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dc.contributor.advisorHoff, Shannonen_GB
dc.contributor.authorRichard, Bryan Samuel
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-11T15:34:28Z
dc.date.available2014-06-11T15:34:28Z
dc.date.issued2013-09-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10756/320798
dc.description.abstractThis thesis pays attention to the nature of human being that comes to light in Martin Heidegger's Being and Time. In particular, it attempts to show that his notion of authenticity allows for a distinctive and fruitful conception of ethical responsibility, albeit one that challenges us to rethink ethics and responsibility anew. I claim that if authenticity is ‘owning’ one's existence in a way that is properly fitted to Dasein's ontological way of being (as nonself-identical, ecstatic temporality), this ownership of self will necessarily be the stance of recognizing and responding to that which always already includes a network of relations involving world and others. On such an understanding, genuine existential care for oneself is also care for others in the most originary way possible. Such an ontological picture has been criticized by some commentators as being too formal, insufficiently historical, and lacking genuine mediation – in short, for being ineffectual as a normative force in real-life situations. The main contribution of this thesis is to argue against such an interpretation by showing that Heideggerian authenticity is a properly dialectical concept, capacious enough to account for the legitimate concerns raised by such criticisms, while also being productive for new articulations of what is really normative about human relations.
dc.description.tableofcontentsIntroduction -- Pt.I. Owning existence: authenticity -- Human meaning: the what of existence -- Human identity: the who of existence -- Pt.II. Owning one's existence: authentic responsibility -- Human responsibility -- Conclusion: Authentic responsibilityen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licenseen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_GB
dc.subjectHeidegger, Martin, 1889-1976en_GB
dc.subjectHeidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Sein und Zeiten_GB
dc.subjectAuthenticityen_GB
dc.subjectSelf (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subjectHuman relationsen_GB
dc.subjectIdentityen_GB
dc.subjectResponsibilityen_GB
dc.subject.lcshSelf (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subject.lcshHeidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Sein und Zeiten_GB
dc.subject.lcshAuthenticity (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.subject.lcshInterpersonal relationsen_GB
dc.subject.lcshIdentityen_GB
dc.subject.lcshResponsibilityen_GB
dc.titleOw(n)ing Existence: Human Meaning, Identity and Responsibility in Heidegger's Being and Timeen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.type.degreetitleMaster of Arts (Philosophy)en_GB
dc.rights.holderThis Work has been made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws of Canada without the written authority from the copyright owner.en_GB
refterms.dateFOA2018-03-05T13:09:55Z
html.description.abstractThis thesis pays attention to the nature of human being that comes to light in Martin Heidegger's Being and Time. In particular, it attempts to show that his notion of authenticity allows for a distinctive and fruitful conception of ethical responsibility, albeit one that challenges us to rethink ethics and responsibility anew. I claim that if authenticity is ‘owning’ one's existence in a way that is properly fitted to Dasein's ontological way of being (as nonself-identical, ecstatic temporality), this ownership of self will necessarily be the stance of recognizing and responding to that which always already includes a network of relations involving world and others. On such an understanding, genuine existential care for oneself is also care for others in the most originary way possible. Such an ontological picture has been criticized by some commentators as being too formal, insufficiently historical, and lacking genuine mediation – in short, for being ineffectual as a normative force in real-life situations. The main contribution of this thesis is to argue against such an interpretation by showing that Heideggerian authenticity is a properly dialectical concept, capacious enough to account for the legitimate concerns raised by such criticisms, while also being productive for new articulations of what is really normative about human relations.


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