This paper is a study of the pre-Socratic, Milesian philosopher Anaximander, in light of the question concerning the rise of philosophy and its relation to myth in the sixth century B.C. We are restricting our inquiry to Anaximander to make our consideration of the myth/philosophy relation more manageable. Thus we will assume that Anaximander's thought is indicative of the general status of this relationship in his time and milieu. We chose Anaximander also because of the great diversity of interpretations of his thought in current pre-Socratic scholarship. Differences in approach to Anaximander reflect differences concerning the nature of pre-Socratic thought in general. Differences with regard to the pre-Socratics in turn reflect ultimate assumptions as to the nature of philosophy and the historical circumstances in which it arose. Therefore, a considerable part of our study will concern itself with the major Anaximander-interpretations in the literature, their key assumptions and their relationships to existing traditions in pre-Socratic research. This part of the study will be carried out in preparation for our own interpretation of Anaximander and the relation between myth and philosophy visible in his thought. The latter will be conducted in dialogue with the other interpretations and with a conscious awareness of its own hermeneutical assumptions.

In this thesis I attempt to develop an alternative to the logical positivist's image of science, which attempts to exclude beliefs from scientific investigations. First I set the problem up by describing what the positivists mean by belief and how they attempt to exclude belief through the use of the scientific method. I begin to develop an alternative by examining the views of three philosophers of science: Thomas S. Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and Gerard Radnitzky. Each of them provides an alternative to the positivistic conception of science by suggesting that scientific research is surrounded by a framework of tacit beliefs. I present each view in the following way. First I describe the background and context for the framework hypothesis; then I explain the framework itself, including discussions on the nature of the framework, how it is acquired, its role in visible scientific activity, and how switches from one framework to another occur; finally I assess each person's insights, including each's relevance for my thesis. The examination of these views sets the stage for my last chapter. Here I briefly compare the three thinkers, noting similarities and differences. Then I highlight each thinker's unique insights. Finally, I present a brief description of what I believe is a viable alternative to the positivistic image of science, based on the work of the three philosophers.