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Joseph Goering, Francesco Guardiani, Giulio Silano

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LOVE, UNDERSTANDING AND THE MYSTICAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

ABSTRACT. I propose to explore the relationship between love, understanding and mystical knowledge of God in Eckhart. It contrasts as it must to the "voluntarism" of the Bernadine tradition. So how does Eckhart see God in mystical union with, as he calls it, "the eyes of love"?

Introduction

I admit in moments of stark honesty that I am a minor magician who comes to the history of philosophical and theological letters with one really good analytic trick. By it I move from one text to the next, conceptual hat in hand, mutter a word of power, say "Aristotle's-modes-of-logical-opposition" and *voilà* a conceptual rabbit appears. It may be a scrawny, pitiful thing and suspiciously tame but there you have it, a presence nonetheless. It's a living.

In this essay, I ply my trade to examine a single motif within the oeuvre of two mystical figures connected by bonds of literary dependence: Margaret Porette and Meister Eckhart.[1] If you will pardon a brief mo-

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[1] For the life and work of Margaret Porette, see Edmund College, "Liberty of the Spirit: *The Mirror of Simple Souls,*" *Renewal of Religious Structures*, ed. Laurence K. Shook (Montreal:Palm Publishers, 1968), 2:100-117; "The New Latin *Mirror of Simple Souls,*" *Ons geestelijk erf* 63 (1989): 279-287; "The Latin *Mirror of Simple Souls:* Margaret Porette's Ultimate Accolade?" *Langland, The Mystics and the Medieval English Religious Tradition*, Helen Phillips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 177-183; Edmund College and Romana Guarnieri, "The Glosses by 'M.N.' and Richard Methley to *The Mirror of Simple Souls,*" *Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Peità* 5 (1968): 357-382; Marilyn Doiron, ed., "*The Mirror of Simple Souls,*" *Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Pietà* 5 (1968): 243-355; Peter Dronke, *Women Writers of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Romana Guarnieri, "Lo *Specchio delle anime semplici* e Margherita Poirette," *L'Osservatore Romano* (16 June 1946): 3; ed., "Il *Miroir des simples âmes* di Margherita Porete," *Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Pietà* 4 (1965): 501-708; Kurt Ruh, "*Le Miroir*

ment of filial homage, it was the late Fr. Edmund College O.E.S.A. and his longtime partner in erudite crime Jack C. Marler who, in an article published in 1984, demonstrated Eckhart's textual dependence upon Margaret's condemned text.[2] They thereby confirmed Herbert Grund-mann's hunch of 20 years earlier.[3]

The Magician's Wand

When I go to work philosophically, I take for granted and affirm the long-suffering wisdom of distinguishing one thing from another carried on under the rubric: *bene distinguere, bene philosophare est.* Consequently, I busy myself with asking what I like to think of as "the next question." How do the things so distinguished hang together? That is, I am drawn to the interconnectedness of things. In particular, I am drawn to the interconnections thinkers conceive between the human faculties of will and intellect and between their most outstanding qualities, love and reason.

The reasons for such attraction are hardly mysterious. The highly dif-ferentiated and disenchanted world of our day exercises a corrosive im-pact upon our human selves. In the eyes of such buffetted selves, ac-counts of the intrinsic coherence of self and world exude the fragile, alien beauty of an ancient artifact uncovered by spadework. Such ac-counts, whether they emerge from the history of philosophy and theol-ogy or from the intuition of poets and seers, seem to grow ever more mysterious. Who is not moved by the enigma of a deepening riddle?

des simples âmes der Marguerite Porete," *Verbum et Signum: Essays Presented to Friedrich Ohly* (Munich: W. Fink, 1975), 2:365-387; Paul Verdeyen, *Margaretae Porete Speculum Simplicium Animarum, cura et studio Paul Verdeyen S.J.: Marguerite Porete: Le Mirouer des Simples Ames,* *édité par Romana Guarnieri,* Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis 69 (Turn-hout: Brepols, 1986); and Edmund College O.E.S.A., Jack C. Marler and Judith Grant, ed., *Margaret Porete: The Mirror of Simple Souls,* Notre Dame Texts in Medieval Culture 6 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). For Meister Eckhart, see N. Largier, *Bibliographie zu Meister Eckhart,* Dokimion 9 (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag,1989); and his sequal "Meister Eckhart. Perspektiven der Forschung, 1980-1993," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie* 114 (1995): 29-98.

[2] "'Poverty of Will': Ruusbroec, Eckhart, and *The Mirror of Simple Souls,*" in *Jan van Ruus-broec: The Sources, Content and Sequels of His Mysticism,* ed. P. Mommaers and N. De Paepe (Louvain: Louvain University Press, 1984) 14-47.

[3] "Ketzerverhöre des Spätemittelalters als quellenkritisches Problem." *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 21 (1965): 519-575.

Following Aristotle, we can identify a number of distinct ways in which the connection between things can be conceptualized. [4] Things can be opposed as contraries connected by a sublimated unity in which they all participate. They can be connected, however paradoxical this might sound, by a dichotomy that separates them as mutually exclusive. Dichotomizing connections can themselves be conceived in two ways: as the opposition of a positive and its privation or of an affirmation and its negation. Things can also be connected by correlation.

It is this last way of conceiving the interconnectedness of things that really catches my eye. Aristotle used as his example of correlativity the mathematical or quantitative correlation of "double" and "half". Each of the terms so opposed is included in the definition of the other. A double is only ever the double *of* its half. A half is only ever the half *of* its double. Neither term is intelligible except in relation to the other.

One admits that correlativity is a particularly perplexing way of conceiving the interconnectedness of things. In the universe formed by correlates meaning only accrues to things in relation to their counterparts. And where everything exists only in relation to some other, the question of origin becomes a difficult matter, a *non sequitur*, if you will. Behold the looking glass wonder of the universe explored by so-called postmodern thinkers. [5]

In this universe, all attempts to distinguish correlates as if they were mutually exclusive and then to valorize one of the correlates so distinguished while suppressing the other—all such attempts are doomed to failure. That is, if one is struggling to conceive dichotomistically things that *really* are correlates, trouble results. The suppressed correlate cannot be done without, for it is necessary to the meaningfulness of the other correlate. Consequently, it can be counted on to remain present as a meaningful absence, a trace, you might say, the ghost haunting the figurative house of the dichotomy in question. Why is this so? The answer is already to hand--because, the suppressed correlate is the very condition

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[4] Aristotle's discussion of four distinct forms of logical opposition is to be found in *Categoriae* 11b-14a.

[5] The rejection of "origin" as ontologically and, hence, historiographically primary is ubiquitous within Michel Foucault's *Archeology of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (London—NewYork: Routledge, 1989), but is also an important in Jacques Derrida's *On Grammatology*, trans.Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore—London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). The importance of questioning origins in contemporary continental thought is well brought out in John D. Caputo's *Radical Hermeneutics* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987).

of possibility for the meaningfulness of its counterpart. Behold the conceptual mechanism of deconstruction.[6]

Despite some loose rhetoric in the preceding paragraphs, I do not think that one employs deconstruction properly as metaphysician; it is not a metaphysical position or theory. To say otherwise would be to say that the deconstructionist is, as it were, an Aristotelian Nimrod dully determined to posit the accidental category of "relation" as metaphysical prime in place of substance. Such a saying betrays an apriori expectation of conceptual depravity that is, if you will excuse the expression, Calvinistic in its totality. But, this *is* how deconstruction is often read, with disbelief and contempt as predictable responses. I suppose it would be no scandal in a St. Michael's publication to say that if such a reading is Calvinistic, it is simply wrong.[7]

I am claiming, then, that deconstruction properly concerns texts and how one understands the conceptual structures operative in the language of texts. In other words, deconstruction is a tool of the interpreter of texts by which to gain a purchase on what lies below the text's conceptual surface. It is this employment that lies behind the famous Derridean aphorism: There is nothing outside the text. The aphorism, as I understand it, bespeaks a truism, for it must be true of every mode of textual analysis that it respect its limits; indeed, there can *be* no textual analysis outside a text.

Moreover, deconstructive reading, like any analytical device, is only designed to train the eye upon a limited range of conceptual and lingual phenomena. It focuses attention upon those conceptual and linguistic phenomena by which two terms are opposed as mutually exclusive opposites such that one is valorized in relation to the other. But this characterization is too broad. Rather, it sensitizes one to the presence of dichotomies in which the valorized term is continually expressed using the suppressed term or one of its synonyms.[8] Such a conceptual and lingual pattern suggests that the writer in question is operating at one and the same time on a surface and a subterranean level and to crossed purposes. On the surface, the writer posits a dichotomy of mutual exclusion, but works subliminally, and perhaps subconsciously, as if the di-

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[6] See in this regard, John D. Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997).

[7] I admit to being a trifle naughty in saying this, the proverbial bad guest, you might say, using self-deprecation, with a twinkle in his eye, to put his host in an awkward position.

[8] Derrida provides a relatively accessible example of such a reading in his essay "Plato's Pharmacy" to be found in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 63-171.

chotomy were a correlation. The result is a language practice, a web of metaphor that muddies the conceptual waters, begriming the clear and distinct reflections posited on the liquid surface.

Of course to have discovered such a textual crux is not yet to interpret it. But, one can already call the surface meaning of the text into question. That is, one can say that such texts do not sustain the purity of their own organizing distinctions. But, again, to note a lack of consistency is not yet to understand why the inconsistency occurs. Does it occur because the world imposes itself upon the thinker at that point forcing its way into the quiet close of the writer's conceptual framework? Or are we witness to the tension introduced to thought by two incompatible commitments when there is no deeper commonality that would allow for sure comparative judgment? These are but two of the truly interesting questions that deconstructive analysis brings to the fore but cannot itself answer. They beckon the reader further, to explore the ways in which the universe of the writer and the world are mediated by the text.

Abracadabra!

We turn at last to our chosen figures and their texts. We begin with Margaret Porette's *Mirror of Simple Souls* and its extended opposition of Reason (*raison*) and Love (*amor*). Throughout this text Reason's dullness and Love's acuity are contrasted.[9] The contrast is frequently cast in terms of mutual exclusion. Where Love's mastery begins, Reason's ends.[10]

It is not that Margaret denies the possibility of comparative judgment. Hardly that, for Love and Reason are both, in her way of seeing things, regulative dynamics within the life of the Soul. She could, then, have chosen to represent Love and Reason as contraries. In such a conceptual opposition the accent would have fallen upon the deeper unity Love and Reason share. However, she chooses to emphasize their difference, the fact that their jurisdictions are contiguous without overlap. This dichotomizing treatment is highlighted throughout the *Mirror*. That is, it is what Margaret sees first and most vividly when she thinks of Love and Reason together. Moreover, it lies at the base of her contempt for

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[9] See for example, the Soul's exasperation with Reason and Reason's submission to the rule of Love in *Mirror*, ch. 35.

[10] See for example, the exchange between love and reason in *Mirror*, ch. 22.

schooled theology and its practitioners. As the Broadway tune would have it: Anything thing they can know, she can know better.

Of course we must yet ask after the sort of dichotomy Margaret had in mind. Did she conceive the disjunction between Reason and Love as that of an affirmation and its negation or did she see it rather as the disjunction of a positive and its privation? The manner of Reason's submission to Love in the *Mirror* seems to point in the latter direction.

In chapter 65 Reason asks Love whether, in the context of Love's mastery she (i.e. Reason) and the virtues are to "be thrust out of her (i.e., the Soul's) dwelling?" Love responds "Not at all . . .; rather you . . . will still remain of her household and keep her gate so that if anyone sought to break into her dwelling who was opposed to Love, . . . you would raise the alarm."[11]

The opposition of a positive to its negation can be cast as the opposition of "A" and "not-A". Where "A" is present "not-A" is necessarily absent and vice versa. It is clear that Margaret is not thinking of Love and Reason in those stark terms. Reason is not banished when she cedes her mastery to Love. Rather, she and the other virtues are assigned a new role in the house of the Soul. They are henceforth to function as "portresses," guardians of the intimate harmony within. Reason is to identify any potential presence inconsistent with that inner harmony. This is a task, as we shall see, that is well fitted to Reason and her pedestrian ways.

Reason and its regulative office is not, then, presented as the very negation of Love and its regulative office. Rather it is conceived as an imperfect manifestation of which Love is the perfection. That is, Reason lacks something which is only fully present in Love but does manifest privatively what Love manifests positively or perfectly.

And what might *it* be? Though Margaret's *Mirror* is notoriously difficult to read on matters like this, I claim that they manifest divine Presence, i.e., the intimate inner harmony of mystical union. Reason and

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[11] Throughout this essay I make use of the edition and translation prepared by Fr. Edmund College O.E.S.A. , Jack C. Marler and Judith Grant mentioned in note one above. The passage in question is to be found on page 86. The Latin and French texts published in the Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis 69 read as follows: French: Nenny, dit Amour, ainçoys vous trois demourrez de sa meignee, et serez vous trois garde de sa porte, ad ce que ce nul se vouloit en son hostel embatre, qui fust contre Amour, que checune de vous rementeust; Latin: Non, dicit Amor, sed remanebitis omnes tres de sua familia. Sed hoc erit in ianuis; unde tres habebit ianitrices. Ita quod si aliquid amori contrarium violenter vellet eius hospitium intrare, quaelibet vestrum reclamet.

Love then are dynamics that orient the Soul with respect to its proper object.

Reason does so from absence. It works toward Presence and does so via the construction of conceptual proof or valid thought. Its modus operandi is consistent throughout the *Mirror*. It wants to know why. It demands proof, which means, above all, conceptual consistency. The first third of the *Mirror* is marked by Reason's inquisitorial demands: Here, O Love, you say "x"; but there you say "not-x". Explain the contradiction. Even when its inquest is later transformed by its acknowledgment of Love's greater Understanding, it continues to demand proof of what it can not follow.

Reason for Margaret, then, is a dynamic orienting the Soul toward Divine Presence, a *via validitatis*. As such, it functions for her even as it had for Augustine in his *De doctrina christiana*. For Augustine, the question of conceptual consistency and argumentative validity had to be distinguished from the question of Truth and its Presence.[12] Analogously, for Margaret, Reason does not deliver Divine Presence. And that is why Love's Understanding cannot be put into words. Moreover, it needs no proof. How could it when it flows from Presence not to it. That is why Margaret has the Soul admonish Reason in response to its insistent demand for proof as follows: "Is there, says the Soul, anything baser than to ask for proofs in love? Truly not, it seems to me, since Love is its own proof, and that is enough for me."[13] In this Margaret inverts the order between intellect, will and Presence as, for example, Thomas Aquinas had presented them.[14]

Reason directs toward divine Presence, Love directs from Divine Presence. Love can do so because it is Divine Presence: "I am God, says Love, for Love is God and God is Love, and this Soul is God through its condition of Love, and I am God through my divine nature, and this Soul is God by Love's just law."[15]

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[12] Aurelius Augustinus, *De doctrina christiana* 2.34.52.

[13] See the exchange between Reason and the Soul in *Mirror*, ch. 69. The Latin and French texts of the *Mirror* read as follows: French: Est il, dit l'Ame, plus grant villenie que vouloir tesmoing en amour? Certes nenny, ce me semble, quisque Amour en est tesmoing: ce m'est assez; Latin: *Estne* maior rusticitas quam velle habere testimonium ab amore? Non mihi videtur. Ex quo amor est, istud satis mihi testimonium.

[14] See *Summa Theologiae* 1-2.3.4.resp.

[15] See *Mirror*, ch. 21. The Latin and French texts of the *Mirror* read as follows: French: Je suis Dieu, dit Amour, car Amour est Dieu, et Dieu est amour, et ceste ame est Dieu par condicion d'amour, et je suis Dieu par nature divine, et ceste Ame l'est par droicture d'amour; Latin: Ego sum Deus, ait Amor, quia amor est Deus et Deus est amor et ista

Love as regulative dynamic in the Soul is, in Margaret's telling, Divine Love. As such, it is pure act. Through it, God gives but does not receive. God does not ever have love that is not God. By implication, the presence of true Love-for-God in the human soul is also at one and the same time the presence of the Love-of-God. To live out of this Love is to live a divine life. Whatever one comes to understand in the course of such a life is understood *sub specie aeternitatis*. There are no human words for such knowing; it is deeper by far than anything we can grasp. It is, in fact, God's knowing not the Soul's, for it is God's Love that has come to move the Soul in its operations. Indeed, Margaret calls this Love "the mistress of Knowledge", and contrasts it with that merely creaturely love that "is Knowledge's daughter." God's Love is "the mother of Knowledge and of Divine Light, for she knows the all of it, as being the more of that all, in which more this Soul remains and dwells, nor can she dwell elsewhere than in that all."[16] And here we notice something peculiar. Love does not cease her argumentativeness once Reason's inquisitiveness has been resolved in submission. Rather, Love's Understanding remains a provider of distinctions and, though itself (famously) without a why, a container of life's Why?" In other words, Love's Understanding too operates in terms of conceptual consistency and dialectical validity. To be sure, Love's Understanding elaborates and confirms the implications of Divine Presence. Nevertheless, Love's regulative patterns, her *usages* in Margaret's language, turn out to look for all the world like the *usages* of lowly Reason. And so, below the level of Margaret's surface dichotomy there lurks a subterranean correlativity. Love's meaning can only be expressed via the customary features of Reason.

The Rabbit

What are we to make of this discovery? Its significance is not self-evident. In what universe of discourse is it to be placed? I am myself exploring the hypothesis that Margaret is drawing on the same sensibility operative in the contemporary "voluntarist" attempt to conceive intellect as subordinate to will. Certainly debates around the relative eminence of the human intellect and will were endemic to theological debate in Margaret's day.

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anima est Deus ex conditione amoris. Et ego sum Deus per naturam divinam et ista est Deus de iure amoris.

[16] See *Mirror* ch. 56.

As I see it, these debates centre upon the age-old problem of *philosophia christiana*: knowledge of self and knowledge of God. They approach the problem from the point of view of human beatitude.[17] That communion with God by which humans come into the perfection of their being demands some ontic likeness if it is to be understood. But any such likeness must be sturdy enough to bridge the absolute metaphysical chasm separating the Creator from his creatures. What quality of human being is sturdy enough in its intelligible structure to serve understanding? All participants in these debates agree that one look to the two highest qualities of human being: intellect and will. And that is where the debate begins. Voluntarists look at intellect and notice that it can only receive in accordance with its own measure. And yet the Creator is immense. Is there some quality of human being that is capable of a like immensity. They then notice that will conforms to the measure of its object. Consequently, it must possess the potential for immensity, if it has the capacity to love God. Here one sees the possibility of accounting for what we affirm in faith when we speak of comm-union with God. It is within human will and through the immense capacity of love that union occurs and we enter into our beatitude.

I read contemporary voluntarists as further justifying their judgment by mapping the distinction of passions and actions onto the deeper metaphysical distinction of act and potency. Of course, both actions and passions are acts of a given substance. Action marks a substance's capacity to affect other substances. Passion marks out a substance's capacity to receive the affective action of other substances. The one bespeaks the substance as mover, the other the substance as moved. That which is moved depends upon the action of another; it is in potency with respect to that action. A mover, by contrast, has complete control over his constitutive act qua mover. It is something like this chain of thought that legitimates the association of action with act, of passion with potency. Act is to potency as end is to means. Thus act is higher, is of greater value, is to be preferred to potency as an end is to be preferred to its means. By extension an action is to be preferred to its correlative passion. Will directs the soul *ad extra*, whereas intellect receives into itself. Thus, the perfective act of an intellect is a passion whereas the perfective act of will is an action. Will's enabling action is the end of which the intellects sciential passion is a means. Thus, will is the higher faculty within human personality. Its perfection entails human perfection. The

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[17] See, in this regard, C. Trottmann, *La vision béatifique des disputes scholastiques à sa définition par Benoit XII* (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1995)

will's loving union with God therefore is beatitude. Intellectual vision of God is but a means toward that end. Such a chain of reasoning, however contestable and contested, provides a conceptual elaboration of hunches about ourselves and our world that underlie Margaret's dichotomous juxtaposition and simultaneous correlation of Reason and Love. Love begins in the Wonder that moves Reason to act. Simultaneously, Love is the ultimate end of all human striving, including Reason's acts. And that Love, if it is true and perfect, is God acting within the Soul. She is transformed, deified, such that all her subsequent acts are divine. Under Love's regulative force, all Knowledge of God is itself Divine and hence but Love, in the end. Love is the deepest name for God that we can utter. Its Presence in the will and through the will to the whole of human being is at one and the same time the perfection and annihilation of that being. All of this represents a particularly paradoxical and gleefully hyperbolic elaboration of a voluntarist meditative pattern. Nevertheless, the voluntarist along with the intellectualist insists that human will and intellect are also to be understood correlatively. One of the ways that Thomas Aquinas illustrates the point is to say: "the intellect understands the will to will, whereas the will wills the intellect to understand."[18] Correlativity forms a base upon which more dichotomizing oppositions of intellect, will and their proper virtues are built whether by voluntarists or intellectualists.

This subcutaneous correlativity is well illustrated by the fact that an intellectualist could appropriate Margaret's analysis of will and its annihilation, without thereby positing Love as the deepest name for God. Enter Meister Eckhart. Eckhart knew all about voluntarist analysis of the human condition and end. Indeed the third of his *Quaestiones Parisienses* is a *reportatio* of his exchange with the Franciscan thinker Gunsalvo of Spain on precisely this issue.[19] Fr. College and Jack Marler have shown that in certain of his German sermons (e.g. Sermon 52) Eckhart appropriated several of the most striking rhetorical emphases and conceptual apparatus from an exemplar of Margaret's *Mirror*, presumably brought to the Dominican priory at Cologne by the Dominican inquistor who had presided over Margaret's condemnation. And yet, Love is not the deepest name for God, in Eckhart's universe. That honour is reserved for the

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[18] *Summa theologiae* 1.82.4.ad 1.
[19] *Die Lateinische Werke*, 5 Vols. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1938-) 5.55-71

Divine "*Intelligere*".[20] That is, deeper than the Love by which God joins himself to us, one posits the being (*esse*) of God. Moreover one understands that being to be convertible with God's understanding (*intelligere*). Eckhart, however, is not content to let the matter rest there. God, he says, is better thought to be because he understands, than the other way round. The deepest name for God is this absolutely first *intelligere*,[21] the absolute unity from which all being flows. Love and its unitive work in the human soul is then an implication of the Divine *Intelligere*. That is why Eckhart prefers to speak of the birth of the Son or Word in the Soul than the active presence of Love.[22] The effect however is isomorphic. *Intelligere* is pure act. It is not intelligible because then it would receive something superadded upon its own act. Consequently, it acts wherever it is present. Subsequent to the Son's birth in the Soul all the Soul's acts of knowing and loving are divine.

And this leaves me with a last question: Why would Eckhart have found Margaret's voluntarist text so suggestive? I offer a provisional answer as this paper's conclusion. Love in Margaret's text points to a "more" that God does not give but which God wills the Soul to desire. In comparison with this "more", all that the Soul is and all that it actually receives from God is as nothing whatsoever. But God gives himself as Love to the Soul in Margaret's telling. And this fact allows Eckhart to read Margaret's "more" as if it were synonymous with his "hidden God" "beyond God", none other than the Divine *Intelligere* itself. Now if I am right, that is some big rabbit.

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[20] See, especially, R. Imbach, *Deus est Intelligere. Das Verhältnis von Sein und Denken in seiner Bedeutung für das Gottesverständnis bei Thomas von Aquin und in den Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts*, Studia Friburgensia NF 53 (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1976).

[21] This is the position argued for in the first of the *Parisian Questions*. See LW 5.37-48.

[22] See for example, Sermon 2 among his German sermons, *Die Deutschen Werke*, 5 Vols. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1938-) 1.24-45. See also R. Manstetten, *Esse est Deus—Meister Eckharts christologische Versöhnung von Philosophie und Religion und ihre Ursprünge in der Tradition des Abendlandes* (Freiburg—Munich: K. Alber, 1993).