meaning, such that all those who speak the language of science have a complete and identical understanding of what is said. The purpose of jargon, i.e. scientific, block language, is to eliminate a person's need to rely upon subjective interpretation (S \rightarrow L) for understanding. However, the number of people for whom the jargon is useful is limited to those who have taken time to learn it.

When a man learns a scientific language or his social community's language, such as "Pittsburghese," he
also learns publicly shared perspectives on the world. The semantic vehicles in scientific language (jargon) have established concepts which identify things, characteristics and dimensions in reality. Every scientific language also has certain methods of relating these semantic vehicles. "The ideal of scientific language" is that all those who know the language understand all scientific propositions "in exactly the same way." (MR, 57) Such uniformity of understanding constitutes a perspective. Uniformity of understanding can also be achieved on the social level of society. Pittsburghese, for example, is defined by its "static terms," its "habit" of use, (MR, 37) and its living vocabulary, which everyone in the community uses. Pittsburghese embraces more than one perspective; however, all of its perspectives share enough similarities so that their differences do not constitute a different social perspective.

Block language, whether prescribed by a certain community (which focuses on one interest or another) or produced by cultural habit (general outlooks and attitudes towards life) (MR, 37) establishes steno-meanings so that such a community has a common language. Prescribed language is limited to the dominant perspective within its own community. Language produced by habit is assumed to embody the presently dominant perspective(s) within the community. Block language, obeying the law
of identity \((L - 0)\), attempts to de-emphasize the necessity of human perspective, and so, by adopting just one or a few common perspectives, block language is able to reach many people.

2) Tensive language and human perspective

The desire to reach many people of many perspectives also motivates tensive language. The task of tensive language is to modify block language in such a way that a unique perspective may be communicated to many people. Rather than establishing precise meanings for key terms, common words are endowed with expressive force through certain modifications in the language.

Language is freed from its steno-bonds when ambiguities are created, when meaning is also suggested through the way something is said, or when a literal statement states a paradox, but the context, perspective, and intent carry a forth right meaning. Tensive language, however, does not include any language which is ambiguous, loose or merely emotionally emphatic. (MR, 43)

Large abstract concepts, such as freedom, love, democracy or justice do not qualify as tensively expressive concepts simply because they are ambiguous. (MR, 43)
To be tensive, ambiguous concepts must "strive towards adequacy;" (MR, 46) they must express a man’s perspective on these ambiguous concepts as he comes to experience them in life. (MR, 16-17) Language is tensive when language is used to communicate a unique perspective on something, expressing meaning which is not publicly recognized.

Wheelwright claims that reality is tensive by nature. A man who becomes aware of some of these tensions which are not publicly recognized ought to use language tensively. (MR, 17) A man might have many precise ideas about reality, but if he is to communicate what is special about his perspective, he will have to express it. (MR, 40-1) Wheelwright explains:

In order to speak as precisely as possible about the vague, shifting, problematic, and often paradoxical phenomena that are an essential part of the world, language must adapt itself somehow to these characteristics; the openness of the language permits such adaptation but does not guarantee it. Language that can adequately, or almost adequately, speak forth the living truths of human experience, must itself be living; and since those truths are always somewhat dark, kaleidoscopic and elusive, an appropriate language will to some extent, and with chosen controls, reflect those qualities. (MR, 43)

Truth, Wheelwright argues is not necessarily identifiable nor clearly revealed in reality. Block language
is useful only for meaning which already is collectively agreed upon. Insights which are new to the semantic positivists, for example, must be convincingly argued, even to fellow believers. (See Introduction to MR, and 37-44)

The uniqueness of human perspective is one of the prime ontological factors responsible for tensive language. A man must always perceive reality and think about it in accordance with his own perspective(s). Reality is temporal and always undergoing change. Reality is never at one time fully in view. Each thing in reality has a complexity of inter-relations with other things. (BF, 9-16, 76-8, ch. 8, 272-4; MR, 38-42, ch. 8; SO, 1)

Therefore, a man can only confront reality one instance at a time, and always in a certain mood, always having at least one holy axe to grind, and always translating his perspectival knowledge into more (or less) well defined block or expressive language.

Reality is most authentically grasped in an expression when it is grasped perspectivally, rather than universally. (See MR, 170-3) Wheelwright grants however, "that open tensive language cannot be as exact as responsibly closed scientific or block language about the things and relations with which the latter properly deals. Nor can open language be as exact in the same way as closed language...."
However," says Wheelwright, as he comes to this point of his argument:

let it be observed that a somewhat vague description or an indirect allusion may, with reference to a problematic situation, be more relevantly precise than the use of a more logical technique would be. To take a trivial example, suppose that someone's statement, "I prefer beef to mutton," is true -- i.e., that it describes what is actually the case about the speaker's felt preferences. Suppose now that a captious critic were to demand greater exactitude, asking: "How much more do you like beef than mutton? Twice as much, or one and five-eighths as much, or just what?" Such a question would probably be taken as a feeble jest; no sensible reply to it could be made, for the kind of exactitude it demands is apriori impossible in a situation that is not analyzable into identical units. (MR, 42)

Expressive language is capable of great precision, but a precision which is different than that found in block language. Block language tries to embody the perspective of its entire community. However, block language is not well suited to explaining perspectival insights. In block language, words have more or less precise definitions. New insights into reality would require that old definitions take on new shades of meaning. However, block language could not carry these new shades of meaning. People would interpret the man's language as they normally interpreted all block language. The new shades
of meaning could only be communicated through block lan-
guage which philosophically designates what these shades
of meaning are and how they relate among themselves to
the definitions which they help modify. Expressing a
perspectively unique meaning through the use of block
language is time consuming and inefficient for mass com-
munication. Expressive language captures new insights
and new shades of meaning -- not in precise definitions,
but precisely in recreating the tensive relationships
which they have in reality.

Expressive language bridges the banks of different
perspectives. It achieves this by using language in
an imaginative fashion, which the community understands,
so that the precise meanings of words are tensified to-
wards clarity, rather than exactness. Expressive lan-
guage, using common (block) language, may put a common
concept up against a different background, or place it
in an unusual or different context. The concept may
receive a new focus or be seen under a different light.
Following are three examples of tensive language, quoted
from Alan Watts, Wheelwright's favorite American philoso-
pher (AS, 278)

The exterior world is your own body extended.
(Watts, 29)

Imagine instead of God the Father, God the
Mother, instead of blazing light, an unfathom-
able darkness from which everything springs. (Watts, 146-8)

You will not see the sky if you paint the glass blue. (MR, 56)

If the reader can intuit what meaning Watts hopes to gain by imagining the world as an extension of his body, by imagining God as unfathomable darkness, or by imagining the disappearing identity of sky when seen through blue glass, then the reader will notice that new shades of meaning have been added to his own knowledge of his body, God, and what a closed mind can ignore in reality. In each example, "the imagery and situation that are directly presented serve" to add meanings to semantic vehicles rather than constrain to a precise conceptual meaning. (MR, 56-7)

Each of the Watts' examples are tensive lingual devices that state an exemplary case of an intended object. Each example is an "imagine that such and such is the case"-type of statement. Each example speaks by indirection and communicates its intentions by intimations. Sometimes an intimation is misunderstood. The fact that intimations can be misunderstood suggest two things. First, that the law of identity does not hold fast in expressive language. Second, that the intimations have certain intended interpretations since they can be
misinterpreted. Wheelwright argues that "tensive language," is language which achieves clarity -- the clarity of "representation," "adequacy," "disclosure," and "representation by participation." (MR, 47, 46, 51, 52, respectively; see also 57) An expression is clear if it is apprehended. Expressive language seeks to make its meaning apprehensible to someone of a different perspective.

C) The Two Most Tensifying Factors of Language

1) The mimetic factor of tensive language

A perspective is not an abstraction cut off by intellectual fiat from the conglomerate flow of experiences surrounding it; a good perspective, despite its high partisanship, will show qualities representing some aspect of larger reality. Its tensive character will be partly its own and partly drawn from the reality of which it is a part. Precisely here lies the difference between mimesis and logical abstraction. (MR, 51)

Logical abstraction seeks the structure of reality; it hunts out distinctions and hopes to define relationships by showing how these distinctions form this structured reality. (See MR, 51-2) Mimesis seeks to represent the multitensive reality as a man perceives it. Since


mimesis is the means by which a man expresses his pers­pective to others, mimesis must have the capacity to express a perspective's "tensive character." The ten­sion in a perspective, Wheelwright says, is "partly its own," in that it orders its knowledge in terms of the tensive relationships between the dimensions of human awareness (as I explained in ch. I), and is "partly drawn from the reality of which it is a part," in that reality is ordered into a tensive coalescence (as I explained in ch. I). Mimesis has two elements which correlate with the two polar tensions in a man's perspective. Mimesis is composed of the tensive relationship between a medium in which an object is represented and the object of the representation (or imitation). (See Mr, 35, 51-2, 54)

Mimesis, as communication by representation, has a dual purpose; it has an aesthetic purpose which is to represent, and it has an implicit semantic purpose which is to indicate the object of the representation. (Mr, 35) Wheelwright holds this theory as early as 1952, in his article, "Mimesis and Katharsis" in which he writes:

Mimesis is essentially something meaningful; ... it is not merely an actual process but also an intuitive relation, a pointing of the semantic arrow; that where we accept B as an imita­tion or mimetic representation of A, we therein accept B as semantically referring to A as its
referent; that B draws its meaning from A; and that as far as we consider the meaning of B in its mimetic role we must thereby refer, however imperfectly, to the meaning of A. The cave man who imitates a bison -- whether by miming the bison in a dance or by drawing it on the cave wall -- thereby produces something which is a symbol of the animal prototype and of whatever it in turn may connote. (MK, 11-12)

Wheelwright says that mimetic representations like that of the above, are iconic. Iconic representations present an image or situation which represents the intended object. Since an object can be represented in any number of iconic representations, I consider an iconic representation an exemplary image of an object. An iconic representation is exemplary first of the artist's perspectival knowledge of the object, since the artist can always make more representations; and second, of the object, since the object is not ever fully captured by anyone.

When tension in poetic (tensive) language is mimetic in nature, the language represents some perspectival insight of the poet. Since the insight is something the poet wants to communicate to many people of many perspectives, he speaks about the insight in an exemplary fashion (being led by mimesis to do so). "Johnny eats like a pig," is an exemplary way of describing Johnny's eating habits. Not one of Johnny's eating habits has been named. However,
the poet has likened Johnny's eating habits to those of a pig. This exemplary statement appeals to people on the level of their experiential knowledge of, and emotional response to, a pig's eating habits. **Mimesis**, therefore, is able to cross perspectives by appealing to people's experiential and emotional levels.

In addition to being able to cross perspectives **mimesis** has one other important capability. **Mimesis** can communicate distinctions in reality which are so problematic and ambiguous (by nature) that they have defied conceptualization and have possibly even escaped recognition in some perspectives. Consider two examples of ideas that relate to the problematic nature of reality which Alan Watts learned from Zen Buddhism: the idea that "rocks are not dead," and the idea that "stars are a function of space." (Watts, 13, 153) Most communities in America do not have names or concepts to say that rocks are not dead, or that stars are a function of space. However, **mimesis** can make many people aware of these distinctions by representing them exemplarily, and yet not identifying them so precisely that the distinctions could be named. Jesus says, for example, upon his entrance into Jerusalem, that if the people were rebuked for rejoicing, the stones would sing; implying that rocks are creatures of God which praise their creator. Jesus
expresses an exemplary image which clarifies for his followers a sense in which it can be said that rocks are not dead.

Wheelwright suspects that the ability of mimetic expression to clarify an object through mimetic representation, is a type of correlate to the ability of logical abstraction to identify an object exactly. (MR, 52-3) This suspicion relates directly to his theory that block language emphasizes the L \rightarrow O \text{ half of the } S \rightarrow L \rightarrow O \text{ relation, while tensive language emphasizes the } S \rightarrow L \text{ half of the same relation.} \text{ His suspicion moves along the following line of logic.} \text{ A steno-vehicle of a tree can be defined. Its definition would include a number of concepts about the tree. The concepts would not have to be scientifically focused. They need only to be concepts known and shared by the public concerning trees.} \text{ (SO, 4)} \text{ But the object of tensive language, by definition, is something for which the common language does not have a steno-vehicle. The object of tensive language is the problematic, unfathomed, vague or elusive qualities about things and their inter-relationships in reality. Wheelwright explains that in order for language to speak about these qualities it "must adapt itself somehow" or "reflect" these characteristics."} \text{ (MR, 43)} \text{ Language which is adapted to express or reflect these qualities cannot depend on names, nor on any set semantic vehicle.}
To "reflect" those qualities is, in some way, to mime them.

Mimesis in language, is using language, (and its rules) to "behave" in a manner corresponding to reality's "behavior". A man's insight into reality's "behavior," that is, its "vague, shifting, problematic" nature of its coalescence, is intuitively based and perspectively interpreted. Wheelwright gives the example of a student who asks his teacher, "What is the real nature of Buddha?" and "the teacher replied: 'The blossoming branch of a plum tree.'" (MR, 155) The teacher's reply seeks to represent the nature of Buddha in a description of a particular branch of a particular tree. The teacher's reply also infers some of his attitudes about Buddha which would not be shared by another teacher.

2) The methexic factor in tensive language

Methexis is another main factor of tensive language which is responsible for bringing a man's perspective to the fore. Methexis means more than mere participation. Wheelwright defines methexis as the participation in those qualities of an object which one is imitating or representing. (SO, 8; MR, 52; BF, 16) Wheelwright explains his notion of methexis further:
Participation implies real identity, at least in significant respects, a transcendence of either-or, an ontological overlapping by which emotionally congruent things, qualities and events blend into oneness. (BF, 182)

Representation which requires participation (methexis) differs from an iconic representation (mimesis) in what it takes from an object to represent. An iconic representation of a bull, for example, would imitate its "appearance with a drawing or ... its movements with a dance." (MK, 12) A representation which requires participation (methexis) requires the subject to do two things. First, it requires a subject to identify himself with the object of the representation. Second, it requires the subject to interpenetrate the object's threshold of awareness (defined in ch. I), as he (the subject) intuits it. The meaning of representation through methexis is produced when the subject merges his act of identification with his act of interpenetration.

When a man identifies himself with an object, he identifies himself with the identity of the object, that is, the object's presence. "Presence" is a word that Wheelwright uses to indicate the "otherness" of an object -- the fact that the object is as real as a man's self. (BF, 185) When a man realizes how dependent he is on something in reality, he realizes the dignity and splendor
of the thing's presence. When a man identifies himself with another presence, he can intuit what the object's perspective on the world might be like, or if the object is nonhuman, what its perspective would be like if it had human consciousness. "Perhaps insects," writes Alan Watts, "with their different organs, have a very different universe, an insect universe." (Watts, 45)

When a man interpenetrates an object's threshold awareness, he is apprehending certain universal conditions of the object. Wheelwright says that representation through methexis, which emphasizes the pole of the object's threshold situation over its presence,

draws the reader-hearer-spectator into a threshold situation, where some of the great moving patterns of human living -- the concrete universals ... are apprehended dimly, ambivalently, insecurely, yet with great power. The insecurity is realized and felt as an aspect of the universal condition; it elicits our pity and fear, and we are thereby somehow purged and re-equilibrated. (MK, 12, 30)

Interpenetrating an object's threshold situation gives a subject an apprehension of the object as a concrete universal. The subject does not and cannot, interpenetrate the object's individuality. What the subject does interpenetrate are the universals of which the object is a particular actuality. An object is a concrete
universal in that its particular actuality ("concrete") "is one with all other things of the same species" ("species" being the "universal"). (MR, 168) Wheelwright explains the coalescence between particulars and universals:

Plato ... recognizes the fact of coalescence between particulars and universals. For a particular exists, according to his teaching, by participation (methexis) in the universal reality that gives it its main significance, and conversely the universal reality permeates all particular things to different degrees, much as the pure light of the sun illuminates the different degrees, each according to its capacity for receiving. Particular things bulge with significance, to whatever extent they participate in, coalesce with, a something more that is consubstantial with themselves. (MR, 168)

Interpenetration of an object's threshold situation, that is, of a concrete universal, allows the subject to apprehend the object's "coalescence with" the something more that is dimly revealed in reality. An insight into an object's coalescence with the "something more" is always "apprehended dimly, ambivalently, insecurely, yet with great power" by the subject. (MK, 30) A man becomes truly aware of the religious dimension after he intuits something more revealed in reality than simple existence. However, every interpenetration of an object's coalescence also leaves a man with a feeling of insecurity.
A man does not know whether that "something more" which is revealed, is a Heaven or an Abyss. The insecurity "elicits our pity and fear" but by this Kathartic release, we realize again that the insecurity is only insecurity and that "something more" is revealing itself in reality. "We are thereby ... purged and re-equilibrated." (MK, 30)

Representation through methexis requires the merger of both participatory acts: identification and inter-penetration. Methexis makes it possible for a man to apprehend any combination of meanings from the radical (individual) actuality of an object's presence (MR, 52), to the revelatory significance of the object as a concrete universal. (MR, 168) The security and the purging of insecurity through methexis is exemplified in this quote from Ecclesiastes, "Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days." (MR, 56) The idea of "casting thy bread upon the waters" risks the insecurity of losing it forever. Yet the quotation promises that he will find his bread again. Faith is based on promise. A man must act in accordance with the promise in reality that he intuits. Methexis is an aesthetic/semantic device which imitates the religious (dimension's) call to faith.

When methexis tensifies language it establishes a basis for lingual representation of the presential
(mundane), and religious, and temporal dimensions of reality. (MR, 169-9) Methexis appeals to a man's imagination, and his unique sense of coalescence based on the emotional congruence among things, qualities, and events. (MR, 156-7) Language which has been tensified by methexis requires each member of its audience to participate in the expression. Each member of the audience must then compare and contrast the author's perspective with his own. In this way, methexis emphasizes the inter-perspectival nature of tensive language.

D) Summary of Tensive Language

According to Wheelwright's view of language, common experiences and common knowledge are best communicated with common language. Ideas which are new or which are perspectivally unique need language which can adequately express that meaning with clarity and in a way that retains its perspectival significance. Metaphor is an element of tensive language which achieves this particularly and succinctly. Two factors which tensify common language in a way that make a metaphor possible are mimesis and methexis. Mimesis tensifies the semantic vehicles so they can obey a law of adequacy, or reflective
precision -- that is, clarity. Methexis establishes a basis for the lingual representations of large intuitions such as presentational and religious dimensions. Together, mimesis and methexis establish the inter-perspectival nature of tensive language, including metaphor.
III WHEELWRIGHT'S ANALYSIS OF METAPHOR

A) Overview of the Components in Metaphor

1) The lingual tensions in metaphor

Wheelwright defines metaphor for the first time in The Burning Fountain: A Study in the Languages of Symbolism (1954). In this book he does not yet use the adjective "tensive" to describe the subjective half of language, but he does use tension as a basic defining concept for explaining how semantic vehicles acquire more than their commonly used meanings. Because of metaphor's unique semantic tension, Wheelwright believes that metaphor is an important component of poetic language and symbol formation. (BF, 101-2; see also 103-6)

He writes:

Whatever else poetic language may do, its exploitation of essential metaphor, or metaphoric tension, properly controlled in relation to the poetic context, is one of its most distinctive and sometimes triumphant achievements. (BF, 101-2)

Wheelwright demonstrates, in The Burning Fountain that metaphor is created when simile and plurisignation are brought together in a tensive relationship to create
a commanding image or expression. (BF, 101) He defines metaphor by distinguishing two lingual elements which are present in every metaphor and which are always tensively merged in some way. He explains:

The hypothesis which I should like to put forward is that metaphor at its best tends to achieve fullness of semantic energy-tension by a merging of two complementary elements — simile and plurisignation. In simile, two verbal expressions each conveying an individual image or idea, are joined; in plurisignation, a single verbal expression carries two or more meanings simultaneously. (BF, 106)

The simile Wheelwright talks about here is not a metaphor when it (the simile) lacks plurisignative depth. Nonmetaphoric similes are "usually not very interesting." (BF, 106) They do nothing more than join two verbal expressions, and so amount to nothing more than stating a comparison between two things. He gives two examples: "He ran like a scared rabbit", and "He pecks at his food like a canary". (BF, 106-8) In each example a boy's behavior is compared as being similar to an animal's. These similies add to the verbs "ran" and (implicitly) "eats," an animal-like quality. Simile, according to Wheelwright, is one form of tensifying language. Simile endows the focal word of the comparison with the similarities between the subject of the sentence and the modifier.
Plurisignation is the other lingual element which tensifies the meanings of semantic vehicles. In plurisignation a semantic vehicle or expression (as a whole) "carries two or more meanings simultaneously. Plurisignation can take more than one form; it is the defining element of "innuendo, double entendre, and the pun." (BF, 112) Plurisignation works by giving the semantic vehicle or expression more than one context, at least implicitly. Plurisignation can produce two or more denotative or connotative meanings for any given word or phrase.

By merging simile and plurisignation, metaphor can be given at least two contexts simultaneously. The meanings which are produced can either give old meanings and connotations renewed significance, or create new meanings altogether. Every implicit element of simile is then understood in each context. If all of the possible combinations of semantic tension between simile and plurisignation are seen in one commanding image, the result is a metaphor. (BF, 114-17) This definition of metaphor explains how language is tensified to produce metaphoric rather than literal meaning.
2) Relating metaphor to reality

However, a more interesting question concerns metaphor's relationship to reality. Wheelwright addresses this question first in his 1960 article, "Semantics and Ontology" and in greater depth in his book, Metaphor and Reality in 1962. Both works assume the theory that metaphor is the smallest, most authentic, and most radical element of tensive language. (SO, 4; MR, 66-70) By analyzing the nature of metaphor and its relation to reality, Wheelwright believes he will be able to define the relation of tensive language to reality, which would then establish the philosophical credibility and usefulness of his epistomological theory that all human knowledge is grounded in language.

Instead of defining the tensive lingual poles (simile and plurisignation) which function in metaphor, as he did in The Burning Fountain, Wheelwright, in his later works on metaphor (SO, ERM, MR), analyzes "the double imaginative act of outreaching and combining" the heterogeneous elements stated, implied or inferred in the metaphor "that essentially mark the metaphoric process." (MR, 72) In Metaphor and Reality he explains "this double imaginative act":
What really matters in a metaphor is the psychic depth at which the things of the world, whether actual or fancied, are transmuted by the cool heat of the imagination. The transmutative process that is involved may be described as semantic motion; the idea of which is implicit in the very word "metaphor," since the motion (phora) that the word connotes is a semantic motion — the double imaginative act of out-reaching and combining that essentially marks the metaphoric process. The out-reaching and combining, which are the two main elements of metaphoric activity, appear most effectively in combination.... But as a means of understanding their respective contributions they may be examined singly, and may be called by distinguishing names -- "epiphor" and "diaphor" -- the one standing for the outreach and extension of meaning through comparison, the other for the creation of new meaning by juxtaposition and synthesis. (MR, 71-2)

"Epiphor" is Wheelwright's concept of the imaginative act of out-reaching and comparing. (MR, 72) The word "epiphor," Wheelwright explains "is taken from Aristotle, who says in The Poetics, that metaphor is the 'transference' (epiphora) 'of a name [from what it usually denotes] to some other object.'" (MR, 72) Aristotle also explains that the transference (epiphora) of names is made on the basis of perceiving similarities in dissimilars (On Poetics, 22, 1459a), and that the similarities are clarified by ordering the transference from something well-known onto something less well-known. (On Poetics, 21, 1457b) Wheelwright uses epiphor to name the imaginative process which Aristotle calls "genius" -- the ability to perceive similarities in dissimilars. (MR, 72-3)
While summarizing Aristotle's theory, Wheelwright clearly distinguishes epiphor as an imaginative act from the literal function of a metaphorical statement. Since epiphor is an imaginative act, the elements to which it compares are not the conceptual meanings of the semantic vehicles, but the (imagination's) images or ideas which are indicated by the semantic vehicles. (MR, 73)

Diaphor is Wheelwright's concept of the imaginative act of combining and synthesizing. (MR, 72) The word "diaphor" was suggested to him by the definition of metaphor in Sir Herbert Read's book, *English Prose Style*. Wheelwright quotes and discusses Read's definition:

'Metaphor is the synthesis of several units of observation into one commanding image; it is the expression of a complex idea, not by analysis, nor by abstract statement, but by a sudden perception of an objective relation.' The main idea that is expressed in Sir Herbert's definition is evidently quite different from the usual idea of metaphor. For whereas metaphor in the usual sense operates by resemblance between something familiar and something unfamiliar, the trope referred to in the new definition consists rather of a grouping of several dissimilars and a relating them on the basis of a felt* congruity. (SO, 5)

Wheelwright realizes that Read's definition is different than the traditional definition posited by Aristotle. From Read's book, Wheelwright develops his own theory of diaphor. Wheelwright explains, "the movement (phora)
is 'through' (dia) certain particulars of experience (actual or imagined) in a fresh way, producing new meaning by juxtaposition alone." (MR, 78) Wheelwright gives an example of a predominately diaphoric metaphor for illustration.

In a now forgotten little magazine of the thirties a leftist poet expressed his decidedly negative feelings toward America by publishing a poem which contained the following verse:

My country 'tis of thee
Sweet land of liberty
Higgledy-piggledy my black hen.

Leaving aside questions of worth and taste, let us note that in this combination of elements, and by their combination alone, the writer manages to convey what is not expressed by either of the parts. His intention is evidently to make an anti-patriotic utterance, but clearly there is nothing unpatriotic about either the first pair of lines taken by itself nor about the third line taken by itself. The anti-patriotic sentiment is expressed solely by their combination. (MR, 78-9; see also 79-86)

The elements which diaphor juxtaposes and synthesizes are not the conceptual meanings of semantic vehicles, but a man's emotional knowledge (feelings) of (for) the images or ideas indicated by the semantic vehicles. (SO, 5; MR, 80-2, 85-6) Diaphoric movement is "through" these images in the sense that the emotional knowledge of one image is juxtaposed to the emotional knowledge of another image. A man's imagination must go "through" his
emotional knowledge of each image in order to make any connection between these images.

When epiphoric and diaphoric acts of the imagination merge in a single imagining, the effect is a metaphoric imagining. (MR, 86) By analyzing the factors which create epiphoric and diaphoric imagining, Wheelwright believes he can trace the way in which a man's experiential knowledge of an object (S → O) is translated into a lingual medium for communicating that knowledge (S → L → O).

Metaphor, according to Wheelwright, is the lingual device which most adequately communicates the true tensions which make up a man's knowledge of something.

3) Why concentrate on Metaphor and Reality rather than The Burning Fountain

Wheelwright does not consider The Burning Fountain (1954) to be an inferior work to Metaphor and Reality (1962). If he did, his revised version of the former would have defined metaphor in terms of epiphor and diaphor, rather than restating his definition in terms of simile and plurisignation exactly as he had written it in 1954. (compare BF, 106 -- 1954 with BF, 109 -- 1968) The works were written for related, but different purposes. The Burning Fountain is an investigation into expressive language, how it functions, and what factors (both subjective and objec-
In Wheelwright's revised edition, he writes in the preface:

In essence the book is unchanged. Its pervading outlook continues to rest upon two basic principles: that of the intrinsically threshold character of experience and that of the ontological status of linguistic ordering. (BF, ix -- 1968)

In both editions of The Burning Fountain, Wheelwright defines metaphor in terms of its tensifying lingual elements, simile and plurisignation.

In Metaphor and Reality however, Wheelwright investigates the relation of tensive language to reality by defining metaphoric imagining. He says that the imagination is able to grasp a nonlingual reality metaphorically. This is done by merging epiphor and diaphor in a way that maintains as purely as possible the authenticity of reality's nonlingual meaning. This imaginative act translates its metaphorically related image (or idea) into language.

Wheelwright does not use his theory of simile and plurisignation to complement his theory of epiphor and diaphor. However, a complementary relationship between simile and plurisignation, and epiphor and diaphor, can be drawn from Wheelwright's mention of plurisignation in Metaphor and Reality. (See MR, 57-61) Plurisignation can
be understood as the lingual correlate to the imaginative act of diaphor, however, Wheelwright does not draw this correlation in Metaphor and Reality (except by implication on pp. 57–61), nor in his revised edition of The Burning Fountain.

Wheelwright does consider his theory of epiphor and diaphor in Metaphor and Reality to be more useful and enlightening, than his theory of simile and plurisignation in The Burning Fountain. In Metaphor and Reality epiphor and diaphor are imaginative acts and are Wheelwright's explanatory devices of how the imagination psychically "transmutes" the knowledge of things "whether actual or fancied," thereby producing an expressive metaphoric image. This image must then be translated into language (simile and plurisignation). A man's knowledge of each thing is "transmuted by the cool heat of the imagination" in a way which imitates the reality's tensional coalescence. Transmutation at the semantic level imitates the tensions used in metaphoric imagining. (MR, 71) Metaphor and Reality presents a more useful theory of metaphor, because it relates language to reality, explaining that the connection is located in metaphoric imagining.
B) Metaphoric Imagining

When Wheelwright defines metaphor in terms of how the metaphorical statement relates to an object in reality, he defines semantic motion as it first occurs in a man's imagination. A lingual analysis of metaphor only explains which lingual elements in tensive language (simile and plurisignation) tensify semantic vehicles in order to produce metaphoric meaning. An analysis of metaphoric imagining explains how and why language is tensified. Language is tensified when the imagination extends and combines the meanings of semantic vehicles, that is, when the imagination functions epiphorically and diaphorically. According to Wheelwright, metaphoric imagining is the point at which a man's knowledge merges with the language he uses to talk about his knowledge of reality. Analyzing metaphoric imagining should explain how tensive language refers to reality's tensions without naming them.

Wheelwright explains that epiphor and diaphor both are necessary elements of metaphor, and that when merged together these two elements are sufficient for metaphor. In chapter two, I explain that there are two factors which are necessary for all elements of tensive language; these factors are mimesis and methexis. Factors are related to elements; a factor is necessary for the existence of an element, and certain factors, when appropriately related,
are then sufficient for that element. Wheelwright's theory consists of a hierarchy of categorical complexities from factors, to elements, to things. This theory is implicit in the following passage.

Wherever any imitative or mimetic factor* is present, whether an imitation of nature or of previous art or a mimesis of some recognizable idea, there is an element* of epiphor. (MR, 79)

Mimesis may be categorized both as an element of epiphor, and as a factor of tensive language. The categorical distinctions are relative to the focal point and depth of the analysis. For example, if an analysis focuses on tensive language, then metaphor, image and symbol are all elements of tensive language; (MR, 66) if the analysis focuses on metaphor, then mimesis and methexis are elements, and no longer factors.

1) The elements of epiphor

Wheelwright defines epiphor as the expression of similarities between dissimilar things. (MR, 73, 74) Obviously, if an epiphoric expression is to communicate meaning, then language (which is anything that stands proxy for something else) must necessarily be one of
epiphor's elements. In order for the language to express (clarify) the similarity, rather than state (identify) the similarity, a tensifying factor must be applied to language. Wheelwright tells us that mimesis is this tensifying element of epiphor. (MR, 79)

I define mimesis in chapter two and distinguish two elements. I say that mimesis involves a tension between a subject's knowledge of an object (S → O) and a subject's use of a medium (S → L → O). In mimesis a subject uses his medium to represent his knowledge of an object. Wheelwright writes:

As man gropes to express his complex nature and his sense of the complex world (S → O), he seeks or creates representational and expressive forms (the two adjectives standing for complementary aspects of a single endeavor) (S → L → Q) which shall give some hint, always finally insufficient, of the turbulent moods within and the turbulent world of qualities and forces, promises and threats outside him. (MR, 46)

Language used expressively, that is to say mimetically, (MR, 35), is the single endeavor for which representation and expression are modifying elements. Wheelwright illustrates this with an example of two different ways to refer lingually to a circle. The word "circle" can be employed to intend the steno-meaning of a circle: a geometric figure in which "every point on the circumference
must be equidistant from a given point which is its center;" or the steno-meaning can be represented by a drawn circle. The drawing is "at once imitating it \( \square \) the essential circle\( \square \) and indicating it." (MR, 35) Imitation and indication are the meaningful results of lingual and mimetic activity.

The meaningful result of any mimetic activity lies along a tensive continuum between the capacity of its means to do some things and not others -- a drawing for example does not smell like what is drawn, and the object's tensive nature (as the subject intuits it). The tension in the drawing of a circle for example emphasizes the medium's capacity. The points of a circle are non-spatial. A circle cannot be produced on paper by pencil, ink, or paint. A circle can only be represented spatially by moving a pencil circumferentially on paper. A drawn circle emphasizes the medium pole of mimesis because it represents an imagined image of "every point on a circumference ... equidistant from ... its center" point.

An example of mimesis where the tension's emphasis falls on mimesis' other tensive pole (the object's tensive nature) is the following passage, from Antony and Cleopatra:

Enobarbus: I will tell you.
The barge she sat in, like a barnish'd throne,
Burn'd on the water. The poop was beaten gold; 
Purple the sails, and so perfumed that 
The winds were love-sick with them; the oars were silver; 
Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke, and made 
The water which they beat to follow faster, 
As amorous of their strokes... (MR, 65)

Shakespeare uses this description of the barge on the water to express Cleopatra's desire for Antony (Antony is the purpose for Cleopatra's journey). The boat is a metaphor for Cleopatra's desire. (See MR, 66) Shakespeare indicates the metaphor by giving the boat perfumed sails that made the winds love-sick, and by giving the boat oars which stroke amorous to the tune of flutes (flutes are instruments for love songs). The stroking oars on the water seem to be metaphors for Cleopatra's desire to stroke Antony's flesh with her hands. Indeed, the even tempo of the stroking oars drives Cleopatra to the source of her desire, just as the even tempo of her stroking hands on Antony's flesh would drive her to the consumation of her desire. Representing Cleopatra's desire in the image of her barge is based on more than the comparable ends of the actions of each. Shakespeare intuits a tensive relationship between the ordinary motion of the oars and Cleopatra's purpose for the journey. So Shakespeare describes the stroking oars with words whose syllabic rhythm "will be found to reinforce the meaning
in 'kept stroke' as well as in the quickening pace of the next line." (See MR, 65-6) The syllabic tempo of the lines describing the stroking oars imitates the tensive relationship between the normal functioning of a barge and the purpose of its journey, because the tempo reorders the last three lines into relationships which serve no other purpose than the imitation of reality's tensions.

Language is the element of epiphor which mimesis tensifies. Epiphor, as mimetic imagining, uses the private language of images and notions (a notion is an open-ended, possibly ambiguous concept) of a subject's imagination. However, to communicate an epiphor, its expressive image must be translated into a public language which uses a system of recognized semantic vehicles. Because of this intimate relationship between epiphor's private and public mediums, any reference to either one implies a reference to the other. (See MR, 73)

Since epiphor consists of two elements: mimesis and language merged into a tense relationship, then epiphor consists of a tensification of language along the tense continuum of mimesis. Therefore, an epiphor will consist of tensified language emphasizing one of the poles on the tense continuum of mimesis. Language will be tensified by mimesis either by 1) tensifying certain capacities of language, which is epiphor's medium, or
2) using language in a way to reflect or imitate certain tensions in the object of which an epiphor is about.

That epiphor consists partly in tensifying its medium is stated plainly by Aristotle. Epiphor transfers "a name from what it usually denotes" to some other object." (MR, 72, see also 73) This is a clear case where semantic vehicles do not fully obey the law of identification. When a thing is imitated by a transference of names (images), the modifying name (image) can be said to function exemplarily, rather than literally (by the law of identification). Consider for example, the metaphor, "That man is a wolf." Putting aside the possibility that this sentence is taken from a 1950's horror movie about werewolves, men and wolves are not the same thing. So, if the sentence is to be meaningful, it must fully obey the literal law of identification. When the context of this sentence indicates that it is to be understood as a metaphor, then the audience understands that calling a man a wolf is to intend wolf as an example of what the man is like. (See MR, 73-4)

The other mimetic emphasis an epiphor might show would be the use of language in a way which is similar to a tension or a tensive significance in reality. There are times, for example, when the mountains seem asleep. To say this is to represent the mountains as having an animal or man-like quality of being able to be asleep or
awake. To express this epiphor, a repetition of Z-sounds would suggest the gentle breathing which we have come to associate with sleep. An amateur poet might use words with Z-sounds in his expression of the snoozing mountains. He might say, for example, "Only the easy breath of the mountains blows through the trees tonight." (See MR, 65-6)

Another use of language which imitates something in reality is the use of forms such as stanzas. Wheelwright quotes an example of this.

Behold my name stinks
More than the odor of carrion birds
On summer days when the heaven is hot.

Behold my name stinks
More than the odor of fishermen
And the shores of the pools where they have fished.

Egyptian, Anon., circa 1800 BC (MR, 75)

A name does not really stink in the sense of smelling horrible, but to say that it stinks connotes a certain disgust the man associates with his name. That the first line of each stanza ends with "stinks" indicates that like the man, the modifier cannot bear to stand beside it. The modifying line removes itself one line from the first, imitating the man's desire to disassociate himself from his name. Other imitative uses of language are too numerous to name. (MR, 75) Let it suffice to
say that Wheelwright is well aware that language's mimetic uses are not limited only to the tensification of semantic meanings. (MR, 75-6)

2). The elements of diaphor

Wheelwright defines diaphor as "the creation of new meaning by juxtaposition and synthesis." (MR, 72) A pure diaphor, he says, is "the sheer presentation of diverse particulars in a newly designed arrangement." (MR, 81) Diaphor is an element of tensive language, just as epiphor. Therefore, diaphor must have as its necessary elements, 1) language and 2) a tensifying element. Wheelwright does not tell us what this tensifying element is, but he does imply an answer in his article "Semantics and Ontology." He defines metaphor as having two elements: epiphor and diaphor. (SO, 5-7) He then concludes his paper with a question. "In broadest terms the question has to do with the relation of tensive language to reality." (SO, 7) Wheelwright then offers three terms whose interrelations may help explain the question of how tensive language relates to reality: imagination, mimesis (imitation) and methexis (participation). (SO, 7) He ends the essay with a hypothesis that the interrelated
roles of imagination, mimesis and methexis might well define the "relation of art to reality." In this relationship mimesis and methexis are the two elements of the imagination. (SO, 7-9) Wheelwright suggests that the tensifying factors of language consist of applying artistic elements to language. That art and tensive language are intimately related is apparent when Wheelwright defines metaphor as a "double imaginative act." (MR, 72) He also states that mimesis is an element of epiphor. (MR, 79) That methexis is an element of diaphor, is implicit in diaphor's role of creating a sense of presence by establishing an emotional congruity. (MR, 80, 82, 91) Methexis' role of participating in another identity, thereby creates a sense of the identity's presence. (SO, 8) Therefore, I will conclude that the tensifying element of diaphor is methexis.

As I define methexis in chapter two, I distinguish between two elements (MS, 62-64) in Wheelwright's theory. These two elements are 1) the subject's participation and 2) the object in which the subject participates. The participation may be defined as a subject "imaginatively ... identifying himself with" the object. (SO, 8) The object is regarded by the subject as a "concrete universal." The subject does not participate in the identity of this or that individual thing. Rather the subject
identifies himself with "a universal idea" of "some concrete embodiment." (BF, 97) When a dancer, for example imitates a deer, the dancer captures the essence of the deer by identifying himself with the deer as a universal type (a concrete universal). (SO, 8) Wheelwright traces this idea of participating in a concrete universal to "pre-sophisticated civilization." He writes:

A particular exists ... by participation (methexis) in the universal reality that gives it its main significance, and conversely the universal reality permeates all particular things to different degrees, much as the pure light of the sun illuminates the different objects of a landscape to different degrees, each according to its capacity for receiving. (MR, 168)

The meaningful significance of methexis is produced by the tensive continuum between subjective participation and the object as a concrete universal. When emphasis is placed on subjective participation, the subject has a sense of the object's presence; that is, the subject has a knowledgeable sense of what it means to be that object. When an act of methexis emphasizes the concrete universal, the subject receives a vague sense of its "something more" quality. Wheelwright says:

Particular things bulge with significance, to whatever extent they participate in, coalesce with, a something more that is consubstantial with themselves. (MR, 168)
Diaphor could be called participatory (methexis) imagining. Diaphor merges its (linguistic) medium of images in a participatory, rather than mimetic, fashion. Methexis is the element responsible for juxtaposing or synthesizing images. It is the nature of methexis to ask its audience to join in the participation, without questioning this participation, and identify with another identity. Diaphor asks its audience to accept and consider the new meaning which is produced by juxtaposing or synthesizing "some hitherto ungrouped ... elements." There is no logical, or organic reason for the juxtaposition or synthesis. The poet uses diaphor to "suspend disbelief." The audience perceives no rationale behind the diaphor. Diaphor asks that a new synthesis be considered. Wheelwright explains:

Coleridge has coined the word 'esemplastic' to designate the same kind of poetic activity, that of bringing diverse particulars into a newly established perspective; the poet being marked he says, by a power to 'diffuse a tone and spirit of unity that blends and (as it were) fuses each into each,' -- a power that reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities. (MR, 82)

A purely diaphoric quality can be all that holds a poem together. "An image may be chosen arbitrarily, by the poet's private sense of some hidden or potential congruence." (MR, 83) Wheelwright cites Wallace Stevens
poem "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird," as an example of a diaphorically unified poem. Here are the first four verses of the poem.

i
Among twenty snowy mountains
The only moving thing
Was the eye of the blackbird.

ii
I was of three minds
Like a tree
In which there are three blackbirds.

iii
The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds
It was a small part of the pantomime.

iv
A man and a woman
Are one.
A man and a woman and a blackbird
Are one.
(MR, 84)

Stevens simply presents this poem, creating meaningful relationships by synthesizing the entire scene on a blackbird. If the reader of this poem does not participate in the blackbird as Stevens depicts it, then the reader will miss the meaning of the poem.

Diaphor, as participatory imagining, can emphasize either knowledge of a thing's presence, or of a thing's "something more" quality. Wheelwright explains that presence consists of imagining two things synthesized into one context. If a man accepts, that is, participates in,
the synthesis, the man's emotional knowledge and associations of each thing will seek to make emotional connections. The result of such connections is what Wheelwright calls "emotional congruity." The second stanza of Stevens' poem creates an emotional congruity between the man's three minds and the tree in which there are three blackbirds.

When the connection made between two things by a diaphoric synthesis (a single context) is one capturing the "something more" quality of a concrete universal, the connection consists of, as Coleridge says, "a tone and spirit of unity that blends and (as it were) fuses each into each." (MR, 82) This spirit of unity is a principle which is suggested by the possibility of being able to amalgamate disparate experiences. When Stevens writes in his third stanza: "The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. / It was a small part of the pantomime," Stevens suggests that the blackbird, as all things in reality, respond in pantomime to a higher order of the universe -- a "something more" quality. Stevens communicates this by pure suggestion, but a suggestion which requires a participatory imagination.
3) The merging of epiphor and diaphor

Wheelwright emphasizes throughout his chapter "Two Ways of Metaphor" (MR) that epiphor and diaphor work most successfully in combination. (MR, 86) In fact, epiphor and diaphor in the best metaphors would be less distinct than two sides of a coin. He writes,

Probably in the greatest cases of metaphor there is no clear division between epiphoric and diaphoric elements, but the two operate indissolubly as blended complementaries. (MR, 91)

Epiphor uses language for mimetic purposes, and therefore lingually communicates some intended "subterranean power to mean something more than the words actually say." (MR, 91) Diaphor gives language a subject's perspectival bent that asks its audience to participate (methexis) in an object as a concrete universal. Wheelwright writes, "the take-it-or-leave-it attitude that is implicit in all good metaphor is in itself, so far as it goes, diaphoric." (MR, 91) Wheelwright succinctly concludes this matter of epiphor and diaphor:

The role of epiphor is to hint significance, the role of diaphor is to create presence. Serious metaphor demands both. (MR, 91)
IV METAPHOR'S PURPOSE CRITICALLY EVALUATED

A) Is Metaphor's Purpose Clarification or Mimetic Expression?

"The test of essential metaphor is ... the quality of semantic transformation that is brought about." (MR, 71) Is Wheelwright correct about the essential nature of metaphor? His theory defines metaphor as an element of tensive language. (MR, 70) If metaphor is lingual in nature, then by the definition of language the purpose of metaphor is "to stand proxy for something else." (MR, 29) Metaphor, as tensive language, is therefore a lingual device for naming parts of reality which are the natural referential objects of tensive language. The natural referential objects of tensive language are anything that has not been recognizably perceived or grasped conceptually. The quality of metaphoric expression therefore, is primarily evaluated according to how well it clarifies its reference to its intended audience.

Wheelwright's theory of metaphor is based on having language tensified by mimesis and methexis. Mimesis and methexis, as I said in chapter two, are aesthetic/semantic factors. (See MK, 11) They are aesthetic to the degree that they are expressive, and they are semantic by the implication that there is an object, a reference, which is being represented or participated in by the subject.
I believe that Wheelwright's theory of *mimesis* and *methexis* have reduced the aesthetic "factor" to the semantic when he juxtaposes them and evaluates them in terms of semantic purpose. What matters in metaphor, according to Wheelwright, is that an object is represented in a metaphor to suggest (MR, 89), allude to (MR, 42), hint at, or in some other way to "mean more than the words actually say" (MR, 91, See also MR, 52) Metaphor, he says, should express something about the object that the author of the metaphor has apprehended.

By giving *mimesis* and *methexis* a semantic purpose, Wheelwright misses the authentic meaning of aesthetic (nonlingual) expressivity. To interpret what a metaphor indirectly alludes to, suggests, or intimates, as he does, is indeed to interpret a metaphorical expression semantically; it is to say in other words what meaning metaphor communicates. Wheelwright knows that metaphor does not state its meaning. Wheelwright agrees that metaphor cannot be paraphrased. (SO, 6) Metaphor, as tensive language, reflects reality's tensions in a lingual expression. In fact, the "tensions" in a lingual expression cannot be paraphrased because they are never semantic.

Wheelwright says that *mimesis* has a semantic purpose because something about an object -- whether that some-
thing is its characteristics (iconic representation) or its presence or threshold situation (representation through methexis) — is represented. I agree that mimesis has an object, and I agree that mimesis can communicate its meaning through allusion, suggestion or intuition, but I do not agree that the allusions, suggestions, or intimations of metaphor function according to the lingual law for referring beyond the representation. Wheelwright has made metaphor's aesthetic factor subservient to its lingual medium. He has argued that the purpose of representation is to clarify the metaphor's reference. I think that Wheelwright's definition of metaphor should be reversed, that its purpose should be to present an aesthetic expression about an object using language to describe the representation. Because Wheelwright gives a semantic purpose to mimesis, he is unable to recognize what is meaningful about a representation in itself (such as found in the nonverbal arts). Wheelwright's theory is criticized for similar reasons by Theodore M. Greene.

Greene criticizes Wheelwright's theory as being unable to explain what is meaningful in the nonverbal arts in his essay, "The Arts as Revelation and Communication: A Perspective on Metaphor and Reality." Greene writes:
Wheelwright is himself doubtful regarding the poetic efficacy of epiphor and diaphor in isolation, and his attempts to find significant examples of pure diaphor indicate, I think, the inadequacy of his aesthetic of the non-verbal arts. 'The purest diaphor is doubtless to be found in non-imitative music and in the most abstract painting.' (MR, 79) If this is true, and if diaphor combines without outreach, pure music and wholly abstract painting are indeed empty of meaning, mere pleasant sound and fury -- they merely are, and have nothing to say. Some aestheticians seem willing to accept this description of these arts; I have yet to find any significant musicians and nonobjective painters who do. (Greene, 26)

My criticism of Wheelwright is based on Eva Schaper's insightful theory that mimesis is self-referential. She argues that a mimetic expression suggests, intimates, or in some other way communicates its meaning through self-referential expression in a medium which is used for aesthetic purposes. According to Schaper, mimesis, which is aesthetic in nature and in purpose can be used for its own sake and does not need to be structurally interrelated with, and subservient to, lingual purpose.

B) Mimesis Communicates Meaning Aesthetically, Not Lingually

Schaper, a modern scholar of Kant, would argue against Wheelwright by saying that mimesis for its own sake is indeed meaningful. In her essay, "The 'As-If'
Element in Aesthetic Thought," she writes:

... works of art appear to be for their own sake and mean only themselves.

... Saying that they are 'for their own sake' and 'mean only themselves' is to recognize their as-if character, their fictional nature. For this is just what things ordinarily and statements normally are not. Things and statements are in relation to this or that, about this or that, referring to or explaining this or that. Things normally never are just 'for their own sake'; statements never mean 'just themselves'. When we consider them in this way, as we do on occasion, we consider them aesthetically.* This requires special circumstances for detachment, for being able to stand back. Or it requires works of art: things which are 'in their own right', 'for their own sake.' This is what artists have constituted for us — appearances of self-sufficiency, apparent microcosms. (Schaper, 121)

Schaper is arguing that works of art, such as dance and painting are imitations which are self-refering. (Schaper, 119, 121-3, 125) She is arguing, as Wheelwright has, that imitation through art captures not the thing, but something about the thing. In the dance of the totemic deer, for example, both Schaper and Wheelwright would agree that the dancer participates in the imitation of the thing's presence. However, according to Schaper, the danced expression is primarily aesthetic, not lingual. As an aesthetic expression, the purpose of the dance is not to refer to the presence or to "indicate something else." Instead its purpose is to express the
deer's presence in the context of an aesthetically purposed medium that is primarily self-referring, not lingually referential. Art and artistic mimesis, Schaper argues, is aesthetic in nature and not linguistic as Wheelwright suggests. (MR, 29-30)

The aesthetic law which holds for artistic expression, according to Schaper, consists of using certain kinds of things to imitate other kinds of things. (Schaper, 122-3) Schaper writes:

To say things indirectly, by presenting an appearance, is a principle ... of art. Transposing descriptive terms from the level of description of things for this or that purpose /lingual purpose/ to that of things as fictional constructs /aesthetic purpose/ is usually achieved by building in the as-if factor, which is rarely announced explicitly. It can be shown, however, to be operative in critical and evaluative discussion of art works in which features that are recognizable as features of presented microcosms. Lines, colors, sounds, shapes, words, stories, episodes, scenes, movements, masses, and so on, are ingredients in art works on which we may concentrate with all the knowledge we have from other contexts. Aesthetic use is made of this when it serves not to describe things, but to disclose that such things construct and enclose their own world of reference. (Schaper, 122-3)

A thing is aesthetically expressed when it is imitated within a fictionally purposed construct. The imitation should be ruled by the intention to regard the constructed imitation as if it were the actual object (Schaper 121-2)
with no other purpose than creating a self-referring entity. Schaper is giving a marvelous modification to Kant's theory of purposiveness without purpose. (Schaper, 128-30) She writes:

I shall end by putting this Kantian point for my own view thus: aesthetic discourse uses any concepts available from other contexts for the description of objects, transposing them so that they function as if the objects had left all possible context behind and were in their own right. When such objects are constructed artifacts, this is just what the artistic statement achieves: the semblance of self-sufficiency. (Schaper, 131)

The primary conclusion to be drawn from Schaper's article is that aesthetic expression self-referentially communicates aesthetic meaning, which is not reducible to lingual meaning. Aesthetic meaning communicates knowledge of what it means to imitate something in the context and constructs of something else, such as paint, or sound, or clay, or movements. While aesthetic expressions do represent something (whether actual or fancied), aesthetic expressions need not clarify their objective references for their expressions to be meaningful. Aesthetic meaning is both irreducible to lingual meaning and communicable.

Mimesis for its own sake is not a new idea. Calvin Seerveld, a professor of aesthetics, explains that mimesis has undergone historical development. In his book Rainbows
for a Fallen World, he explains that art began as mimetic and well crafted "visual embellishments that were usually, thoroughly meshed in ceremonial affairs," (RW, 110) but that mimesis for its own sake, otherwise known as

art-as-such, /was/ firmed up in the eighteenth century of Europe, rightly becoming differentiated as something other than craft. "Artistic" activity came to be more than competent construction and even more than some sort of adjectival, decorative function of technique. Art came to be something deserving full-fledged attention proper to its own* nature. (RW, 112)

He does not think that art ought to be defined as a duplicating craft ability, nor that art is something which properly belongs to psychology (emotivist theories of art) or linguistics. Seerveld posits,

People who are busy with aesthetic theory or who as critics study art are, by and large, aware that they are not examining things as practicing psychologists or testing items as scholars in the area of linguistics." (RW, 104)

Art is defined by an irreducible aesthetic law. (RW, 107, 104)
C) Wheelwright Fails to Recognize the Irreducibility of Aesthetic Expressions

Wheelwright does not wholly neglect the aesthetic aspect in his theory of metaphor. All the adjectives he uses for the pole of language which is opposite to the literal pole: expressive, tensive, fluid, poetic, and living, describe "aesthetic" features of language. Each adjective describes not language's sign character, but language's mimetic ability to represent the tensions among real things by recreating tensions among and within the semantic vehicles of language itself. Wheelwright's theory of tensive language can be restated in terms of Schaper's aesthetic theory: each adjective describes the ability of language to describe the transposition of the context of the object being imitated into the context of the object's modifier. Wheelwright would not object to the comparison of his definition with Schaper's aesthetic theory. However, he would object to naming what the comparison defines as aesthetic meaning. Wheelwright does not think that the aesthetic aspect, which he calls expressivity, can be meaningful by itself.

Wheelwright argues this point by explaining the difference between the definition of poetic language and "the quasi-musical qualities, which, in some manner are expected to inhere in poetic language."
Music, for the most part, is self-contained; in the jargon of semantics, it is self-referring; it does not refer beyond itself to something that is meant, except in such vague ways as perhaps to suggest the quality of joyousness or of tragic seriousness in the world, or the hidden order beyond disorder, or the like. Words, by contrast, even in their most purely poetic usage, have a power of more specific eliciting; they not only are, they also say. And so it may be that a more suitable definition of poetry is to be found not by characterizing poetic language as such, but by indicating the general nature of that which is spoken of, when the speaking is truly poetic. (MR, 50)

Music, we may surmise from this passage, is aesthetic since it is pure expressivity and "does not refer beyond itself." Wheelwright defines music as an art-form using the same terminology as Eva Schaper does (in her definition of art); Wheelwright says that music is "self-contained" and "self-referring." Both music and poetry are arts, says Wheelwright, and therefore aesthetic in regard to their expressivity; (See MR, 29-30) however, he does not argue that art is primarily aesthetic in nature. He argues instead that art can be focused on its own aesthetic element and on its own lingual element. Art's aesthetic element is its quality of expressivity; its lingual aspect is its quality of clarifying its reference. Since art can be analyzed either way, Wheelwright concludes that defining art's sufficient elements is not as useful as defining the "general nature of ... [the reality] which" art takes as its appropriate object of reference.
What is implicit in this conclusion is Wheelwright's assumption that meaning can only be communicated lingually. The expressivity of music, for example, is meaningless, he says, as long as it remains self-referential; but when the music's expressivity "does ... refer beyond itself" enough "to suggest the quality of joyousness or of tragic seriousness in the world," then it can be said to be meaningful. The problem that Wheelwright now faces is explaining how music clarifies its reference.

If music imitates something in reality with the mimetic purpose to express its reference self-referentially, then its meaning cannot be communicated lingually. Imitation, both Wheelwright and Schaper agree, intends to be contemplated for its own expressiveness; it does not intend to be used for contemplation of the object which the imitation refers to. The dance of the totemic deer for example, does not have as its main purpose to tell its audience that deer jump gracefully or that deer run from hunters, or that deer sleep in tall grass. The dance, as Wheelwright tells us, intends to express the deer's "presence." Therefore, when the dancer leaps, he does not try to duplicate how the deer looks when it leaps; the dancer leaps as if, he, a man, were a deer. As a man, the dancer has only two legs. He therefore cannot duplicate the leap of a four-legged deer. The dancer must
leap as a man, but his leap must imitate the deer's.

Wheelwright correctly states:

The ceremonial dancer was expressing the grace and agility of the deer, and no doubt other qualities which, although they cannot be caught in the net of verbal language, we may suppose were inarticulately present in his awareness. (SO, 8)

The dancer communicates the grace, agility and other qualities of a deer by imitating a deer in the context of human movements, strength and related abilities. Nothing in the dance intends a semantic arrow. The dance may be known to imitate a deer, but what it communicates about the deer is communicated by human movements, relating self-referentially, creating aesthetic meaning through the interrelations of human movements. The movements do not intend to communicate to the audience the idea that deer are agile and graceful. When a critic, or any interested spectator, talks about the dance he will use words like "agile" or "graceful," but these are semantic names given to a nonlingual, aesthetic act.

D) Metaphor As Aesthetic in Nature

Wheelwright develops his theory of metaphor on the assumption that meaning is only communicable through
language. (MR, 30) However, people who create aesthetic works communicate meaning in a way just as artificial as the creation of lingual media. The difference between aesthetic works and language is that aesthetic works principally communicate aesthetic meaning. Aesthetic works express meaning through their self-referring media which are artificially constructed. Meaning which is communicated by a self-referring medium is communicated differently than it would be by a medium which refers beyond itself. For example, if paint is used self-referentially, then the communication of a painting's meaning depends on the painter's use of the paints to self-referentially create a meaningful expression. Language, on the other hand, depends upon the audience's understanding of the vehicle-reference (semantic) relationship. (MR, 30) To communicate meaning with language, a speaker need only select those vehicles which refer beyond themselves to the things or meanings which he (the speaker) intends to communicate. Wheelwright, however, confines the aesthetic factor (self-referential expressivity) to a lingual purpose. Therefore, he is unable to define aesthetic expression as meaningful by itself. He understands instead, that some aesthetic expressions (aesthetic works) more adequately "tensify" language, and so more adequately communicate the intended meaning, than do other aesthetic expressions. (MR, 29-30) A simile, for example, may more
adequately communicate its intent than a metaphoric abbreviation of that simile. (MR, 71)

Because Wheelwright confines the aesthetic factor to a lingual purpose, he argues that the two elements of metaphoric imagining, epiphor and diaphor, are each elements which tensify language. A metaphoric image, he argues, must be communicated by language which is tensified by both epiphor (language tensified by mimesis) and diaphor (language tensified by methexis). (Compare MR, 30 and 71-2)

Wheelwright explains metaphor in terms of tensified language because he assumes that any meaningful communication ("to intend What Is" (MR, 30)) must be lingual.

However, language is not the only means of communicating, that is, of "intending What Is." Aesthetic expression also intend What Is" by using a medium self-referentially rather than by using a medium to refer beyond itself. Iconic representation (mimesis) or representation through participation (methexis) are two kinds of aesthetic expression. Rather than arguing that metaphoric imagining tensifies language, as Wheelwright does, I believe that we should argue a metaphoric image is an aesthetic expression, in which mimesis and methexis are combined. The metaphoric image (the result of metaphoric imagining) is then described to other people through language. By defining metaphor as an aesthetic expression, I am suggesting that the lingual
purpose of Wheelwright's theory of epiphor and diaphor be dropped. Instead, epiphor and diaphor should each be defined as communicating meaning aesthetically. Epiphor would be redefined as a type of mimetic expression and diaphor, as a type of methexic expression.

Epiphor, Wheelwright says is Aristotle's definition of metaphor, which says that "metaphor is the 'transference' of a name [from that which it usually denotes] to some other object." (MR, 72) Wheelwright's use of Aristotle's definition of metaphor can be restated in terms of defining metaphor as an aesthetical figure. If metaphor is an aesthetical figure which is not purposed for lingual communication, then the medium of metaphor must have an aesthetic purpose, that is, it must function self-referentially. What then is the medium for metaphor?

Wheelwright provides the answer when he correctly regards metaphor as a type of imagining. (MR, 71-2) The medium of metaphor must therefore be the medium for imagining. The medium for imagining is memory. In order for a man to imagine something, he need not have a word for it, and he need not have analyzed it; he only needs to have experienced it, or if he is imagining something he heard about, he only needs to have experienced the things involved. Therefore, a man only needs to have a memory of something in order to imagine it. A man's memory has the potential to
retain (or record) all human sense perceptions of any experience. The most dominant sense perception for me (and for people I have talked to about this) is sight. Recollections of past experiences, for me, are usually dominated by what I saw. I tend to imagine my recollections in terms of my most dominant sense perception: sight. I prefer, therefore, to say that the imagining of something is composed of "imagined images." By imagined images, I mean recollections which are represented by what I remember seeing. The medium of imagining is therefore imagined images. Metaphor, as an aesthetical figure also uses imagined images, instead of semantic vehicles, as its medium.

Taking imagined images as the medium of metaphor, two modifications may be made of Wheelwright's theory of epiphor. Instead of "names," which he quotes from Aristotle's definition, substitute "images," and instead of "semantic motion" (MR, 72) substitute "aesthetic depiction." Since a metaphor depicts, that is, imagines an object as being imitated by something else, with the sole purpose of creating a self-referring imitation, then metaphor can be defined in terms of Schaper's theory of aesthetic expression. Therefore, Wheelwright's use of Aristotle's definition of metaphor can be restated as follows: metaphor depicts the context of an object (as imaginatively imagined) being transposed to the context of a modifying object (as imaginatively imagined).
For example, "that man is a wolf" depicts the context of "that man" as transposed to the context of "a wolf." Metaphor does not transpose the contexts of that actual man and an actual wolf. Metaphor transposes the imagination's images of the contexts of that actual man and an actual wolf. Metaphoric expression is communicated in the self-referring depiction of the transposed imagined images. The language which communicates the metaphor does not undergo tensifications in its semantic vehicles. Instead the language simply describes on its literal level the metaphoric depiction of that man as a wolf.

Diaphor, Wheelwright says, creates a sense of "presence" by juxtaposing the contexts of the object and the modifier, so that a reader can apprehend the metaphor. If diaphor is regarded as having only an aesthetic purpose, then Schaper's theory of aesthetic expression can explain diaphor as being the metaphor's presentation of itself as an "apparent microcosm," that is, "as if" it were "a thing in its own right." (Schaper, 121)

Defining metaphor as an expression with an aesthetic purpose, rather than as a tensive statement with a lingual purpose, has established a distinction between the expression of a metaphor's meaning and the communication of the metaphoric image itself. Metaphor, as Wheelwright insightfully argues, is an imaginative act. Rather than creating mimetic representations (depictions) with media such as
paint or clay, metaphor mimetically represents its object with imagined images of things ("whether actual or fancied"
(MR, 717) Imagined images are not able to be directly apprehended because they are self-referentially related in a man's imagination. The metaphor communicates its (aesthetic) meaning through the self-referentially related imagined images to the man who has imagined the metaphor (assuming, of course, that he can apprehend the metaphor's meaning).
If a man wants to share the metaphor with someone else, however, he will have to describe the metaphor in language, that is, a medium whose elements refer beyond themselves (to the imagined images which compose the metaphor). Metaphoric meaning is created and communicated aesthetically (through the self-referring metaphoric image), and the metaphoric image is described lingually (with words standing proxy for the relevant imagined images which compose the metaphoric image). Any spoken (or lingually communicated) metaphor is a description of the metaphoric (aesthetic) depiction.

The lingual description of a metaphor does not have to be a verbal language such as English or French. The lingual description of a metaphor can be anything which refers beyond itself to imagined images (the medium of metaphor). A cartoon for example can lingually describe a metaphor. The metaphor, "that man is a wolf," can be represented by depicting a cartoon representation of "that man" as looking
lecherously at a cartoon representation of a woman, and at the next moment, the man's head could be replaced with the head of a ravenously hungry wolf.

Distinguishing between the aesthetic meaning and the lingual description of metaphor answers the question: can metaphor be paraphrased. Metaphor cannot be paraphrased for the same reason that dance cannot be paraphrased. Aesthetic expression which is self-referential cannot be fully or adequately captured by lingual expression which refers beyond itself. Aesthetic expression and lingual expression have two different natures.

In this chapter I have argued that metaphor should be defined as an aesthetical figure, and not as a lingual device (or even an element of tensive language). In order to establish the usefulness of my definition of metaphor, two tasks remain: 1) defining aesthetic expression, and 2) explaining how metaphor (self-referentially) functions as an aesthetical expression (figure).
In chapter four I give a brief explanation of how metaphor can be defined as an aesthetic figure. I base my definition of metaphor on Eva Schaper's theory that meaning is aesthetically communicated by transposing the context of an object's description to the context of an aesthetically purposed medium. (Schaper, 122-3) A metaphor is publicly communicated by using language to describe the metaphoric image. Since a metaphor's meaning is communicated through its aesthetic depiction, rather than through the language which describes that depiction, metaphor should be defined as having an aesthetic nature.

A) Aesthetic Expression and Reality

An aesthetic expression (such as a metaphor), says Schaper, is a self-referential representation. An aesthetic expression contains meaning in that it communicates its meaning by depicting something in the context of a self-referring medium. A self-

V TOWARDS A THEORY OF METAPHOR AS AN AESTHETIC FIGURE
referring medium is composed by a man to create the semblance of a self-sufficient "microcosm". An aesthetic expression, as a self-sufficient microcosm, communicates its meaning, not by how its elements refer beyond themselves, but by how its elements are self-referentially related. The self-referential nature of an aesthetic expression is similar to the natural relations an object has with other objects in reality, such as a tree's relations to soil, air and sunshine. Both aesthetic and natural relations communicate (perhaps reveal is a more accurate word) meaning through the elements and the elements' interrelationships which constitute the whole, whether the whole be a statue (aesthetic expression) or a tree (object in reality). Both aesthetic and natural relations must be experientially apprehended.

The kind of meaning a man apprehends in a rock, for example, is that it is hard, heavy, roughly textured, and that it hurts his bare toe when he kicks it. The semantic vehicle "hard" refers beyond itself to the quality of being hard. The semantic vehicle "hard" is a name given to (used to refer to) experiential knowledge of things that are hard. The hardness of a rock is one of the rock's natural meanings. By "natural meaning" I mean the characteristics and dimensions of an object as a man experiences them. The natural meaning of a rock is that if kicked by a man's unprotected toe, it will hurt that toe.
Natural meaning, when apprehended by a man, is experiential knowledge. A man's knowledge of an object, Wheelwright has taught me, is never the pure natural meaning of the object; experiential knowledge is natural meaning as apprehended from a man's perspective. Hence, a man only knows natural meaning through his experiential knowledge. A man's experiential knowledge can then be abstracted, analyzed, shared with others, or reflected upon, any of which can inform and create a new perspective. This new perspective, informed by these mental processes, can reinterpret his experiential knowledge.

I believe, as Wheelwright does, that natural meaning, as we experience the (temporal) changing structure of reality's interrelating elements, reveals the origin of reality, dimly and ambivalently. The reason why I believe reality is only dimly and ambivalently revealed is because of the fact that throughout history human cultures have disagreed about the nature of the origin. Some have argued that reality is originated from chanced order and a degree of chaos, others have argued that God created reality and the effects of sin confuse us, and still others, that reality is composed of opposite forces such as yin and yang.

Meaning is communicated aesthetically by composing self-referring semblances of "microcosms," paintings, for example. An artist intends to order and enrich our ex-
periential knowledge, not through identification and analysis, but through ordering elements of reality with the elements of a medium, such as paint or sounds. The significance of an aesthetic expression is that it orders a man's experiential knowledge of a characteristic of an object with a man's experiential knowledge of the elements of a medium used to imitate the characteristic. The meaning of an artist's work can be critically appraised, analyzed, and discussed, so that some paintings depicting pink elephants could be paraphrased, or interpreted as suggesting craziness or lunacy, while other painted depictions of pink elephants could suggest a happy, childlike, or dreamy way of looking at the world.

B) Five Theses on Conditions for Aesthetic Expression

An aesthetic expression is most easily explained in terms of how the elements of its medium are self-referentially related. Following are five theses which I believe constitute an aesthetic expression and which are sufficient to explain how a metaphor communicates meaning.

1. An aesthetic expression is created when the description of an object is represented in a medium which
has a different nature than the object. A story is different from an historical account, for example. A story works with characters in which a man's personality is abstracted and interpreted in a writer's mind, resulting in a fabrication, that is, a characterization of a personality (not an actual personality), while an historical account uses language to record the events of real men and women. An example of a borderline case where the object and medium are of the same nature is an actor who portrays himself. Assuming that the actor "plays the part" honestly, the question may be asked, is there any sense in which the actor is creating an aesthetic expression? The answer is yes; as long as he is reacting to situations in a script, his actions and reactions are pretence. An actor cannot act out of his real personality when the situations are pretence, because pretended situations do not hold the full consequences on the man's life as they would if they were real situations. An actor, playing himself, plays a characterization of his personality. A characterization of a personality abstracts certain structural qualities of a personality, for example, shyness, boorishness, and cowardice, but it does not react to situations as personality does. A character, for example, cannot undergo a conversion,
unless the script calls for it. If a character changes, that is, goes against its established structural qualities, the way a personality can, the character is faulted for destroying the continuity which is important for any semblance of a self-sufficient microcosm, such as a drama production.

2. Elements of a medium are used to imitate elements of an object through any capacity shared by the elements of both the object and the medium. For example, a dancer uses human movement to imitate a deer. Both humans and deer share a capacity for movement. However, a deer's movement is not all that human dance can imitate. Because a deer depends on its ability to move in order to escape danger, find food, nurture its young, and challenge another deer's leadership, many related qualities of deer such as these (finding food, nurturing young, etc.) can also be expressed in human movement.

3. The elements of an object which are imitated must be imitated in a medium "as-if" the elements of the object have the medium's context. (See Schaper, 120-1, 130-1) For example, a pencil drawing of a man on paper requires that elements of the man be imitated in two dimensions, although the illusion of its third dimensions,
can be created. The drawing also requires that the man be imitated in a stationary composition, although the illusion of movement and breathing can be created. The pencil drawing cannot create the colors, odors, or surface textures of the man's skin and clothes. However, all of these elements of the object (a man) can be imitated with the use of a pencil. Surfaces can be outlined, colors can be correlated with degrees of shading, and odors can be suggested by outlining and shading areas on his clothes to imitate sweatmarks. No matter what elements of an object are imitated, they must be imitated as if they had the context of the medium.

4. Elements of an object can be imitated by elements of a medium by relating the elements of a medium self-referentially, according to a law of allusiveness. Allusiveness may be defined as the quality of enriching elements or things with "ends" other than their natural own. For example, the natural end of a line drawn on paper with a pencil is to make a mark. When a line is used to imitate the visible outline of a tree's trunk, the line serves two ends simultaneously: 1) it makes a mark on the paper, which is the natural end of the line, and 2) it imitates the outline of the tree's trunk, which is an end of representation. The
The law of allusiveness can be explained in three points, as a method of imitation based upon my first three theses. (a) The elements of the medium can only be allusively related on the basis of some capacity shared by the elements of both the object and the medium (thesis 2). (b) The elements of a medium can only have their ends "enriched" with the ends of the descriptive elements of an object (thesis 1). For example, clay can be molded to imitatively correspond to an object's contours. (c) The ends of the descriptive elements can only be expressed by the elements of the medium to the degree that the capacity of the elements permit (thesis 3). For example, the line drawn by a pencil may imitate the visible form of the tree's trunk as it rises up from the ground, but the line cannot imitate the three dimensional system of plant cells which constitute the tree's trunk. The law of allusiveness uses the elements of a medium, not to "stand proxy for" the object or its natural elements, but to imitate the object and its descriptive elements.

5. An aesthetic expression contextualizes the allusively related elements of its medium in a style of composition. An aesthetic expression is not only named for what it is e.g. metaphor, sculpture, dance, but for the way the object is portrayed in the medium. The
portrayal of a sculpture's expression indicates that the sculpture should be looked at, possibly touched, but not heard, smelled, or tasted. The portrayal of a painted expression indicates what the audience is to notice about the object which is painted: whether the audience, for example, should recognize the genus and species of the painting's object, or just that the object is one thing and not another. The portrayal of an aesthetic expression is called the expression's style. Style indicates the artist's perspective on the object of the aesthetic expression. (See Holman, 514-15) Style directs an audience as to how to regard the allusively related elements which compose an aesthetic expression. Style has four primary factors: 1) the meaning to be communicated, 2) the medium of the aesthetic expression, 3) the artist's cultural background and his artistic training (See TC, 145-7; CC, 42-5; RW, 116-25), and 4) the artist's individual use of the medium. For example, a story written in the style of impressionism would describe the characters, scenes and events of the story as they appear to the narrator from the narrator's vantage point, from his place in the story, and from his perspectival knowledge of what happened. (See Holman, 268) A story written in the style of neoclassicism would intend "to
delight, instruct and correct man, primarily as a social animal." (Holman, 345) Both of these styles may have the same meaning to communicate and the same basic story with which to express that meaning aesthetically. However, the style of impressionism would direct the audience to regard the meaning as a subjective interpretation, while the style of neoclassicism would direct the audience to regard the meaning didactically, as a lesson.

The above five points are sufficient for explaining the purpose of an aesthetic expression. An aesthetic expression does not imitate natural meaning as it presents itself. An artist uses an aesthetic expression to represent his apprehension of natural meaning. An artist imitates elements of natural meaning by allusively modifying elements of the medium. The elements of the medium are self-referentially related in a style which reveals the artist's apprehension of the object. Our experience of natural meaning is enriched and reordered by our knowledge of the aesthetic expressions' medium and the way the expression imitates the object.

Much more needs to be said about aesthetic expression. However, enough has been said to define metaphor as an aesthetic expression. Because metaphor requires lingual rep-
presentation to be communicated, I hope to make the difference between aesthetic expression and lingual description more clear.

C) Metaphor, an Aesthetic Figure

In chapter four, I define metaphor as an aesthetic figure, that is, an expression with an aesthetic purpose. I say that metaphor communicates meaning about an object through a medium of imagined images. Metaphor depicts the context of an object (as imaginatively imagined) being transposed to the context of a modifying object (as imaginatively imagined). (MS, 106) I later say that the significance and usefulness of this definition depends on an explanation of how meaning can be communicated by a medium which functions self-referentially. Following are my five theses explaining what is necessary for creating an aesthetic expression as they apply to explaining metaphor.

1. "An aesthetic expression is created when the description of an object is represented in a medium which functions self-referentially and which is different in nature than the object." This thesis is true of metaphor. The metaphor "that man is a wolf" does not indicate that in reality a man can be both a man and a
wolf. "Man" and "wolf" refer to imaginary images which make it possible to depict a man as a wolf.

2. "Elements of the medium are used to imitate elements of an object through a capacity shared by elements of both the object and the medium." A metaphor uses as its medium images of the imagination. An imagined image, and an object's capacity to be seen by the eye, share the capacity of being envisioned by the imagination.

3. "The elements of an object which are being imitated must be imitated in a medium 'as-if' the elements of the object have the medium's context." An object has a set structure, set characteristics, and requires certain relationships with other objects in reality. An image of a wolf, for example, can be a cartoon-like representation of a wolf one moment, and the next moment it can be a realistic image of a wolf. Characteristics of the imagined object can change. The same image of the wolf can have brown fur, then white fur, and the next moment gray fur. Imagined images are subject to the whim of suggestion and direction of a man's mind. For example, a man can decide to imagine a wolf with pink fur, or a man can decide to imagine a wolf with pogo-sticks instead of legs.
4. "Elements of an object can be imitated by elements of a medium by relating the elements of a medium self-referentially, according to a law of allusiveness. Allusiveness may be defined as the quality of enriching elements or things with 'ends' other than their natural own." The "end" of an imagined image is to recall a retinal image of something seen. An imagined image can be combined with other imagined images (such as replacing a wolf's legs with pogo-sticks). Using imagined images to create things not found in reality is to create fantastic images. By "fantastic images" I mean any image which has no natural correlate. Unicorns and rainbow striped cows are not known actually to exist, and therefore they will have no natural correlate. The metaphor "the man has guilt written all over his face," relates the image of a man to the image of the word "guilt" written on his face. The relationship is allusive because the two images: man and the written word "guilt" are used for two purposes simultaneously: 1) to recall two retinal images: a man and the written word, "guilt", and 2) to combine the recalled retinal images so that they form a fantastic image: a face with guilt written all over it.

5. "An aesthetic expression contextualizes the allusively related elements of its medium in a style of composi-
tion.... Style indicates the artist's perspective on the object of the aesthetic expression." The meaning a man wants to communicate can be expressed in more than one perspective. Take for example a woman who wishes to express to her friends the lecherous way her boss looks at her. The woman can have at least three possible apprehensions of her boss' staring. She may apprehend his staring as threatening, as violating, or as contemptible. She can express any one of her apprehensions by suggesting in a metaphor, a perspective that correlates with her apprehension of her boss' staring. She can suggest the perspective through the style of her metaphoric expression, that is, through the way she presents the metaphor, and the choice of modifier she uses for her boss. Following are three examples of metaphors: one for each perspective. The woman might say: "That man is a wolf," or "He is always pawwing me with his eyes," or "He stares at me with all the subtlety of a mountain goat in heat." The first metaphor might be spoken in a tone of fear. She wants to suggest that her boss' lechery is as unrelenting as a wolf hunting or staring at its prey. The natural meaning of the boss' lechery is as unrelenting as a wolf hunting or staring at its prey. The natural meaning of the boss' lechery -- what
it reveals about his sexual behavior — as the woman apprehends it, is allusively related to the hunger drives of a wolf. The style of the comparison suggests that the woman finds her boss' behavior threatening. The second metaphor, "He is always pawwing me with his eyes," might be spoken in a tone of dread. The woman wants to suggest how defenseless she feels, perhaps she feels violated by the way her boss stares at her. The fantastic image that the woman describes is an image of her boss' eyes being able to paw at her, as if his stare could touch her flesh. The style she uses — choosing a modifier which relates the effective force of his lecherous stare to the ability of paws to touch or grope — expresses to her friends, how she apprehends his staring as violating her. The third example, "He stares at me with all the subtlety of a mountain goat," expresses the contempt she has for him. This metaphor is styled with the purpose of lampooning and degrading the man's character. The woman wants her friends to know that her boss' lechery does not bother her; she considers his behavior to be something less than human, and therefore he is no threat to her. To communicate her apprehension of her boss' lechery, that is, her interpretation of the natural meaning of his lecherous behavior, she relates the
image of him staring, with the image of a mountain goat that is driven by "the call of the wild" to do unnatural things to satisfy its drives.

These five points which are necessary for the creation of aesthetic expression are sufficient to explain how metaphor communicates its meaning. Metaphor requires a transposition between the object as represented by an imagined image, and the modifying object (modifier) as represented by an imagined image. The reason for this transposition is that the nature of the aesthetic medium of imagined images requires an imaginative act. Just as a pencil can be used to draw a straight line, or to shade in an area, so images can be used to combine natural meanings, or to imagine the action of a scene, etc. Metaphor requires that the object as apprehended be expressed in the context of a modifier so that the perspectival force of the author's apprehension is suggested. Hence, metaphor is an aesthetic figure which requires two different transpositions: the first transposition of an object to a medium of imagined images establishes metaphor as an aesthetic expression. The second transposition of an imagined imitation of an object to an imagined imitation of a modifier establishes the allusive relationship between the two images.
D) Metaphor and Its Literal Meaning

The previous section explains the functioning of metaphor as an aesthetic figure. If my definition of metaphor as an aesthetic figure is to be as useful as Wheelwright's theory of metaphor (as an element of tensive language), then my definition must explain what the lingual description of a metaphor's, or a simile's depiction says. What does the lingual communication of a metaphor mean when it says the subject (of the sentence or phrase) "is" the modifier? And what does the lingual communication of a simile mean when it says the subject "is like" or "is as" the modifier?

Explanation of these questions first requires that the terms describing metaphor on its lingual level be established. Since a metaphor's depiction is described in language, a metaphor may also be explained by referring to the words which refer to the images (in the imagination) composing a metaphoric image. The object about which the metaphor is communicating aesthetic knowledge is the grammatical subject of the sentence (or phrase). The modifying image in the metaphor is the grammatical modifier of the sentence (or phrase). Whenever I talk about the subject and modifier of a metaphor, I am also talking about the correlating imagined images which are the aesthetic medium of metaphor. When I talk about the intention of a metaphor I mean to
indicate the meaning that a metaphor intends to communicate about an object in reality.

1) Simile

Simile is aesthetic in nature. Therefore the use of "is like" or "is as" indicates an allusive relationship between the subject and the modifier, instead of comparing two items in a logical relationship. For example, the simile "His smile was thrown forward in the darkness like a spear," (The King's Indian, 143) does not logically intend to equate the rate the man's smile can be thrown to the rate the spear can be thrown. Instead, the smile is described as being thrown into the darkness as one might throw a spear. The description is not naturally possible and therefore, fantastic. The simile, in the context of the story, is used to express the conversion of the narrator of the story, from cynicism to the hope that life continues after death.

The question to be answered now is why is a smile said to be thrown like a spear, that is, what are the underlying connections between a smile and a thrown spear? The connection, what Aristotle calls the similarity, between the smile and the thrown spear is found in the darkness into
which the man's smile is thrown. Darkness, in the context of the story, is associated with death, meaninglessness and nihilism. The smile, which the narrator apprehends as an expression of his friend's hope and joy of living, is used like a weapon against the darkness. This depiction of a smile used as a weapon against an enemy intends the audience to apprehend the conquering power and fervor that hope gives to a man. On the other hand, the power of a spear is limited. A spear may only wound, it may miss its target, and perhaps most importantly of all, a spear is a one throw, one chance proposition. Suppose for example, that the narrator apprehends hopefulness to be the truth which negates all doubt that life is meaningful; he might associate his friend's smile with something as devastating as an atomic bomb. However, the narrator chooses to associate his friend's smile with a spear. A spear is an unsure weapon. The man who throws a spear into the darkness, that is, the man who lives by hope, will not know if he has slain the dragon "Death" unless he (the man) remains living after he dies.

If the simile is paraphrased, a similarity between the hope and the spear can be identified. That similarity is that hope has the force of a weapon. However, to paraphrase the force of the connection between hope and spear is to ignore the aesthetic import of associating in the
reader's mind the reader's knowledge and experience of hope and a thrown spear. Simile, as an aesthetic expression associates a man's experience and knowledge of things whether actual or fancied.

Since these same arguments can be made for metaphor I will concentrate the following analysis of metaphor on the question of why aesthetic expression is important.

2) Metaphor

Because metaphor is aesthetic in nature, its "literal" statement, which describes the subject to be the modifier, indicates not an actual, but an allusive relationship between the subject and the modifier. In the metaphor, "He is always pawwing me with his eyes," a man's eyes are described as pawwing. The purpose of the metaphor is to relate allusively both images on the basis of enriching the "ends" of the image. The woman who speaks the metaphor intends for her audience to relate their experience and knowledge of staring to those of pawwing.

However, the question being asked in this section is why the aesthetic expression of metaphor is significant. Why is it important to relate experiential knowledge of one thing with that of another thing. If a metaphor is paraphrased or interpreted only as a lingual element, then
metaphor's meaning is abstracted into semantic vehicles. Metaphor as an aesthetic figure concentrates on some dimension or characteristic of an object, such as an object's mutability (dimension), or the groping effect of a lecherous man's stare (characteristic). The image of pawning recalls a man's experiential knowledge of what it is like to be pawwed by his cat or dog. The woman who uses this metaphor of "pawning with his eyes" expresses the groping effect which she feels from her boss' stare by combining in one image the act of a man staring and the act of an animal pawning. The woman's apprehension of her boss' lecherous stare is most adequately expressed according to the woman, if it is imagined to be like the experience of being pawwed by an animal. Metaphor relates natural meaning to what is remembered in one's lifetime. When experience is related to memories on the basis of similarities between dissimilar things (that is, metaphorically), the natural meanings of the similarities are enriched by the contexts of the dissimilar things.

3) Simile and metaphor

As I say in my Introduction, simile and metaphor are both metaphors. However, the difference that distinguishes
them ought to be addressed. As two kinds of metaphor, both simile and metaphor are self-referring aesthetic expressions. Similes are easily distinguished from metaphors on the level of their lingual communication, that is, their use of "is like" or "is as". What the phrases "is like" or "is as" indicate in the literal description of a simile, is an emphasis on the similarity rather than the dissimilar things which compose a metaphoric image.

The difference is easily illustrated in formula form. Letting $A$ stand for the similarities, $B$ for the subject and $C$, for the modifier, the formula for simile may be written as:

$$\text{the } A \text{ in } B \text{ is like the } A \text{ in } C.$$  

In simile the similarity clearly stated or implied, is stated to exist in both the subject and the modifier. Consequently the subject and modifier transpose in such a way that the similarities maintain the focus.

In metaphor, the similarities arise out of the context of the discourse and especially out of the imagined transposition of subject and modifier. Usually the modifier which is chosen is delimited enough by the context of the discourse in which the metaphor occurs so that the choice of a modifier is enough to imply its similarities to
the subject. Other elements of the metaphor also may imply the similarities which are expressed in the fantastic image of the metaphor. Often the verb used to indicate the transposition of the subject and the modifier is used in a way that only the relevant similarities will hold the transposition together. The transposition of a metaphor, rather than a simile, emphasizes the dissimilar things which compose the metaphoric image. The formula for metaphor is this:

\[
\frac{A}{BC}
\]

This formula represents the fantastic metaphoric image. What is not represented here is that B is transposed to C, and that C fits into the context of B. Their juxtaposition however illustrates that the final image is not of B, or of C, or of their summation, but a composition of both. This formula takes the form of a mathematical fraction in order to illustrate that a metaphor does not consist of all the possibilities which exist in the composition of BC. Instead, a metaphor is responsible only for the context of BC which is necessary to express A adequately. The dissimilar elements between B and C are not of immediate consequence. The dissimilarities are only important if they destroy or contradict the meaning which is put together by transposing B and C.
Consider, for example, "My boss is always pawwing me with his eyes." The subject (S) is the boss' eyes. The modifier (C) is an animal's act of pawwing. The similarity (A) is not stated. Instead it is implied to be that which staring (which the boss is doing with his eyes) and pawwing have in common, which is that both staring and pawwing are kinds of groping, or perhaps less judgmentally said, they are kinds of concentrating one's attention on something else (that something else in this example is the "me," the boss' secretary). The fantastic metaphoric image that is described is of a boss with eyes whose look is actually able to paw at his secretary. The subject (the boss) is transposed to the context of its modifier (pawwing paws). The subject maintains the large context of the object which is being depicted, and the context of the modifier creates the intention of the metaphor: that the secretary feels her boss' stare almost as physically as the pawwing of an animal.

E) Conclusion

Metaphor is an aesthetic figure and as such communicates its meaning aesthetically. Metaphor brings together disparate experiences that express more forcefully than
block language can a man's apprehension of his experience of an object. Metaphor transposes two disparate things or experiences in ways which help order and enrich our knowledge of reality (natural meaning).
POSTSCRIPT: ABOUT WHEELWRIGHT AS A PHILOSOPHER

Philip Wheelwright taught at New York University in 1927. In a short time he became chairman of the department of philosophy at Washington Square College. In 1930, The Symposium: A Critical Review was published with Wheelwright as senior editor. (Flint, 2) In 1937, he went to Dartmouth. In 1953, he went to California, "first as visiting professor at Panoma College, and then as the first faculty member of professional rank, aside from the divisional chairman." (Flint, 3)

During his career, Wheelwright wrote introductory texts on philosophy and ethics. He wrote books on the works of Aristotle, Heraclitus, and the pre-Socratics. But his two most famous books (The Burning Fountain and Metaphor and Reality) focus on the symbolic uses of language.

In F. Cudworth Flint's "Dedication to Wheelwright," Flint quotes a passage from Wheelwright's own introductory philosophy textbook (The Way of Philosophy), in order to display the wide-range approach Wheelwright uses.

To practice philosophy is to think critically: and this implies two things. First the good philosopher is critical about meanings.... Second.... the good philosopher is critical about
beliefs.... In the next place, to practice philosophy is to think appreciatively....
Finally, to practice philosophy is to think integrally.... The purpose of philosophy is to see things, so far as possible, in their wholeness. It involves the synoptic vision...
'Seeing everything in its bearing upon everything else...!' (4)

Wheelwright's two books on symbolism show an acute awareness of the faults of positivism, which is one of the major spiritual influences in the western world. That he is able to see the faults of positivism, at the time of positivism's dominance, is a credit to his critical talents. As his own alternative to positivistic philosophy, Wheelwright is careful to contextualize his theories in

a metaphysical standpoint that neither reduces all nonphysical aspects of experience to mere epiphenomena of the physical world, nor yet, on the other hand, reduces the concept of the physical world to merely a useful set of fictions. (Flint, 4-5)

Proper philosophy requires an attitude of openness to all types of information. A good philosopher must critically evaluate all of his information and then allow what he considers to be true information to speak to his own systematics. Wheelwright confesses that humanism provides this attitude.
The one necessary humanistic postulate is that all deeply philosophical inquiries must not only start out from the human center but must be justified at each step by reference to the full range of human interests; .... What he maintains is that human goals are autonomous and of first importance, that science is for the sake of science. (Flint, 5-6)
1 My use of the term 'clarity' may seem different than its common use. My use of it should not be confused with, for example, Descartes' distinction between 'clear and distinct' ideas. I have chosen clarity to describe tensive language's ability to communicate and "mean something more than the words actually say." (MR, 91) Clarity is summarized in the colloquial expression "It's clear to me," rather than the literary evaluation of being "perfectly clear." Since Wheelwright argues that tensive language is language, only a word specifying a lingual purpose would serve properly to indicate the nature of tensive language's vibrancy, adequacy and openness of meaning. My interpretation of Wheelwright will hold to the following distinctions. Block (literal or steno) language obeys the law of identity. Propositional (logical or scientific) language, which is an extreme form of block language, obeys the law of noncontradiction as well as identity. (50, 3-4) Tensive (expressive or poetic) language obeys the law of clarity.

2 Wheelwright says of intuition, "we can and do have direct intuitions of the beyond -- intuitions which can err in details but can never be proved to err in the major assurances of a Something More which they yield. The word 'intuition' in its proper sense (shorn of the meretricious associations and exaggerated claims that sometimes get attached to it) is perhaps the best way of denoting man's threshold awareness of the time, mundane and religious dimensions; "to intuit thus means to be directly aware of more, in any experience than the immediate sensuous content." (BF, 15)

3 "Exact" is a word Wheelwright uses to describe the effect of proposition, logical and scientific language. "Precise" is a word he uses to describe the effect of block (literal) language's ability to identify things, as well as to describe tensive language's ability to clarify vaguer and problematic qualities in reality. In order to distinguish block language from tensive language I will use "precise" to indicate block language and the word "adequate" to indicate tensive language, whenever possible.

4 Wheelwright explains what he means by semantic positivists: "When logical language is taken as the type of all valid language in its representative role, as distinguished from language employed for the purpose of"
either emoting or persuading -- the resultant philosophy (whatever other names may be given to it in certain of its particular developments) may be called semantic positivism. This philosophy involves as a corollary that the only legitimate role of any philosophy is to investigate and clarify the presuppositions, implications, and interrelations of the sciences; for it assumes that any inquiry into the nature of What Is can be valid -- that is, can be composed of legitimate, meaningful questions -- only so far as it goes about its task scientifically, which is to say, as a first step, only so far as it employs scientific, logical language." (MR, 38-9)

5By "apprehend" I mean "to grasp mentally." A child can apprehend the distinction between right and wrong, but a philosopher cannot comprehend it fully. Apprehension is knowledge gained through any degree of intuition, sense perception, reason, or any combination of these three.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

"Metaphoric Imagining" is also the title of a subsection in *The Burning Fountain* (p. 93) (which is entitled in the revised edition as "Compositive Imagining" p. 45). This section discusses how semantic tensification occurs according to the lingual elements of simile and plurisignation. This section is not as illuminating as the discussion of epiphor and diaphor, because (in BF) it focuses on lingual tensions and does not relate lingual tensions to reality's tensions.

Wheelwright's theory is not a simple one to grasp. The following diagram may offer illustrative assistance. Remember, everything can be tensively related.

3 *Methexis*, as representation through participation is, I think, more easily explained as representation through pretence. When a man participates in an object, he is pretending to be that object, or he is accepting a pretence as being real. Methexis suspends a man's disbelief. Methexis is different than mimesis in that methexis does not need any medium other than the imaginative ability to pretend. Methexis is the representation which a man's ability to pretend produces.
ENDNOTES FOR THE POSTSCRIPT

1"Wheelwright, Philip Ellis, educator; born in Elizabeth New Jersey, July 6, 1901; son of Charles Edward and Jessamine (Meeker) W.; Bachelor of Arts, Princeton, 1921, Doctor of Philosophy, 1924; student at Union Theological Seminary; married Maude Chase McDuffee, June 8, 1940; one daughter Linda Jean. Instructor of Latin in Hun Preparatory School, 1923-24; Instructor of philosophy at Princeton 1924-25; Instructor of philosophy Washington Square College, N. Y. University, 1925-27, assistant professor 1927-28, associate professor 1928-31, professor 1931-35, chairman of division of humanities, 1944-47, lecturer in philosophy at Bread Loaf School English Summers 1930, 42; visiting professor of philosophy Panoma College, 1953; professor of philosophy at University of California at Riverside, 1954—(as of 63); research professor at Smith College, 1957-58 Churchill professor at University of Bristol, 1959-60; lecturer Amerst, Vassar College, Wellesley College, Mount Holyoke College, University of Texas, University of South Naverford College, Princeton, Yale, Syracuse University, University of Mexico, University Southern California. Member of American Philosophical Association, American Association of Aesthetics, English Instructors Society for American Association of Aesthetics, English Instructors Society for American Folklore, Phi Beta Kappa,... Editor: (with James Burnham), The Symposium, 1930-33. Contributed articles to professional journals in the United States and Mexico. Home: 4465 Randall Road, Riverside, California. (Who's Who in America, 1963-1971)


2He has also written numerous articles.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works Cited


Other Formative Sources


Other Works by Wheelwright (in Chronological Order)


__"Dogmatism, New Style." Chimaera (1943).


If the Lost Word Be Lost...." Sewanee Review 59 (1951): 348-62.


Philosophy as the Art of Living. College of the Pacific Publications, 1956.


Wheelwright, Philip, and James Burnham. *Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*. Holt, 1932.