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dc.contributor.advisorKuipers, Ronald A.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorEuverman, Ryan M.
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-03T15:27:43Z
dc.date.available2013-05-03T15:27:43Z
dc.date.availableNO_RESTRICTIONen_GB
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10756/288466
dc.description.abstractThis thesis explores and makes explicit various aspects of Richard Rorty's rhetorical program for shifting our traditional conceptions of reference and truth. Rorty wants to persuade us to adopt verification (coping) semantics in place of correspondence seeking semantics. I argue against his intuition pumps by considering Keith Donnellan's remarks on description and reference and argue for a view of correspondence truth that is based on what the object, whatever the object, permits us to say. Making this point allows us to see a purposeful conflation in Rorty's work. If beliefs are true because they are justified, Rorty's fallibilistic remark that any of our beliefs may not be true (in the cautionary sense) would follow. But truths may pay because they follow (as "attributive representations") from 'unblocked' objects, or they may just pay. Thus, I suggest that Donnellan preserves William James' remark that we desire correspondence truth, an everyday explanatory notion.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/thesescanada/vol2/002/MR69340.PDFen_GB
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.subjectRorty, Richarden_GB
dc.subjectReference (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subjectTruthen_GB
dc.subjectIntuitionen_GB
dc.subjectDonnellan, Keith S.en_GB
dc.subject.lcshRorty, Richard--Philosophyen_GB
dc.subject.lcshReference (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subject.lcshTruth--Philosophyen_GB
dc.subject.lcshIntuitionen_GB
dc.titlePumping Intuitions and Making Practice Different: Richard Rorty's 'Intuitive' Account of Reference and Truthen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.type.degreetitleMaster of Arts (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.rights.holderThis Work has been made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws of Canada without the written authority from the copyright owner.en_GB
html.description.abstractThis thesis explores and makes explicit various aspects of Richard Rorty's rhetorical program for shifting our traditional conceptions of reference and truth. Rorty wants to persuade us to adopt verification (coping) semantics in place of correspondence seeking semantics. I argue against his intuition pumps by considering Keith Donnellan's remarks on description and reference and argue for a view of correspondence truth that is based on what the object, whatever the object, permits us to say. Making this point allows us to see a purposeful conflation in Rorty's work. If beliefs are true because they are justified, Rorty's fallibilistic remark that any of our beliefs may not be true (in the cautionary sense) would follow. But truths may pay because they follow (as "attributive representations") from 'unblocked' objects, or they may just pay. Thus, I suggest that Donnellan preserves William James' remark that we desire correspondence truth, an everyday explanatory notion.


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