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Society After the Subject, Philosophy After the Worldview

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Our theme in this volume is the issue of worldview in social science, but it began and now ends on a philosophical note. This had to be the case—the nature of the topic demanded it—and yet it can hinder discussion of the issue. More than once we have felt the need to "come down" to cases in the social sciences. But some of us have not yet felt the need to come down to cases because we know we have not climbed the philosophical mountain on the worldview question. There is no account of worldview in social science that is philosophically satisfying. We badly need a paradigm that will give the concept of worldview a healthy yield in the social sciences. The use of this idea is philosophically vague, and the idea itself problematic, as several previous chapters have shown. This has been expressed so far in terms of the concept's origins in Romanticism. We have been reminded, or warned, that the concept of worldview is not a native but rather an immigrant into Christian intellectual territory. And, like all immigrants, it has crossed our borders with its baggage in hand. It is possible, as the discussions in this book have shown, to conduct a kind of border search, opening the linguistic suitcases of the worldview idea in order to examine the contents for semantic contraband. To be consistent in their thinking, Christians need to confiscate such contraband and bring it captive to Christ. But I do not think merely impounding certain aspects of the worldview idea will suffice; we must also replace its illicit content with, biblically speaking, licit content, if we wish the idea to settle

and prosper in the Kingdom of God. As social scientists and philosophers, we hold the keys to the gates of this Kingdom. We will have to give account for our conduct in this office.

But the paradigm we need to guide our use of the idea of worldview in these sciences is still an object of desire. Perhaps this is as it should be—theoretical knowing apparently does not *begin* with discussions of paradigms and guiding ideas, even though a scientific account of any phenomenon is unimaginable without the intervention of some paradigm. Rather, the discussion of paradigms comes as theorizing develops and matures. Hence, the philosophical element in our conference indicates a relatively advanced stage of reflection. Nevertheless, we have not yet attained our goal.

The following paper attempts two things. The first is to offer some thoughts on the nature of paradigms. The second is more mischievous: to make the problem of worldview even more difficult by looking deeper into its philosophical suitcases. I believe what is contraband in this idea lies on a deeper level than has been stated so far. Philosophically speaking, the ''worldview'' discussion so far has really been an ''anthropology'' discussion. For what we make of the worldview idea depends entirely—again, philosophically speaking—on our concept of what we used to call ''Man.'' We don't need to be reminded that modern ''man'' understands himself as a subject. It has been suggested in previous chapters that the worldview idea, because of its Romantic roots, is subjectivist, that it causes us to place too great an emphasis upon the contributions of the knowing subject in scientific activity, and that this is the baggage in the worldview idea that must be seized. I suggest that this objection is on the right track, but that it is not thorough enough.

The problem with the worldview idea in modern philosophy is that it obliges us to construe this creature ''Man'' as a subject in the first place. If we are hoping for a philosophical account of Subject which avoids subjectivism altogether, we wait in vain. Even a preliminary glance suggests that ''subjectivism'' in its several senses derives from a general notion of humanity as the subject. We must make this idea of the Subject a problem for ourselves if we wish to confiscate the contraband in the worldview idea. I am not suggesting that we throw away the idea of Subject altogether. I am saying that our common—even pedestrian—idea of the human being as Subject demands the redeemed and redeeming attention of the Christian philosophical critique. Such a criticism is only begun in this paper.

I want to avoid giving the reader the impression that I offer a coun-

sel of despair concerning the ideas of worldview and the Subject. I do not want to explode either of these notions. On the contrary, we have reason to believe that these ideas already contain explosives hidden in their philosophical suitcases. This requires that we examine their luggage for any devices that may threaten the philosophically innocent members of the biblical public we serve.

In the subdiscipline that is my special concern—i.e., the historiography of the history of philosophy—the importance of the worldview issue cannot be overestimated. But even in disciplines not aimed at some special form of human consciousness, or disciplines that study non-human phenomena, the importance of the idea of worldview seems to be gaining recognition. Yet, I am aware that the notion of worldview I employ in research and teaching is underdeveloped and in some respects vague. In my case, the reason for vagueness is that I have understood worldview itself as an imprecise, global picture of reality, painted in broad strokes and employed in the course of everyday living and knowing. The significance I have attached to the notion of worldview for the theoretical disciplines has consisted in the idea that theorizing and research are surrounded, permeated, and guided by a world-picture which derives from the visceral domains of human life decisions. The world-picture is important for science in that it reflects a manner of knowing and taking up the world that is distinctly non-technical and non-theoretical. But one may expect the presence of such a picture within theoretical activity in the various disciplines to go largely undetected. In the past, I have been satisfied simply to point to these extra-theoretical elements in our scientific knowing without accounting for them, assuming that where knowing is animated by its visceral substratum the presence and effects of the worldview could never become transparent. Even so, this is no excuse for a vague concept of worldview. Therefore, my philosophical interest in the worldview issue at this conference lies not only in speaking to the influence of worldview upon philosophy, but also in developing a more rigorous concept of worldview as such.

The Paradigm and the Public

I have, however, a more specific reason for pursuing a rigorous concept of worldview, which arises out of my concerns as an historian of philosophy. Perhaps you find it difficult, as I do, to resist the idea that something like a "worldview consciousness" is currently on the rise in many disciplines and especially in the social sciences. Many

who applaud Kuhn's research into the history of paradigms in the natural sciences find the concept of paradigms useful in the social sciences—although Kuhn believes the social sciences are still too young and undeveloped even to display paradigms.[1] This is a warning that what many of us mean when we speak of "paradigms" in the social sciences may not be paradigms at all in the Kuhnian sense. Nevertheless, the work of Kuhn and its reception lends support to the idea that a recognition of the importance of worldviews is just now on the rise.

I am skeptical about this way of construing the current trend. Many of us suffer from an optical illusion when we consider the historical significance of the worldview question. We entertain the idea that ours is The Age of the Worldview—borrowing the title of Heidegger's essay, "The Age of the World-Picture"—a period in which philosophy and the sciences are characterized by a cognizance of perspective and viewpoint. Accordingly, we tend to view this awareness as something new, even as an advance. Perhaps we are under the impression that to become aware of paradigms, of "language games," is to recognize the role of commitment in theorizing. Perhaps we assume that the idea of worldview will undercut the traditional idea of neutrality. But the theme of cosmopsis (worldviewing) is not new; neither is the search for a scientific discipline of cosmoptics (the study of worldviewing), and neither is a philosophical cosmophthamology (treatment of disorders of the worldview).

What appears to be a novel worldview consciousness among our contemporaries is merely the break-up, or pluralization, of the modern Western ideal of the world-picture. This break-up is an irrationalization of the *ratio*, the dis-ideation of the *idea*, a scattering of the *subiectum*. As a result, philosophy has fallen from its modern vocation of epistemological criticism of culture. Post-modern philosophy is obliged to be post-critical philosophy. But the transformation wrought by this break-up is not merely a transformation *of* philosophy. This break-up is more than constitutional, it is also institutional. What has been altered is the relationship between philosophy and its public.

This relationship between philosophical leadership and the philosophical public—with its interplay of "influence" and "reception"—is a frequently neglected factor in the rise of "great" movements, "great" periods, and "great" figures in the history of thought. This relation is also the principal way into the problem of the social conditions affecting philosophy. Although the philosophical public does not produce philosophy, neither is it external to philosophy in the institutional sense. Philosophers and the philosophical public together

constitute the philosophical community as an historical reality. In some periods of philosophy's history, such as the one we call "German Idealism," the intellectual market has been quite bullish on philosophy. In others eras, we find philosophical values underpriced and, historically speaking, philosophies driven out of business. It is not cynical to say the "great" philosophers are to a large extent products of the market for philosophy in their times, and that the marketability of philosophy in a certain age largely determines the fate of particular philosophical views. To say so is not cynical because even if this is the case, it does not diminish the need for a philosophy to display both logical cogency and explanatory power in order to be construed as valid in the theoretical sense. And yet the consideration of marketability allows us to ask about the general historical conditions that existed, for example, in Western societies just prior to World War I and that set the stage for the rise for Existentialism, Neo-positivism, and Calvinistic philosophy. Such an inquiry may enable us to determine in part why in the following years the career of philosophy took an upswing, and what features differentiate this period of growth from the one a century earlier in Germany.

The line that separates philosophical leadership and the philosophical public is not easily discerned. Indeed, it is so frequently redrawn that it appears to be flexible. I prefer not to say the line is inherently obscure or fluid, but to say that the history of philosophy consists partly in drawing and redrawing, in crossing and recrossing, this line. The line between philosophical leadership and public simply marks—as it does in every cultural institution with a history—the difference between the forces that form history and the material that is formed. By "material" I mean, of course, human beings—the followers of a particular school of philosophy.

Undoubtedly great philosophies arise in bad times as well as good, but a philosophy is a creature with a delicate constitution. It will not survive in an indifferent environment, let alone in a hostile one. In this respect, philosophies are more like theatrical productions than, say, novels. Like performances, they must be put on, well-attended, and critically acclaimed. Philosophies thrive only in the philosophical space afforded them by an audience which, by "attending" this philosophy, renders the intellectual room around it a theatre. The difference between the historical spectacle of German Idealism and the philosophy of the preceding period, for example, cannot be explained merely by appealing to the presence in the former and the absence in the latter of great philosophers. It is not, or not only, a question of

talent; it is also a question of public receptivity to philosophical talent. As Nietzsche notes,

> It has been rightly said that a people is characterized not as much by its great men as by the way in which it recognizes and honors its great men.[2]

The reception the public gives a philosophy depends upon what the public believes philosophy can do. The university population and the larger philosophical public Hegel addressed still regarded the French Revolution as a philosophical event, a revolution in thinking, a monument to the power of Reason to influence human events ("vive Jean-Jacques"). But the university generation of the late 1830's, the generation of Marx, looked askance at the high priesthood of Idealism, and sought a new cultural hero in the rising European masses. For Marx, the French Revolution was not a philosophical event, nor the outcome of a new consciousness. It was the result of changes in the material conditions of history. Marx's view fed upon a new set of assumptions in Western societies concerning the relation between philosophical leadership and its public,[3] which had a profound historical effect upon the university. The remaining decades of the nineteenth century saw a professionalization of philosophy on a grand scale,[4] not unlike the trend in our own day.[5] As a result, some of the innovative and prophetic philosophy of the nineteenth century left the universities in search of more congenial, "off-broadway" theatres.

In some circles the humble role played by the philosophic public is not recognized as necessary to philosophy as such. When we stop to think about it, the history of the reception of philosophy does seem *prima facie* to be important. Still, we tend to feel we either know "what Plato said" or we do not, without regard for the historical situation into which Plato was speaking. I submit, however, that "what Plato said" is not such a straightforward state of affairs. Plato's philosophy is discourse aimed at a philosophical public whom he hoped to call to philosophical task.

Because we must take into account the historical audience of any philosophy, the history of philosophy is not so easily, or straightforwardly, understood. In fact, it is my contention that it is always *mis*understood. It is not that we must remove some barrier blocking our way into the history of philosophy. It is rather that the history of philosophy *is* a barrier to understanding. The reason for this is that, of all of the subject matters of historiographical science, the history of philosophy is unique in generating categories about itself. The history of

philosophy is autocategorical. Perhaps the art historian finds in a given art phenomenon (a movement, period, or oeuvre) an articulate awareness of some other art phenomenon that it places over and against itself. It may be that the phenomenon under investigation could not have taken shape without this articulate categorization of its other. But with art phenomena in general, this need not be the case. The phenomena that make up the history of philosophy, however, are by their very nature imbued with a theoretical consciousness of other phenomena in this history. The history of philosophy knows no paradise; it boasts no innocent first generation. The fragments of the Pre-Socratics manifest critique, dissent, and polemical labeling from the beginning. This, among other things, is what philosophy is. Hence, there is no philosophical thesis that is not already the anti-thesis of some other thesis—even if this other thesis is non-philosophical in nature. This is the historical kernel of truth in the traditional idea that philosophy begins in doubt. This idea is true if by it we mean that, for the philosopher, believing x includes not believing some non-x, such the latter is *explicit* in the former. It belongs to the logical structure of philosophical discourse that the philosopher knows both what he knows *and* its implications.

Paradigms in Philosophy

This fact explains why the history of philosophy *appears* superfluous as an object of study, whereas in fact a critical historiography is indispensable to philosophy as such. If the history of philosophy is an autocategorical field of research, rigorous and reflective inquiry may appear unnecessary. Surely, "Platonism is Platonism" and "Sophism is Sophism," and historiography can neither change this fact nor make it truer. But historiography can investigate and criticize the distinction between Plato and the Sophists. And this kind of investigation is in philosophy's highest interest. The distinction at issue is Plato's own, and the label "Sophism" is a spontaneous product of his effort to articulate his viewpoint. The label "Sophism"—or Analytical Philosophy," or any other label—is *not* a historiographical concept born of a disciplined analysis of the history of philosophy. Rather, such labels are by-products of this history itself. They are expressions of philosophy's own historical consciousness. Such labels and the histories of their usage belong to the subject matter of philosophical historiography, they are not themselves attempts at historiographical science.

This distinction may seem tenuous, but it rests upon the difference between two kinds of concepts in philosophy. The first is a philosophical label resulting from discussion and expressing concurrence, dissension, allegiance, or co-belligerency vis-a-vis another philosopher or view. The second is a rubric under which philosophical opinions on various matters can be ranged based on some criterion determining similarity and difference. For example, though we may not be persuaded by Ayer's attempt in *Language, Truth and Logic*, to identify a tradition for "Logical Empiricism,"[6] we do not for that reason lose interest in the label. We are still able to profit philosophically from its study. However, in doing so we are not dwelling in the philosophical/historical space this label created. Instead, we are analyzing the label itself as an historical/philosophical problem. To do so presupposes philosophy—in fact, it is a function of philosophy. But it also demands that we take up a different attitude toward the label or category, for we are not simply agreeing or disagreeing with the philosophical standpoint and historical consciousness expressed by the category.

Labels or categories arise in the course of a philosophical leadership's work in founding a paradigm and disseminating it to the philosophical public. Such categories are paradigm-relative, but they are not themselves the paradigms they are invented to serve. The paradigm is necessarily and internally bound up with such historical/dialectical categories for its articulation and defence. This inner bond is seen if we go beyond the question, What are the criteria for legitimating a paradigm? to ask, Why are there paradigms? If there were only one paradigm in all the sciences, its existence would be an uninteresting fact; it would be an undiscoverable fact as well. Even if there were only as many paradigms as there are academic disciplines, still the essential nature of a paradigm could not come to light. In fact, in either of these hypothetical cases, there would be no paradigm at all. For one paradigm is *not* a paradigm, and several paradigms which avoid competing for hegemony over a single territory are *not* paradigms. The paradigm is a heuristic contestant in a struggle for the right to interpret some phenomenon, or class of phenomena. I call this a competition for the *right* to interpret a phenomenon in order to indicate that it is not merely a power struggle, but a quest for theoretical justice. Paradigms arise in order to meet a specific need: a theory's need not to verify itself vis-a-vis the phenomenon it wishes to explain but to defend its right to certain assumptions made while explaining this phenomenon. Paradigms are wrought in the course of scientific activity to settle questions about these assumptions so that hypotheses can get on with the

business of accounting for states of affairs.

In this competition for the right to interpret phenomena, theoretical activity is diverted momentarily from its straightforward accounting of things to pursue the same end indirectly by accounting for its own hypotheses. Such a *defense* of the right of a hypothesis to its assumptions assumes there is an *attack* on its right, which in turn implies a countervailing notion of the proper foundation for a hypothesis. In other words, the defence of a paradigm is carried out in the presence of another (at least implicit) paradigm. The paradigm is already something of an *apologia*. But it belongs to the nature of philosophy to make this *apologia* explicit. Hence, when the paradigm has been given shape and put in place, then its authors and functionaries must defend its historical right to be. This defence is a discursive practice that produces those spontaneous and pseudo-historiographical labels or categories mentioned above that must be made the objects of a critical historiography of philosophy.

Paradigms are not theories, neither are they the *objects* of philosophical analysis. The object of philosophy is "what is," as a whole and in general. But paradigms can be said to be philosophy's object in the teleological sense of the word: the paradigm is a certain species of concept which philosophy is at pains to produce. We call these concepts paradigms not in order to claim a chiefly instrumental relationship to them, but to underscore their special status. The notion of special status concepts was first articulated by Kant in his analysis of *Grenzbegriffe* (limiting concepts)[7]. Some, such as Natorp, have attributed an awareness of such concepts to Plato.[8] It is true that Kant consciously adopted Plato's term *idea* in order to designate these peculiar *Grenzbegriffe*. But this does not mean Plato himself recognized the existence of such concepts, and it certainly does not make Kant a Platonist. Nor does it make Kuhn a Platonist when he appropriates Plato's other term for the *idea*—namely, *paradeigma*—in order to give new expression to the idea of special status concepts. Although *idea* and *paradeigma* have the same referent in Plato's lexicon, they are not synonyms. *Paradeigma* is the *idea* as a blueprint for the building activity of the cosmic craftsman. Kuhn's choice of this term, then, may reflect a constructionist and instrumentalist interpretation of epistemic activity. But we are not obliged to construe the paradigm as an instrument of production. The fundamental idea is simply that of a concept that acts as an intra-theoretical criterion, serving a variety of purposes in theorizing. In precisely what respect the paradigm affords guidance to science has not been established. It may guide in a number of ways,

or its guidance may be very specific in nature. In any case, it is difficult to imagine this guidance being reliable, or even being taken seriously, if the paradigm is *simply* a tool. The paradigm wields heuristic/theoretical authority; it is more than an expedient. This is proved by the fact that paradigms have exercised great influence in science and philosophy despite being internally complicated and even difficult to apply. Lack of efficiency is not a consideration by itself and cannot displace a paradigm. (Moreover, the historical evidence is that inefficiency as such never did displace a paradigm—until efficiency as such attained paradigmatic status in science in the late sixteenth century. Descartes insisted that the builder who wishes to lay a new foundation for the sciences is advised to start from the beginning and work alone, the labor of several hands, or minds, being inferior because it lacks efficiency and, above all, simplicity.[9]) The authority of the paradigm as such derives from that at which all paradigmatic concepts are aimed: namely, "what is," as a whole and in general.

Philosophy and the World-picture

The notion of the world-picture is peculiarly modern, though it has roots in ancient philosophy.[10] It rests upon two fundamental concepts. These are not "world" and "picture," as we might expect, but *idéa* and *subiectum*: the "idea" and the "subject." These notions are appropriations of the Greek terms *idéa* and *hypokeímenon*, but the modern notions differ markedly from the ancient in content.

To the Greeks, the term *idéa* initially—that is, before it was taken up by philosophers—meant the visible outline of a thing. Near the end of the fifth century B.C., the term had come to mean in philosophy the fixed and permanent structure of an entity, whether sensed or thought. We speak of "knowing" (*epistéme*) not when the thing as such but when the *idéa* exerts its influence upon the knower. Plato conceived of the *idéa* as timeless, intelligible, and paradigmatic (*Timaeus* 29B), existing in "the intelligible world" (*hò noetòs kósmos*). Even the classical atomists, who were not physical materialists,[11] regarded the fundamental ontological element, the "atomic entity," as an *idéa*.[12] *Idéa* here is still a visible, bodily shape. But shape itself is not bodily; it is the geometrical *shape of* a body. Indeed, what is significant in Democritus is not that atoms are *idéai*, but that *idéai* are *átomai*, that is, "irreducibles." Ideas are not made up of—and so cannot be reduced to—bodily elements. On the contrary, the elements are simply constellations of the geometrical "atomic ideas,"[13] or elementary shapes.

The classical Greek *idéa* was something other than our modern *obiectum*. It was not simply the over-and-against-which of thinking. To construe *idéa* as objective in this principally epistemological sense was not in the purview of Hellenic thought.[14] If the *idéa* interested Hellenic thinkers as an object of knowledge, this was because it first served as the ordering principle of entities. We cannot describe the Greek *idéa* as the mere correlate of thought, but we can describe thinking in certain Greek philosophies as the correlate of the *idéa*. Thus, Plato speaks of the *idéa* of the Good as the cause of knowing.[15] Similarly, Aristotle says, "what thinks (*nous*) is moved by what is thinkable (*noetón*)," for the thinkable is the target of desire (*orektón*).[16]

Along with the notion of *idéa*, the ancients had already conceived the notion of a support, or container, where copies of *idéai* were collected. At *Republic* 596 D & E, Plato speaks of a human craftsman who believes he is able to produce copies of anything in the cosmos. Plato belittles such pseudo-demiurgic *poiésis* (the poets are the topic of discussion) by explaining how mindlessly this could be done. "The quickest way is to carry a mirror with you everywhere; you will then quickly make the sun and things in the heavens...(etc.)." "Yes," says Glaucon, "I could make them appear, but I could not make them as they truly are."[17] The same difficulty attends copying in any sense, whether it is copying done by poets or by the cosmic craftsman himself. At *Timaeus* 49A, after a brief discourse on mirrors (46A), Plato posits a third kind of entity (*eîdos*) besides the intelligible world and its visible copy. The third thing is the "receptacle" into which copies of paradigms are received and where they take shape as the visible cosmos. He calls this receptacle the *hypodoché*, indicating "reception" or "entertainment" (as a host is said to receive and entertain guests). Plate's receptacle is a metaphor of acquiescence. The *hypodoché*, like the mirror, is capable not so much of copying as of being rendered a copy of something. In this sense, the *hypodoché* anticipates Aristotle's *hypokeímenon*, which underlies and supports attributes, qualities, or predicates (*kategoríai*). But *hypokeímenon* means not merely "that which underlies." The term means rather "that which has been laid under," hence the Latin translation *subiectum*. *Hypokeímenon* is not a metaphor of acquiescence and submission, but one of conquest, subjection, and rule.

In Aristotle's definition of *hypokeímenon* (*tò d'hypokeímenón esti kath'hou tà alla legetai, Metaphysics* 1028b 36), we can still hear the parallelism between *keímai* (to lie, to be laid) and *légein* (to lay, to lie down). Ross translates this definition as, "the substratum is that of

which everything else is predicated.''[18] But we should not overlook the juxtaposition of lying and laying in Aristotle's choice of words: literally, ''that which has been laid under (*to hypokeímenon*) is that down upon which (*kath'hou*) others are laid (*légetai*).'' And what is laid down upon what-lies-underneath is subjected to the authority of the *kategoreisthai*, apophantic judging.

Clearly, Aristotle's *hypokeímenon* is not the modern human *subiectum*. The human *subiectum* in Descartes is not so much what is judged as it is the judge, the seat of the deliberative faculty of judgment.[19] The essential difference between *hypokeímenon* and *subiectum*, however, rests on the difference between the ancient and the modern notions of *idea*. For Descartes, *idea* is a ''mode of thought,'' i.e., one of the permutations that the thinking substance, or *subiectum*, is able to sustain. By *idea*, Descartes means not what is ''viewed'' (Plato's meaning), but the ''view'' itself. What is viewed is now *obiectum*—the correlate of the *idea*, the referent of the picture.[20] The optic metaphor still governs Descartes' *idea*, but now *idea* is an *ópsis* (an act of seeing), not an *horatón* (something visible). The Greek *idéa* is what is seen; the modern *idea* is the ''view,'' the *result* of seeing. The modern *idea* is the already accomplished and therefore fixed picture of something, held within our thinking. The human *subiectum* is, accordingly, something into which ''views'' or ''representations'' are gathered and stored for ''reflection.'' The *idea* is the source of certainty, as well as of unity, in the representations which the *subiectum* contains. According to Descartes, the distinct idea is construed as necessarily true, whereas in the absence of clear and distinct ideas even the existence of the thinking entity is thrown into question.[21] For Leibniz, each free and self-determining *subiectum* is the unity of the entire cosmos, because each *subiectum* is this very cosmos itself *qua representation*. As he puts it, each *subiectum*

> stands in relations which express all the others. Whence every single substance is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.''[22]

The essence of the *subiectum*, its ''subjectivity,'' consists in its being a ''power of perception,''[23] a faculty of sight. Thus the subjectivity of the modern Subject is the consciousness that represents and pictures its object.

Hence the modern concepts of *idea* and *subiectum* represent a departure from classical metaphysics. Aristotle's *hypokeímenon* had nothing whatever to do with the human being, let alone with consciousness. The Greeks simply did not know of philosophy as the pursuit of

a worldpicture in the sense of a system of representations gathered into a *kosmoeídolon* (world-image). It is not that modernity suddenly became aware, whereas antiquity was not aware, that people have a *view* of the world. It is not that Descartes added to the world an ideational and representational supplement located in the human mind. It is rather that for moderns the world possesses its very *being* in being the *object* of representations, in being pictured. Thus for Berkeley, the being of things consists entirely in their being perceived. Berkeley's *esse est percipi* says, for our purposes, "the being of the world consists in a view of the world," or "the world is the world*view*." We hear the same thing in Schopenhauer's phrase "die Welt *als* Vorstellung." As Heidegger puts it in "The Age of the World Picture,"

> The expressions 'world-picture of the modern age' and 'modern world-picture' both mean the same thing and both assume something that never could have been before, namely, a medieval and an ancient world-picture. The world-picture does not change form an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the fact that the world becomes picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age.[24]

As Ortega expresses it,

> We cannot take as our point of departure the reality of the outside world: everything that surrounds us, all bodies including our own, are suspect in their pretension that they exist in themselves and independently of our thinking of them. But on the other hand, it cannot be doubted that all this exists in my thought, as my ideas, as *cogitationes*. The result is that the mind becomes the centre and support [i.e., the *hypokeímenon* and *subiectum*—WVR] of all reality....This system is idealism, and modern philosophy since Descartes has been idealist at root....Thought has swallowed up the world; things have turned into mere ideas.[25]

He then adds, "The superseding of idealism is the great intellectual task, the high historic mission, of our era, the theme of our time."[26]

There is hardly a philosopher of Ortega's generation who could not have uttered that last remark. But as the quote indicates, the "superseding of idealism" was for this generation a *task* and not, as it is for our generation, an accomplished fact. Of course, Ortega means by "Idealism" not German philosophy form Kant to Hegel but modern subjectivism in general. In our day, the problem of Idealism in this

sense is perhaps no longer a source of inspiration to our philosophical imaginations. But Ortega's generation thrived in the strong currents of a transitional period. Accordingly, many in his generation stood with one foot in the philosophy of the Worldpicture and the other foot outside it. Among these philosophers, Wittgenstein has figured prominently in the development of our current "paradigm consciousness." The philosophy of Wittgenstein, particularly in terms of its development, represents at once the completion of the worldpicture idea, and its displacement by a post-critical philosophy of linguistic praxis.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein has taken the view that every proposition with a sense is a picture of some state of affairs. Such a picture may be true or false depending upon whether or not it displays the structure found in the state of affairs it pictures. Although Wittgenstein does not speak in the *Tractatus* of picturing the world as such, he does speak of the "totality of true propositions." This propositional totality is equivalent to language[27] and indicates an exhaustive picturing of all that is the case. But since "the world is all that is the case,"[28] language as such is a worldpicture. In his posthumously published notes *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein remarks that a *Weltbild* is not acquired through accurate picturing; it is not fashioned by insight into its being a true or false picture of what is the case. On the contrary, insight into what is the case rests upon the substrate provided by the worldpicture. The worldpicture is "the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."[29]Here the worldpicture is something presupposed by all language. Does this mean the worldpicture is extra-linguistic?

If world-picturing is construed in the *Tractatus* as extra-linguistic, this is because for Wittgenstien the world could be thought as such and all at once—in his words, *sub specie aeterni*—in a unutterable "showing" of its logical form.

> The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside....The thing seen *sub specie aeternitatis* is the thing seen together with the whole of logical space.[30]

In the collection of notes on *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein writes,

> But it seems to me too that there is a way of capturing the world *sub specie aeterni* other than through the work of the artist. Thought has such a way—so I believe—it is as though it flies above the world and leaves it as it is—observing it from above, in flight.[31]

Here thought has the world "in mind"—an ancient motif Vollenhoven called "ennoetism."[32] Thought is regarded as a superstratum (*hyperkeímenon*), a support from above, rather than as a substratum, a support from below. In this ancient philosophical paradigm, which Wittgenstein rather faithfully represents, thought exercises no influence in the world and desires none—"How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher."[33] Nevertheless, the world coheres in the transcendental philosophical I: "I am my world."[34] Hence, the world is a world only *for* the I: "the world is *my* world."[35] The philosophical self remains hidden;[36] it is not a *thing* that thinks (*res cogitans*) such that I come across it the way I come across objects in the world.[37] The self is rather "the metaphysical subject, the *limit* of the world—not part of it."[38] Moreover, *what* this *subiectum* sees *sub specie aeterni*, it cannot say, for "what *can* be shown, *cannot* be said."[39] Where there are representations—pictures—there is language, and what language cannot picture is silently "mirrored"[40] in its logical form. Thus, logic or logical thought—the world's metaphysical *subiectum* and "transcendental"[41] limit—is a "mirror-image of the world,"[42] the "great mirror."[43] Both "picturing" and "showing" are optic metaphors, but their meanings in Wittgenstein's system are very different. By picturing, Wittgenstein means what we call "saying." But showing is something else entirely, an *opsis* of a different sort, an utterly mute *apódeixis*, or *demonstrans*.

In the later notes *On Certainty*, however, language relates to the worldpicture in a different way. Wittgenstein now conceives the possibility of making one's worldpicture the object of descriptive propositions. But the propositions describing the worldpicture are not themselves pictures in the earlier, Tractarian sense; instead they are a kind of myth.[44] Wittgenstein has switched from an optic metaphor to a narrative one. But how does he understand narrative? This is explained in another simile by which his later philosophy is better known. The propositions describing my worldview are like the rules of a game: they are learned not by examining them for their correspondence to fact but by actually employing them, the way we learn the rules of a game. Thus the worldpicture is not a picture of states of affairs, but is really a structured praxis. The propositions describing this picture have sense for us only as long as we reside in this structured praxis, as long as we play the game. And only insofar as others may be compelled or enjoined to play our language game will they see the world that we see, see it *as* we see it, and so experience the communality of a shared worldview.

Wittgenstein's distinction between the game and its rules, and between having a picture of the world and articulating it discursively, is echoed by Kuhn in his distinction between "shared paradigms" and "shared rules," which develop out of a paradigm.[45] We have it on the authority of Von Wright that Kuhn's theory of the overthrow of shared paradigms in science "is a good illustration of Wittgenstein's idea about the role of worldpictures".[46] The emphasis in both Wittgenstein and Kuhn is on epistemic, or linguistic, praxis. Though the "game" is also called a world "picture," it is clear that Wittgenstein does not emphasize *viewing* at the expense of *doing*. In fact, Wittgenstein in several places quotes Goethe's dictum, "In the beginning was the Deed."[47] For Wittgenstein, this conception of the worldpicture as *praxis* meant a crack in the mirror of the world, if not its shattering into an incommensurable plurality of language *praxes*. It therefore signaled an end to the view of philosophy as the critical, epistemological deduction (justification) of the worldpicture.

Post-subjective Philosophy and the Paradigm

French philosophy over the past twenty years has shown a remarkable ability to appropriate the work of many traditions for its own agenda. The result has been one of the more fruitful and sustained periods of something akin to "research" in philosophy in modern memory (the eighteenth-century French encyclopedists also come to mind). One of the figures currently at the forefront of French thought is Jean-François Lyotard. In his recent book, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, a work commissioned by the Conseil des Universiteés de Quebec, Lyotard offers a highly interesting analysis of knowing in contemporary societies. Drawing upon Wittgenstein's notion of the language game—which he also calls the "paradigm" or "perspective"—Lyotard seeks to highlight the essential features of post-modernity. He finds the distinguishing mark of the postmodern period in its "incredulity toward metanarratives."[48] We might also describe this as unbelief in the metaparadigm, the metaparadigm being a kind of worldview whose function according to Lyotard is to provide linguistic cohesion for the various language games disseminated in culture. We noted earlier the idea of narrative in Wittgenstein's view of *Weltbild*, which he also calls a *Mythos*. Wittgenstein's "worldpicture" is not in the first place a viewing but a linguistic (even narrative) doing. Lyotard underscores this element of praxis by speaking of the "pragmatics" of metanarrative. Metanarrative is discourse which, like all

discourse, aims at accomplishing something. Hence, the metanarrative, too, is a language game.

Like Wittgenstein, Lyotard acknowledges an indefinite plurality of irreducible language games. There is no whole of which language games are parts; they share no common ground. Indeed, they compete for territory, and they are compelled to do so by their nature. Their nature is that of a ruled activity, and its inherent problem, as we saw, lies in the impossibility of approaching its rules apart from playing the game itself. Wittgenstein introduced the notion of language games in the context of a discussion about *learning* the rules of language.[49] In Lyotard's analysis of the language game, however, the socio-epistemic problem of rules is presented in a different light. If playing the game establishes a relationship between player and rules, and if there is no other avenue of approach to rules, then language games are unable to defend the authority on which their rules are based. Or rather, if playing as such apprises us of the game's rules, then it is playing *per se* that justifies them. Attempts to legitimate a language game must take the form of playing the game. Thus Lyotard underscores a peculiar aspect of that linguistic praxis Wittgenstein called the language game: namely, the idea of playing the game *in order to defend its rules*. Play, then for Lyotard is essentially *agon*[50]—struggle and competition. Here he is not referring to the competition that exists *within* a game, i.e., between contestants playing by the same rules, but rather to the competition that exists *between* games. Linguistic competition within a game is a matter of making well-calculated or novel "moves."[51] But competition between games is something different. This difference is easily overlooked because the two kinds of competition are expressed by the same activity: the playing of a language game. But the "agnostics of language"[52] demand that new language games be developed that will legitimate existing games. These new games are Lyotard's metanarratives.

The social importance of these metagames consists in the fact that the language game is the substance of the social bond.

> I am not claiming that the *entirety* of social relations is of this nature—that will remain an open question. But there is no need to resort to some fiction of social origins to establish that language games are the minimum relation required for society to exist: even before he is born, if only by virtue of the name he is given, the human child is already positioned as the referent in a story recounted by those around him, in relation to which he will inevitably chart

his course.[53]

The power of metanarrative for effecting this bond in society as a whole, however, lies in its fiction of the Subject. Lyotard assigns this term a narrative (diegetic) meaning: every story has its hero. The linguistic essence of the Subject is that of the protagonist in the *agon* of legitimation. Like the fictional *hypokeímenon* that he is, the Subject "bears all things" for the society (language game) on whose behalf he acts. The hero of the metanarrative makes himself responsible for the social bond. He takes upon his shoulders the burden of justifying its rules.

There are several important metanarratives in our Western tradition. Lyotard cites two nineteenth-century examples: the metanarrative of speculative knowledge, which animated the philosophies and institutions (universities) of German Idealism, and the metanarrative of collective human emancipation, which has inspired radical traditions since the French Revolution. In both of these metanarratives, the narrative Subject is not the individual human being but "Spirit" and "the Proletariat," respectively. Interestingly, however, each of these metanarratives based its competence on an identification with science. This is in keeping with the modern idea that worldpictures are legitimized by an appeal to theoretical thought. Yet, any such appeal to science by the metanarrative is vain, according to Lyotard, since science must in turn appeal to metanarrative for its legitimation. Science—whose game has been determined since Plato as dialogue—has repeatedly fallen short of legitimating itself, because it has committed the error of importing metanarrative into its own discourse and disguising it as part of science. As Lyotard says,

> The fact is that the Platonic discourse that inaugurates science [e.g., the allegory of the Cave] is not scientific, precisely to the extent that it attempts to legitimate science. Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all. Without such recourse it would be in a position of presupposing its own validity and would be stooping to what it condemns: begging the question, proceeding on prejudice. But does it not fall into the same trap by using narrative as its authority?[54]

Yes it does, because the narrative game in the end is always a matter of appeal, of petition for acquiescence, and hence of presupposing:

"...there is no other proof that the rules [of science] are good than the consensus extended to them by the experts."[55] The rules of a science, which make it possible to judge its statements true or false, belong to a game that differs from these statements themselves. The language game in which these rules are presented and legitimated is a request, or petition.[56] In Lyotard's estimation, however, science is itself unable to bear the responsibility for articulating this petition because the pragmatics of science lie entirely within the realm of denotation and are isolated on principle from the pragmatics of other, especially prescriptive, games.

> Scientific knowledge requires that one language game, denotion, be retained and all others excluded.[57]

That alone which is able to gather, bear up under, and support these rules—the *hypokeímenon* or *subiectum* who takes responsibility for them—is the fictional Subject of the metanarrative.

This Subject is not a human being, according to Lyotard. In the human personality, in the "self," he finds no subjectivity: that is, no universality, centrality, or stability to ground the world or life in society—no anchor for a *meta*narrative. "Each of us knows that our *self* does not amount to much."[58] The "self" is a locus in which we find a lack, rather than that surplus the modern notion of subjectivity leads us to expect. But this awareness of the self's deficiency is not the result of a "loss of subjectivity." For the Subject cannot turn up missing where it never was in the first place. Where the Subject has been is, of course, at the heroic but fictive center of the metanarrative. The "self," on the other hand, is and always has been merely a sender and receiver of messages, a player of language games. Where the player stands or plays is determined not by some supposed subjectivity-to-the-world, an alleged *a priori* centrality for man. The place of the self, on the contrary, is eccentric and changes with the course of the language game.

> One is always located at a post through which various kinds of messages pass...the messages that traverse and position him at the post of sender, addressee, or referent.[59]

We might say that the ethos of the spectator of games—the role in which Pythagoras cast the Philosopher—is here exchanged for the ethos of the participant in games. Hence, the world as *picture* disappears from view and re-emerges as an incommensurable plurality of *ways of speech*. There can be no totality to this new world because the

center around which it is spun is really an infinity of nodal points in the vast nexus of the language game. We might unthinkingly describe this attitude as a "subjectivization" of the world, the way we are accustomed to construe Nietzsche's saying:

> It is of cardinal importance that one should abolish the *true* world. It is the great inspirer of doubt and devaluation in respect of the world *we are*.[60]

But Nietzsche already saw that the "we" which "we are" is not "subjective" in the proper sense, and that the nihilism of worldviews and perspectives is not a victory *of* but a victory *over* the Subject. As he says,

> Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—"There are only *facts*"—I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want such a thing. "Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is....In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is *interpretable* otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings—"Perspectivism."[61]

Nietzsche concludes, "My hypothesis: the subject as multiplicity."[62]

Along similar lines, Lyotard speaks of

> ...that severe reexamination which postmodernity imposes on the thought of the Enlightenment, on the idea of a unitary end of history and of a subject.[63]

In the interests of this reexamination of modernity, Lyotard seeks a new linguistic praxis aimed at delegitimating existing language games. Lyotard describes delegitimation as "paralogy," a strategy of "anti-model pragmatics,"[64] a form of linguistic civil disobedience vis-a-vis the dominant language games and metagames in society. Lyotard describes the dominant game in most advanced, modern societies as marked by "the pragmatics of performance."[65] This language game is totalitarian to an unprecedented degree, and Lyotard calls its pragmatics "terrorist."[66] What is needed above all, according to Lyotard, are strategies for undermining the terror of the "system." The first requirement is that we make knowledge of language games as such a goal within the system.

> A recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language games...implies a renunciation of terror, which assumes that they are isomorphic and tries to make them so.[67]

By antimodel pragmatics, Lyotard does not mean an attempt to *escape* the influence of all models and paradigms. Rather he means a form of *research* dedicated to revealing paradoxes in existing games and aimed at petitioning the research-consuming public to accept the validity of other possible models. Hence, Lyotard sees the growing awareness in the post-modern world of irreducible language games and perspectives as a significant and hopeful sign. To be sure, there is a tragic element to the break-up of the great modern metanarratives, and to the subsequent scattering of the heroic Subject. But there is no nostalgia in Lyotard's view. The recognition of langauge games and the development of anarchic antimodel pragmatics simply amounts to resistance against those terrorist linguistic practices that have ensconced themselves in the legitimation space left empty by the disappearance of modern metagames. This resistance signifies the desire for a paralogical pluralization of games,[68] in addition to dissent against the "outmoded and suspect value" of consensus.[69]

Paralogy and its antimodel pragmatics are presented by Lyotard as a secularized science, cut off from narrative and rooted only in a paradigm of catastrophe.[70] This game does involve a kind of "interest" and it does, therefore, intervene. Nevertheless, paralogical research is a *neutral* praxis, committed to no existing paradigm, speaking on behalf of no position, and lacking the desire to be gathered into a unifying and orienting subjectivity. Paralogy is research that has been purified of rationale, agenda, and goal.

The interests of Lyotard's standpoint-neutral but praxis-interventionist game lie not so much in dismantling and scattering the Subject as in resisting the totalitarian and terroristic regime of performativity with its stable, systemic balance of input and output. Indeed, Lyotard argues, there is no need to scatter the Subject or demythologize the modern metanarrative since "the seeds of delegitimation and nihilism were inherent in the grand narratives of the nineteenth century."[71] What Lyotard means by paralogy is the historiographical research that intervenes in order to bring such points to light. For this movement represents not only the presence of research in philosophy; it represents the presence among the sciences of philosophy *as* research. Research involves the contribution and relevance of philosophy to its public, a relationship manifested in the way philosophy engenders and maintains its paradigms. This recalls ground covered in earlier sections of this

paper. But something peculiar has occurred when philosophy relates to the public and to the paradigm in the shape of scientific research. For philosophy then has as much interest in deconstructing as in constructing paradigms. For the mark of fruitful research is not only its effectiveness in answering questions but also its effectiveness in raising new questions for further research. As Heidegger notes, an essential feature of research is its character as an on-going activity.[72] This seemingly trivial point is of great significance in the present context, for as an institution research must be carried *out* in such a way that it can be carried *on*. The well-planned and well-executed research project succeeds, by the very manner in which it completes its agenda, in raising new questions and placing them on a new agenda. Hence, says Lyotard,

> ...the pragmatics of scientific research, especially in its search for new methods of argumentation, emphasizes the invention of new 'moves' and even new rules for language games.[73]

This emphasis on research, and the conception of research as the opening up of new possibilities, is intended as a departure from every classical (modern) idea of science. Lyotard views the pragmatics of postmodern science as a search for "instabilities," "counter-examples," "paradox," "the unintelligible," and "catastrophe."[74] Like every science, however, postmodern research must face the question of legitimation. And in Lyotard's view this science is able to do what classical modern science was not, that is, address the problem of legitimation on its own initiative and out of its own resources *as research*. This is a reversal of the classical view. Both Positivism and classical Idealism shared the supposition that science or research is structurally unable to take up its own legitimation. It was the Idealist tradition, in fact, that persuaded the nineteenth century that science as such is "positive," meaning uncritical and unreflective.[75] Postmodern research, which is beyond this supposition, is in that measure beyond Positivism. Therefore, it does not disclaim the pragmatics of legitimation, but wishes to show itself competent to do what modern philosophy proved unable to do. Hence, this research is "post-philosophical." But this is not because it suspends the question of the paradigm—as Positivism was forced to when it clung to Idealism's positive conception of submetaphysical science—but because it approaches the paradigm in the interests of destabilizing it. In terms of this interest, paralogical research can and must justify itself to the postmodern public. To do this, it need only bear fruit—that is, it must lead

not to practical results but to further research.

This raises the issue of the relation of philosophy to its public, for only research that perpetuates itself in this sense is fundable, and in the postmodern world the fundability of research is the unimpeachable measure of its value. But the pursuit of philosophy as research raises the question of philosophy's relation to its public in yet another way. For this conception of research throws into a crisis the very idea of philosophical leadership. Philosophy *qua* research must adopt a radically innovative stance toward the paradigm. As described earlier, the paradigm is sought by philosophy as the theoretical schema that surrounds, directs, and justifies science *qua* research. Research requires, but cannot produce, paradigms. The decisions that render problems "important," thereby placing them on the agenda of research in the first place, are philosophical-paradigmatic decisions. But when philosophy sets about its paradigmatic business—its task of legitimating science (Lyotard)—*after the fashion of research itself*, then there can be no resting in the foundation provided by any paradigm. As research that is by nature on-going, the paradigm/foundation (and not merely its discipling/edifice) must continually undergo excavation carried on by historiographical science. The function of that research is the sort of unbuilding and unfounding that aims in principle at keeping *all paradigmatic possibilities open*.

Conclusion

Our contemporary philosophical leadership has greeted the philosophy of French Post-structuralism, which Lyotard in part represents, with suspicion treating it as a fad. Undoubtedly it is a fad, among other things. But what does this fad signify? In my view, the faddishness of this movement suggests a shift is taking place in the relationship between philosophy and its public. Suspicion that the new approach is merely a fad may conceal the leadership's resentment against pressure from the public to place "relevant" questions on its research agenda, whereas the new approach has responded positively to this pressure. Perhaps the leadership's resentment is well founded inasmuch as our modern philosophical public has never understood the difference between what is essential to philosophy and what is called "research," so that the success and productivity of the former has been measured by the latter's standard of marketability. Perhaps this resentment is aimed not so much against the existence of a philosophical constituency whom philosophers must take care to address, but is merely a

refusal by the leadership to allow a demagogic band of "contras" to play havoc with the community and its tradition.

On the other hand, perhaps it is the philosophical public that feels resentment. Perhaps this is a resentment directed, not against the existence of a philosophical leadership, but against its traditional claims to a privileged and metaparadigmatic knowing—First Philosophy—capable of legitimating worldviews, thus governing the latter's effect upon culture. Perhaps it is this public resentment against Metaphysics that animates the approach of Lyotard. The metanarrative of Metaphysics, after all, did not die with Hegel; even Comte presented positive science as a First Philosophy.[76] Perhaps Lyotard's approach means that someone is speaking out on behalf of ideological victims in the philosophical community. In any case, the historical interests of this community would be poorly served, and its social constitution equally undermined, by antimodel anarchism in its leadership as well as by philosophical democratism in its public.

The book in which Lyotard presents the new pragmatics of postmodern science—in spite of its appearance of being a research document ("A Report on Knowledge") solicited by a funding institution (the Government of Quebec)—is in fact itself a narrative petitioning its audience to accept and legitimate its research model. What are Lyotard's real intentions in taking up this, let us say, Nietzschean narrative whose Hero-Subject is the Man who overcomes Man? Lyotard's analysis depends upon this narrative, yet he cannot make himself responsible for it. The practice of paralogy should reveal the self-delegitimation of this *mythos*. But here the power of Lyotard's research-inspired meta-unbelief falls into decidedly uncritical and un-postmodern belief. Can paralogical research allow this metanarrative to condition its discourse? Should it not require even this myth to be deconstructed? Lyotard would say, of course, that Nietzsche's narrative is not a *meta*narrative, and so aims neither at the unification, not at the legitimation, of other games. One can almost hear sighs of relief. For this means the lifting of a tremendous burden of responsibility from the shoulders of science, a burden early modern thought felt itself capable of supporting, thus casting itself in the heroic role of *Philosophy*, the ultimate "Subject" of modern metanarrative. Lyotard reduces the business of legitimation to science once again, and, moreover, to a science that need not bear the weight of a metadiscourse since it is in turn reduced to *research*, a "gay science" that has been relieved and purified of seriousness about the paradigm.

How, then, does postmodern research legitimate its paradigm?

Lyotard answers:

> The function of paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is to point out metaprescriptives (science's ''presuppositions'') and to petition the players to accept different ones. The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements.[77]

But isn't this merely another narrative of performativity, a promise of infinite fecundity and enrichment? What finally validates rules—especially the rules of postmodern research—is the promise of paralogy: not merely new theories but new logics, and therefore the promise of endless alternative paradigms. This is science gone to market in a big way—that is, as an industry—bent on satisfying if possible the infinite, mass desire for the new and for seeing things in a new way: philosophy as vision quest, research as hallucinogen. It is difficult to distinguish this industry from entertainment. And one fails to see what is so *post*-modern about research conducted in the ''columbian'' spirit of exploration, fueled, as always, by the desire not for justice (as Lyotard claims), but for colonization of the unknown.

Footnotes

1. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 15.
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. M. Cowan (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1962), 32.
3. See José Ortega Y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957).
4. Herbert Schnädelbach, *Philosophie in Deutschland 1831-1933* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983), 123-128.
5. Richard Rorty, ''Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture'' and ''Philosophy in America Today'' in *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 60-70, 211-232.
6. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 69ff.
7. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 271-2, and 310ff.
8. Paul Natorp, *Platon's Ideelehre* (Leipzig, 1902).
9. René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur

(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1960), 10.
10. Martin Heidegger, ''The Age of the World Picture'' in *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 115-154.
11. Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Though*, trans. D. Freeman and H. de Jongste (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 3:7-9.
12. Democritus, Fragment B 141, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz (Verlag Weidmann, 1975), DK II, 170, 3.
13. Democritus, A 57, DK II, 98, 34ff.
14. D.H.T. Vollenhoven means something else entirely in calling Democritus an ''objectivist'' at *Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte I* (Franeker: T. Wever, 1959), 378-388.
15. *Republic* 508 E.
16. *Metaphysics* 1072a 30.
17. *Plato's Republic*, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974), 241.
18. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 785.
19. René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1960), 117.
20. ''Among my thoughts some are like images of objects, and it is to these alone that the name of 'idea' properly applies, as when I picture to myself a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God himself.'' Ibid.
21. ''So I judged that I could accept as a general rule that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are always true.'' *Discourse*, part 2, 25.
22. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays*, trans. P. Schrecker and A. Schrecker (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), Section 56, 157.
23. Ibid., Section 48, 135.
24. Heidegger, 130.
25. José Ortega Y Gasset, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. M. Adams (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), 152.
26. Ibid., 183.
27. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (New York: The Humanities, 1961), 4.001.
28. Ibid., 1.
29. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, trans. D. Paul and G.E.M.

Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), Section 94.
30. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 7.10.16.
31. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, trans. P. Winch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 5e.
32. Vollenhoven, 326ff.
33. *Tractatus*, 6.432.
34. Ibid., 5.63.
35. Ibid., 5.62.
36. Ibid., 5.6331. Also, *Notebooks*, 4.8.16.
37. "I objectively confront every object. But not the I." (*Notebooks*, 11.8.16) "The I is not an object." (Ibid., 7.8.16) "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas." (*Tractatus*, 5.631)
38. *Tractatus*, 5.641.
39. Ibid., 4.1212.
40. Ibid., 4.121.
41. Ibid., 6.13.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 5.11.
44. *On Certainty*, Sections 95 and 97.
45. Kuhn, 43.
46. G. Von Wright, *Wittgenstein* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 180-181.
47. *On Certainty*, Section 412; *Culture and Value*, 31.
48. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Conditions: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington and G. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv.
49. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), Section 23.
50. Lyotard, 10.
51. Ibid., 38.
52. Ibid., 10.
53. Ibid., 15.
54. Ibid., 29.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 65.
57. Ibid., 25.
58. Ibid., 60.
59. Ibid., 15.
60. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will To Power*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: H. Regnery, 1968), Section 583, 312.

61. Ibid., Section 481, 267.
62. Ibid., Section 490, 270.
63. Lyotard, 73.
64. Ibid., 64.
65. Ibid., 3-6.
66. Ibid., 63.
67. Ibid., 66.
68. Ibid., 60-67.
69. Ibid., 66.
70. Ibid., 59ff.
71. Ibid., 38.
72. Heidegger, 124ff.
73. Lyotard, 53.
74. Ibid., 54.
75. Ibid., 38-39.
76. Auguste Comte, *Introduction to Positive Philosophy*, trans. F. Ferre (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 45.
77. Lyotard, 65.