The question of how music relates to our existence as ethical beings has not always elicited the same response. For much of the twentieth century, the relation between music and ethics was addressed from the angle of music's autonomy. Music was fenced off from society so that it might better fulfill its own internal demands. Thus, in answer to the question whether music has, or should have, an ethical dimension, the predominating philosophical answer of the twentieth century was solidly negative. The article that follows, a response to this negative point of view, reproduces a panel discussion that took place in April 2010 during a conference entitled "Songs of Love and Sorrow: Re-Engaging the Social Ethics of Music." Co-organized by the Institute for Christian Studies, the Toronto School of Theology, and the Royal Conservatory of Music, the conference attempted to bring to the musical arts a concern to re-evaluate the social significance of artistic experience and practice. Though not argued like an essay, the article highlights significant themes about the relationship of music to ethics, including the innately social character of music, its possible effect on our behaviour, the potential social content of sound itself, the positive social effect of music's ambiguity, the need to break down the barriers between music practitioners and interpreters, the role communities might play in sponsoring the work of musicians, and the possible compatibility between music's formal requirements and its potential for social engagement.

This paper will examine the pedagogy of the exemplary vignette as a means of "mass" identity formation within the Dominican Order and among its far flung support­ers. In the process, I make the case that Cistercian Conrad of Eberbach's earlier Exor­dium Magnum provided a model for a Dominican "memory" and the identity that shared memory was to ensure.

Hugo Meynell objects to the apparent fideism and anti-foundationalism of Herman Dooyeweerd's philosophy. In response, my essay explicates the historical setting and logical structure to Dooyeweerd's "transcendental critique of theoretical thought." His transcendental critique seeks to uncover the "religious root" of philosophy and of other academic disciplines. Given Dooyeweerd's notion of religion and his account of theoretical thought, I show that Meynell's criticisms are misplaced. Yet they point toward fundamental problems in Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique. Some problems pertain to the logic of Dooyeweerd’s argument, and others to his notion of religion. I explain these problems and indicate how they should be addressed.