Hugo Meynell objects to the apparent fideism and anti-foundationalism of Herman Dooyeweerd's philosophy. In response, my essay explicates the historical setting and logical structure to Dooyeweerd's "transcendental critique of theoretical thought." His transcendental critique seeks to uncover the "religious root" of philosophy and of other academic disciplines. Given Dooyeweerd's notion of religion and his account of theoretical thought, I show that Meynell's criticisms are misplaced. Yet they point toward fundamental problems in Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique. Some problems pertain to the logic of Dooyeweerd’s argument, and others to his notion of religion. I explain these problems and indicate how they should be addressed.

Contemporary philosophical stances toward ‘artistic truth’ derive from Kant’s aesthetics. Whereas philosophers who share Kant’s emphasis on aesthetic validity discount art’s capacity for truth, philosophers who share Hegel’s critique of Kant render artistic truth inaccessible. This essay proposes a critical hermeneutic account of aesthetic validity that supports a non-esoteric notion of artistic truth. Using Gadamer and Adorno to read Kant through Hegelian eyes, I reconstruct the aesthetic dimension from three polarities in modern Western societies. Then I describe aesthetic validity as an horizon of imaginative cogency governing the exploration, presentation and creative interpretation of aesthetic signs. The essay argues that aesthetic processes, so construed, are crucial to cultural pathfinding, and that aesthetic validity-claims in art talk contribute significantly to this pursuit. Aesthetic validity, cultural orientation and art talk constitute the hermeneutical matrix from which questions of artistic truth emerge.