Brandom and Hegel on Objectivity, Subjectivity and Sociality: A Tune Beyond Us, Yet Ourselves

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dc.contributor.advisorZuidervaart, Lamberten_GB
dc.contributor.advisorKoslowski, P.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorDeMoor, Michael James
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-16T17:44:03Z
dc.date.available2013-05-16T17:44:03Z
dc.date.availableNO_RESTRICTIONen_GB
dc.date.issued2011-07
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation is an exposition and critique of Robert Brandom's theory of discursive objectivity. It discusses this theory both within the context of Brandom's own systematic philosophical project and, in turn, within the ideas and questions characteristic of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition in German philosophy. It is argued that Brandom's attempt to articulate a theory of the objectivity of discursive norms (and hence also of the content of discursive attitudes) resembles J.G. Fichte's development of themes central to Kant's philosophy. This "Fichtean" approach to the problem of objectivity is then compared and contrasted to that of G.W.F. Hegel. Though Brandom, Fichte and Hegel share the desire to derive an account of the conditions of objectivity from the social character is discursive practices, Hegel offers a version of this project that differs with respect to the nature of self-consciousness, sociality and truth. It is then argued that Brandom's theory suffers significant internal inconsistencies that could be avoided by adopting a more "Hegelian" approach to these three themes. More specifically, Brandom's own project requires that he recognize the necessity and irreducibility of firstperson and second-person discursive attitudes, as well as that he recognize the role of "I-We" social practices for discursive objectivity. Furthermore, he must include in his explanations some form of natural teleology and hence he must abandon his deflationary approach to semantic explanation. However, Brandom's methodological and metaphysical commitments prevent him from doing so.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10756/292268
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherInstitute for Christian Studiesen_GB
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
dc.rights.holderThis Work has been made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws of Canada without the written authority from the copyright owner.en_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0
dc.subjectBrandom, Roberten_GB
dc.subjectHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831en_GB
dc.subjectObjectivityen_GB
dc.subjectSubjectivityen_GB
dc.subject.classificationHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831en_GB
dc.subject.lcshBrandom, Roberten_GB
dc.subject.lcshObjectivityen_GB
dc.subject.lcshSubjectivityen_GB
dc.titleBrandom and Hegel on Objectivity, Subjectivity and Sociality: A Tune Beyond Us, Yet Ourselvesen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.type.degreetitleConjoint Ph.D. by the Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto and the VU University Amsterdamen_GB
html.description.abstractThis dissertation is an exposition and critique of Robert Brandom's theory of discursive objectivity. It discusses this theory both within the context of Brandom's own systematic philosophical project and, in turn, within the ideas and questions characteristic of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition in German philosophy. It is argued that Brandom's attempt to articulate a theory of the objectivity of discursive norms (and hence also of the content of discursive attitudes) resembles J.G. Fichte's development of themes central to Kant's philosophy. This "Fichtean" approach to the problem of objectivity is then compared and contrasted to that of G.W.F. Hegel. Though Brandom, Fichte and Hegel share the desire to derive an account of the conditions of objectivity from the social character is discursive practices, Hegel offers a version of this project that differs with respect to the nature of self-consciousness, sociality and truth. It is then argued that Brandom's theory suffers significant internal inconsistencies that could be avoided by adopting a more "Hegelian" approach to these three themes. More specifically, Brandom's own project requires that he recognize the necessity and irreducibility of firstperson and second-person discursive attitudes, as well as that he recognize the role of "I-We" social practices for discursive objectivity. Furthermore, he must include in his explanations some form of natural teleology and hence he must abandon his deflationary approach to semantic explanation. However, Brandom's methodological and metaphysical commitments prevent him from doing so.
refterms.dateFOA2018-03-05T12:53:51Z
thesis.degree.grantorInstitute for Christian Studiesen
thesis.degree.namePh. D.en
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