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dc.contributor.advisorHoff, Shannonen_GB
dc.contributor.authorMorrisey, Jeffrey James
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-07T19:22:22Z
dc.date.availableNO_RESTRICTION
dc.date.issued2012-05
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10756/271444
dc.description.abstractDrawing on the ideas of J.G. Fichte and M. Merleau-Ponty, I argue that experience and freedom are intersubjective, linguistic, and bodily. In the first chapter, I take up Fichte's three "fundamental principles" from the Science of Knowledge alongside his ideas of embodiment and intersubjectivity from the Foundations of Natural Right to show that all experience is an indefinite mixture of self and not-self, and, therefore, that both the experiences of self-consciousness and its freedom must also be accomplished with reference to the not-self, and particularly others. The second chapter is an examination of Merleau-Ponty's account of expression in his Phenomenology of Perception. The key insight I pursue here is that the medium of expression, which makes possible all significance, is bodily and intersubjective, and that any expressive act is therefore both self-opaque and soliciting cooperation. In the end, I turn to how this cooperation, i.e. freedom, should be enacted.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.rightsAttribution, NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subjectFichte, Johann Gottleib, 1762-1814en_GB
dc.subjectMerleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961en_GB
dc.subjectExperienceen_GB
dc.subjectFreedomen_GB
dc.subjectPerception (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subjectSelf (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subject.lcshFichte, Johann Gottleib, 1762-1814. Science of Knowledgeen_GB
dc.subject.lcshFichte, Johann Gottleib, 1762-1814. Foundations of Natural Righten_GB
dc.subject.lcshMerleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961. Phenomenology of Perceptionen_GB
dc.subject.lcshExperienceen_GB
dc.subject.lcshFreedomen_GB
dc.subject.lcshPerception (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subject.lcshSelf (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.titleSpeaking Bodies: Communication and Freedom in Fichte and Merleau-Pontyen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.type.degreetitleMaster of Arts (Philosophy)
dc.rights.holderThis Work has been made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws of Canada without the written authority from the copyright owner.en_GB
refterms.dateFOA2018-03-05T12:54:34Z
html.description.abstractDrawing on the ideas of J.G. Fichte and M. Merleau-Ponty, I argue that experience and freedom are intersubjective, linguistic, and bodily. In the first chapter, I take up Fichte's three "fundamental principles" from the Science of Knowledge alongside his ideas of embodiment and intersubjectivity from the Foundations of Natural Right to show that all experience is an indefinite mixture of self and not-self, and, therefore, that both the experiences of self-consciousness and its freedom must also be accomplished with reference to the not-self, and particularly others. The second chapter is an examination of Merleau-Ponty's account of expression in his Phenomenology of Perception. The key insight I pursue here is that the medium of expression, which makes possible all significance, is bodily and intersubjective, and that any expressive act is therefore both self-opaque and soliciting cooperation. In the end, I turn to how this cooperation, i.e. freedom, should be enacted.


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